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ABSTRACT 
'Shall Australia be a sheep-run or a nation?', asked nationalists after the First 
World War. While this sentiment was not new, the war created an atmosphere in 
which the equation of nationhood with greater industrial self-sufficiency complemented 
the federal government's economic aims. Woollen manufacture proved ideally suited as 
a centre-piece in the campaign to promote local manufacture. Failure to develop the 
country's best known national export - wool - threatened to incline Australia more 
towards being a metaphoric sheep-run than an independent nation. Such apprehensions 
assisted in woollen manufacture becoming one of the sentimental icons in the push to 
industrialise. This work focuses primarily upon the establishment of two British 
woollen manufacturers, Kelsall & Kemp and Patons & Baldwins, whose foundation 
derived from the relationship between economic policy and Australian nationality. 
Concentration is upon the period between World War I and the Depression. During 
this period Australia's woollen industry made a successful transition from holding a 
minor domestic market share to being pre-eminent within the Australian market. The 
thesis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive study of the two companies even 
during the period emphasised. It rather examines how these companies' experiences 
relate to the broader concerns and practicalities of industrial development. It also 
explores how closely reality mirrored industrialisation's promises, as well as and the 
associated benefits and costs. Symbolic of the contradictions characterising the 1920s 
were attempts to achieve greater industrial self-sufficiency through the attraction of 
companies controlled outside Australia. The influences of external control at Kelsall & 
Kemp and Patons & Baldwins were evident during these companies' establishment 
phase. The repercussions of direct foreign investment, however, become increasingly 
apparent in the late twentieth century. To demonstrate the progression of ideas, values 
and policies within Australia, the thesis' final chapter surveys the period since 1930. 
For decades the hopes of the 1920s seemed on the way to fulfilment, but more recently 
that prospect has diminished. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Australian protective system ... is based on a growing nationalism, intense and rather 
conscious, which expresses itself in the cry 'Australia for the Australians', in the belief 
that the country is better than any other land, and in the desire to have a national army, 
navy, manufactures and culture. 'Shall Australia be a sheep-run or a nation?' asks a 
leading protectionist publication almost every week. From this desire for economic 
nationhood comes the desire to be self-sufficing, self contained. 1 
Encouragement of greater self-sufficiency in the name of Australian nationalism had 
prevailed around the island continent since the nineteenth century.2 An upsurge of 
patriotism associated with World War I provided much impetus to such ideas. The war 
highlighted Australia's vulnerability as a country largely reliant upon imports of 
manufactured goods. Transportation difficulties and domestic needs had seen Britain, 
long Australia's most significant source of imports, unable to meet Australian demand 
during the conflict. Much of the resultant shortfall was taken up by alternative 
suppliers, particularly the United States and Japan, but there were also opportunities 
for Australian manufacturers. Despite problems procuring the necessary capital, 
equipment, and skilled labour, many manufacturers profited greatly, few more so than 
the woollen industry. With the textile industry returning over 31 % on investment 
capital between 1915 and 1917,3 the war demonstrated Australia's potential for 
industrial development. These industrial successes also helped prove what nationalists 
had long maintained, that Australia was capable of being more than just a primary 
producer, feeding and enriching British industry. Such views had been given further 
credence by long-standing neo-classical visions of empire in which the evolution from 
agricultural to more commercially sophisticated societies was seen as the natural 
course of social and economic development.4 The relationship between 
industrialisation and nationhood thus took on renewed significance after the war. 
1 Definition for 'Tariffs' in Arthur Jose et al., The Australian Encyclopedia (Sydney, 1927). 
2 James Bonwick expressed this sentiment in 1887 when he claimed that the cry 'Australia for the 
Australians' was evidenced "in the desire to make the island continent self-contained". Wanting self-
sufficiency in food, clothing and manufacture, Bonwick particularly encouraged the development of 
woollen manufacture. 
James Bonwick, Romance of the Wool Trade (London, 1887), p.467. 
3 Colin Forster, 'Australian Manufacturing and the War of 1914-1918', The Economic Record: The 
Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand, 1953, vol. 29, p.214. 
4 See Robert Dixon, The Course of Empire: Neo-Classical Culture in New South Wales 1877-1860 
(Melbourne, 1986). · 
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Although published over 30 years ago, Colin Forster' s work on post-war 
industrialisation remains the authoritative voice on this period and the subject has since 
received little further development. This thesis aims to expand upon one small aspect 
of Forster's work through close examination of the establishment process of two 
woollen mills. National enthusiasm for promoting domestic manufacturers in the post-
war period "found one of its chief expressions in a desire to see the growth of local 
woollen rnills".5 Woollen manufacture was ideally suited as a centrepiece in the 
campaign to promote local manufacture because the industry already had a basic 
framework in place and its war-time profitability proved attractive to investors. Alfo 
significant was the sentiment most Australians held for the woollen industry. All 
Australians knew the adage that their country rode on the sheep's back. If it was 
wrong to enrich other countries by supplying raw products and buying back 
manufactured goods, the offence was intensified when it came to Australia's best 
known national export. As part of efforts to encourage industrial development after 
the war the federal government established the Bureau of Comme~ce and Industry "to 
help force the establishment of new industries, and the development of existing o.nes". 6 
Bureau director, Henry Joseph Stirling Taylor, became "the main official spokesman"7 
in the drive to encourage local woollen manufacture.8 Utilising nationalistic sentiment, 
Taylor argued that allowing others to manufacture our wool was: 
5 Colin Forster, Industrial Development in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra, 1964), p.74. 
6 E.A. Painter, General Secretary of Australian Textile Workers' Union, Federal Council, Melbourne, 
To Premier Lyons, 26/7/1926: PDl 179/30/26. 
7 Forster, Industrial Development, p.74. 
8 Taylor (1874-1948) is personally credited with assisting between 20 and 24 woollen manufacturers 
to establish in Australia during his time with the Bureau. His involvement with Launceston's textile 
industry, however, appears to have been limited to an ideological contribution. Taylor's worth was 
nevertheless recognised by State authorities. In July 1926, E.A. Painter of the Australian Textile 
Union wrote to Premier Lyons suggesting that the Tasmanian government utilise Taylor's services 
further to develop secondary industries within the State. The State government agreed with the 
Textile Union's glowing appraisal of Taylor and claimed to be aware to his capabilities from a visit 
Taylor had made to Tasmania in connection with the State Development Board in 1924. While 
admitting they would have no hesitation in seeking the benefit of Taylor's advice, this was put on hold 
because the Board had virtually ceased to function because of delays regarding the Imperial Migration 
Agreement. The Australian Textile Union claimed that "Perhaps no one can point to a more effective 
record" than that held by Taylor, describing him as a "fine man of wide vision, Australian outlook and 
marked constructive and administrative capacities". , The Textile Union were therefore scathing of 
Taylor's dismissal from the Bureau in 1924 after the Bruce-Page government took power, seeing it as 
a victory for importing interests and a retrograde step for the country. 
H.J.W. Stokes, 'Taylor', in ADB, vol. 12, pp.181-2; & Painter, To Lyons, 26/7/1926; & J. Allan Guy, 
Acting Premier, To Painter, 6/8/1926: PDl 179/30/26. 
Economically - a farce 
Industrially - a tragedy 
Nationally - a humiliation.9 
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Perpetuating this practice was "deliberately choosing to continue [as] 'the hewers of 
wood and drawers of water' to those nations who use OUR wool to create THEIR 
wealth". These words told the lesson that failure to develop the country's own 
woollen industry inclined Australia more towards being a metaphoric sheep-run than an 
independent nation. The ideological weight of such arguments assisted in 'woollen 
manufacture becoming one of the sentimental icons in the push to industrialise. 
Proving the success of this campaign, in early 1924 Launceston's Examiner 
newspaper noted the "unprecedented activity in woollen manufacture" since the war. 
With 36 new mills so far established, the Examiner expressed satisfaction that 
Launceston had acquired two such mills. 10 It is these two woollen mills which provide 
the focus of this study. The mills were established in close succession in the early 
1920s by well-known British firms, Kelsall and Kemp Limited and Patons and 
Baldwins Limited. Between the war and Depression only five woollen manufacturers 
are known to have established in Australia using British capital. I I Although Australia's 
woollen industry was centred in Victoria, with New South Wales claiming honours as 
the second largest employer, two of the five mills financed with British capital were 
located in the same northern Tasmanian city. Forster believed that as far as Australia's 
woollen industry was concerned, growth of the industry in Tasmania was "One of the 
more interesting developments in this period". I2 The industry was certainly one of 
great significance to Tasmania after World War I. With this growth centred in 
Launceston, Tasmania's second largest city and self-proclaimed industrial capital of the 
State, a woollen manufacturing industry in which the two British firms were central 
figures would emerge as the region's main secondary industry. Focusing upon the 
establishment of mills by these two companies in Launceston, this study ai~ !o 
explore some of the costs and benefits of industrialisation, both to the companies 
involved and the regions in which they settled. Whether or not reality mirrored 
industrialisation' s promises will be a central theme of the story. 
9 Bureau of Commerce and Industry, Annual Report, year ended 30/6/1922, as cited in Forster, 
Industrial Development, p.74. 
10 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.5. 
11 Forster, Industrial Development, p.82. 
12 Forster, Industrial Development, p.88. 
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Australia's industrial history has long been a neglected area of research, 
perhaps as a result of excessive concern with Australia as a sheep-run. Geoffrey 
Blainey, in his 1950s study of Tasmania's Mt. Lyell mines, was one of the national 
pioneers in this field, 13 although the emphasis was still upon primary rather than 
secondary manufacture. Since the 1960s N. Butlin, C. Forster, G. Abbott, N. Nairn 
and G. Linge have been amongst those who began to redress academic disregard for 
Australia's industrialisation process. 14 Much of the work in Tasmania has focused 
upon hydro-electricity, an essential force in Tasmania's industrial history. While 
articles and more general histories have looked at various Tasmanian companies and 
specific industrial personalities since the middle of the century, it is only since the 
1980s that Tasmania's industrial history has received greater emphasis. In the early 
1980s the publication of Launceston's Industrial Heritage15 was the first significant 
attempt to catalogue the industrial development of any Tasmanian region and provides 
a broad picture of the industrialisation of Launceston. Since then, significant southern 
Tasmanian manufacturing companies such as Electrolytic Zinc and Cadbury-Fry-
Pascall16 have also received detailed attention. This study is the first specifically to 
examine a Launceston based manufacturing industry. The thesis does not, however, 
attempt to provide a comprehensive study of the companies during the period of 
concern. It rather aims to examine how these companies' experiences relate to the 
broader concerns and practicalities of industrial development, particularly for 
companies in which control is externally based. In order to do this it is first necessary 
to understand the environment in which the companies were established. 
The world remained in a state of flux after the war, creating a sense of 
insecurity about where various countries fitted into the new, somewhat shaky, world 
order. Lloyd Robson sees the 1920s as a period of "rampant contradictions" in which 
"Australians searched for a vision of the world and their part in it - a vision which 
13 See Geoffrey Blainey, The Peaks of Lyell, (Carlton, 1954). 
14 A selection of their work is cited in the bibliography. 
15 Miranda Morris-Nunn & C.B. Tassell, Launceston's Industrial Heritage: A Survey, Parts 1 & 2 
(Launceston, 1982 & 1983). 
16 See Ruth Barton, 'Cooperation and Labour Management at Electrolytic Zinc and Cadbury-Fry-
Pascall Between 1918 and 1939', MA, University of Tasmania, 1989; Alison Alexander, A Heritage 
of Welfare and Caring: The EZ Community, 1918-1991(Risdon,1991); & Bruce Brown, I Excel! The 
Life and Times of Sir Henry Jones (Hobart, 1991). 
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would make sense". 17 With rapid changes occurring globally, progress was the key to 
viability and prestige. Industrialisation was equated with progress and was seen as 
being crucial to creating a strong Australia. This desire for national strength was also 
apparent in "a contemporary obsession with Australia's 'smallness"'. 18 The war gave 
greater urgency to fears about Australia's need to populate or perish, and immigration 
was seen as the answer. Population growth, however, created its own problems. 
Industrialisation offered a temporary solution to the inconsistency between Australia's 
desire to maintain and improve existing wage levels and living standards, while 
increasing population.19 The growth of labour intensive industries helped alleviate 
unemployment during this period but, as a solution to Australia's problems, had its 
limits. Australia's high cost structures meant that industrialisation focussed upon 
increasing local manufacturers' share of the domestic market through import 
replacement. Nevertheless, striving for industrial strength and its complementarity with 
national independence did offer some comfort to the Australian public in the face of 
world-wide instability. 
These post-war fears were intensified in Australia's island State. Geographic 
isolation made Tasmania marginal to broader Australian considerations. Resultant 
insecurities led Tasmanian authorities to be enthusiastic supporters of the 
industrialisation push. The development of Tasmania's hydro-electric power scheme 
during the 1910s had created an optimism within the State that Tasmania actually had 
some advantage over its mainland counterparts in the rush to industrialise, at least in 
attracting large power-consuming industries. The provision of inexpensive power to 
such enterprises - the policy of hydro-industrialisation - underlay Tasmania's industrial 
development. Even geographic isolation had some advantages in the bid to attract 
industry. Tasmanian labour, on the whole, failed to join the industrial unrest 
characterising this period. Able to claim an adaptable, yet industrially docile, work 
force was an attractive incentive to industry in the post-Bolshevik years. Tasmania 
made much of this point and it was certainly one factor influencing the attraction of 
both K&K and P&B, as well as other large post-war industrial arrivals such as mineral 
17 L. Robson, Australia 'in the Nineteen Twenties: Commentary and Documents, Topics in Australian 
History Series (West Melbourne, 1980), p.iv. 
18 Neville Cain, 'Political Economy and the Tariff: Australia in the 1920s', Australian Economic 
Papers, June 1973, No. 12, p.2. 
19 Cain, 'Political Economy', p.3. 
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processor, Electrolytic Zinc, and two other British firms, chocolate manufacturer, 
Cadbury-Fry-Pascall and Rapson Tyre and Rubber Company. 
Although industrialisation was promoted in terms of its links to nationhood, 
regional parochialism was perhaps a stronger influence within Tasmania than was 
nationalistic sentiment. However, the two forces were not - as may be assumed at first 
glance - hostile and opposite to each other; rather regionalism sought and found 
strength by invoking nationalism, and that process is a major theme of this study. 
Henry Reynolds pointed out that "Regionalism was probably an inevitable concomitant 
of Australian settlement and the ubiquitous tyranny of distance" .20 Tasmania's 
isolation and settlement experience created an environment in which regionalism 
thrived. The longest standing intrastate battle was between Tasmania's two largest 
cities, Hobart and Launceston. With a tradition of self-reliance generated by perceived 
neglect from Hobart based government, Launceston Council and residents were keen 
adherents of the idea of industrialisation. As will be seen, Launceston City Council 
was, arguably, not just Tasmania's most active in its efforts to attract industry, but one 
of the most active in Australia.21 (In terms of the city's contribution to Australianism, 
this activity may be seen as echoing its earlier dynamic support to campaigns against 
transportation of convicts and on behalf of Federation - both nationalist movements, 
yet both also serving the city's particular interests.) While the Council may have had 
the same concerns which led industrialisation to be embraced on a national basis, local 
conditions also meant that industrialisation made particularly good economic sense. 
Northern Tasmania lacked a diversity of employment opportunities. Mining, the 
region's main primary industry, had been in decline since the 1910s, and the return of 
ex-servicemen meant that a source of alternative employment was required with some 
urgency. 
Nevertheless, local economic expediency or nationalistic rhetoric would, by 
themselves, have done little to induce the expansion of industry within Australia if not 
accompanied by significant tariff protection. Tariff protection predated federation and 
had previously been used by Australian colonies, Victoria in particular, to foster home 
20 Henry Reynolds, 'Australian Nationalism and Tasmanian Patriotism', The New Zealand Journal of 
History, April 1971, vol. 5, No. l, p.29. 
21 In 1900 the Cyclopedia of Tasmania credited Launceston with probably the most progressive 
Corporation in Australia, events in the 1920s upholding such claims. 
Cyclopedia of Tasmania (Hobart, 1900), p.82; Also see Stefan Petrow, Sanatorium of the South? 
Public Health and Politics in Hobart and Launceston 1875-1914 (Hobart, 1995). 
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industries. Until the First World War, however, tariffs continued to be used 
predominantly for revenue raising.22 The 1920-1921 Massy-Greene tariff was 
significant because its main intention was to build upon industrial gains made during 
the war, and to encourage the growth of existing industry and the creation of new 
industry. Nurtured by tariff protection, the textile industry would prove to be one of 
the great success stories of Australia's industrialisation policy. Constituting only a 
minor market share against imports before the war, by the end of the 1920s the 
situation had been reversed.23 
Although the Massy-Greene tariff was central to government efforts to 
industrialise, tariff protection was never universally embraced within Australia. With 
woollen manufacture central to a tariff-induced industrialisation campaign, the level of 
protection afforded this industry came under considerable attack in the 1920s. 
Opposition came not just from importing interests. Senator J.F. Guthrie,24 a crusading 
protectionist and acknowledged woollen expert with mill holdings, saw the 1920 tariff 
as "protection run stark staring mad".25 Believing that a "rattling good profit" could be 
made in the textile industry at the pre-existing tariff level, he criticised the decision as 
protecting "an industry which, on the evidence of the people in it, can do with very 
little protection". Guthrie's claims were, however, made during a period of prosperity 
for the industry. A backlog of Australian domestic orders after the war had been 
accompanied by Australia's main textile supplier, Britain, likewise concentrating upon 
its own home markets. By 1923 the textile boom had come to an end as extraordinary 
post-war home demand, both in Australia and abroad, was met. Imports again re-
entered the market. The industrialisation of more countries also created greater 
competition and, consequently, saw aggressive world trading. High cost structures 
placed Australian industry at a disadvantage under these circumstances. Establishment . 
of K&K and P&B corresponded with the end of the textile boom. The experiences of 
these two mills highlights some of the problems faced by indµ_stry establishing during 
this period, as well the types of issues facing all levels of Australian government in the 
22 Revenue raising and industrial protection had been a dual concern of tariffs since federation. 
23 The 1920 tariff, as it relates to textiles, was largely a confirmation of 1914 tariff increases which 
had not yet been effectively tested due to the war. 
Forster, Industrial Development, pp.72 & 75. 
24 Allan Barnard, 'Guthrie', in ADB, vol. 9, pp.144-5. 
25 
'The Tariff in the Senate', 18/8/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
Duties remained in the schedule at 30% for British goods, intermediate 40%, and general 45%. 
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drive for greater industrial self-sufficiency. By the mid-1920s conditions were such 
that the only way for Australia to maintain its economic gains was to further increase 
tariffs, the same occurring at the decade's end as economic conditions again took a 
down-turn. 26 
Greater tariff protection alone did not ensure a greater domestic market share 
for local manufactures. With locally manufactured goods traditionally perceived as 
inferior to their imported counterparts, it was necessary to change public perception. 
As already seen, strong national feeling associated with the war was used to encourage 
industrialisation. National sentiment was also invoked to encourage Australians to 
support their manufacturers, and hence their country, by purchasing locally 
manufactured goods. Tariff increases went hand in hand with propaganda campaigns 
to encourage Australians to buy Australian-made products. The campaign had its 
problems, as the reputation of British textile products posed serious hurdles to local 
manufacturers. These hurdles were heightened when teething problems experienced by 
new mills resulted in poor product quality. The continuous propaganda campaign for 
Australian woollens products in the post-war period linked considerations of price and 
quality with nationalistic arguments.27 In September 1921, for example, Launceston's 
Weekly Courier announced that 4 August was a "Great Red-Letter Day" for 
Tasmania's textile and industrial history.28 The event so celebrated was a shop-
window display featuring the first set of worsted patterns woven in Tasmania. The 
Courier challenged people to inspect, and if satisfied, purchase this new product, thus 
aiding the country to "advance another step to the ideal of 'A self-sustained 
Australia'". 
British firms had a vested interest in propagating a belief in the superiority of 
British manufactured goods. Once operating inside Australia, however, these 
companies continued to hold an advantage over their local counterparts. Able to take 
advantage of Buy Australian propaganda, British companies also benefited from brand 
names already familiar to the consumer and associated with quality products. J.B. 
White, P&B's general manager from the late 1920s, utilised his company's heritage 
when claiming; "Only has one to examine the products of the Launceston mill in the 
retail stores to realise that the Australian branch of this old established firm is setting a 
26 Forster, Industrial Development, pp.13, 78-79. 
27 Forster, Industrial Development, pp.19-20, 75. 
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very high standard in maintaining the quality of their yarns in accordance with the 
traditions of their forefathers".29 Nevertheless, the stigma of inferiority surrounding 
Australian-made goods lingered, even for British companies based in Australia. As late 
as 1963, vice-chairman of K&K's parent company, I. Hill, was defending reports that 
Tasmanian textile products were not equal to their imported counterpart. "My view", 
Hill claimed, "is that Kelsall & Kemp (Tas.) is either technically equal to, or in some 
cases superior to, the parent company in Rochdale, which is regarded as one of the 
most successful and efficient medium-sized textile companies in Gre~t Britain". 30 
Australia's push to industrialise after the war may have addressed a number of 
post-war concerns, but in superficial ways also contradicted broader policy. The 
government had declared "men, money and markets" as the slogan encapsulating the 
direction of Australia's post-war economic development. It seemed to echo "the Old 
Imperial division of labour" in which Britain supplied its colonies with men and money, 
and Australia produced the raw materials to be manufactured in Britain and then 
purchased in the Australian market.31 Under this system Australia's economic growth 
was, in theory, confined primarily to rural developments. Barrie Oyster and David 
Meredith point out that the "men, money, markets" policy of the 1920s not only 
ignored international circumstances, but was also contradicted by the diversification of 
the Australian economy going on since the 1890s, particularly manufacturing 
diversification.32 The federal government was not, however, oblivious to such changes. 
Although professing to serve Britain's interest, the government concurrently used 
imperial slogans as a means of securing national ends.33 It recognised the necessity of 
industrial growth for the well-balanced economic development which was vital to 
Australia's national interests. 34 Australia therefore continued to affirm its dependence 
upon Britain, while the government simultaneously promoted industrialisation to an 
Australian audience as a means of achieving greater national self-sufficiency. 
28 Weekly Courier, 8/9/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
29 Extract from Pioneer Booklet, 1934, signed J.B. White: 'Some Old Records & Information of 
Interest - From 1923'. Held by CP. 
30 
'Expansion in use of Wool Forecast', 21/8/1963: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z'. 
31 Barrie Oyster & David Meredith, Australia in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1990), p.107. 
32 Oyster & Meredith, Australia in the Twentieth Century, p.313. 
33 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration, 1915-1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes 
(Oakleigh, 1995), p.48 
34 W.H. Richmond, 'S.M. Bruce & Australian Economic Development Policy 1923-9', Australian 
Economic History Review, March 1983, vol. 23, pp.239-40. 
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Despite the policy's inherent contradictions, the establishment of companies 
such as K&K and P&B did largely fulfil the criteria encompassed by "men, money and 
markets". These two companies assisted Australia's desire to increase its population. 
Shortages of skilled labour made it necessary for the companies to introduce virtually 
all management, along with their core work force, from Britain. The companies 
continued to nominate a number of migrants throughout subsequent years, but more 
significant numbers were associated with chain migration as original migrant employees 
nominated friends and family. British in nationality, the workers were ideally suited to 
the country's white Australia policy, and had the advantage of arriving to ready-made 
jobs. Michael Roe shows that, despite recognising the need to increase population, 
migrant arrivals had few Australian supporters. Although resentment certainly existed 
towards some of the Launceston textile migrants, their story is generally a more 
positive one than the "desperate hopes" permeating the migrant experience in Roe's 
work.35 
Australia had always depended heavily upon Britain for its capital and the 
arrival of companies such as K&K and P&B was, in one sense, the continuation of a 
long-established trend. Encouraging British interests to establish firms, rather than 
merely provide capital, had additional advantages for Australia's industrial 
development. British-owned or controlled companies were able to acquire machinery 
almost impossible to procure after the war, along with supplying technical expertise 
and skilled workers. Investment by British companies also encouraged local 
investment confidence. Australians were more likely to put money into an established, 
reputable company, than into one unknown. The success of these companies then 
helped stimulate further development. These were precisely the types of benefits 
Australia sought from its association with the British Empire, and were pursued with 
much determination by successive Australian Prime Ministers, W.H. Hughes and S.M. 
Bruce.36 These were the same leaders who simultaneously utilised post-war national 
·sentiment to promote industrialisation. Depending upon perspective or audience, 
arguments for industrialisation could therefore be used to support apparently opposing 
viewpoints. While Australian nationalists focused upon the increased independence 
35 Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration. 
36 Hughes held the Australian Prime-Ministerial post from 27 October 1915 to 9 February 1923, and 
was replaced by Bruce, who remained in office until 22 October 1929. 
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provided by manufacturing our own goods, supporters of British imperialism held that 
Australian manufacturing development strengthened ties within the Empire. Even 
before Australia's post-war push to industrialise, the English-based Financial News 
had viewed British investment in the colonies' development as a means of Empire 
building. "News of the steady progress of a great colony'' it was claimed, "is 
heartening to an Imperialist".37 By 1919 The Times Imperial and Foreign Trade and 
Engineering Supplement tempered the Financial News enthusiasm for colonial 
development with a warning; "industrial development in the Empire, properly handled, 
can be the greatest factor in Imperial Unity, neglected it may prove the surest means of 
separation". 38 With the Australian federal government committed to industrial 
development through tariff protection and seeking to attract capital, British 
manufacturers with markets in Australia were largely pre-empted into direct investment 
in this period. If they did not invest, Australian or other foreign. manufacturers would 
likely take their place. America was the greatest threat. 
Development of manufacturing industries intended to cater for Australia's 
domestic market did not correspond with Britain's prescribed role within the men-
money-markets trilogy. Nevertheless, recognition that development of Australian 
industry was inevitable, meant that 'the establishment of branch plants within Australia 
by British firms was the next best option to retain Australian markets. As previously 
discussed, the companies' British origins then gave them a distinct domestic market 
advantage. 
Concentration within this study upon companies formed by direct foreign 
investment also highlights the ambiguity between Australia's desire to industrialise after 
the war and the use of non-Australian capital to do so. The extensive use of such 
capital to found Australian manufacturing development generally during this period 
(and beyond) led to criticism that, rather than achieving greater self-sufficiency by 
striving toward industrial self-sufficiency, Australia was swapping one form of 
imperialism for another. In 1941 Brian Fitzpatrick wrote, ''There is still something 
essentially colonial about the Australian economy, still a very effective measure of 
See Chris Cunneen, 'Hughes' in ADB, vol. 9, pp.393-401; & Heather Radi, 'Bruce', in ADB, vol. 7, 
pp.453-460. 
37 Financial News, 14/3/1912: PDl 38/13/12. 
38 The Times and Foreign Trade and Engineering Supplement, 13 December 1919, cited in Peter 
Cochrane, Industrialisation and Dependence: Australia's Road to Economic Development, 1870-1939 
(St. Lucia, Queensland, 1980), p.5. 
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economic control by British capital interests by virtue of their investment in 
Australia". 39 Viewing the expansion into Australia by overseas companies as a 
deliberate attempt by foreign imperial powers to maintain the status quo would, 
however, be over-estimating the control imperial powers exerted over these companies. 
The 1920s expansion into Australian was the first overseas manufacturing venture for 
both the companies under consideration. It was also the embryonic stages of a 
movement towards companies which were continually expanding and increasingly 
international, rather than national, in nature. These came to be known as multi-national 
enterprises or corporations (MNEs).40 While the attention given to MNEs is relatively 
recent, their origins date back to the exploitation by British, Dutch, and French firms of 
the resources of their governments' overseas possessions. Due to poor transportation 
and communications and a preoccupation with domestic markets, manufacturing firms 
were generally slower to develop foreign operations.41 Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century the fundamental structure of business organisation began to change. 
While the earliest companies consisted of partnerships of capitalists, the necessity of 
growing enterprises to control large amount of capital and restrict competition saw 
"combination and monopoly in business organisation".42 World War I interrupted this 
trend by halting pre-existing plans and directing production towards domestic 
government purposes.43 During the inter-war period under review, however, both 
K&K and P&B joined in the continuation of this "interweaving of interests" .44 
39 Brian Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia: An Economic History I834-I939 (Melbourne, 
1941), p.436. 
40 A multinational enterprise "is a company that is headquartered in one country but controls 
productive facilities and sales outlets in other countries. Its operations involve flows of capital, goods, 
services, and managerial and technical personnel among its subsidiaries. Ultimately this leads the 
enterprise to assume a global outlook and strategy". 
Brian Berry, Edgar Conkling, & Michael Ray, The Global Economy: Resource Use, Location Choice 
and International Trade (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1993), p.403. 
41 Berry, The Global Economy, pp.403, 406-407 
A few pioneering industrial firms, such as Singer, Westinghouse, Kodak, and Western Electric, went 
abroad with their new products and manufacturing technologies during the late 1800s, their numbers 
gradually increased until the Great Depression. 
42 F.J. Wright, The Evolution of Modern Industrial Organisation (London, 1967), pp.SS & l lS. 
43 Wright, Industrial Organisation, pp.116-7 
44 Wright maintains that the troubles of Britain's textile industry, along with the iron and steel 
industry, in the inter-war period arose from British industrialists' reluctance to combine. 
Wright, Industrial Organisation, pp.117 & 141. 
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With the emergence of multinational enterprises as powerful entities,45 
economists began devising theories to explain MNE's origins and behaviour, including 
identification of stages usually associated with the internationalisation of a company. 
The development of MNEs generally demonstrate a progression from servicing their 
local domestic market, beginning to export, establishing overseas distributorships as 
export sales increase, to forming new companies within the export market to more 
efficiently distribute products manufactured by the home firm. The company may then 
decide to commence manufacturing overseas, usually motivated by exports reaching a 
sufficient level to justify either constructing a factory or acquiring an existing business. 
As will be seen, both K&K and P&B basically followed this line of progression and it is 
at this point that the thesis begins. When deciding whither to expand, MNEs were also 
found to "exhibit a strong preference for similar cultures in nearby countries". 46 
Experience was necessary before location choices were efficient responses to global 
economic opportunities and conditions. Although Britain and Tasmania were almost as 
far apart as geographically possible, this does not subvert established theory. As 
Geoffrey Blainey remarks of Britain and Australia at large, while "Poles apart in 
position, in commerce they behaved as if they were neighbours".47 Additionally, 
Tasmania was more able, than almost any other location, to claim similarity with 
Britain. The State had long been recognised as being more English than England 
itself.48 The region therefore offered companies introducing migrants workers the 
promise of an easier transition when relocating to the other side of the world. The 
similarity and consequent suitability of Launceston's weather compared with Britain's 
textile regions was likewise conducive to attracting British textile companies. 
45 It was only after WWII that multinationals truly burst upon the world commercial scene, the 
greatest surge coming in the 1960s when USA multinationals moved abroad in numbers, aided by new 
developments in transport, communication, and industrial technology and corporate organisation. By 
the late twentieth century, some such companies had grown to a size that ranked their sales along with 
the gross national product (GNP) of entire countries. In fact if the countries of the world are ranked 
on a basis of GNP, half the top hundred places go to MNEs. 
Berry, The Global Economy, p.299. 
46 Berry, The Global Economy, pp.409 & 307-8. 
47 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History, (London, 
1982), p.314. 
48 For example see 'Lord Leverhulme, Visit to Launceston' 25/1/1924: LCC Press Cuttings, 
18/4/1923-19/1/1926. 
Himself an industrialist, Leverhulme claimed that after previously visiting Tasmania 30 years earlier 
he had always said that "Tasmania is the most English of any of our dominions". 
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It would, however, be a mistake to give too much credit to Tasmania's 
"Englishness" as a factor in attracting British industry. While familiarity may have 
offered some benefits, the companies' location choices were based upon economic 
considerations. England had entered the Industrial Revolution1 a revolution centred 
around textile manufacture, as "a great commercial nation".49 By the outbreak of 
World War I, however, industrialisation by Britain's traditional markets meant that 
Britain's proportion of total world output was in decline and further markets could not 
afford to be lost. The imposition of tariffs prompted British companies to move into 
Australia if they wanted to retain their Australian markets. The availability of raw 
material heightened Australia's appeal as a manufacturing centre, and Tasmania's 
single greatest appeal was inexpensive hydro power. 
A brief examination of the development of MNEs reveals that the reasons for 
companies establishing overseas branches were complex. The evolution of the 
capitalist system and Britain's changing economic status combined to encourage British 
companies to take advantage of Australia's desire to industrialise. Kosmas Tsokhas 
appropriately warns that "an imperial fallacy" has allowed Britain's domination over 
. the rest of the empire to be too easily assumed. Tsokhas believes that this position has 
led to a flawed understanding of twentieth century Australian history: 
It has blocked the way to a balanced assessment of the costs and benefits of Empire for 
Australian capitalism and simplified · what in reality was a highly complex and 
contradictory history of political-economic alliances between British Australian and 
Anglo-Australian companies, industries and business organisations. 50 
Only by close scrutiny of such enterprises as Kelsall & Kemp and Patons & Baldwins 
can be revealed the dialectic of empire and nation, for long the pulse of Australia's 
history. 
The work itself is divided into four sections, each examining a particular phase 
of the two companies development. Section A is concerned with the process of 
attracting companies into the region. The first chapter provides an overview of the 
local textile industry's development in the lead-up to K&K and P&B' s arrival. It also 
examines the initial motives for, and problems surrounding, establishing this industry 
within Tasmania. Chapters 2 and 3 look at the process of inducing the respective 
companies to establish in the Launceston region. These chapters conclude as the mills 
49 Wright, Industrial Organisation, p.45. 
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became ready to commence production. Many of the problems faced by both the 
companies and government authorities provide a microcosm of the industrialisation 
process nationally in the post-World War I period. Yet a number of the issues are 
distinctly Tasmanian. Although separated, these two chapters are intrinsically 
connected, as the issues elaborated upon in the chapter on Kelsall and Kemp are 
generally the same areas of concern for Patons and Baldwins. The final chapter in this 
section links winning of these two companies with the Launceston Council's efforts to 
attract other industry in the post-war period. Throughout the 1920s, the Council's 
emphasis remained upon textile manufacturers, great zeal being shown in the battle to 
attract industry. This theme relates to a major work about Tasmanian "boosterism" -
the process of selling Tasmania - by Simon Harris.51 The chapter further reveals the 
interplay of regional and nationalist dynamics. 
Section B consists of one substantial chapter on how the companies fared in 
their first years of operation, and covers the period from 1923 until the Depression. 
Focusing predominantly upon the economic environment in which the companies 
operated, it examines the teething problems experienced and successes achieved. 
Attention is also given to the establishment of a number of other industries during this 
period, all in some way linked to the companies under review. The four major sub-) 
sections provide a picture of the ups and downs characterising these years. The period 
concludes with the foundations laid to allow the successful operation of the companies 
for the next thirty plus years. 
Section C spans the time frames covered by both preceding sections. 
Addressing the people behind the companies, this section aims to add a human 
dimension to the wheelings and dealings, bricks and mortar, and cost analyses involved 
in establishing an industry. As both companies were British-owned or controlled and 
introduced a core work force from their home mills, chapter 6 looks at the process of 
industrial migration and the migrants themselves. Chapter 7 focuses upon these textile 
companies' labour forces. As the study thus far revolves around the establishment 
process, emphasis is given to labour issues of particular concern to companies during 
establishment. Introduced labour was a significant part of this process, so still further 
50 Tsokhas, Money, Markets and Empire: The Political Economy of the Australian Wool Industry 
(Carlton, 1990), p. l. 
51 Simon Harris, 'Selling Tasmania: Boosterism and the Creation of the Tourist State 1912-28', PhD, 
University of Tasmania, 1993. 
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attention is given to migrant workers, more than their sheer numbers in the work force 
would otherwise warrant. The chapter does not therefore attempt to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the problems facing Australian or Tasmanian labour 
generally during this period, but, to some extent, inexorably touches upon these areas. 
While this study basically follows Colin Forster's stress on the 1920s because of 
its significance as a period of rapid growth for the textile industry, Section D 
progresses beyond that decade. Consisting of a single chapter which covers the period 
from the Depression until present, it provides an overview of the two companies' 
progress, as well as highlighting significant events affecting K&K (Tas), P&B 
Launceston and the textile industry generally. Particular emphasis is placed upon the 
post-1973 period. While Launceston's textile industry had gone from strength to 
strength in the 1920s, changing national and international circumstances in the 1970s 
began an industry demise which apparently is still taking place. At the same time there 
remains talk of the need for value-adding and down-stream processing. The 
ambiguities and contradictions of the 1920s thus have their successors, not so different 
in essence, but perhaps yet more corrosive. 
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CHAPTERl 
THE ORIGIN OF LAUNCESTON'S TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
Australia's industrial development was unique amongst British colonies, not 
least because Australian settlement ran concurrent with the industrialisation of Britain. 
Australia's penal function meant that economic growth was largely government 
directed in the early years of settlement, as opposed to the predominance of private 
enterprise in other colonies. While Britain never envisaged colonies entering into 
competition with its own secondary industries, undertakings which assisted a financially 
dependent prison-society towards self-sufficiency were encouraged. 1 The desire to 
achieve self-sufficiency aided development of woollen manufacture, the industry under 
consideration in this work, in two interconnected ways. Firstly, the new colony 
recognised early its need for staple export commodities to offset import expenses. 
Australia's potential as a supplier of primary products for British industry had been 
recognised before European settlement. Encouraged by the success of Britain's 
woollen manufactories, and supply shortages resulting from the Napoleonic wars, wool 
soon emerged as one of the main products to fulfil this role. Although attempts to 
improve wool quality began in NSW before the end of the eighteenth century, no great 
improvements were made in VDL until 1820,2 when three hundred lambs were 
imported from the flocks of John Macarthur.3 Although very modest, ventures in the 
textile industry in both NSW and VDL corresponded approximately with the start of 
flock improvements.4 
1 D.K. Fieldhouse in G.J. Abbott & N.B. Nairn, Economic Growth of Australia 1788-1821 (Carlton, 
Victoria, 1969), p.27. 
2 T.W.H. Leavitt, The Jubilee History of Tasmania (Melbourne, 1887), pp.21-22. 
3 Before attempts at flock improvement began in 1820, sheep in VDL reputedly bore little resemblance 
to the animals of today. Widowson's 1829 description gives an indication of their appearance. "Their 
form, as near as possible, is this: a very large head, Roman nose, slouch ears, extremely narrow in the 
chest, plain narrow shoulders, very high curved back, and a coarse hairy fleece: those bad qualities, 
with four tremendous long legs, give a faithful representation of the native sheep". 
Widowson, Present State of Van Diemen's Land (1829), p.142. 
4 Much of the earliest experimentation in NSW cloth manufacture centred around flax and, 
encouraged by Whitehall, samples of such cloth made at Norfolk Island were sent to England in 1791. 
The first sheep, intended specifically to improve wool quality and yield, had arrived in NSW by 1797, 
and before the end of the century coarse woollen cloth made from local wool was being produced for 
convict slop clothing. 
Abbott & Nairn, Economic Growth of Australia, p.257. 
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The second element aid~g the development of woollen manufacture was that of 
geographic isolation. Isolation encouraged many types of industrial enterprise, often 
led by a government attempting to redress continual shortages in the most basic of 
necessities, including cloth. From settlement until the early 1820s, supplies of cloth, 
for convict clothing in particular, were generally less than requirements. The problems 
of isolation were further accentuated in Van Diemen' s Land where, in 1817, Lieutenant 
Governor Sorell was reputedly distressed at the hardships being endured by convicts. f) 
Many convicts were totally without bedding and jackets, and "in the extreme 
vicissitude of weather", sickness abounded.5 Two years later, Sorell commented that 
the convicts' "destitute state as to clothing is truly lamentable, and I possess no means 
of relief'. 6 Reports made to the Bigge inquiry7 in 1820 highlighted the continuing 
severity of the problem Inspector of Public Works at George Town, C.J. 
Vandermeulen, told how. "Thirty men at a time [had] been exempt from work on 
account of their nakedness". 8 Daily faced with such shortages, it is hardly surprising 
that the first textiles produced in VDL (and similarly on the mainland) came from 
convict workers and were largely used to meet convict needs. 9 Although convict 
women first manufactured flax, hemp and wool at Port Dalrymple in northern VDL by 
1810, initial experiments proved uneconomical. 10 By 1822 the George Town female 
5 HRA, ID, ii, Lieut. Governor Sorell, To Governor Macquarie, 8/12/1817, p.289. 
6 HRA, ID, ii, Lieut. Governor Sorell, To Major Cimitiere, 4/1211819, p.541. 
7 English born, John Thomas Bigge (1780-1843) arrived in Australia in September 1819 as 
commissioner of inquiry into the colony of NSW. The inquiry sought to ascertain the effectiveness of 
transportation as a criminal deterrent, and Bigge was to ensure that transportation was "an object of 
real terror" and report any "ill considered compassion for convicts". Appealing to Bigge for convict 
humanitarian improvements was thus unlikely to bear results. 
J.M. Bennett, 'Bigge', in ADB, vol. 7, pp.99-101. 
8 Unlike Sorell, however, Vandermeulen was convinced that the convicts did "not suffer by exposure", 
and that they were "now so accustomed to go nearly naked, that they ... feel neither Inconvenience or 
Disgrace from It". Another examinee admitted that some convicts did grumble about this state of 
affairs, but that he had "learnt by Information" it was only "the bad characters" that did so. 
Examination of Lieut. C.J. Vandermeulen, 14/4/1820, HRA, ID, iii, p.383; & Examination of John 
Broadhurst Boothman (Superintendent of Convicts), 15/4/1820, p.400. 
9 VDL's clothing shortages in the late 1810s were no doubt influenced by the general state of the 
economy. Heavy spending on imports, with not enough counterbalancing exports, saw the colony 
virtually bankrupt by 1817. Sorell also commented on the "generally distressed state of the settlers" in 
1820, a situation which could only have had an adverse impact upon the treatment of convicts. 
Abbott & Nairn, Economic Growth of Australia, p.347 
HRA, ID, iii, p.56. 
10 HRA, III, i, p.766-767. 
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factory had inmates producing coarse cloth for convicts requirements. The same 
occurred at Maifa Island by 1827. 11 
As a private enterprise, however, the textile industry was sluggard. One of the 
first proposals to establish a private mill came from Patrick Miller, who failed in his 
1820 application for an allotment of land to erect a woollen manufactory about two 
miles along the Derwent River at the west end of Hobart. Miller's application was 
again rejected when he appealed Governor Sorell's decision to J.T. Bigge. Authorities 
alleged that Miller did not have the necessary means to carry out so large an 
undertaking, 12 even though he had already raised £500 capital and claimed to be 
capable of making the machinery himself. Authorities' reluctance to assist this venture, 
even in the midst of chronic shortages, perhaps reflected concerns about encouraging 
the development of privately owned industries which would compete with Britain's 
principal industries. 
By the mid-nineteenth century Tasmania was firmly established as an exporter 
of quality wool. This corresponds with evidence of an increasing self-consciousness 
amongst the Australian population. Henry Reynolds points out that regional loyalties 
predated the emergence of nationalism in many parts of Australia, 13 and regional pride 
was certainly invoked to encourage the establishment of industry within Tasmania. 
Textile manufacture remained the focus. "Is it not a disgrace", asked the Launceston 
Examiner in 1847, "that so young a colony as South Australia should grapple with 
every difficulty and dare every adventure, while we - a colony of forty years standing -
are not able to point to a single important manufacture?"14 The paper then related how 
Sir John Eardley-Wilmot15 had obtained information from NSW regarding the 
establishment of a coarse cloth manufacture soon after entering government. The 
subsequent shelving of the idea due to economic and political difficulties was seen as 
proof that such projects should be private rather than government enterprise. The 
Examiner also provided a substantial list of convicts experienced in textile manufacture 
to affirm the viability of such a venture. There was, nevertheless, little immediate 
11 Hobart Town Gazette, 16/3/1822; Colonial Times, 1/6/1827; & J.R. Morris, 'Early Convict History 
of Maria Island', THRAPP, 1963, vol. 11, pp.157-176. 
12 P. Miller, To J.T. Bigge, 13/10/1820, HRA, ill, iii, , p.689. 
13 Henry Reynolds, 'Australian Nationalism and Tasmanian Patriotism', The New Zealand Journal of 
History, April 1971, vol. 5, No. 1, p.30. 
14 Launceston Examiner, 20/3/1847. 
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progress. Later that same year a Hobart entrepreneur was importing flax from New 
Zealand for processing and, reflecting textile trends in Britain, he "employed the 
children of several poor families in the upper portion of town, preparing, spinning, and 
winding the material for the loom". 16 A company aiming to build VDL' s first privately 
owned textile mill was floated in 1848, 17 but aborted. 18 
By the late 1860s, concerns about unemployment saw the Tasmania 
government offering financial incentives to promote the development of certain 
industries. Included was a £1,000 bonus for the first £1,000 sale of Tasmanian 
manufactured woollen goods.19 Before the Act received formal consent, the 
Tasmanian Wool Manufacturing Company was floated in Hobart, with nominal capital 
of £ 10,000. In 1871 Peter Bulman also began investigating the possibility of 
establishing a woollen manufacturing venture in northern Tasmania. Bulman 
subsequently entered into partnership with an experienced Scottish textile manufacturer 
to form Bulman, Johnstone and Company. Anticipatory of events nearly 50 years later, 
skilled operatives and machinery were imported from Scotland to the mill site at 
Waverley, three miles from Launceston. (For location, see Appendix A.)2° The 
manufactory would be known an Waverley Woollen Mills. Thus began the region's 
association with an industry which would become the city's lifeblood for much of the 
following century. Waverley secured the bonus, and soon established a national 
reputation for producing quality textile goods. 21 Winning two gold medals at the 
1891-1892 Tasmanian International Exhibition,22 Waverley's successes also proved 
Launceston, with its conducive climatic conditions and soft water supply, to be suitable 
for the manufacture of textiles. 
15 Eardley-Wilmot was Lieutenant-Governor of VDL between 1843 and 1846. The first civilian to 
occupy the position, his term in office was plagued by trouble and controversy. 
16 Hobart Town Courier, 25/911847. 
17 Colonial Times, 12/9/1848 & 26/9/1848. 
18 For further background on this period see Linge, Industrial Awakening: A Geography of Australian 
Manufacturing (Canberra, 1979); Abbott & Nairn, Economic Growth; & R.M. Hartwell, The 
Economic Development of Van Diemen's Land 1820-1850 (Carlton, 1954). 
19 Bonuses were also offered for the Tasmanian production of sugar, salt, and sacking, but only 
'woollen stuff' "had any practical results". 
Hobart Town Gazette, 1874, p.819; & Linge, Industrial Awakening, p.660. 
20 Appendix A provides the location of all Launceston textile mills referred to in this work. 
21 Cyclopedia of Tasmania, An Historical and Commercial Review, vol. II (Hobart, 1900), pp.117-8; 
Launceston Examiner, 13/5/1914; & Linge, Industrial Awakenirig, p.660. 
22 Official Record of the Tasmanian International Exhibition, held at Launceston, 1891-1892. 
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The development of an industrial base in late nineteenth century Launceston 
cannot, however, be credited to the textile industry. This instead resulted from the 
1870s mining boom, which was largely organised and financed from Launceston. 
During this period Launceston flourished and became a city by act of parliament in 
1888.23 Mining wealth financed the city's reconstruction in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and led to the rise within Launceston of such industries as 
tin-smelting and foundry work. When the mining boom began to wane early in the 
twentieth century, other activity took a larger place.24 While orchards would spring up 
along the Tamar valley as the main primary industry alternative to mining, the region's 
dominant secondary industry for decades to come would centre around textile 
manufacture. 25 One of the early proponents advocating Tasmania's potential as a 
major textile centre was the Tasmanian Agent General, John McCall. 26 In a paper 
delivered to the London Royal Colonial Institute in 1909, McCall criticised Victoria's 
erstwhile propensity to raise tariffs in order to kill any Tasmanian industry with an 
outlet in their state. He claimed that the woollen industry was the only industry with 
which this policy had not succeeded, thus proving Tasmania's suitability for textile 
production.27 McCall added that Tasmania's three current woollen mills had secured 
"a veritable gold mine", and held "little doubt that an opening offer[ed] for the 
investment of capital". 28 He confidently predicted an investment return of at least 10% 
or higher. 
There were those who saw even greater potential for Tasmania's textile trade. 
By 1909 Sir Edward Hutton (pioneer commander of Australia's army) was already 
proclaiming the lucrative trade possibilities with China for Tasmania's textile trade. 
23 John Reynolds, Launceston: History of an Australian City (South Melbourne, 1969), p.130. 
24 Beaconsfield was the only major goldfield remaining by 1914, and it collapsed during the first year 
of the war, at which time the north-eastern tin-fields were also in decline. 
25 For background on period see E.A. Beaver, Launceston Bank for Savings 1835-1970: A History of 
Australia's Oldest Savings Bank (Carlton, 1972); & John Reynolds, Launceston; W.A. Townsley, 
Tasmania. From Colony to Statehood 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991). 
26 A north-west coast Tasmanian by birth, Sir John McCall (1860-1919) was a medical practitioner 
who was also active in local and State government, holding a seat in the Tasmanian House of 
Assembly on two occasions between 1888 and 1909. It was with his appointment to Tasmanian 
Agent-General in 1909, however, that the Mercury maintained McCall really "found his place". An 
"enthusiastic spokesman for his State", McCall worked hard to attract capital to Tasmania and is 
credited with influencing the development of Mount Lyell Mines, Launceston White Lead Works and 
encouraging hydro-electric power generation. Knighted in 1911, McCall died of pneumonia whilst in 
office on 27 June, 1919. 
Scott Bennett, 'McCall', in ADB, vol. 10, pp.208-9 . 
27 McCall termed woollen manufacturing as "one of our best partially developed industries". 
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Hutton believed that once China's 450 million inhabitants were taught the advantages 
of wool, "that market alone would give an impetus to the trade and prosperity of 
Australia". 29 Darcy Addison was another who saw export potential for Tasmania's 
textile industry, this time in the European market. Upon returning to Tasmania in the 
1910s from his post at the Agent-General's office, Addison had sent a "bluey" jacket to 
a mountaineer and scholar, Professor Roget, with whom he had made acquaintance in 
Switzerland. Roget's enthusiasm for the bluey led Addison to advocate it as a major 
export.30 This was particularly encouraging for Launceston's textile development as 
the bluey was a product of Waverley Woollen Mills. Just as the region's textile 
industry was taking off in the early 1920s, the bluey again raised hopes of the textile 
industry's export potential. In 1921, the Commonwealth's first trade commissioner for 
China, Edward Little, addressed Launceston's business community on "the immense 
possibilities of reciprocal trade between China and Australia".31 As proof of his 
contentions, Little provided an extract from the North China Herald about a Tasmanian 
made mater~al. While no specifics were given, the President of Launceston's Chamber 
of Commerce believed that the cloth mentioned as being "the ideal material for China 
winter wear" was Waverley Woollen Mill's famous bluey.32 
If one were to believe an English newspaper report in early 1910, however, the 
future of Tasmania's textile industry was assured even without the "bluey". McCall 
:r:equested details on a woman identified only as Mrs. Williams of Tasmania, after an 
article appeared describing her invention of a revolutionary substitute for silk, known 
as travelite. Synthetics were still in their commercial infancy at this stage. Reputedly 
made out of leaves from a Tasmanian tree, the material was claimed to be thin, light, 
untearable, able to take any dye, and so inexpensive that it was cheaper to replace a 
28 Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, part I, vol. XLI, Dec. 1909, p.23. 
29 Hutton pointed out the "the unfortunate Chinese" presently wore only quilted cotton and silk during 
their intensely cold winters. 
Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, part I, vol. XLI, Dec. 1909, p.23. 
30 Roget was presumably related to the Thesaurus founder. 
Mercury, 5/3/1914 in Simon Harris, 'Selling Tasmania: Boosterism and the Creation of the Tourist 
State, 1912-28', PhD, 1993, p.36. 
31 
'Trade with China', 22/3/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
32 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Annual Meeting (press cutting), 26/9/1921: Minutes 
28/10/1915-29/11/1937. 
Within a year of the report, the chief inspector of factories, Henry Reynolds, was able to announce that 
the first shipment of Tasmanian blankets to China would occur in late 1922, a move expected to "be 
the forerunner of further business". 
Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1921-22, No. 14, p.32: Tasmania. Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, 1922-23. 
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soiled dress made out of this material than to wash it.33 After extensive state-wide 
inquiries, however, no information on this fantastic new product surfaced.34 
Negotiations to establish the first twentieth-century northern based woollen mill 
began around 1908 at the small rural village of Westbury, 35 miles from Launceston. 
Promoted by a man identified only as Mr. Robinson of Frankford, Westbury's water 
was tested and a site for the mill selected before difficulties arose in obtaining the 
necessary capital. As Westbury Council saw it, this was because Robinson "was not 
the man for the project" and Launceston people "declined to recognise the, project", 
presumably as it was not Launceston-based.35 Robinson thus proceeded to England to 
try and float the company, but nothing eventuated. When the Tasmanian press 
reported rumours in mid-1910 that companies were being formed to establish two 
Tasmanian woollen mills, one each in the north and south, Westbury pressed its claims. 
In need of employment opportunities, the Council petitioned the Agent-General, 
acknowledged as the promoter of these new ventures, as to Westbury's good roads, 
suitable land close to the railway system, and its ability to offer ample water power 
from the Meander River. Power w.as Westbury's trump card .. Westbury warden, 
Daniel Burke, was quick to highlight recent newspaper reports which called into 
question Launceston' s ability to handle the power requirements of such a mill.36 
So recurred that key issue. Launceston Council had its own power supply. 
Since 1895 Launceston's main streets had been lit by power from Australia's first 
hydro-electric scheme, but by the 1910s the city's power supply was reputedly under 
pressure.37 With Launceston city's population at just over 20,000 by this time,38 
demands upon the hydro scheme were further increasing with the construction of a new 
electric tram system. This development saw much public debate as to whether the 
Launceston Corporation should supplement its existing plant with steam power and a 
poll was subsequently held on the issue.39 A drawn-out and emotive debate preceded 
the poll, and the outcome saw an almost two to one majority against installing a steam 
33 John McCall, Agent General, To Premier, 18/2/1910: PDl 68/1/10. 
34 Premier Lewis, To McCall, 18/4/1910: PDl 68/1110. 
35 D. Burke, Warden of Westbury Council, To McCall, 7/7/1910: PDl 119/8/10. 
36 Burke, To McCall, 717/1910: PDl 119/8/10. 
37 Lloyd Robson, A History of Tasmania, Colony and State from 1856 to the 1980s, vol. II 
(Melbourne, 1991), p.294. 
38 Walch's Tasmanian Almanac, 1919 (Hobart, 1919), p.341. 
39 Burke, To McCall, 717/1910: PDl 119/8/10. 
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plant.40 With cost as the major drawback, opponents claimed the Council was 
responding to "a temporary and panic expedient to tide over a non-existing 
difficulty".41 While nothing eventuated from the rumoured woollen mill projects, this 
experience must have stressed to Launceston Council the industrial advantages of 
connecting to the State power grid when opportunity offered. 
The first woollen manufacturing investor subsequently to consider Tasmania 
was the federal government. Upon hearing in 1912 that federal authorities proposed 
establishing woollen mills "for the production of wearing apparel in connection with 
the defence scheme", the Hon. G.T. Collins, MLC (also President of the Launceston 
Chamber of Commerce) cabled the Minister of Defence to expound Launceston's 
advantages.42 James Smail, the Scottish expert bought to Australia to manage the 
proposed new Federal Woollen Mills, was given the job of scrutinising and advising 
upon locations.43 Smail visited a number of Tasmania towns and cities in 1912, being 
met upon arrival in Launceston by the Secretary of the Launceston Chamber of 
Commerce and consulting with the Chamber's executive committee on 27 March. 44 A 
proposal regarding transport, power, water, and raw materials and labour was laid 
before Smail, as well as the offer of a site at Town Point. Located in a "working class 
suburb", the site was appropriately situated to cater for the mill's labour 
requirements.45 After inspecting the site, Smail was impressed with Launceston's 
proposal, proclaiming that "the facilities available were all that could be desired" and, 
though he could make no promises, hoped the representation was successful. 46 When a 
final decision was reached Launceston came in second place out of the 35 towns and 
cities considered, losing to Geelong. In his concluding analysis, Smail described 
conditions in Launceston as "ideal for cloth manufacture" and equal to the previous 
best in climatic conditions and natural facilities, but felt the city had to take second 
40 
'Water Wins', 9/7/1910: LCC Press Cuttings, 1909-1910. 
41 
'Vote Against Steam' (poster), 8/7/1910: LCC Press Cuttings, 1909-1910. 
42 Examiner, 18/3/1912: Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive, 12/8/1909-
9/211917: LMSS 073. 
43 Examiner, 18/3/1912 & 251711912: Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive, 
12/8/1909-9/2/1917. 
44 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Meeting 26/3/1912: Minutes of the Executive, 12/8/1909-
9/211917. 
45 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Special Meeting, 28/3/1912: Minutes of the Executive, 
12/8/1909-9/2/1917. 
46 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Monthly Meeting 11/411912: Minutes, 111111906-26/8/1915. 
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place t~ Geelong as far as labour conditions, railways, shipping, and as a centre for 
distribution. 47 
Locals had their own theory on the decision, however, believing it had been 
influenced by strong mainland pressure and that the federal government's centralisation 
policy prevented out-lying centres from getting "a fair deal".48 It appears that such 
contentions had validity. The government had, from the outset, declared a preference 
for placing the mill in "some centre of population", 49 while among reasons listed for 
Hobart's failure to secure the mill was it not being "central enough" for a government 
factory. 50 The perception that Launceston had been unfairly dealt with in this instance 
continued on for many years. When commenting on the quality of Launceston's water 
supply in 1923, the Examiner made reference to the 1912 decision, pointing out that 
Geelong had to process water to soften it. Alternatively, Launceston's Distillery Creek 
was described as having the "purest water for the manufacture of the finest woollens ... 
in Australia".51 The 1912 loss provided Launceston, and Tasmania generally, with a 
valuable lesson regarding the attraction of secondary industries. It was not enough for 
Tasmania merely to match inducements offered on the mainland. Tasmania had to 
offset its locational disadvantages by providing more attractive incentives than other 
states. Within a decade the provision of inexpensive hydro-electric power would 
emerge as Tasmania's main drawcard for secondary industry. More significant than the 
Smail visit from Launceston's perspective, however, was that 1912 also saw 
representatives of English based company, Kelsall & Kemp Ltd, visit Australia with the 
view to establishing a woollen mill. 
47 Examiner, 251711912: Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive, 12/8/1909-
9/2/1917. 
48 Examiner, 17/3/1920: K&KPress Cuttings. 
49 Examiner, 18/3/1912: Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive, 12/8/1909-
9/211917. 
A policy swing toward decentralisation in the 1950s would later benefit Launceston in attracting its 
third British owned textile company, namely James Nelson. See below, chapter 8. 
50 According to Smail, Hobart had also offered an inferior site to Launceston. Of the other Tasmania 
towns considered, Devonport had not compared well with Launceston, while Burnie was described 
comparatively as "quite an impossible place". 
Examiner, 251711912: Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive, 12/8/1909-9/2/1917. 
For the official report on this matter see: Australia. Parliament 1912. Commonwealth Papers 
presented to Parliament, Melbourne: Government Printer, vol. 3, pp.211-13. 
51 Examiner, 411111922. 
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CHAPTER2 
KELSALL & KEMP (TASMANIA), LIMITED 
The Company's Origins 
The private company of Kelsall & Kemp, Limited was formed just over twenty 
years before negotiations to establish an Australian mill commenced, although the 
company's origins date back much further. Henry Kelsall (1791-1869) began business 
in Rochdale in 1815 as a private trader, a system under which he bought wool and put 
it out for spinning and weaving, then sold the cloth at the market in an unfinished state. 
Kelsall was joined in the business by his brother-in-law, William Bartlemore, in 1828, 
the two men's first mill beginning operations by 1835.1 The other famous name in the 
company's title came from George Tawke Kemp, Kelsall's son-in-law, who succeeded 
William Bartlemore as a partner in 1856. Unsatisfactory financial arrangements after 
the death of a succeeding partner, led existing arrangements to be dissolved and a 
private company formed to take over the business' assets. Kelsall and Kemp Ltd was 
therefore registered in 1890 with a share capital of £ 100,000, and Robert Slack 
(grandson of Henry Kelsall) and George Kemp (son of George Tawke Kemp) were 
appointed directors. The company expanded rapidly between 1904-1914, during which 
time George Kemp (now Colonel and the executive governing director) was knighted 
for political services in 1909, and created a baron in 1912, taking the title of Rochdale.2 
It was during this period of the company's expansion that thought was given to the 
possibility of establishing a branch overseas. 
Early Negotiations 
While information on K&K' s earliest negotiations is sketchy, most references to 
this incident3 claim that the newly titled Lord Rochdale and another director, Jesse 
Lord, visited Tasmania in 1912 and selected Hobart as the preferred option for 
establishing their first mill based outside Britain.4 Hobart was undoubtedly selected as 
1 The factory system took longer to become operative in the woollen industry than in the cotton 
industry. 
Kelsall & Kemp, Ltd.1815-1965, p.4: QVM. 
2 Kelsall & Kemp, Ltd. 1815-1965, pp.4-16: QVM. 
3 For example see Kelsall & Kemp, Ltd. 1815-1965 & Morris-Nunn & Tassell, Industrial Heritage. 
4 Mercury 17/311920: K&KPress Cuttings. 
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the preferred mill site in 1912, but no substantiating evidence was found that either 
Lord Rochdale or Jesse Lord were in Tasmania (or even Australia). What is certain is 
that Hobart Council granted concessions for water supply to Sydney based T.B. 
Wilkinson through his agent James (Jas) Robinson of Yorkshire.5 Wilkinson was 
K&K' s Australian representative. 6 It appears that the negotiating company was still 
anonymous at this time. Robinson first met with Hobart Council representatives to 
discuss water supply for a proposed mill .in late March 1912.7 By mid-April the 
Examiner reported that Robinson had recently passed through Launceston after 
selecting a site at Hobart to establish woollen mills, "provided other arrangements he 
[had] in train proved successful".8 Robinson explained that Hobart had been selected 
because cheap electrical power would be available when the hydro works were 
completed. Negotiations over water were not, however, finalised at that point. 
Robinson explained that many difficulties surrounded such a venture and, for it to be 
successful, the promoters desired water ''for practically nothing". Negotiations over 
water continued over some months. Hobart Council specified its offer in May,9 but 
Robinson was dissatisfied. The Council stood firm, claiming that its offer conceded 
"everything, and in fact rather more" then Robinson had requested. 10 The two parties 
had still not agreed on terms by July,11 at which time correspondence on the issue 
peters out. 
Initial disclosure of the deal with Hobart was subject to much discussion in 
Launceston's commercial circles, mainly because Launceston's advantages had never 
been brought to Robinson's attention. Launcestonians believed that they were pre-
eminent in the areas of both power and water. In seemingly the first contact between 
Launceston and K&K, the Chamber of Commerce subsequently endeavoured to 
contact Robinson and extol Launceston's water and power arrangements. The 
Examiner concluded: 
5 A.W.C. Johnston, Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Wilkinson, 55 York Street, Sydney, 10/10/1917: 
PDl 179/1/18; & Examiner 16/4/1912: LCC Press Cuttings, 1912-14. 
6 A.W.C. Johnston, Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Wilkinson, 55 York Street, Sydney, 10/10/1917: 
PDl 179/1/18. 
7 Town Clerk, To Robinson, ·16/3/1912: Hobart City Council Letterbook, MCC 16/17/34, 9/1/1912 -
18/7/1912. 
8 Examiner 16/4/1912: LCC Press Cuttings, 1912-14. 
9 Town Clerk, To Robinson, 21/5/1912: Hobart City Council Letterbook, MCC 16/17/34. 
10 Town Clerk, To Robinson, 27/6/1912: Hobart City Council Letterbook, MCC 16/17/34. 
11 Town Clerk, To Robinson, 18/7/1912: Hobart City Council Letterbook, MCC 16/17/34. 
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It looks as if our power is not sufficiently advertised. What the Hydro-Electric Company is 
prepared to do in Hobart on completion of its works is made known far and wide, but the 
cheap rates at which power and water are available in Launceston· are not sufficiently 
known. 12 
These claims demonstrate a heightened awareness of Launceston's need to sell itself if 
it wished to attract industry. This awareness was no doubt influenced by Launceston 
being overlooked by the second woollen mill in as many months. The war meant that 
the immediate future offered few opportunities to rectify this problem. Encouraged by 
federal policy after the war, however, Launceston Council emerged as an Australian 
leader in self-promotion. 
Meanwhile negotiations between Hobart Council and K&K continued. Lord 
Rochdale visited Australia in 1914, and corresponded with the State government from 
his base at the Australian Club in Sydney. 13 An option was subsequently secured over 
the old Cascades site at Hobart. Previously a prison site used as a reformatory, the 
company intended to either adapt the existing building or erect new ones. 14 According 
to the Agent-General, John McCall, the option over the site was actually purchased by 
Wilkinson rather than the company. With Wilkinson and a number of other Sydney 
gentlemen "prepared to take an interest in the company", 15 Wilkinson's_ purchase and 
services were presumably to be exchanged for share-holdings when· the company was 
floated, and possibly a directorship. Although the war halted progress, K&K began 
accumulating suitable machinery and fittings for the new mill during this period in 
anticipation of post-war shortages. 16 Like most textile companies, K&K's war-time 
production was devoted almost exclusively to domestic government contracts. 
Demand was, in fact, so great that work and workers were placed out at other firms 
because the company's Rochdale plant was unable to cope. This practice continued 
into the early 1920s, as public demand took over from government requirements. 
These circumstances created an atmosphere conducive to post-war expansion. 
K&K' s actions throughout the war confirmed their intention to continue with 
expansion plans after hostilities ceased. When K&K' s original water supply agreement 
with Hobart Council expired on 21 May 1916, the option was renewed on the 
12 Examiner 16/4/1912: LCC Press Cuttings, 1912-14. 
13 Premier A.E. Solomon, To Lord Rochdale, 5/3/1914: PDl 119/4/14. 
14 McCall, To Premier, 51711917: PDl 118119117. 
15 Agent-General, To Hon. Jens-August Jensen, Minister for Customs, 1/8/1917: PD 1 118/19/17. 
16 Mercury, 17/3/1920: K&KPress Cuttings. 
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understanding that, if operations had not begun within a year, satisfactory proof must 
be shown of the company's intention to begin within a reasonable time. 17 The Agent 
General, McCall, also continued to mediate between local, State and federal authorities 
and the company. In July 1917, for example, Lord Rochdale used McCall to place a 
number of issues before the Hobart Council. Water supply was still of particular 
interest. Desirous to know the terms on which not less than 200,000 gallons of 
suitable water could be provided per day, K&K also wanted permission to discharge 
their effluent into Hobart's sewers (as done in Rochdale), and guarantees of a minimum 
of 250 hp from the hydro scheme.18 
In August 1917 McCall likewise petitioned the federal Customs Minister to 
admit K&K's machinery into the country duty free as an incentive to establish in 
Australia, and requested assistance in acquiring permission to introduce skilled 
foremen. 19 He sought backup from the Tasmanian Premier on these matters,20 and 
Lee obliged.21 The Minister, Jens-August Jensen, responded that certain machinery 
was already admitted free or at 10%, but machinery not included would be considered 
upon submission of illustrations and particulars. While admission of migrants was not 
his area of concern, Jensen had consulted with the relevant department and provided 
details on how to proceed (an issue developed in chapter 6).22 
McCall's enthusiasm for the venture was unquestionable. He believed that it 
would "be a great thing for Tasmania to get such people interested in the woollen trade 
as they are financially strong and in a position to extend their works to any limit the 
trade may warrant". 23 McCall also pointed out that, "if we can get such people as 
Messrs Kelsall & Kemp interested, it might lead to the establishment of many more 
mills".24 He was therefore particularly keen for a prompt response from Hobart 
authorities to the company's inquiries so that he could discuss matters with directors as 
soon as the information became available.25 Despite McCall's urging, three months 
elapsed before Hobart Council provided the Premier (by now, Walter Lee) with the 
17 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Wilkinson, 10/10/1917: PDl 179/1118. 
18 McCall, To Premier, 517/1917: PDl 118119/17. 
19 AG, To Hon. Jens-August Jensen, Minister for Customs, 118/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
20 McCall, To Premier, 2/8/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
21 Premier Lee, To PM, 15/10/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
22 Jensen, To AG, 14/11/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
23 McCall, To Premier, 517/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
24 AG, To Hon. Jens-August Jensen, Minister for Customs, 1/8/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
25 McCall, To Premier, 517/1917: PDI 118119/17. 
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requested information.26 The company was told that all water requirements over that 
obtainable from the Hobart rivulet could be supplied at a maximum of ls. per thousand 
gallons, and renewed Wilkinson's option "in respect to certain concessions in 
connection with water supply". 27 These water charges were apparently at much the 
same terms as the original 1912 agreement.28 The Council then refused to comment 
upon hydro prices, claiming this was "a matter for the Hydro Electric Department", but 
did permit K&K conditionally to discharge effluent into city sewers.29 
McCall subsequently informed the Premier that Lord Rochdale was satisfied 
with everything except Hobart's water charges. Lord Rochdale believed that Hobart's 
proposal could lead to water costing the "outrageous amount" of £3,000 per annum, 
and inquired as to whether water and power costs would be similar in Launceston. 30 
He therefore requested McCall write to Launceston mayor, Percy Hart, in early 1918 
and inquire about power and water prices in that city. Due to Lord Rochdale's 
dissatisfaction with the prices quoted by Hobart, McCall felt that if water was supplied 
"at something like a nominal rate" Launceston would probably win out. 31 McCall also 
explained that it had "further been represented to [Lord Rochdale] that Launceston will 
probably give more female labour". The most likely person to have made these claims 
seems to have been leading Hobart businessman, Sir Henry Jones.32 Jones was the only 
other individual mentioned in the Agent-General's letter and had declared his 
26 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Secretary to the Premier, 10/10/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
27 Butters, To Premier, 15/10/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
28 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Wilkinson, 10/10/1917: PDl 179/1/18. 
29 Butters, To Premier, 15/10/1917: PDl 118/19117. 
Butters subsequently confirmed to the Premier that the power needs at the Cascades could be met. 
Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Secretary to Premier, 10/10/1917: PDl 118/19117. 
30 McCall, To Premier, 8/2/1918: PDl 179/1/18. 
31 Office of the Agent General for Tasmania, To Hart, 8/2/1918: Launceston City Council, Industries -
Kelsall & Kemp (1918-1922), 19/4.1. 
32 Hobart born, Sir Henry Jones (1862-1926) began work pasting labels on tins at George Peacock's 
jam factory aged 12 years. Becoming an expert jam boiler within a few years, Jones was promoted to 
factory foreman in 1885 and, upon Peacock's retirement, took control of the company, renamed H. 
Jones & Company, in partnership with two others. This partnership was dissolved in 1902, and a 
limited liability company was formed the following year, with Jones as managing director, assisted by 
federal politician and tariff expert, George Edwards, and Alfred Henry Ashbolt. Amidst much public 
criticism, a confederation of companies known as Henry Jones Co-Operative Ltd was subsequently 
formed in Melbourne in November 1909. With diverse business interests, Jones was described as "a 
shrewd investor in promising Tasmanian undertakings", and he was knighted in 1919. While Jones' 
motivations for promoting Tasmanian industry are questioned within this work, there is no doubt that 
he placed much effort into the promotion and development of his State, dying during negotiations to 
attract another company. Jones also quietly provided financial support for many Tasmania 
organisations. 
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preference (presumably to Lord Rochdale) for Launceston over Hobart as "the best 
place for starting this mill".33 Jones maintained that Hobart, unlike its northern 
counterpart, already had so many demands on female labour - first specified was his 
own jam factory. He had also offered to put "a substantial sum of money" into the mill 
if it were started in Launceston. 34 Jones would thus benefit from the new scheme, 
whilst also ensuring no new labour demands were added in Hobart, to the detriment of 
his existing business. Subsequently rewarded by being made a director of K&K' s new 
Tasmanian company, in 1922 Jones proclaimed that "he was in a great measure 
responsible for the Mills being established in Launceston". 35 Most of the populace 
remained unaware of the back room deals which influenced the mill's location. Jones' 
role highlights the self interest which motivated some of the promoters who were 
actively involved in attracting industry, and seeking development of the State and its 
resources throughout this period.36 Not long into Jones' directorial role, for example, 
K&K (Tas) agreed to loan Sir Henry Jones & Co Ltd of Hobart up to £10,000. It 
turned out that K&K only had £9,000 available, but the entire amount was lent to 
Jones' company for a six month term at bottom of the market rates of 6% p.a. 
interest.37 It is also noteworthy that Alfred Ashbolt,38 a long-time and close business 
John Reynolds, 'Jones' in ADB, vol. 9, pp.513-4; & Bruce Brown, I Excell The Life and Times of Sir 
Henry Jones (Hobart, 1991). 
33 Office of the Agent General for Tasmania, To Hart, 8/2/1918: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
34 Jones' claim also calls into question Tasmania's repeated assurances to industry during this period 
about the availability of female labour, without geographical reservation. 
35 Having just been re-elected by shareholders when making this claim, Jones also stated that he would 
retire any time they wanted to be represented by a Launceston man. He retired early the following 
year for his own reasons, however, and Carl Stackhouse was appointed in Jones' place. See below, 
p.56. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/511922 & 22/211923. 
36 Jones' involvement with K&K was short-lived. In April 1921 he applied and was granted three 
months leave of absence from directorial duties to visit South Africa. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 22/4/1921. 
37 K&K Minutes of Directors' Meetings, 10/1/1921 & 17/1/1921; See also S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall & 
R.C. White, Australian Banking and Monetary Statistics 1817-1945 (Sydney, 1971), p.494. 
38 Businessman, Sir Alfred Henry Ashbolt (1870-1930) was New Zealand born and educated, passing 
accountancy exams aged 19. Moving to Tasmania in 1891, he was a book-keeper for Hobart 
merchants A.G. Webster & Sons, whilst also managing an insurance office and agency for a 
navigation company. Leaving Webster in 1901 he became a junior partner in Henry Jones' firm. 
Ash bolt was involved in the local, national and international growth of what became Henry Jones (Co-
operative) .Ltd. With many other business interests, his most successful venture was one in which 
Jones was also heavily involved, the Tongkah Harbour Tin Dredging Company in Thailand. In 1919, 
the year Ashbolt took over the Agent-General's office, the Tongkah Company paid dividends of 
£517 ,500. Ash bolt was recognised for promoting industrial investment in Tasmania and credited with 
the establishment of several large branch firms within the State. Returning to Tasmania in 1924 and 
resuming his active role in business, Ashbolt was knighted in 1925 and, after Jones' death the 
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associate of Jones, took over the office of Agent-General in mid-1919 before a final 
decision on the mill site had been made. While no information on Ashbolt's role in 
negotiations is available, the Agent-General held an influential position as middle-man 
in such dealings and Ashbolt was undoubtedly aware of Jones' preference for locating 
the mill in Launceston. Ashbolt's appointment and K&K's subsequent decision to 
locate in Launceston may, nevertheless, have been coincidence. Bruce Brown, author 
of a biography on Jones, points out that Ashbolt and Jones had fallen out over Ashbolt 
leaving Jones' company to take up the post of Agent-General.39 
Launceston Council was understandably thrilled that "such an · important 
industry" was considering establishment in their city.40 After Hart met with the Hon. 
T. Shields MLC to discuss the matter, the Council subsequently decided to offer K&K 
every facility. Concessions granted included 200,000 gallons of water per day for three 
years at no cost and thereafter at 4d. per 1,000 gallons. Additionally offered was 250 
hp electricity for an eight hour day at 0.375d. per unit, or 0.25d. per unit for a 24 hour 
day.41 Hart responded to news of K&K's interest in Launceston by trying to press 
Lord Rochdale to make Launceston an immediate and definite offer,42 although the 
company was less enthusiastic to commit. 
Contrary to Launceston' s enthusiasm, Hobart Council was, at first, baffled by 
Lord Rochdale' s interpretation of their water offer and maintained that he was under 
the wrong impression. During lengthy negotiations with K&K' s Australian 
representative, Wilkinson, and his agent, Robinson, the previous October,43 the 
company had been granted all rights to water flow down the Hobart Rivulet at a cost 
of only £ 100 per annum. In a dry season the rivulet was estimated to have a minimum 
flow of at least 500,000 gallons per day, and up to 15,000,000 gallons per day after 
heavy rain. The 1 s. per 1,000 gallons mention by Lord Rochdale applied only to 
additional water supplied from the city service, and Wilkinson had felt that additional 
following year, was credited as "the undisputed leader of commercial activities in Southern Tasmania" 
until his death in January 1930. 
G.P.R. Chapman & John Reynolds, 'Ashbolt', in ADB, vol. 7, pp.107-8. 
39 Private correspondence with author; see also Brown, I Excel! 
40 Acting Mayor, Percy Hart, To Hon. T. Shields, MLC, 'Confidential', 17/4/1918: PDl 179/1/18. 
41 A footnote was added that a nominal water charge might need to be applied to comply with Council 
statutes. Pressure and nature of the power supply would be nominally 5,000 volts, 3 phase, 50 cycles. 
Acting Mayor, Percy Hart, To Hon. T. Shields, MLC, 'Confidential', 17/411918: PDl 179/1/18; & 
Undated suggested cable; & 'Confidential', Hart, To Hon. T. Shields, MLC, 17/411918: Launceston 
City Council, 1'9/4.1. 
42 Undated hand-written note from Hart, To Agent-General: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
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water would be unnecessary.44 The Council concluded that the mix-up occurred 
because Wilkinson had, in the interim, died. The information may therefore not have 
been forwarded to K&K. Claiming that the Council had "endeavoured to meet the 
Company in every reasonable way", Hobart's town clerk told the Premier that they 
would be "deeply disappointed if through any misunderstanding the mills be established 
in Launceston instead of [Hobart]".45 The Premier subsequently forwarded 
Launceston's offer and Hobart's explanation to the Agent-General and asked that both 
be placed before Lord Rochdale simultaneously.46 
For almost a year nothing further eventuated. Hart inquired to the Agent-
General about the delay in March 1919. Possibly hoping to jolt the company out of its 
indecision, Hart related that local demand presently necessitated the importation of 
woollen goods from New Zealand, and that many items were simply being done 
without.47 A firm commitment on the establishment of the mill was finally made in 
mid-July. After a meeting with Lord Rochdale on 18 July, H.W. Ely (secretary to the 
Agent-General's office)48 and W.M. Williams (Hobart Councillor and State politician)49 
cabled home news that K&K had "definitely decided" to establish in Tasmania.50 All 
that was left to determine was location. Hart again initiated contact with the company 
in September after being informed by the Launceston Council that all future business to 
do with the mill would be left in his hands.51 From an influential Launceston family 
with a history of involvement in progressive activities, Hart was an appropriate man to 
handle these negotiations.52 
43 Hobart Town Clerk, To Premier, 2/5/1918: PDl 179/1118. 
44 The current City Engineer declined to give his own estimates on water flow, but used figures 
calculated by a predecessor in 1901. 
Hobart Town Clerk, To Premier, 2/5/1918: PDl 17911/18. 
45 Hobart Town Clerk, To Premier, 2/5/1918: PDl 179/1/18. 
46 Premier, To AG, 7/5/1918: PDl 179/1/18. 
47 Percy Hart, To McCall, 2113/1919: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
48 Walch's TasmanianAlmanacfor 1919 (Hobart, 1919), p.130. 
49 Williams was in London for the 1919 British Conference of Chambers of Commerce. 
Scott & Barbara Bennett, Biographical Register of the Tasmania Parliament 1851-1960 (Canberra, 
1980). 
5° Cablegram from Ely, London, 18/7/1919: PDl 179/5/19. 
51 Acting Town Clerk, To W. Miller, President, Chamber of Commerce, 16/9/1919: Launceston City 
Council, 19/4.1. 
52 In the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries, "Outsiders heard so much of the widely varied 
activities of the Hart family that for years Launceston was called 'Hartsville' by the Sydney Bulletin 
and critical Australian journals". 
John Reynolds, Launceston: History of an Australian City (South Melbourne, 1969), p.125. 
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Word was received in November that a visit by a company representative was 
imminent, s3 although Launceston still, as yet, had no guarantees. This lack of 
commitment seemed not to worry some sections of the community and, in late 1919, 
the Launceston Chamber of Commerce applauded itself for supporting "the movement 
which had for its aim the erection of additional woollen mills . . . in Launceston". s4 
Giving credit where due, the Chamber conceded "It could hardly take any other action, 
in view of the fact that Mr. Robert Hogarth ... had frequently and on his own initiative 
pointed out both privately and publicly the desirability of extending this section of the 
textile industry in Tasmania". As proprietor of Hogarth and Sons Pty Ltd, better 
known locally as the previously mentioned Waverley Woollen Mills, Robert Hogarth 
had spoken for 15 years of Launceston's advantages for this industry. When K&K 
subsequently signed a deal with Launceston, Hogarth maintained that the company's 
choice proved his contentions correct. He thus took it upon himself "As managing 
director of the only mill in Launceston" to extend a welcome to the company.ss 
Hogarth added that it was gratifying to see an increasing realisation of the quality of 
Australian output, with demand for Tasmanian goods currently exceeding production.s6 
Hogarth's contributions to promoting the region's potential were again praised in 1921 
upon his election to the presidency of the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of 
Australias7 (he was also described as the "father" of the Tasmanian Chamber).ss The 
Chamber believed, "The community [was] indebted greatly to Mr. Robert Hogarth and 
his broad mindedness in connection with the establishment of the woollen industry". s9 
An important aspect to Hogarth's ''broad mindedness", however, was that none of 
Launceston's textile mills were in direct competition with one another, except in terms 1' 
I 
of female labour requirements, not then seen as a problem. While K&K and Waverley: 
I 
came closest in similarity of product, both producing blankets and flannel, the types; 
and qualities of their respective ranges varied considerably and they never viewed one1, 
53 R.C. Roe, K&K Director, To Town Clerk, Launceston, 12/1111919: Launceston City Council, ; 
19/4.1. 
54 Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM, 17/12/1919 (press cutting): Minutes 
29/11/1937. 
55 Daily Telegraph, 17/3/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
56 Daily Telegraph, 17 /3/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
57 Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM, 26/9/21 (press cutting): Minutes, 
29/11/1937. 
I 
28/10/19157 
I 
I 
2811011/i5_ 
I 
I 
I 58 Examiner, 4/11/1922. 
59 Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM, 26/9/21 (press cutting): Minutes, 28/10/1915-
2911111937. / 
I 
35 
another as competitors. Hogarth was therefore not supporting an industry which 
threatened his own. The increased focus upon Tasmanian textiles that large companies 
would attract was more likely to boost Waverley sales. 
The Chamber's self-congratulations proceding the arrival in Tasmania of 
K&K's representatives seem even more premature when one considers the 
transportation problems plaguing Tasmania during negotiations with, and well into the 
construction phase of, the two companies under consideration. These problems were 
persistent and undoubtedly disadvantageous to Tasmania from a business perspective. 
During the early stages of negotiations with K&K, Tasmania was isolated from the 
mainland as quarantine restrictions were imposed upon all steamers trading between 
Melbourne and Launceston in order to stem the influenza virus sweeping the country in 
1919. While this was an exceptional event, it must have underlined to potential 
investors how isolated Tasmania could be, and also reinforced the validity of existing 
concerns. The commercial danger of such isolation was obvious to local businessmen 
and the Launceston Chamber of Commerce held a special meeting to discuss the matter 
in March 1919.60 Tasmania's transportation problems extended far beyond this 
exceptional event, with shipping strikes isolating Tasmanian from the mainland 
becoming only too common in the early 1920s. As the only state unable to utilise other 
means of transportation, to move goods interstate during these interruptions, many 
Tasmanians demanded their state receive special dispensation during shipping strikes. 
Perceived federal government inaction against this problem stirred the anger of many 
locals. The Circular Head Marine Board sought support from the Launceston Mayor 
during a shipping strike in 1920, for example, aiming to influence every Tasmania 
federal member of parliament to oppose the Hughes government if communication 
between Tasmania and the mainland was not restored.61 
Against this backdrop, local Councils had an uphill battle to convince industrial 
investors of Tasmania's superiority over mainland states. Launceston Council 
therefore proceeded to use all available means to expedite the signing of K&K, as well 
as other industries, within their city. Upon hearing that another British manufacturer 
intended visiting Hobart in early 1920 (likely the chocolate manufacturer, Cadbury-Fry-
60 Special Meeting of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee, 18/3/1919: Minutes, 
8/3/1917-19/6/1930. 
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Pascall), the Launceston Chamber of Commerce wrote to the Premier suggesting that 
the delegates "stay as long as possible in Launceston on their way through". 62 
Laun~eston was criticised during the 1920s for allowing the city to be merely a transit 
stage and for making little effort to ensure that visitors spent time and money in 
Launceston.63 The Chambers' action in this case belied such criticism The wish to 
detain the "delegates" was presumably meant to give locals a chance to win the 
representative over before Hobart got a chance. 
K&K' s representative, director Reginald Claude Roe, 64 arrived in Tasmania in 
January 1920. Roe was assisted in these negotiations by the intended company 
secretary for the new mill, C.W. Danvers Walker. Originally from Launceston, 
Danvers Walker had spent the past several months at Rochdale learning about "old 
world mills".65 The selection and training of an ex-Launceston resident for this 
position might have been coincidental, or might imply that the company had already 
decided upon location. The company would have been aware of the advantages of 
having a member of a well-connected family in the company's chosen region to deal 
with locals during the establishment phase.66 While Danvers Walker's employment 
may have been a win for Launceston, neither Hobart nor Launceston's chances of 
acquiring K&K's new mill would have been helped by public discussion about 
problems with their respective water supplies when the company's representatives 
arrived. Water restrictions had been in place at Hobart for almost a month, and Hobart 
Council saw the situation as potentially dangerous. 67 The previous month, W.E. 
61 W.C. Spinks, Secretary, Circular Head Branch of the Tasmanian Farmers', Stockowners' & 
Orchardists' Association, To Launceston Mayor, 25/12/1920: Launceston City Council, Shipping 
Strike (1920). 
62 Minutes of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee, 27/1/1920: Minutes 8/3/1917-
19/6/1930. 
63 See Simon Harris, 'Selling Tasmania: Boosterism and the Creation of the Tourist State, 1912-
1928', PhD, University of Tasmania, 1993, p.152. 
64 While now British based, Claude Roe came from a prominent Australian family. His recently 
retired father, Reginald Herber Roe, had long been active in education reform in Queensland, his 
positions including inspector general of schools, professional adviser to the Minister, and first vice-
chancellor at the University of Queensland. 
Daily Telegraph 17/3/1920: K&KPress Cuttings; & E. Clarke, 'Roe', inADB, vol. 11, pp.437-8. 
65 Examiner 18/5/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
66 Danvers Walker was born at the property of Rostella on the East Tamar. Both sides of his family 
were amongst the earliest English settlers in the region, and his maternal grandfather, William 
Turner, was a former Launceston mayor. An old Grammar boy, Danvers Walker finished his 
educational training in 'the old country', was a fellow on the Chartered Institute of Secretaries, and 
married into 'a well-known English family'. 
Examiner 18/5/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
67 Mercury 20/1/1920 (Reprinted from The World). 
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Shoobridge (a Labor House of Assembly representative who was also dubbed 
Tasmania's Minister for Water),68 had claimed that the water troubles experienced in 
Hobart also prevailed in Launceston and half the townships in Tasmania.69 By January 
Launceston Council was expressing "very grave concern" about water supplies during 
their driest summer since 1914.70 Also doing little for Tasmania's appeal as an 
investment location was the occurrence of a shipping strike while K&K' s 
representatives were actually in the State.71 
Over the next few weeks further negotiations took place between the company 
and Launceston and Hobart lmd, by mid-April, a deal was in sight. K&K wanted an 
agreement signed before Roe returned to England. 72 The two K&K representatives 
had met with Hobart's mayor, Eccles Snowden, and were informed that the offer made 
several years ago regarding water supply would stand73 - presumably a move aimed at 
settling confusion over this matter. Although water rates had been paramount in 
negotiations until this point, it appears power charges clinched Launceston's success. 
Hobart was a client of the government-owned hydro scheme and Hobart Council had 
repeatedly directed K&K to deal with the Hydro Electric Department as to power 
rates. The HED had contracted to deliver power to northern Tasmania, but 
Launceston still operated exclusively from its own power supply in 1920. With the 
northern connection not yet operational, Launceston apparently felt no obligation to 
intrastate price parity and simply undercut the south. Although Hobart was aware that 
K&K was also negotiating with Launceston, a genuine belief existed that the company 
would still sign with Hobart. Upon learning that the capital city had been passed over, 
the matter was acrimoniously discussed at a Hobart City Council meeting on 19 March 
1920. Rumours circulated that Hobart's mayor or town clerk were "somehow 
responsible" for K&K's decision not to establish in Hobart,74 and that the company 
68 See W.E. Shoobridge, Tasmania's Water Power. Its Probabilities and Possibilities. How Natural 
Resources Can Make Industry (1916). 
69 Letter to the Editor, 'Water Supply', 17/12/1919: LCC Press Cuttings, 9112/1919-April 1923. 
70 
'The Water Shortage', 16/111920: LCC Press Cuttings, 9/1211919-April 1923. 
71 Representatives of the British Chocolate manufacturing firm, Cadbury, Fry & Pascall were also in 
Australia as the time looking for a site for their new factory and were temporarily stopped from 
visiting Tasmania. 
E. Collegeshaw, Representative for Cadbury' s & Fry' s Joint Agency Cadbury Brothers Ltd, To 
Premier Lee, 13/2/1920: PD 1 179/7 /20. 
72 Acting Town Clerk, Memo to City Engineer, 17/4/1920: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
73 Mercury, 30/3/1920. 
74 Mercury, 30/3/1920 
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may have been using Hobart to negotiate a better deal with Launceston.75 Many 
involved in Hobart's negotiations felt duped, and it was not long before hydro-power 
costs came under attack in the south. 
The Role of Hydro-Power 
While the hydro-electric extension to northern Tasmania in the early 1920s was 
a crucial factor in Launceston's ability to attract further industry,76 reactions to this 
development were mixed and explain ill-feeling arising from power negotiations. The 
State government appears to have left Launceston City Council hanging when it came 
to a commitment on extending the government owned hydro-power scheme to 
northern Tasmania in 1916-17. Launceston Council stressed the urgency of their 
position and pushed for a final decision on the power connection to enable alternative 
arrangements if need be. The government wanted the Council to stay its hand 
indefinitely, however, and informed them that the only prospect of a northern 
connection was the unlikely chance of Launceston attracting a large power consumer. 
Council needs alone were too small to justify expansion. 77 As it turned out the Council 
was soon negotiating with a large industry likely to meet the government's 
requirements; a white lead manufacturer. The Department claimed to be pleased about 
this eventuation and "extremely anxious" to connect Launceston to its Great Lake 
scheme, but concluded that war-time restrictions meant this would not be possible in 
the immediate future. 78 In a statement that would not have allayed northern fears about 
southern partiality, Butters added that the HED already was committed to two large 
consumers in the Hobart district and was unable to take on more. 
While 1916-17 negotiations showed that some within the Launceston Council 
were keen to connect to the State hydro-power system, final negotiations before a deal 
was signed in 1919 indicate that not everyone was enthusiastic about this prospect. In 
early 1919, the sub-committee appointed to consider increasing Launceston's power 
supply reported that the Council "could develop its own undertakings more 
75 Examiner 30/3/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
76 Launceston's promise of a guaranteed future large block of power undoubtedly also increased the 
city's confidence in making the K&K deal. 
77 W. Coogan, Mayor, To Premier, 30/12/1916: PDl 30/12/1916. 
78 Butters, Chief Engineer and General Manager, HED, To Launceston Mayor, 19/2/1917: PDl 
135/5/17. For more detail on the white lead venture, see below, pp.72-73. 
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advantageously from a departmental viewpoint" for increases in domestic supply.79 
They also acknowledged that the Council would not be able to supply large power 
blocks and therefore, "for the future welfare of the city", advised connection with the 
new State scheme. A conference was subsequently held between Council and State 
representatives in mid-April, and a tentative agreement to connect to the State owned 
scheme was reached. 80 
In late 1919 Launceston City Council debated the proposed new power 
arrangements under which the State Hydro Electric Department was, in the Council's 
terminology, "to assume a sort of parental control over municipalities".81 While 
recognising that this was desirable from'the Department's view point, the Council was 
not entirely happy and showed an unwillingness to conform to new State controls 
during the early 1920s. One organisation keenly awaiting the completion of the new 
State power scheme, however, was the Launceston Chamber of Commerce. 
Recognising the potential for promoting industrial development, Chamber 
representatives met with J.H. Butters82 (chief engineer and general manager of the 
HED) and expressed hope that the Council would accept the Department's terms. But 
approval was not unanimous, even within this organisation. As one wearing dual hats 
of Chamber of Commerce member and Councillor, Percy Hart personally opposed the 
terms offered to the Council, but claimed he would accept the majority Council 
decision.83 The final agreement was signed on 1 December 1919, power supply to 
commence by the summer of 1923. 84 Presumably it was the difference between the 
79 Report of sub-committee on Increased Power Supply, 31/1/1919: PDl 135/6/19. 
8° Conference held at Launceston between representatives of State Government and Launceston 
Corporation (undated): PDl 135/6/19; & Mercury 15/4/1919. 
81 R.J. Strike, Memo To Sub-Committee on Increased Power Agreement with Government Hydro-
Electric Department, 22/9/1919: Launceston City Council, Hydro Electric Department & Supply of 
Power, 1918-1921. 
82 English born Sir John Henry Butters (1885-1969) was transferred to Australia in 1909 by his 
employers Siemens Brothers Dynamo Works Ltd as chief engineer to their Melbourne based 
Australasian branch. ·The following year he was consulted by Complex Ores Co. Ltd and its 
subsidiary the Hydro-Electric Power & Metallurgical Co. Ltd regarding their Tasmanian proposal to 
produce electricity for processing zinc ore; the State's first such major scheme. With this company 
actively beginning operations in August 1911, Butters resigned his existing position and joined the 
Tasmanian venture as engineer and chief manager in September. Due to financial problems the 
undertaking was acquired by the State Government, Butters becoming chief engineer and general 
manager of the new Hydro-Electric Department. For a summary of Butters' extensive and 
multifaceted career see G.J.R. Linge, 'Butters', in ADB, vol. 7, pp.512-4. 
83 Meeting of Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee, 6/5/1919: Minutes, 8/3/1917-
19/6/1930. 
84 Copy of Agreement between Tasmanian Government, HED and Mayor and Aldermen and Citizens 
of Launceston for Supply of Electrical Energy, 1112/1919: PDl 135/6/19. 
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dates of signing and supply which led to subsequent problems. Launceston Council 
adopted the view that it retained the right to control power supply deals in this interim 
period. Under pressure from southern interests, the HED attempted to exert its 
authority. 
After Launceston undercut Hobart's power deal with K&K, the HED moved to 
ensure that Launceston did not do this again. In mid-1920 H.S. Williams made 
inquiries about establishing a factory near Hobart. 85 As a final decision upon location 
had not been reached, he was informed by Butters that the same rates would apply for 
both Launceston and Hobart. Butters then sent a telegram and letter to Launceston 
Council to ensure they also bore this in mind when interviewing Williarns;86 a move 
which suggested that Butters did not greatly trust the Launceston Council regarding 
power rates. Butters' mistrust appeared well founded, as Launceston was slow to heed 
the message that it could not continue to determine its own power rates irrespective of 
the HED's wishes. In October 1920, the HED again wrote to the Launceston Council 
claiming that a possible large scale power consumer had recently "expressed the 
opinion that he could probably obtain power in Launceston at a lower price than in 
Hobart".87 The potential power consumer, A. Sinclere, subsequently confirmed that he 
had been quoted a cheaper power price by Launceston (or as Butter's phrased it, that a 
lower offer had been made "by you than we are prepared to consider in Hobart").88 
Butters therefore threatened Launceston Council with implied legal action, by warning 
they were overlooking clause 20 of their agreement with the HED. The HED tried to 
point out that an outcome which saw the Department and the Council entering "into 
any kind of competition for the sale of power" was undesirable. Refuting the HED's 
claims, Launceston Council affirmed that they had only quoted the same price for 
power that had been offered to the woollen mills. They also claimed to have never 
quoted a large scale power consumer at a lower price than that agreed between itself 
85 J.H. Butters, To H.S. Williams, Hobart, 16/611921: Launceston City Council, Hydro Power etc., 
Enquiries for 1920, 1921. 
86 Butters, To Town Clerk, Telegram No. 121, 18/6/1920; & Butters, To Town Clerk, 18/6/1920: 
Launceston City Council, Hydro Power etc., Enquiries for 1920,1921. 
87 HED, To Launceston Town Clerk, 4110/1920: Launceston City Council, Hydro Power etc., 
Enquiries for 1920,1921. 
88 The phrasing of Butters' statement in which the 'we' was interchangeable for his Department and 
the city of Hobart would have done little to convince Launcestonians that his Department was 
impartial in regional sympathies. 
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and Butters' Department, 89 a statement which ignored that the Council and HED had 
agreed upon very little. The Department had its way, telling Sinclere that Launceston's 
quote had been based on a misunderstanding, and sent a revised figure. Launceston, it 
was maintained, had "not fully appreciated the fact that to sell power on such terms 
must result, in the majority of cases, in a loss". 90 If the HED thought that Launceston 
Council had now been put in its place, negotiations with P&B would reveal 
Launceston' s continuing dissatisfaction with the restrictions placed upon it. In the 
meantime, however, Launceston Council's refusal to toe the HED's line assisted it in 
acquiring a substantial new industry - K&K. 
A Deal Finalised 
After a deal for power and water was finalised, a site was selected for the mill 
at the western end of Mayne Street in Invermay.91 Roe purchased two adjoining 
blocks, the larger covered over eight acres and was purchased first on 30 April 1920 
from Edmund Mozier King for £2,000.92 A second purchase of approximately one 
acre-was made three days later from Downes James Barnard for £635. This was a high 
price considering the cost of the first block and suggested that Barnard played upon the 
company's desire to have this adjoining property.93 The site was chosen for its close 
proximity to the river and King's Wharf. On 3 May the company awarded the contract 
to erect a ferro-concrete woollen mill to Sydney architect, Edward Giles Stone, who 
was to handle all negotiations connected with the construction of the mill. 94 Stone had 
recently come from Victoria in connection with the railway workshops at 
Launceston,95 and was recognised as "one of the most eminent consulting engineers 
and concrete specialists in Australia".96 His appointment promised many advantages 
for the company, as his connections enabled him to secure machinery and materials 
otherwise unobtainable, or available only after long delays. His duties included the 
89 City Treasurer for Acting Town Clerk, To HED, 8/10/1920: Launceston City Council, Hydro Power 
etc., Inquiries for 1920, 1921. 
90 HED, To Sinclere, 28/10/1920: Launceston City Council, Hydro Power etc., Enquiries for 1920, 
1921. 
91 
'Woollen Mill, A Site Selected', undated: K&K Press Cuttings. 
92 Agreement to purchase land from Edmund M. King: Held by P.M. Hart. 
93 Agreement to purchase land for D.J. Barnard: Held by P.M. Hart. 
94 
'Woollen Mill, A Site Selected', undated: K&K Press Cuttings; & Agreement between E.G. Stone 
& R.C. Roe, 3/5/1920. 
95 
'Woollen Mills, A Site Selected', undated: K&K Press Cuttings. 
96 Australasian, 11111921. 
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preparation and provision of reports, plans and estimates, through to the supervision of 
construction work, either personally or through his own selected foremen. Stone was 
also to provide the skilled labour, with all labourers paid for by the company. For his 
part, Stone would receive a 5% commission on the agreed estimate of £32,570.97 The 
estimate was prepared working upon a fixed price for labour and materials, increases in 
which were not held as Stone's responsibility. Labour rates within the estimate were, 
however, worked out at current Tasmanian rates plus an additional ls. per day per 
head to cover the contingency of a pay increase.98 While Stone was required to use all 
means "to expedite the speedy completion" of the works,99 an agreement which 
contained so many variables proved to be unwise on K&K' s part. With proceedings at 
this point, Roe returned to London, leaving company secretary, Danvers Walker, to 
conduct K&K' s business.100 
The new company was registered as Kelsall & Kemp (Tasmania) Limited and 
had six directors, three each from Britain and Tasmania. The original British 
contingent consisted of Lord Rochdale (as Chairman), Jesse Lord and Reginald Claude 
Roe, the three men who had negotiated the company's establishment in the State. The 
Australasian termed the selection of local talent to fill the other half of the directorial 
positions as "wise", and suggested that it was in some part a reward for those involved 
with promotion of the industry in Tasmania.101 The rewarded Tasmanian directors 
were George Cragg, Sir Henry Jones and Percy Hart. While Jones' and Hart's 
pertinent efforts have been noted, George Cragg, who was appointed vice-chairman, 
was praised by the Australasian as being unsurpassed in his efforts to promote local 
industry. This claim was later reiterated by Launceston's mayor, who held that 
I 
throughout his life, Cragg "contributed in no small measure to the building up of many 
97 Stone's commission was to be paid quarterly and be based upon the value of the work done during 
that period. He was further to be compensated up to a maximum of £250 for associated travel and 
accommodation expenses. If any of his chosen foremen or skilled workmen came from the mainland, 
they too were to be reimbursed for travelling expenses, as well as any other expenses to which they 
were entitled under Union rules or as was customary to their trade. If any additional work was 
required by the company over and above that already agreed upon, Stone would handle these 
arrangements as well, at an increased commission of 10% of cost. 
Agreement between E.G. Stone & R.C. Roe, 3/5/1920: Held by P.M. Hart. 
98 Letter from Stone, To Directors, K&K, c/- Roe, 3/5/1920: Held by P.M. Hart. 
Increases in these costs were not considered to be an increase in the estimate, or in Stone's 
commission, which was probably a wise stipulation considering subsequent cost increases. 
Agreement between E.G. Stone & R.C. Roe, 3/5/1920: Held by P.M. Hart. 
99 Agreement between E.G. Stone & R.C. Roe, 3/5/1920: Held by P.M. Hart. 
100 Australasian 111/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
101 Australasian, 1/1/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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of the institutions in our city which we hold most dear". 102 A New Zealander by birth, 
Cragg had extensive experience in the woollen industry. He was managing director of 
the Launceston based Tasmanian Woolgrowers' Agency Company, and during the war 
received Prime Ministerial appointment as chairman of the Tasmanian State Wool 
Committee. Becoming Tasmania's representative when that organisation was taken 
over by the federal agency, BA WRA, Cragg served as chairman of the Tasmanian 
branch of the National Woolselling Brokers' Association, and President of the National 
Agricultural and Pastoral Society. Described as "a wool enthusiast", Cragg "never 
tired of telling visitors of the improvement of the Tasmanian fleece". 103 As with the 
other promoters, Cragg's appointment benefited both his own and the company's 
interests. 104 
K&K (Tas)'s mill was, at first, to be directed toward the manufacture of 
flannel. The target was around 10,000 pieces of flannel annually from 180,000 pounds 
of wool. 105 The venture's success appeared assured, considering K&K Ltd's buoyant 
position at that time. K&K Ltd had taken a major step forward by floating as a public 
company in 1919,106 and in the early 1920s owned several groups of mills iri and 
around Rochdale, had a debenture and share capital of just over £ 1,000,000, 107 and 
employed around 1,800 people (reputedly large for this class of manufacturing). 108 
According to the Examiner, "public interest and keenness [had] been fully 
roused" in K&K's Tasmanian mill and, according to those "competent to judge, the 
venture should lack nothing in the matter of support". 109 . On 18 May 1920 Roe had 
announced that there would be no public issue of shares, but that Tasmanians would be 
given some opportunity to invest in the new mill as K&K intended to raise a large 
amount of capital both in Tasmania and on the mainland. 110 The Australasian 
reiterated this point a few months later.m K&K's intention was that share capital for 
the Tasmanian venture would consist of 50,000 £ 1 preference shares to be offered to 
102 Examiner, 19/10/1934. 
103 Australasian, 1/1/1921. 
104 H.J. Gibbney & Ann G. Smith (comps. & eds.), Biographical Register 1788-1939: Notes from the 
name index of the Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra, 1987); & Examiner, 19/1011934. 
105 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1919-20, No. 21, p.4: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1920-21. 
106 Kelsall and Kemp Limited, p.16: QVM. 
107 
'Woollen Mills, A Site Selected': K&K Press Cuttings. 
108 Examiner, 18/5/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
109 Examiner 18/5/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
110 Examiner, 18/511920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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Australians. Of the 100,000 £ 1 ordinary shares, the parent company would hold 
51,000, the English directors 15,000, 112 and the Australian public 34,000.113 While 
K&K (Tas), more than its counterpart P&B, would make much ado about being a 
Tasmania company, in reality local involvement in a financial sense, and therefore in a 
decision and profit making capacity, was limited. Securing some local capital made 
good business sense. Even minimal local investment ensured commitment to the 
venture by the most influential locals - those with money. In a period when the desire 
for national self-sufficiency encouraged consumer support of domestic industry, local 
investment also reinforced the perception that this was truly a Tasmanian company. In 
accordance with the company's intention, George Cragg subsequently announced that 
65% of the company's shares had been purchased by London people, with a large 
proportion of the balance taken up by Australians. 114 Difficulty disposing of this 
comparatively small local share allotment, however, meant that the percentage of 
English holdings rose even higher. By mid-1922, 66,000 ordinary shares were held by 
K&K Rochdale and its directors, only 14,000 by mainland investors and 6,000 by 
Tasmanians. 115 (For a list of shareholders and summary of share capital as at June 
1922, see Appendix B.) 
Difficulty disposing of the local shares was one of the first signs that the tide of 
optimism on which ventures such as K&K (and subsequently P&B) were founded was 
waning. This became apparent soon after K&K's inception. In December 1920, J. 
Jordon requested his allotment be reduced from 2,000 to 500 shares "owing to the 
unsettled conditions of the wool market" .116 The company refused. Jordon was not a 
one-off case, as J. Davenport previously had a similar request refused and was 
ct:hreatening legal action against K&K if they did not reconsider and cancel his 
111 Australasian1/111921: K&KPress Cuttings. 
112 Of the 66,000 shares held by the parent company and its directors in 1922, 5,000 had been given to 
promoters "in payment for inception &c". On 5 September 1921, K&K (Tas) and K&K Ltd had 
signed an agreement whereby the English company transferred to the Tasmanian company, "the 
benefit of the contract entered into by the English company for the purchase of a site, the erection of 
buildings, and the services of power, light, and water". K&K also agreed to "procure and lay out the 
machinery'', provide skilled workmen, give "detailed technical information" regarding dyeing, 
manufacturing and selling, as well as the right to use their existing trade marks. 
Agreement between the two firms on setting up in Launceston: Held by P.M. Hart; & Letter attached 
to inside cover, 1317/1920 in Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings .. 
113 Prospectus of K&K (Tas) Ltd, 21/9/1920, as cited in Forster, Industrial Development, p.82. 
114 
'Promotion of Industry, New Woollen Mills', undated: K&K Press Cuttings. 
115 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
116 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 20/12/1920. 
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allotment. K&K again refused. K&K' s difficulty in disposing of its local share 
allotment continued and, prior to the second AGM, directors discussed the likelihood 
of placing the remaining 9,813 preference shares and 7,169 ordinary shares. Not 
wishing to undermine investor confidence, directors concluded that any further 
"systematic canvassing in the State at present would lead to the impression that shares 
were being hawked around". 117 At the 1921 AGM directors were still expressing hope 
that the unalloted shares would be taken up in Tasmania. us For the remainder of that 
decade, however, K&K (Tas) failed to dispose of most of these remaining shares. 
Undercapitalised, they would struggle financially during this period.119 
Construction 
Launceston Council's agreement with K&K stipulated that supply of both 
power and water must commence no later than 31 March 1923. This allowed the 
company a year to build, a year to install machinery, and another year for 
contingencies. No one expected anything like this time would be necessary. 120 If they 
had, the company would probably have had doubts about establishing anywhere in 
Tasmania. Upon concluding negotiations, Roe maintained it would be possible for the 
company to commence operations within twelve months. At the same time, the Daily 
Telegraph was discussing a shortage of some building materials due to the shipping 
strike and other unspecified causes. 121 Such problems during the construction period 
would distort Roe's time-frame, and the start of production only just met the March 
1923 deadline. 
With the K&K contract secured, in July 1920 the Chief Inspector for Factories, 
Henry Reynolds, reported to parliament that building was to begin immediately on a 
mill which would cover two acres of ground. 122 Difficulties associated with shortages 
of labour and building materials, and delivery of machinery from England saw Roe's 
time-table already been pushed back. Reynolds now estimated that operations would 
begin in around 18 months. This was just the first of many altered deadlines before 
117 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 13/5/1921. 
118 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Second AGM, 24/5/1921. 
119 Colin Forster, Industrial Development, p.82. 
120 Ritchie & Parker, Alfred Green & Co, To Acting Town Clerk, 21/6/1920: Launceston City 
Council, 19/4.1. 
121 Daily Telegraph, l 7 /3/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
122 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1919-20, No. 21, p.4: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1920-21. 
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production began. Meanwhile, in September 1920, K&K requested that the supply of 
power be "hastened forward" as it was now required for building purposes. 123 Despite 
initial optimism, K&K' s construction process was destined to be slow. In 1921 Cragg 
reported to K&K' s first annual meeting that under "ordinary conditions" the mill would 
be completed early next year.124 Unfortunately for the company, they encountered a 
string of extraordinary conditions throughout the construction process. Only when 
work was under way did various problems became manifest. 
One such area related to local building labourers. Almost from the start 
directors were unhappy about both the cost and performance of labourers working on 
the mill site. In June 1921 directors discussed the need to increase labourers wages in 
accordance with the Builders' and Painters' Award, which had come into force on 20 
May. 125 The Award called for payment of 18s. per day or 2s. 3d. per hour. 126 When 
agreements had been made, labourers were being paid 9s. to 10s. per day, carpenters 
13s. per day and boys from 3s. to 4s. per day.127 In defiance of the Award, directors 
instead decided to offer labourers 14s. per day from that date and left the matter for 
Stone to arrange.128 Later in the month the following increases were confirmed: 
I leading hand to be paid 19s. 6d. per day for a 44 hour week 
2 Mixer hands to be paid 18s. per day for a 44 hour week 
1 Winch hand to be paid 18s. per day for a 44 hour week 
1 Tackle hand to be paid 18s. per day for a 44 hour week 
1 Leading Reinforcing hand to be paid 18s. per day for a 44 hour week 
Rest of Labourers to be paid 14s. per day for a 44 hour week 
Reinforcing hands to be paid 48 hours pay for a 44 hour week. 129 
Increasing the wages of a few to the new Award rate was presumably aimed at 
claiming compliance with the Award. Authorities were not, however, convinced and in 
July 1921 Stone came to the attention of the Inspector of Factories for paying below 
Award wages to 14 labourers presently employed by K&K. Compliance was estimated 
to cost an extra £720. 130 After counsel's opinion was sought regarding the definition 
123 Danvers Walker, To Town Clerk, 24/9/1920: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
124 
'Launceston Woollen Mills ... First Annual Meeting Held', Daily Telegraph, 25/5/1921: K&K 
Press Cuttings. 
125 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 7/6/1921. 
126 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 221711921. 
127 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
128 Upon Stone's recommendation foreman N.W. Patterson's wages were also to be increased to £8 per 
week, along with an expression of appreciation "of the interest and zeal he showed in his work". 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 7/6/1921. 
129 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/6/1921. 
130 Minutes, K&K Directors' Meeting, 2217/1921. 
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of what constituted a labourer in the Builders' Award - described by directors as "not a 
very intelligent instrument" - K&K concluded their labourers were not covered under 
the determination and were advised not to pay.131 The company made no future 
reference to this decision. 
Building progress at the mill was also perceived as too slow and it was 
determined that changes must be implemented if the mill was to be completed "within a 
reasonable time" .132 The criticism was aimed at Stone, with the problem specified 
being the unsatisfactory nature of the boys he employed. After visiting the site in July, 
for example, Hart had noted the boys on steel, sorting and bending were "not attending 
to their work" .133 The responsible foreman acknowledged that he had experienced · 
difficulty getting reliable boys, but was convinced these were the best that could be 
procured. Stone responded to such criticism by explaining that "Boy labour [was] 
usually unsatisfactory to a certain extent but it was the cheapest" and claimed that the 
mill was progressing as quickly as possible without increasing the number of men 
employed. 134 A suggestion to dismiss the boys currently employed and replace them 
with new ones was also not seen as a viable option. Stone claimed that new ones 
would be no better, and that "in spite of their skylarking you are getting good value for 
money expended" .135 He suggested that, if the company was unhappy, a decision had 
to made to replace the boys with men, or employ extra supervision, both options 
increasing costs.136 He cited experience at Cadbury, another of his const~ctions 
simultaneously under way in Hobart, where most of the work was done by men at 14s. 
per day, as that firm was "determined to push on at any reasonable cost" .137 Intended 
to highlight that K&K was hiring cheaper boy labour and got what it paid for, his claim 
also showed that men at the Cadbury site were similarly being paid below Award 
wages. As Stone employed the labour at both sites it is reasonable to assume that 
nothing was done to enforce either company to comply with the Award. Ignoring the 
131 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 19/8/1921. 
132 K&K Secretary, To E.G. Stone, 26/9/1921 in Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings. 
133 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 2217/1921. 
134 Stone, To K&K, 26 & 27/9/1921 in Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings. 
As previously mentioned, the contract stipulated that Stone select the labour and the company pay for 
it. Nevertheless Stone was obviously restricted in the type of labour that he could choose by the 
amount the company was willing to pay labourers. 
135 Stone, To K&K, 30/9/1921, Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings. 
136 Stone also warned of discontent amongst supervisory staff if allegations implying incompetence on 
their part continued. 
Stone, To K&K, 30/9/1921, Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings. 
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company's unwillingness to pay higher wages, Reynolds told parliament that K&K's 
construction was not progressing as quickly as expected. He claimed that skilled 
labour was difficult to obtairi, and the 70 to 80 hands employed on site by July 1921 
had taken "some time" to train.138 
While the surge being experienced in construction work throughout Tasmania 
at that time boosted the State's economy, it also had drawbacks for newly-arrived 
industries, as well as for attracting further industry. During the early part of 1921 
builders and contractors were having "difficulty securing sufficient numbers of 
journeymen", due to the many buildings under construction at the time. 139 As far as 
potential investors were concerned, this situation must have raised questions as to 
Tasmania's longer term ability to supply labour requirements. If considered in unison 
with strikes and supply shortages, Tasmania would not have looked a particularly 
attractive investment location. 
The growth spurt leading to building labourer shortages was reputedly short-
lived, with the State government claiming in July 1921 that the building trade had 
slowed. Decreasing metal prices and the associated "recent closure of many mines" 
had also swelled the numbers in this trade, resulting in the supply of artisans roughly 
equalling demand:140 so went the argument, although P&B's subsequent experiences 
call it into question. While improvements in the building labourer position were 
positive from K&K's perspective, even if only short-lived, new problems soon arose to 
take their place. 
By the Third AGM in May 1922, directors attempted to address "a certain 
feeling" amongst shareholders about the slow progress of K&K's construction. 141 
Shareholders had expected production to have already commenced, leading directors 
to explain that "exceptional circumstances" had resulted in the mill not yet being 
operational. Robert Hogarth requested the original estimate of building costs as 
137 Stone, To K&K, 30/9/1921, Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings. 
138 Sixth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.7: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1921-22. 
139 Sixth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.37: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1921-22. 
140 Sixth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.37: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1921-22. 
This claim implied that new industries such as the textile manufacturers and Cadbury were merely off-
setting the downturn in other areas (arguably with worse jobs than the ones they replaced), rather than 
substantially strengthening the state's economy 
141 
'Commercial, Finance & Trade, K&K (Tas) Ltd', 25/5/1922: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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compared with the current estimate. The figure had risen from £32,570 to £63,000, 
although Stone held that he did not agree with this estimate and believed the work 
would not cost that much.142 This led one H. McKenzie to inquire whether the 
company was able to finance the work with the money it presently had, and was 
informed that the remaining 1 Os. balance on ordinary shares would be called up before 
manufacturing commenced, while an additional 50,000 preference shares would be 
issued. Difficulties selling the existing share issue, let alone more, were not mentioned. 
The purchase and installation of machinery was also proving expensive and causing 
delays.143 In October 1921 Stone had informed directors that he anticipated difficulty 
acquiring specially skilled labour to assist in installing the machinery, and expected it 
could take twelve months to erect.144 Directors admitted that the machinery had been 
expensive, but felt that it could not have been obtained for less. In an attempt to cut 
costs, K&K had supplemented some of the "very best" new machinery available with 
"really high grade second hand machinery"145 (although they subsequently admitted 
that the second hand machinery "had not been purchased at the top end of the 
market").146 These cost-cutting measures in machinery were later shown to have 
hampered the company's progress throughout the 1920s. Countering criticism of cost 
blow-outs, directors maintained that K&K Ltd felt sure that K&K (Tas) would "give a 
good account" of itself compared with other modern mills floated at the same time. 
142 The original estimate did not include professional fees, whilst the revised estimate did. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/511922. 
143 
'Commercial, Finance & Trade, K&K (Tas) Ltd', 25/5/1922: K&K Press Cuttings; & Minutes of 
K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
K&K' s machinery and its erection had, to date, cost £40,500 and only around half the machinery had 
yet arrived. Machinery, including installation, was expected to eventually total £54,000. K&K (Tas) 
had also experienced some difficulties in acquiring its equipment in one piece, presumably increasing 
costs. In early 1921 K&K Launceston advised Rochdale to start sending machinery directly from 
England to Launceston to avoid "transhipment" "which causes much damage" - reinforced glass so far 
arriving in "very bad condition". Machinery, however, continued to arrive damaged. In June 1921 
the mill cabled Rochdale regarding necessary replacement parts due to ongoing damage. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 10/1/1921 & 7/6/1921. 
144 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 4/10/1921. 
Considering the on-going difficulties associated with this project, Stone possibly rued the day he 
agreed to undertake the K&K contract. While relations between Stone and directors were already 
tense after the labour problems, in April 1922 the Board expressed a lack of faith in Stone by 
questioning his estimates on cement used in construction, and requesting verification both from the 
English architect who had drawn up the original plan and from another concrete specialist. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 28/4/1922. 
145 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
146 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
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The parent company also believed that Australian demand was "a long way from being 
satisfied", and expected good results in the long term. 147 
Shareholders were not prepared to let the issue of a cost blow-out drop. Big 
businessman A.G. Ferrall asked how expenses had spiralled. 148 Stone invoked many 
factors. He claimed that the original estimate had been made before a site was chosen 
and had assumed the land would be level, ignoring excavation costs. This statement 
was not altogether true. Stone's contract was signed three days after the main block of 
land was purchased, and he must have been aware of the site, even if his estimate did 
not allow for excavations. It was additionally explained that costs had been based on 
wage rates current at the time of the contract, and that rates had increased substantially 
since then. Although correct, this explanation ignored the company's refusal to pay 
award rates, 149 and failed to mention that some leeway had been allowed for wage 
increases in the original estimate. After the previously mentioned pay increases, one of 
K&K' s foreman had also commented that ''the amount ... estimated for such wages 
was not being exceeded". 150 Shareholders were then told how the original plan had 
been altered. The first was drawn up by an English architect and subsequently fused in 
with another made by Stone. The building was originally designed in brick, but the 
company had been convinced that cement was a better option, presumably by Stone, a 
recognised cement expert. As well as using approximately 600 cubic yards more 
cement than originally estimated (a total of 4,000 cubic yards), cement had risen from 
around 20s. a cask to 40s. within a year. This most decisively blew out costs. 151 Roe 
assured shareholders that tenders to build the mill in brick had been much higher152 (but 
the subsequent story suggests that rather they might have been more realistic). 
The decision to construct the mill in cement blighted K&K more than any other 
during this period. Concern over cement supplies at K&K was already being noted in 
147 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
148 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
149 Figures cited to shareholders were that labourers wages had increased from between 9s. and 10s. 
(also claimed to be 9s. and 12s.) to between 14s. and 18s.; carpenters rose from 13s. to £1 per day and 
boys from 3s. or 4s. to 8s. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
150 The reference was made specifically in regard to recent wage increases for reinforcement hands. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 22/7/1921. 
151 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922; & 'New Woollen Mills, Completion 
in Ten Months', 20/611921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
The mill was estimated to use 4,000 cubic yards of concrete, distributed by a sixty foot shaft (along 
with 200 tons of steel). 
152 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Third AGM, 24/5/1922. 
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November 1920,153 and by the following month Stone began promoting the idea of 
Tasmania manufacturing its own cement supply. The current national and international 
scarcity of Portland cement154 had been further aggravated in Tasmania by shipping 
strikes. 155 Total Tasmanian requirements were estimated at 90,000 casks p.a., 156 and 
Stone's current Tasmanian works alone (which included the railway workshops, K&K 
and Cadbury)157 required as much as 40,000 casks of cement. Many Tasmanian works 
were "absolutely blocked" through inability to acquire Portland cement. 158 With 
several Tasmanian projects alre3;dy examined, Stone concluded that Fingal was the best 
site for the manufacture of cement, as it was the only local area with the three 
necessary materials - limestone, clay and coal.159 Stone therefore personally secured an 
option over the Silkstone Mine, five miles from Fingal and 76 miles from Launceston, 
as well as over machinery from Melbourne. 160 Supply problems had reached crisis 
point by early 1921,161 and yet another shipping strike aggravated matters. In light of 
Tasmania's current "extraordinary demand" on cement, and with the cost of cement 
having "practically doubled in the past 12 months", Stone's proposal for Tasmanian 
self sufficiency in cement gained momentum. 
Seeking financial assistance from the government, Stone submitted the Fingal 
Cement Company's prospectus to the Premier for approval on 11 December 1920. 162 
The company had a nominal capital of £70,000 in £ 1 shares; 48,000 of these were to 
be offered to the public, and 7 ,OOO to be issued as fully paid to Stone in consideration 
of his options over leases and machinery and for services rendered, past and future. 163 
The Prospectus also claimed that Cadbury-Fry-Pascall and K&K were respectively to 
153 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 6/11/1920. 
154 
'Fingal Cement Proposition', Letter to the Editor by E.G. Stone, 16/12/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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'Cement Still Short', 10/1/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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Work had been suspended for over a year at the Railway Department's roundhouse at Invermay and 
the Trevallyn reservoir for the City Council, resulting in continued water shortages for that suburb. 
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subscribe 5,000 and 2,000 shares.164 While the government declined to take up shares, 
a £5,000 government loan was being negotiated on the proviso that Cadbury and K&K 
took up their share option and that £24,000 was raised from the public.165 For their 
involvement, Cadbury, K&K (Tas) and the State government were to each nominate a 
director. Stone was to act as managing director. 166 
The scheme was publicly launched in Launceston on 12 January 1921. At a 
meeting attended by some 40 "leading" citizens, Stone sought capital by the end of the 
month. The meeting was presided over by leading Launceston businessman, G.E. 
Harrap, 167 who deemed the proposition sound and played upon north/south rivalry 
when he declared his hope that the industry would stay in the north. 168 Links between 
self-sufficiency and national pride were also utilised. The Commissioner of Railways 
had predicted there was no chance of getting supplies from other states, and that 
Tasmania would be forced to rely predominantly upon Japan and Norway for cement, 
along with small amounts from England. Within a few days of this meeting the 
Examiner announced the incorporation of The Fingal Cement Company Ltd., with a 
nominal capital of £ 100,000. Subscriptions for 80,000 £ 1 shares were invited 
immediately.169 
In late February, however, the government accused the cement company's 
Prospectus of misleading the public.17° Claims of backing from Cadbury and K&K 
164 Prospectus of Reliance, Lime, Cement & Pottery Company Ltd; & Lee, To Stone, 17/12/1920: PDl 
100/5/21. 
165 Stone, To Lee, 11/1211920; & Lee, To Stone, 17112/1920: PDl 100/5/21. 
166 Prospectus of Reliance, Lime, Cement & Pottery Company Ltd: PDl 100/5/21. 
167 Launceston Grammar School educated, George Edward Harrap (1856-1937) gained banking 
experience both locally and interstate before joining his father's wool broking, grain and produce 
business in the late 1880s. Becoming head of Harrap & Sons upon his father's death in 1893, the 
company was incorporated in 1924. George had many interests, succeeding his father as vice-consul 
for Norway and Sweden in 1891, becoming justice of the peace in 1894, having a distinguished career 
in the Launceston Volunteer Artillery, and acting as president of the Launceston Chamber of 
Commerce in 1909-1910. 
R.A. Ferrall, 'Harrap', in ADB, vol. 9, pp.207-8. 
168 
'Cement at Fingal', 13/1/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
169 
'The Fingal Cement Company Ltd', 21/1/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
170 Lee, To Stone, 25/2/1921: PDl 100/5/21. 
Stone seems to have had a propensity for attracting trouble, he and the General Manager of the HED, 
Butters, being subject to an inquiry by a Government Select Committee over the alleged destruction or 
removal of certain correspondence in 1923. Stone had a contract with the HED regarding the 
construction of the Great Lake Dam which was cancelled for unspecified reasons. Related 
correspondence containing recriminatory statements about Stone and certain HED officials were 
subsequently destroyed through mutual agreement between Stone and Butters. Eventually cleared on 
any wrong-doing, the Committee concluded there were no regulations covering correspondence 
received and suggested a policy change. 
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were, for example, questionable. K&K directors were only discussing "Stone's 
proposition" as late as 10 January 1921. Even then their only commitment was that 
they "might" consider the proposal if Stone could guarantee cement production within 
six months. The matter was held over until local directors could attended the public 
meeting two days later, and even then they could only make a recommendation to 
Rochdale. 171 K&K's seriousness about investing in the cement venture was even more 
doubtful in view of the decision at the same directors' meeting to approve a loan of up 
to £10,000 to Sir Henry Jones and Co Ltd, more money than K&K (Tas) had at the 
time. 172 After attending the public meeting Stackhouse and Danvers Walker concluded 
that "although sympathising with the movement, it was not likely to benefit [K&K] so 
as to relieve its needs in the near future". 173 Jones had then met with Stone, who had 
been unable to guarantee cement supplies within the six months deadline. K&K (Tas.) 
did cable Rochdale for advice on this matter, but also began discussing alternative 
supply sources. It was subsequently revealed that K&K' s Articles of Association 
precluded them from investing in the cement venture anyway. 174 It was also revealed 
in February that Cadbury's had probably never intended investing in the project 
because, in their words, of "an aversion to Side Shows" .175 With the cement company 
floundering, a proposal was floated for its site to move to Launceston. 176 One reason 
offered for the locational change was that Launceston could provide electricity. At 
Fingal the company needed to generate its own power.177 Stone's self-interest in this 
venture became apparent when it was disclosed that new plant patented by Stone and 
in the process of being patented in various countries around the world, was be to 
installed at the Launceston cement manufactory. 178 The Tasmanian venture would 
presumably have proved the viability of his plant. While negotiations continued for 
Contract between the HED and Mr. E.G. Stone, Report of Select Committee, 14/8/1923, No. 22, 
Tasmania. Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, 1923-24. 
171 K&K Minutes of Directors' Meetings, 10/1/1921. 
172 K&K Minutes of Directors' Meetings, 10/1/1921 & 17/1/1921. 
Finalisation of the decision to loan Jones' Co. £9,000, K&K's entire credit balance, was reached at the 
next meeting when the cement proposal was also rejected. See above, p.31. 
173 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 17/111921. 
174 Martin & Hobskirk, Solicitors, To Lee, 4/3/1921: PDl 100/5/21. 
175 Stone, To Lee, 26/2/1921: PDl 100/5/21. 
176 Inglis, Cruikshank & Creasy, Public Accountants, To Premier, 6/511921: PDl 100/5/21 
177 
'Fingal Cement, Immediate ... operations', 23/3/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
178 Lee, Minute paper to Minister for Railways, 10/5/1921; & Stone, To Premier, 20/5/1921: PDl 
100/5/21. 
Stone committed to replace the plant with the ordinary type at his expense if it failed. 
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some months, the government now declined to advance the company a loan, 179 
correspondence on the venture petering out by mid-1921.180 
Alternative arrangements were therefore necessary to acquire cement for 
building. In early February 1921 arrangements were made for a large shipment of 
English cement to arrive in Launceston by April, much of which would be purchased 
by Launceston City Council and the State government. 181 K&K also received word 
from the home firm at the end of February that 400 tons of cement was on its way from 
England. 182 K&K evidently managed to find some supplies before this arrived as, in 
mid-April, the Examiner reported that increased supplies of cement and steel had 
enabled better progress to be made on K&K's structural work. With a further supply 
of cement and the first of its machinery expected to arrived from England on a direct 
steamer before the end of the month, 183 prospects appeared to be looking up for the 
company. The expected shipments arrived on schedule, one consisting mainly of 1,225 
tons of cement, more than half intended for K&K. 184 The other consisted of the mill's 
first 123 packages of machinery.185 By mid-1921 all supplies were supposedly on 
ground, and building was in full swing. K&K's engineering expert, Sam Tuting, and 
around half the machinery had arrived from Rochdale, the machinery to be installed as 
floor space became available. The revised completion date was now set at March or 
April 1922.186 Problems with cement would, however, continue to hamper progress at 
K&K. English cement, intended to relieve problems, created more. Three different 
shades were visible in the imported batch of cement, for example, one showing faulty 
setting. 187 Cadbury's representatives even wrote to K&K suggesting that their two 
companies, along with the Railway Commissioner (all Stone's projects), take joint legal 
179 Premier, To Stone, 2/6/1921: PDl 100/5/21 
180 A cement manufacturing venture, the Tasmanian Cement Proprietary Ltd, was registered in Hobart 
in September 1922 but fell through; in 1926 the north received a second chance when a British based 
company, Foundation Ltd, proposed establishing the Beaconsfield Cement Company, although they 
too decided not to proceed with flotation because the scheme was not financially attractive. 
PD 1 179/6/22 & PD 1 179/5/26. 
181 
'English Cement', 1/2/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
182 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 28/2/1921. 
183 
'The Woollen Mills', 16/4/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
184 
'Overseas vessels for the Tamar', 19/4/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
"Good" supplies of Australia cement had begun arriving by mid-1921. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 7/6/1921. 
185 
'Overseas vessels for the Tamar', 19/411921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
186 Sixth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.7: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1921-22. 
'Launceston' s Woollen Mills ... First AGM Held', Daily Telegraph, 25/511921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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action against the cement supplier.188 A strike at the Kandos Cement Company's NSW 
works in February 1922 again saw K&K's supplies running low. On this occasion 
Stone arranged for the K&K to borrow up to 50 tons of approved British cement from 
the Tasmania Government railways. This was later to be replaced by approved Kandos 
cement.189 
After continual problems, K&K's mill was finally nearing realisation by July 
1922. The completion date was now set at the end of September, with progress 
throughout the past year described as "steady".190 Almost all machinery had now 
arrived, along with a number of expert staff. Henry Reynolds predicted that unless 
"unforeseen circumstances arose" (something no-one involved in the K&K project 
would by this stage rule out) one series of machines would begin manufacturing by the 
end of 1922. By November directors were asking Stone when the building could be 
handed over to the company. The prediction was now the year's end. 191 With 
directors concerned about overhead expenses, Stone was also asked if he could get rid 
of some of the hands. By December 1922 the building was "practically" completed, 
after what Reynolds termed "unavoidable delay". 192 
Preparing for the start of production, directors authorised the purchase of wool 
from the Brisbane sales between October and December;193 the first purchases being 
made by K&K Rochdale's visiting wool buyer.194 When the Tasmanian Woolgrowers 
Agency Co Ltd (of which George Cragg was managing director) held its first weekly 
sales of the season in early December, K&K representatives were also present for the 
first time and purchased several lots.195 To address further unspecified problems the 
187 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 5/8/1921. 
188 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 19/8/1921. 
189 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 17/211922. 
190 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
191 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 17/11/1922. 
192 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1922-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
Although construction was finally nearing an end, Stone's wrangles with K&K were not over. In 
November he applied for an additional payment of £600 in commission because of increased yardage 
of cement due to alterations and additions; directors refused to recognise the claim. A compromise 
was eventually reached, however, with half the disputed amount being paid. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Special Meeting, 17/11/1922 & 8/211923 & 2/3/1923. 
193 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 16/10/1922. 
194 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 1/12/1922. 
195 
'Wool Sales', 2/12/1922: K&K Press Cuttings. 
Lord was later reported to have purchased 300 bales of Tasmanian wool totalling £3,500, of which 
£500 was for the Tasmania mill, the rest going to Rochdale. 
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parent company again sent out director Jesse Lord in January 1923.196 K&K's official 
opening ceremony took place on 13 February 1923 and was described by local 
newspaper, the Weekly Courier, as an incident "of outstanding importance to the 
history of Launceston".197 (See illustration No. 10.) According to the Courier, 
however, "the ceremony could hardly have been more unostentatious". Production 
officially began later that month.198 Directors subsequently admitted that production 
had not genuinely commenced until 31 March, the contractual deadline for 
commencing power and water usage. 199 By April the mill had produced some flannel 
with the assistance of "a few trained workers". 200 Previously giving notice of his desire 
to resign from the Board and being asked to delay this decision, 201 Jones tendered his 
resignation as soon as the mill was under way. 202 He was replaced by local 
businessman, Carl Stackhouse.203 George Cragg also resigned soon after.204 
As K&K was set to begin its working life in Launceston, the class of flannel 
produced appeared to be in good demand. Nevertheless, the continuing frustration of 
K&K's construction process had taken a toll on the company's enthusiasm. 
Complaining that construction had been "a costly job", the company now hoped that 
the expense would be justified.205 After the economic promise of the early 1920s, by 
mid-1923 the wool market was "unsteady", and K&K claimed it was "difficult to see 
what [was] ahead of them". Although Reynolds predicted that, "given favourable 
circumstances", the company should be able to run continually once initial teething 
problems were overcome, teething problems were exacerbated by an economic down 
turn. This resulted in years passing before K&K (Tas) showed anything like the returns 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 111111923. 
196 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1922-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24; & Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 8/2/1923. 
Jesse Lord had reputedly accompanied Lord Rochdale on the 1912 visit to Tasmania and was a 
director of the Tasmanian company. 
197 Weekly Courier, 22/2/1923, p.30. 
198 Weekly Courier, 22/2/1923; & Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 22/211923. 
199 Ritchie & Parker, Alfred Green & Co, To Acting Town Clerk, 21/6/1920: Launceston City 
Council, 19/4.1. 
200 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1922-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
201 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 14/1111922. 
202 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 22/2/1923 
203 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 2/3/1923. 
204 Minutes of Directors Meetings, 16/4/1923. 
205 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1922-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
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foreseen when deciding to establish in Launceston. Similar conditions faced 
Launceston's second British woollen mill to establish in the 1920s. 
1. Top left - George Kemp (Lord Rochdale) 
The Tasmanian directors ofK&K (Tas) 
2. Top right - Percy Hart 
3. Bottom left - Sir Henry Jones 
4. Bottom right - George Cragg 
5. Top right - Early stages of 
construction at K&K (Tas)'s new 
mill, 28 February 1921 
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6. Left - The Council plan of K&K 
(Tas)'s mill site (shown upside down), 
allows easy identification in the aerial 
view below. 
7. Below - Circa 1922. Launceston city 
is in the background, and K&K' s mill 
site is on the left. The tower used to off-
load cement around the building site is 
visible, and can be seen with greater 
clarity in illustration No. 8. 
8. Above - Building progress at the K&K site, 1922. 
9. Below - The completed mill, circa 1923-24. Note the racks used for drying on the right 
side of the photograph. 
10. Above - A small group gathers for K&K (Tas)'s opening ceremony on 13 February 1923 . 
Mrs. Percy Hart switches on the electricity. 
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CHAPTER3 
PATONS & BALDWINS LIMITED, LAUNCESTON 
The Company's Origins 
At the same time that Kelsall & Kemp's representative, R.C. Roe, finalised an 
agreement to establish a new woollen mill in Launceston, two British woollen 
manufacturing competitors were negotiating amalgamation. The ramifications of this 
deal would be even more important to Launceston than the one in which the Council 
was presently involved. The amalgamation of the two companies, John Paton, Sons & 
Company, Ltd and J. & J. Baldwin and Partners, Ltd to form Patons & Baldwins, Ltd 
came into effect on 16th April 19201 and created the "largest spinning and weaving 
firm in the world". 2 The company had mills at Halifax (base of the head office), as well 
as at Alloa, Wakefield, Leicester, Melton Mowbray and Holmfirth.3 With a share 
capital of £5,000,000 Stg (five times that of K&K Ltd), P&B Ltd employed 5,000 
hands.4 Like K&K, both of the newly amalgamated companies had long histories in 
their own right dating back to the earliest days of Britain's industrial revolution. The 
Baldwin side of the partnership was commenced by James Baldwin, who began wool 
washing and fulling at Matt Shovel Yard in Northgate, Halifax in 1785. Before long, 
carding and spinning was added to these operations, and James also took his son into 
the business.5 Early the next century the Baldwins moved to a mill at Clark Bridge, 
remaining at that site for nearly 150 years.6 At the end of the nineteenth century the 
firm united with a number of similar and complementary companies to become J. & J. 
Baldwin and Partners Ltd, its title at the time of the 1920 amalgamation.7 The Paton 
1 Memorandum & Articles of Association of P&B Ltd: Held by CP. 
2 
'Land Wanted', Daily Telegraph, 4/7/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
3 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.5. 
4 
'Land Wanted', Daily Telegraph, 417/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
5 John Baldwin was Halifax's first Mayor, an office also held by his grandson exactly 50 years later. 
'History Issued by P&B, Ltd. (Publicity Department)': Held by CP. 
6 The machinery at Clark Bridge Mills stopped for good in March 1951 when production was 
transferred to the company's giant new factory at Darlington. 
'History Issued by P&B, Ltd. (Publicity Department)': Held by CP. 
7 These companies included, R.H. Barker & Co. and Isaac Briggs & Sons of Wakefield (worsted 
spinners); Whitmore's of Leicester; Rust's of Melton Mowbray; Forster & Clay of Sowerby Bridge 
(also worsted spinners who had strong connections in the hosiery manufacturing trade which was fast 
developing and making fortunes for Leicester men); and Wood & Burtt, Holmfirth (specialists in 
woollen spinning, through whom a big business in rug wool was made possible). 
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business started in Trafalgar year, 1805, when John Paton began wool dying and 
spinning in the Clackmannanshire town of Alloa, Scotland. 8 In a move replicated on 
the other side of the globe over a century later, John Paton found it necessary to import 
skilled operatives from England to teach Scottish locals in the art of textile 
prq_duction. 9 Forming a company in 1814, John subsequently took his youngest son, 
Alexander, into the partnership, the company then becoming John Paton & Son. After 
John's death in 1848, Alexander's brother-in-law and nephew also joined the business, 
from 1873 entitled John Paton, Son & Co. 10 The respective companies expanded their 
markets throughout the world. The hand-knitting yarns of both the Patons' and 
Baldwins' companies were pre-eminent in Australia when negotiations to establish here 
commenced in the early 1920s.11 
Initiating Negotiations 
In September 1920 Percy Hart, who had handled Launceston Council's 
negotiations with K&K, initiated contact with an unidentified textile firm known to be 
considering a venture in Australia. Correspondence was directed to a company 
representative in Melbourne. Citing K&K' s recent decision to establish in Launceston 
as proof of the city's advantages, Hart claimed that he had no self-interest in 
approaching the company as he was retired from business. 12 In fact Hart was a 
director of K&K and still had many other irons in the fire around Launceston. He 
spent great time and energy promoting his home city, but could still hope for such 
rewards as the K&K's directorship. By April 1921 John Reid, Frederick Wright and 
William Stewart, 13 representatives of the now identified Patons & Bald wins Ltd, were 
in Tasmania and negotiating with the Launceston Council. Reid and Wright were 
'History Issued by P&B, Ltd. (Publicity Department)': Held by CP. 
8 
'History Issued by P&B, Ltd. (Publicity Department)': Held by CP. 
9 The Romance of Patons Yam. 
10 
'History Issued by P&B, Ltd. (Publicity Department)': Held by CP. 
In the 1890s both the relatives involved, Forrester and Thomson, added the hyphenated title of Paton 
to their name by deed-poll, so as to maintain the family name within the company. Forrester-Patons 
and Thomson-Patons still held roles of authority in P&B in the period under review in this work. 
11 Walch's Tasmanian Almanac, 1957, p.183. 
12 Percy Hart, To H.D. Flanigan, Spencer St., Melbourne, 16/9/1920: Launceston City Council, Patons 
& Baldwins, 19/6.1. 
13 Reid and Wright were with the Alloa branch of the company, while Stewart (who would later 
become the Launceston branch's first general manager) was from the company's Australasian 
distributing warehouse in Melbourne. Reid and Wright were appointed to act as Attorneys 
representing P&B Ltd in November 1921. 
P&B Notarial Certificate, 18/11/1921: Launceston City Council, 11.6. 
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directors of the English company. Stewart was manager of P&B (Australasia) Ltd, the 
company's distributing warehouse in Melbourne. Amongst other concessions, 
electricity was offered to the company at 0.75d. per unit, 14 an offer which received a 
very negative response. Wright was "greatly disappointed" at the proposed power 
rate, aware that it was double the price given to K&K only a year before. Wright 
concluded that, "with power practically the same in Tasmania as on the mainland, the 
advantages of being near our headquarters and where the bulk of our customers are 
established, [would] make it more advantageous to begin in Australia". 15 He intended 
to advise the board accordingly should the company decided to go ahead with a new 
branch, implying the matter was not yet finalised. A later reference indicates that the 
decision lay wholly with Wright and Reid and that no recommendation to England was 
required.16 
Hobart's mayor also met with Reid and Wright during their visit. As with 
K&K, the Cascades' site was again under negotiation and water supply continued to be 
an important issue. An unspecified Australian syndicate held the option over certain 
water rights at the site and, with the syndicate wishing to renew its option, Hobart 
Council pushed P&B for a commitment. Proclaiming themselves "very anxious to 
afford ... t'.very inducement", the Council requested an early reply on whether ''there 
were any possibility of ... coming to Hobart".17 If so, they asked P&B to consider 
"making an offer to the Council for the rights to the concessions referred to". There is 
no indication that P&B replied to the Council's correspondence. Hobart's approach to 
the P&B negotiations appears to have been flawed. As seen in negotiations with K&K, 
water concessions offered by both Councils were comparable and would have done 
little by themselves to induce a company to establish. The main discussions with 
Launceston Council had revolved around power charges, and it was this issue which 
most interested P&B, but the Hobart corporation had no capacity to determine these. 
14 Acting Town Clerk ,To P&B (Australasia) Ltd, 20/4/21: Launceston City Council 19/6.1. 
15 Presumably by 'Australia', Wright was referring to the mainland. K&K's electricity rate had been 
at0.375d. 
Wright, To Acting Town Clerk, 25/4/1921: Launceston City Council 19/6.l. 
16 Strike, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 6/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1: 
17 Hobart Town Clerk, To P&B, 230 Flinders Lane, Melbourne, 3/5/1921: Hobart Town Clerk's 
Letterbooks, MCC 1617/60, 23/3/21-16/6/21, AOT. 
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The Role of Hydro-Power 
Some Hobart residents recognised the point at issue. The Mercury accused 
Hobart City Council of losing thousands of pounds a year because it was "too slow", 
and asserted that the Council had to charge a high power rate because it was supine 
before the HED. 18 The paper maintained that power arrangements needed to be placed 
on a firm basis since, when the transmission line to Launceston was completed, both 
Launceston and Hobart would have the same power. Asking whether one city would 
compete against the other, the Mercury wanted to know whether there was an 
agreement on the terms under which power could be sold. It gave the hypothetical 
example of a company considering both cities, and asked whether the HED could or 
would undersell Hobart for Launceston? Claiming it was advisable to set one rate and 
no cut-throat intra-state competition be entered into, the Mercury called for the need 
for a definite understanding on this point. Memories of the K&K deal and the current 
negotiations with P&B would certainly have influenced such debate. 
Under pressure from the south, the HED and P&B regarding power deals, 
Launceston Council tried to explain to Patons & Baldwins' representatives that K&K' s 
price was arranged some years ago and conditions had altered in the interim. 19 After 
the problems between Launceston Council and the HED over K&K's hydro deal, the 
Council had consulted the HED to determine an offer for P&B. Following P&B's 
response, however, the Council informed the Department that they agreed with the 
company that proposed charges "might be considered high when compared with the 
advantages of establishing on the mainland".20 Questioning the HED's decision and 
requesting a revision, the Council also warned that if the company's statement on 
power prices was correct, Council claims regarding Tasmania's advantages for 
industrial development would be negated. John Butters (general manager of the HED) 
responded that the proposed rate could not "possibly be considered high", and was 
undoubtedly less than the cost of producing power on the mainland. 21 Believing that 
any further reduction would result in a "severe loss", Butters deduced that P&B were 
just "endeavouring to beat you down". Supporting Butters' conclusion, P&B 
contacted the Launceston Council a couple of weeks later claiming they were 
18 
'Electric Power', 26/411921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
19 Acting Town Clerk, To P&B (Australasia) Ltd, 10/511921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
20 Acting Town Clerk, To Butters, 10/5/21: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
21 Hydro-Electric Department, To Acting Town Clerk, 12/511921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
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"inclined" to select Launceston for their spinning mill if electricity could be provided at 
0.375d.22 Encouraged by this statement, the Council sent the city electrical engineer, 
R.J. Strike, to Melbourne to further negotiate with P&B.23 With other cities also 
bidding to attract the new mill, Strike suggested that if Butters (who was in Melbourne 
at the time) and P&B could get together then perhaps an agreement could be reached. 
Although this appeared to be a step forward in the relationship between the Council 
and the HED, P&B seemed confident that the Council would over-ride HED directives 
on pricing. P&B representative, Wright, consequently requested that Strike report 
immediately to the Council and that a special meeting be held on the power deal. 
Acknowledging the Council's obligations to the HED, Strike pointed out that even if 
the Council were to approve, it would be necessary to consult with Butters.24 At this 
point the price of electricity was the only sticking point for the company signing a deal 
with Launceston. 
P&B continued to invoke the Council's deal with K&K. For its part, Council 
sought to avoid offering the same rates to P&B as it had to K&K on the grounds that 
the latter deal had pre-dated its 1919 agreement with the HED, and that new rules now 
prevailed. P&B rejected this explanation, pointing out that the final agreement had 
only been signed about 12 months ago. P&B also suggested that they looked upon 
K&K "as competitors in a sense".25 This claim stretched credibility. P&B and K&K 
produced totally different products for different markets. A more credible bargaining 
tool was that Launceston had ground to make before it began negotiations. P&B 
already had a base in Melbourne, through P&B (Australasia) Ltd, the company formed 
to act as Australasian distributor for P&B Ltd's British manufactured goods.26 Unless 
Launceston could offer much, there were obvious benefits in choosing a Victorian 
town. P&B also added that one such town had offered them ten acres free, and they 
had been quoted the same price for power as in Tasmania, with "the possibility of 
something lower".27 As P&B was no doubt aware, it would have been almost 
impossible for the Council to verify such claims. The Council did manage to convince 
22 P&B, Telegram to Town Clerk, 27/5/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1 
23 Acting Town Clerk, To P&B (Australasia) Ltd, 116/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
24 Strike, City Engineer, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 6/61921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
25 Strike, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 6/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1: 
26 When Launceston mill commenced production it took over all yarn production for the region and 
P&B (Australasia) acted as distributor. 
P&B Ltd., Fifteenth AGM, 18/711934. 
63 
Butters to lower Launceston's power offer to 0.625d., 0.125d. less than the previous 
offer, but P&B again refused. 
By this stage the disputed amount was only about £350 per annum. While not 
wanting to lose the deal, the Council recognised the potential dangers of having the 
rate further reduced. They recognised it was "likely to be used by other possible power 
inquiries as a precedent in the same way as these people have used Kelsall & Kemp". 28 
The HED's message may have gotten home. The Council therefore discussed alternate 
concessions to counteract the price difference, whilst still maintaining the higher figure 
in the power agreement. 29 Another problem not· broadcast was the timing of the 
proposed power deal, which cut things fine as far as Launceston' s ability to supply the 
required power. Assurances were sought that the company's needs could be met and 
that the current hydro dam and connecting line to Launceston would be completed for 
the summer of 1923. 30 This time-table was met, as in mid-1923 the HED was 
proclaiming that the delivery of continuous power to Launceston and the north by 
November would "herald in a new industrial era" to the region.31 When in full working 
order P&B was to use 500 hp, or one sixth of the Council's power block from the 
State scheme. As such, the Examiner maintained that P&B was "relieving the citizens 
[of Launceston] of a Big responsibility". 32 While the specific concessions which finally 
sealed the deal between the Council and P&B are unclear, an agreement was reached 
by mid-1921.33 P&B would, however, long be unhappy with the differential power 
rates charged to K&K and themselves. When P&B's power contract came due for 
27 Strike, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 6/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
28 Strike, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 9/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
It may have been the realisation that power from the State scheme was essential for Launceston to 
attract new industry which finally led the Council to accept the HED's authority on such matters. 
29 These included rate concessions, as well as making an end of year adjustment from one account to 
another to let the company off the debated amount. 
30 Strike, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 9/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
31 HED Report for 1921-22, No. 22: Tasmania. Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, 1922-23. 
32 P&B, along with a number of other large Launceston concerns, were supplied at this time with 
higher pressure than the rest of Launceston, the Council being still undecided in early 1924 as to 
whether such a system should be extended over the entire city. The Council also provided P&B with 
its own special main from the Cataract Hill Substation to the mill gate, with a pressure capacity of 
6,600 volts. P&B then had its own substation from which the power was taken over by them and 
distributed throughout the mill. 
Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
33 Telegram to Town Clerk, 14/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
64 
renewal in 1930, P&B's general manager again noted the inequity that K&K's power 
arrangement was for 21 years at approximately half P&B's rate.34 
Securing a Site 
With the power and water deal between P&B and the Council subject to a 
suitable site being found, 35 arrangements for Ian~ purchase proved even more 
protracted. Despite the lengths to which the company had gone to procure a 
satisfactory power deal, at this point the company claimed it was still wavering 
between Tasmania and the mainland as its preferred mill site. P&B initially advertised 
through their solicitors for a suitable property and, after receiving many offers, 
announced that a decision was imminent.36 Nevertheless, P&B's subsequent actions 
suggest they were unhappy with the private offers, and that P&B's indecision was 
likely an attempt to ensure assistance from local authorities in securing a suitable site. 
With the validity of the existing contract subject to a site being found, authorities were 
keen to oblige. In July 1921 the company was therefore informed that the government 
and Council would make a site at Glen Dhu available.37 The three most suitable areas 
available were a ten-acre Recreation Reserve, a 16 acre Glen Dhu House property, and 
a soldier settlement area. While there were problems with the immediate release of any 
of these properties, the first of the above mentioned sites was initially offered to P&B 
for the price of £2,000.38 Subsequent negotiations were drawn out, but a deal for the 
third property, the Repatriation Department block, was eventually finalised between 
late July and early August. Containing two plots facing Glen Dhu Street, the selected 
site was around ten and three-quarter acres, and had only recently been requisitioned 
by the War Services Homes Commission for soldiers' homes. Although prospects had 
not initially looked encouraging for its release, all obstacles were eventually removed.39 
The Minister for Repatriation had been assured that the land's release would "not 
prejudice returned soldiers"40 and the Commonwealth government had ascertained that 
ex-servicemen representatives held no objection to giving up the site. It was then 
34 J.B. White, To ARP, 23/10/1930: Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-39. 
35 Telegram to Town Clerk, 14/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
36 
'Spinning Mill', in Mill History File: Held by CP. 
37 Hart, To Hogarth, Scott's Hotel, Melbourne, 11/7/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
38 Acting Town Clerk, To Shields & Heritage, 1917/1921; Acting Town Clerk, To the Premier, 
2017/1921; & J.H. Russell, To A.W. Monds: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
See correspondence dated between July and August 1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
39 Examiner, 5/8/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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decided that acquiring the mill was "of sufficient public importance" to warrant the 
plots' release.41 
The Council felt that difficulties releasing suitable land for sale had jeopardised 
the deal, and subsequently requested that the State owned Glen Dhu House property 
be sold to the Council to ensure a similar situation did not arise again.42 Yet when an 
offer to sell the requested land was made to the Council in September 1921,43 no 
answer was forthcoming. Over a year later the State reiterated its offer after another 
buyer made inquiries about the land in question.44 This time the offer was taken up.45 
P&B appear to be the other party. A month after the Council's deal with the State 
government, P&B contacted the Council about purchasing land near the mill to build 
12 workmen's cottages and a hostel. They suggested that the newly purchased Glen 
Dhu site would be "most suitable".46 As was probably the case when P&B requested 
assistance to acquire its original mill site, P&B were seeking to counter "extortionate" 
prices requested for privately owned property in the district.47 This was not just a case 
of locals taking advantage of outsiders, however, as Waverley Woollen Mills was 
suffering similar problems at this time. As part of an extensive expansion program 
under way at Waverley, its proprietor, Robert Hogarth, had undertaken to build a new 
dam to increase the company's water supply. A deal had been agreed upon to flood 
part of an adjoining property at £20 per acre, and construction had begun. With the 
dam two-thirds completed, the neighbours informed Hogarth that the land was now 
£200 per acre. Hogarth simply refused to proceed.48 
The Council decided not to sell P&B the requested property due to the "park-
like features of the land". 49 They instead offered all or part of the existing Glen Dhu 
Reserve, with the Housing Estate to become the new reserve (although one would 
40 Mayor Monds, Telegram to Minister for Repatriation, 23/7/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
41 Examiner, 5/8/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
42 Acting Town Clerk, To Chief Secretary, 6/8/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
43 Secretary Public Works, To Town Clerk, 29/9/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
44 Minister for Works, Hobart, To Mayor, 31/10/1922: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties 
General (1922-23) 
45 Mayor, To Minister for Works, 8/11/1922: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General 
(1922-23). 
46 Stewart, To Mayor, 15/12/1922: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General (1922-23). 
47 Mayor, To Premier, 26/1/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General (1922-23). 
48 Jack Hogarth (Robert's grandson) claimed that, because of Robert's stance, the company went short 
of water every summer after. 
Jim Marwood, Ways of Working, (Kenthurst, 1986), p.106. 
Talk by Bob Hogarth to Industrial Heritage Group, 111611996: Tape held author. 
49 Premier, To Mayor, 26/1/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General (1922-23). 
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assume that the existing reserve itself had park-like features). Although subject to 
approval from England, P&B Launceston were enthusiastic about the alternative 
proposal and asked that the deal be finalised quickly since the housing was required for 
the arrival of their British staff.50 Nothing progressed as smoothly as either side liked, 
however, as the land could not be transferred until a Bill passed Parliament.51 These 
were the same problems encountered when the company was looking for its original 
site, and made the Council's inaction in acquiring the land when first offered difficult to 
understand. Two months after the initial agreement the company was still urging the 
transfer of the Reserve. The company's main buildings were almost completed and 
they believed that if the new work did not proceed "almost immediately", allowing 
them to retain their present bricklayers, securing more would be very difficult. 52 
Finalisation on this land deal came in mid-April 1923, when the company thanked the 
Council for the trouble it had gone to on their behalf.53 
A Deal Finalised 
A willingness to express good-will smoothed tensions created during 
negotiations, and the company also saw fit to thank the Council after the initial 
wranglings over power costs were finalised. Reid and Wright had proclaimed their 
indebtedness to the mayor and aldermen regarding conditions granted for water and 
power, claiming these were "as reasonable as could be hoped for". 54 This ignored the 
company's discontent at the difference in power and water rates charged itself and 
K&K. They also thanked Senator J.H. Keating (who had helped with federal 
government negotiations), and Robert Hogarth, along with "other public minded 
citizens" for the "cordiality" with which these people had sought to advance the 
company's plans. Although Percy Hart had handled early negotiations between the 
Council and P&B, he was not specifically mentioned. Subsequent events show that 
P&B harboured some resentment towards Hart, despite his own contention that P&B 
50 Martin & Hobskirk, Shields & Heritage, To Acting Town Clerk, 25/111923: Launceston City 
Council, Land & Properties General (1922-23). 
51 Secretary of Public Works, To Mayor, 9/2/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties 
General (1922-23). 
52 Acting Town Clerk, To Premier, 28/311923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General 
(1922-23). 
This suggested that building labour shortages continued beyond rnid-1922, despite Reynolds' earlier 
claims to the contrary. 
53 P&B, To Mayor, 18/4/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General (1922-23). 
54 Examiner, 5/8/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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were well pleased with the work he had done in helping them secure "excellent 
contracts".55 The Launceston Chamber of Commerce heralded the attraction of P&B 
as "a very big feather in Launceston' s cap, the company having made Australia wide 
inquiries before choosing Launceston as their base. 56 With the new factory to be 
significantly larger than K&K, the local papers were quick to highlight P&B's 
"standing and reputation" and saw the new mill as "an enterprise of Commonwealth 
importance". 51 
P&B Launceston's intended product was to be yarns for hand and machine 
knitting, as well as hosiery yams for manufacturers of knitted goods.58 Prior to the war 
no companies had manufactured yarns for the weaving or knitting industries "except 
where they themselves were engaged upon, or interested in companies carrying on, that 
class of work".59 P&B denied it would compete with any established knitting firm in 
Australia, and proposed instead to cater for such establishments by manufacturing 
knitting wools and weaving worsteds. It was estimated the mill would employ between 
400 and 500 people, 80% of whom would be.girls.60 
After settling upon a Launceston based mill, it was necessary for P&B to 
appoint a number of people to represent their interests in Tasmania. Launceston 
accountant, Gordon Creasy, was appointed as the company's Tasmanian agent in 
March 1922, a necessary requirement under the Companies' Act.61 With tenders 
advertised Australia wide, the Examiner felt "particularly proud" that practically all 
construction work was being carried out by Launceston people. 62 The Launceston 
architectural firm, A. North, Richards & Heyward, was awarded the contract to draw 
55 P. Hart, To Managing Director, Wolsey Ltd, Leicester, 2/10/1941: Launceston City Council, 
Industries General (1939-1945), 23/1.9. 
56 Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM 26/9/1921 (press cutting): Minutes, 28/10/1915-
29/11/1937. 
57 
'The Woollen Spinning Mill', 5/8/1921: K&KPress Cuttings. 
58 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
59 During the 1920s the specialised manufacture of yarns developed into a major activity of woollen 
mills, aided by the rapid growth of the knitting and hosiery trades. Quality as well as quantity 
increased, manufacturers turning to make worsted and cashmere yarns. 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.80. 
60 
'Land Wanted', Daily Telegraph, 4/7/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
61 P&B Ltd, To Gordon Leonard Creasy Esq. (copy), Appointment of Agent in Tasmania for the 
Purposes of the Tasmanian Companies Act, 7/3/1922: Held by CP. 
62 Examiner, 27/5/1922. 
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up the mill's plans,63 while Launceston firm, Salisbury's Foundry Co. Pty Ltd 
undertook to prepare, fabricate and deliver iron and steel for the building. 64 The 
construction contract went to local building firm, Hinman, Wright and Manser, Ltd,65 a 
decision likely influenced by their recent reconstruction of Waverley Woollen Mills.66 
One of the P&B's employees later recalled that the speed of P&B's construction was 
"a credit to the builders", particularly as they had none of the benefits of modem plant. 
Even concrete had to be mixed by hand on a concrete board. 67 In a much wiser move 
than that made by K&K, P&B had specified that the contractor would receive £88,986 
all-inclusive to complete his contractual obligations on or before 25 July 1923. Penalty 
clauses existed for late completion and bonuses for early completion. The contract also 
stipulated that work had to commence within ten days of the date of signing. 68 
Although a considerable demand, this was met. 
Construction 
While K&K's new mill was utilitarian, P&B heeded aesthetics. All bricks 
required approval, a major undertaking as the building used one and three-quarter 
million bricks, with those facing the external walls along Thistle and Glen Dhu Streets 
being picked for colour.69 Along with the problems already related regarding cement 
63 Specification of Spinning Mills, Launceston, Tas. for Messrs. P&B Ltd - A. North, Richards & 
Heyward, Architects, Launceston: Held by CP. 
64 Copy Agreement to Fabricated Iron and Steel Works, 2617/1922, Salisbury's Foundry Proprietary 
Limited withP&B Ltd: Held by CP. 
To give an idea of the scope of this job, the sawtooth roofing, if placed one bay end to end, would 
extend for over a mile. Construction of the mill also used 60,000 sq. ft. of glass, and at least a mile of 
drains. 
Examiner, 27/5/1922. 
65 Hinman, Wright and Manser were timber merchants and builders based in Cimitiere Street, 
Launceston. A. Hinman and Jas. Wright originally took over the business of J.T. Farmillo (builder of 
the Albert Hall) in 1903, A.H. Manser joining them the following year. Incorporated in 1911 and 
registered as a proprietary company in 1921, the firm's other major constructions included the 
racecourse grandstand at Mowbray, Launceston High School, the Infectious Diseases Hospital and 
additions to the Children's Hospital, Harrap & Sons' Wool Store, the Tramway Depot and the Railway 
Roundhouse. 
The Cyclopaedia of Tasmania: An Historical and Commercial Review of Tasmania (Hobart, 1931), 
p.326. 
66 Waverley Mills were almost totally rebuilt by this firm over a two year period at the start of the 
1920s, during which time only three working days were lost. Construction had taken place around 
Waverley Mills' normal operations, the Examiner hailing the building contractors' effort on the 
Waverley project as a tribute to their work. 
Examiner, 4/11/1922. 
67 Handwritten notes in a letter by 'Bill', To A.B. Stirling, 20/11/1968: Held by CP. 
68 Agreement made on 22/311922 between Hinman, Wright & Manser, Ltd. of Launceston on part of 
P&B, Ltd. of Launceston: Held by CP. 
69 Examiner, 27/511922 & 26/1/1924. 
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shortages, the building spurt in the early 1920s also saw a "big scarcity of bricks in 
Launceston and Hobart".70 P&B were reputedly leaning towards concrete as their 
main building material when tenders were called,71 although tenders for construction 
were initially invited in a combination of brick, concrete and steel. 72 Alf Hutton, owner 
of a brick making operation at Sandhill, subsequently conducted tests to convince the 
company of the strength of his bricks, and presumably of his ability to supply their 
needs, and won the contract.73 With Hutton's brickyards situated only a quarter of a 
mile from the mill site,74 P&B avoided many of K&K's supply problems. Ironically 
K&K' s original plan had been in brick and they had been convinced of the benefits of 
concrete, which had duly delayed and increased the cost of their construction process. 
Although P&B used only a limited amount of concrete for walling and foundations, 75 
they still found it necessary to bring in two shipments of cement from England. 76 In 
total, P&B used 5,500 casks of cement.77 Floors were constructed using a mixture of 
cement and wood (which still added up to a lot of cement considering that floor space 
was 207,000 sq. ft.), and the mill was also built on a single level. This required 
substantial excavation work and a 14,000 cubic feet run of concrete retaining wall.78 
Work began on P&B's mill site on 29 March 1922,79 only 25 days after the 
purchase of the main site was announced, although some months after the original pact 
was signed. Recognition of the desire to encourage consumption of local products 
probably influenced the company to declare its intention to draw upon Australian and, 
as far as possible, Tasmanian, products for building purposes (some of which were 
considered "very suitable").80 In contrast to the labour wranglings at K&K, by April 
Agreement made on 22/3/1922 between Hinman, Wright & Manser, Ltd. of Launceston on part of 
P&B, Ltd. of Launceston. 
70 Examiner, 26/1/1924 
71 Hodgkinson, Sandhill Story, p.12. 
72 
'The Spinning Mill, English Firm's Proposal', 8/4/1969 (1921 press cutting), Mill History File: 
Held byCP. 
73 Hodgkinson, Sandhill Story, p.12. 
Hutton met the massive demand by working overtime 
74 Examiner, 2611/1924. 
75 Examiner, 27/5/1922. 
76 Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
77 4,000 yards of metal was also used in the cement work. 
Examiner, 26/111924. 
78 Examiner, 26/111924. 
79 Hodgkinson, Sandhill Story, p.12a 
80 Examiner, 5/811921. 
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over 100 hundred men (not boys) were engaged at P&B's mill site.81 In addition, 21 
horses, and two teams of eight bullock each drawing ploughs, were excavating the 
foundations and basements;82 10,000 cubic yards of earth had already been shifted, and 
250,000 bricks were on site. Work was aided by "almost faultless" weather 
conditions. 83 By May contractors had completed excavations and fillings, a large part 
of the foundations had been readied, and much of the brickwork built, all within only 
eight weeks. Covering four and a half acres of ground, the new mill was "the largest 
single building erected in Tasmania certainly the largest under one contract". 84 It was 
also claimed to be "one of the most economical industrial buildings ever erected in 
Tasmania", although the company was quick to add that "No rubbishy building 
expedients had been resorted to". 85 
By mid-1922 Henry Reynolds informed parliament that progress at P&B was 
"splendid". 86 Already the wool-washing, carding, combing and dyeing departments 
were ready for their steel work, the first three expected to be the first departments to 
start operations (running day and night shifts). Construction of the wool warehouse 
had also begun, and machinery was on order and expected within three months. P&B's 
proprietors were "highly satisfied" with progress, and production was expected to 
commence in less than 12 months87 - a prediction almost realised. The construction 
contract had stipulated July 1923 as the completion date, and by early that month 
completion of the buildings was only weeks away. Most of the machinery had also 
been installed and a few frames were being given "a trial run". The mill was expected 
to be in full running order by December. 88 The first machines became operational in 
August 1923, and, right on schedule, P&B made their first outward delivery of goods 
on 20 December. 89 The first bulk deliveries to Melbourne, base of the factory's 
81 
'Work on New Mill Site', 21/411922: K&K Press Cuttings; 
Examiner, 26/111924. 
82 
'Work on New Mill Site', 21/411922: K&K Press Cuttings. 
83 
'Work on New Mill Site', 21/411922: K&K Press Cuttings; & Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
84 Examiner, 27/5/1922. 
85 Examiner, 27/5/1922. 
86 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
87 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
88 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department 1922-2, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
89 Hodgkinson, Sandhill Story, p.12b. 
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distributor, were expected the following month.90 The atmosphere surrounding P&B's 
start of production contrasted markedly with the loss of enthusiasm noted at K&K by 
the end of their construction phase. In early 1924 the Examiner proclaimed that 
P&B's "standard [was] high, their reputation substantial, their resources almost 
unlimited, and their enthusiasm and confidence keen".91 "The inventive genius of the 
British race" was also seen to be "strikingly reflected ... in every detail" of P &B 's new 
mill. The differing confidence levels at both mills would prove to be justified by results 
achieved during the first years of production in Launceston. 
90 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 7/12/1923: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
91 Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
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11 . Built predominantly on a single level , above are the plans for the ground floor of P&B Launceston 's mill 
12. Above - The architects ' representation of P&B Launceston 's new mill. 
13. Above - P&B ' s construction site in 1922. Launceston city is in 
the background under the smoke haze on the left. 
!.+. Below - Continuing progress at the mill site, circa 1923 . 
15. Above - 1924. View of P&B 's completed mill from the corner of 
Thistle and Glen Dim Streets. 
16. Below - View of P&B 's completed mill from the south-east. 
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CHAPTER4 
LAUNCESTON'S PROMOTIONAL EFFORTS, 
SERVING BOTH REGION AND NATION 
He who will not help himself will find few to assist him. This is an age of ideas, dawning 
upon men who have the great faculty of grasping opportunities as they come .. . Self help 
is the keynote. 1 
These lines are from a 1926 promotional advertisement for Launceston's 50,000 
League, an organisation aimed at boosting the city's population and encouraging 
progress. The quote could also be viewed as the philosophy driving Launceston 
Corporation and many of its leading citizens throughout the 1920s. While this theme 
has already had some play, it merits and now receives direct attention. Likewise, now 
becomes yet more apparent how regionalism called into its support not merely 
nationalistic rhetoric but also some genuine national feeling. 
Launceston's attitude of self-help was grounded in a perception of northern 
"rape and neglect" by the south. 2 Regional parochialism is a much discussed area in 
Tasmania history, but the most comprehensive analysis relating to the 1920s is by 
Simon Harris. Although focusing upon tourism, Harris discusses a cross-section of 
areas in which regional rivalries were apparent, including competition for industry. As 
far as industrial development was concerned, the perception of neglect, or at least 
disregard, by a southern-based State government, appears to have validity. The 
experiences of the four major industries to settle in Launceston during this period, 
provide little evidence that the State government in any way encouraged selection of a 
northern location over one in the south. 
Towards the end of World War I a syndicate intending to manufacture white 
lead applied, through the Agent-General, for a power supply anywhere in Tasmania. 
Such proposals would have been forwarded to the government run HED and, because 
only Hobart was then supplied by the State-owned hydro scheme, Hobart automatically 
1 Weekly Courier, 20/5/1926, p.50. 
2 See Simon Harris, 'Boosterism: Tasmania and the Making of the Tourist State 1914-1928', PhD 
thesis, University of Tasmania, 1993, p.54. 
Stefan Petrow maintains that Launceston's lack of natural advantages when compared with Hobart 
also fostered community consciousness and an attitude of self-help. 
Stefan Petrow, Sanatorium of the South? Public Health and Politics in Hobart and IAunceston 1875-
1914 (Hobart, 1995), p.32 
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had first option over any large power consumers interested in establishing in the State. 
We have already noticed that the HED refused to connect Launce~ton to the State 
scheme unless a commitment was received from a large industry to ensure the 
proposition's viability. Most companies interested in establishment wanted guaranteed 
power supplies before committing. Although the white lead manufacturing proposition 
was considered to be attractive, difficulties securing plant meant that the HED could 
not immediately guarantee power supplies, even in Hobart. Launceston, with its own 
power scheme, turned out to be the only area able to meet the company's demands.3 
The north's victory in this case was therefore the result of its attitude of self-help rather 
than government design. Likewise, Kelsall & Kemp and Patons & Baldwins were 
largely attracted to Launceston by aggressive Council marketing. The last major 
industry to be established in Launceston during this decade was the British firm, 
Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co. in 1926. Lloyd Robson tells of Sir Henry Jones' 
involvement in these negqtiations and his efforts to encourage the company to establish 
in Launceston.4 Local opinion in Hobart, however, believed Jones was encouraging 
Rapson to settle in that city, and there seems little reason to question that opinion. 5 If 
it were so, then one must give greater weight to Launcestonian activism (aided by Sir 
Henry's death during negotiations) in winning the business for their city. These cases 
gave weight to Launceston's view of southern neglect and suggest that the government 
took credit for establishment of industry with little apparent input. Whatever assistance 
was provided seems to have come after the south had been ruled out of consideration, 
not before. Launceston residents therefore appear justified in their opinion that if one 
wanted something done, they had to do it themselves. 
The attraction of K&K and P&B in the early 1920s created a sense of optimism 
within Launceston of a bright industrial future. The end of the post-war boom and 
corresponding Australia-wide economic slump would, however, see hopes of further 
industrial advancement unfulfilled. Nevertheless, the Launceston region continued to 
push the industrial potential of its city throughout that decade. Launceston had long 
viewed itself as a progressive city. 6 With industrialisation promoted as the means of 
progress after the war, many local residents and organisations made a concerted effort 
3 HED Report for 1917-18, No. 27: Tasmania. Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament 1918-19. 
4 Lloyd Robson, A History of Tasmania, vol. 2, p.421. 
5 
'Rapson Tyre Co., Unfounded Rumours', 25/11/1926 & 22/1/1927: LCC press cuttings, 1926-30. 
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to attract industry into the city during this period. Even the textile story went well 
beyond that given in these pages: companies wooed by Launceston during this period 
ranged from manufacturers of wool, cotton, linen and artificial silk, through to 
companies producing finished goods such as carpets, rugs, towels, sheets, corsetry, 
hosiery and other knitted goods.7 While analysis of Launceston's promotional efforts 
would be a study in itself, 8 a number of common characteristics stand out. 
First, was the obvious desire of the Council and many of its leading citizens to 
attract industry and their commitment in pursuing that end. This commitment was 
recognised by the Industrial Australian and Mining Standard in 1921. The Standard 
had followed "with much interest the arrangements . . . . for advertising the City of 
Launceston with the view to attracting industrial enterprises". 9 Paying tribute to the 
Launceston Council's promotional efforts, the Standard noted that, "The energy and 
enthusiasm ... shown by your Municipality in this matter are in marked contrast to the 
apathy regarding similar matters in so many other cities of the Commonwealth". Such 
energy and enthusiasm were aided by Launcestonians confidence in what their city had 
to offer. Although Gee long often layed claim to being "the Bradford of Australia", 10 
Launceston was not to be outdone. Robert Hogarth repeatedly spoke of Launceston 
as "the Bradford of the Commonwealth",11 a splendid exemplar of the regional-national 
symbiosis. Percy Hart proclaimed Launceston as "without a doubt, the place in the 
Southern Hemisphere best suited for the manufacturing of woollen goods and the 
products of spinning mills''. 12 Launceston residents would therefore have been 
delighted to hear that a prospective linen manufacturer had not been impressed with the 
Geelong people who had interviewed him, and thought Tasmania "more likely to suit 
him than anything in the Commonwealth" .13 Promotional efforts did not emanate just 
from within the city. Negotiations between London based Amalgamated Textile 
6 For views, of both a contemporary and an historian, as to the progressivism of the Launceston 
Corporation, see note 21, p.6. 
7 See Launceston City Council Files on Industries General, 1920-30. 
8 Even Harris' comprehensive work leaves something to be said on these matters. 
9 Industrial Australian and Mining Standard, To Mayor, 29/9/1921: Launceston City Council, 
Advertising Launceston's Resources etc., 1920-1921. 
10 Forster, Industrial Development, p.88. 
11 Robert Hogarth, To Acting Town Clerk, 24/2/20: Launceston City Council, Industries - Kelsall & 
Kemp, 19/4.1. 
12 P. Hart, To Managing Director, Wolsey Ltd, Leicester, 31/8/1922: Launceston City Council, 
Industries General (1922-1923), 19/1.1. 
13 S. Donnelly, Tasmanian Government Tourist Department, To Town Clerk, 28/7/1927: Launceston 
City Council, Industries General (1925-27), 21/1.3. 
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Company Limited and the Launceston Council began in 1921 after the company 
approached the Agent-General for information on Tasmania. Their interest was 
sparked by a glowing paper the Agent-General had written about Tasmania for the 
Royal Society of Arts. 14 The Examiner newspaper also played an active role in 
promoting Launceston in the early 1920s. It told of the city's "exceptional 
inducements to British and Foreign capital for the establishment of industries", 15 and 
claimed Launceston was "aptly styled the 'commercial capital' of the state", and had 
"everything necessary to make it one of the hives of Australian industry". 16 The local 
newspaper's promotional efforts were, however, largely directed toward the converted 
and did little to attract investment capital into the State. Alternatively, newspapers 
reports (and even rumours) were useful in ascertaining likely new industries. The 
Council took note of any companies reported to be considering establishment in 
Australia and initiated contract.17 
After the arrival of K&K and P&B and the enthusiasm these companies 
generated, Launceston's industrial advancement slowed, and there were no new 
industries on the horizon. Believing promotion as a textile manufacturing centre was 
still Launceston's best chance for further development, in 1924 the Council twice 
discussed sending a representative to England and Scotland specifically to court textile 
manufacturers. The Council had already employed a Mr. Riley (about whom little is 
known) to represent its interests. Up until that point, Riley had supplied 45 British 
textile firms with information on Launceston, sent three reports to the Council, but 
claimed the immensity of the job meant he had not scraped the surface. The proposal 
was rejected on the first occasion, and the second time it was raised, Councillor and 
K&K director, Percy Hart, again held that the idea was a bad one. He pointed out that 
no benefit had been received from the Council's other representative who, as soon as 
he had arrived in England, had wanted more money. Hart maintained that 
Launceston's interests were being watched. Another Alderman Monds also expressed 
concern about the apparent lack of results from monies already expended for 
advertising. Nevertheless, the idea was supported by all except these two dissenters, 
14 Agent General, To Premier, 11/4/1921: PDl 179/7/21. 
15 Examiner Album: Launceston City Council, Advertising Launceston' s Resources etc., 1920-1921. 
16 Reprinted for Examiner 8/8/1921: Launceston City Council, Advertising Launceston's Resources 
etc., 1920-1921. 
17 See Launceston City Council Industries General files, 1920-30. 
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Hart and Monds both saw the proposal as a waste of ratepayers' money. 18 Some 
ratepayers agreed. A letter to the editor entitled "A Joy Ride" and signed 
"Somnambulism"19 reflected public disquiet over what Hart had implied was little more 
that a junket. 
Locals generally celebrated the establishment of any industry in their district, 
but there was also public concern about the lengths to which the State government 
would go to attract industry. In December 1920 the Examiner proclaimed, "Tasmania 
needs industries, and needs them badly, but unless great care is exercised we will pay 
very dearly for some of them".20 According to the Examiner the floundering Hydro-
Electric Carbide Manufacturing Company had the State government "by the wool." 
The government had issued the company with an ''ultimatum ... to paddle its own 
canoe", then asked its Ministers to back the same company to the value of £120,000. 
Debate on the cost of attracting industry to Tasmania continued to be raised 
throughout the 1920s and beyond. Two examples highlighting the State government's 
lack of judiciousness when seeking to attract new industry in the 1920s can be seen in 
the Rubber Encouragement Bill of 1926 and the Artificial Silk Encouragement Bill of 
1927. The first again relates to Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co and was directed towards 
encouraging the firm to establish in Tasmania. Despite the company's dubious 
financial standing, dividend payments were guaranteed for a certain period. 21 Rapson 
was placed in liquidation only two years after establishment. The Artificial Silk 
Industries Bill was proposed as an incentive to a synthetic manufacturer considering 
establishment in Tasmania. It effectively backed the company to the extent of 
£500,000. The papers took up this issue, claiming that the Tasmanian carbide case a 
decade earlier should have highlighted the danger of government association with 
private enterprise. As the synthetic company reputedly had no capital, government 
backing was seen as "a desperate policy of 'industries at any price"' .22 
The basis of Launceston Council's efforts to attract industry throughout the 
1920s continued to revolve around the same incentives offered K&K and P&B: 
inexpensive hydro power, a cheap, plentiful and pure water supply, and a labour force 
18 
'Industries Wanted', 14/5/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
19 Letter to editor, 16/5/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
20 Examiner 4/12/1920. 
21 See PD 1 179111/26, Rapson Tyre & Jack Co. 
22 
'A Half Million Gamble' & letter to editor, 'Silk Industry', 10/11/1927: LCC Press Cuttings 1926-
30. 
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free from industrial disturbance. After 1922, however, K&K (Tas) and P&B 
Launceston were themselves used as proof that the city's contentions about its 
industrial potential were correct. Additionally, in 1924, the State introduced a law 
whereby new industrial buildings costing over £25,000 were given special rating 
concessions for six years after their first assessment. 23 Launceston was referring to this 
change in promotional efforts even before its implementations.24 K&K (Tas)'s 
dissatisfaction with its property valuation the previous year25 had been appeased by the 
new law, and would only re-emerge when the concessions expired. 26 
By the latter half of the 'twenties, Launceston Council also began offering land 
to prospective companies at token charges. As early as 1919 the Launceston Chamber 
of Commerce had "strongly recommend the City Council . . . offer land, power and 
water at special rates to induce the establishment of industries" and "make a definitive 
statement of the lowest sales that would be accepted". 27 The Council had done this 
with power and water, and repeatedly proclaimed that its "exceedingly low charges" 
were cheaper than in any other part of the Commonwealth. 28 Launceston Council was, 
however, slow to follow suit with land, even through other Councils were following 
this practice. There are instances of free land being offered to industry by private 
citizens. When car manufacturer, Henry Ford, was looking to establish in Australia, a 
local resident, E.J. Sidebottom, offered five acres at Newnham if Ford located in 
Launceston. 29 Aid. J.F. Ockerby made a counter-offer of 20 acres. 30 While the 
Examiner praised the men's generosity, both owned land surrounding their respective 
23 The concession allowed qualifying industries to be rated at 3% of their capital value for the first 6 
years, after which the rate was fixed at not less than 5%. 
Launceston Mayor, To Henry Ford, Ford Motor Company, Canada, 16/1/1924: Launceston City 
Council, Industries General (1924-25), 21/1.2. 
24 Acting Town Clerk, To J.H. Butters, 19/3/1924: Launceston City Council, 2111.2. 
25 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 20/4/1923 & 31/8/1923. 
26 When the concession expired in 1929 K&K (Tas) again raised its dissatisfaction with the £40,000 
valuation placed upon its property, the Council agreeing to reduce the valuation by £2,635 because of 
roofing problems. 
27 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee Meeting 4/8/1919: Minutes, 8/3/1917-
19/6/1930. 
28 For example see Acting Town Clerk, To Messrs. Kenyon & Hyett, Melbourne, 5/6/1924: 
Launceston City Council, 21/1.2. 
29 Examiner 12/1/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/1923-19/1/1926. 
30 Examiner 15/1/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/1923-1911/1926. 
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sites and were quick to point out that this could be used for associated expansion or 
housing purposes.31 
In May 1926 the Council was admonished over its failure to provide free 
industrial sites by F. Phillips, who was looking to establish a carpet industry in 
Tasmania. In a letter advising that Launceston had been ruled out of contention as a 
factory location, Phillips pointed out that others within the State had been keen to 
extend land "gratis", along with other unspecified inducements. He added, "that the 
people of Tasmania have naturally got to act more quickly if they desire to bring 
industries to their midst".32 That same month A.A. Evans was encouraging Sydney-
based corset manufacturer, Fred Berlei, to establish in Launceston. Evans asked the 
mayor to send details of "every inducement" Berlei could be offered.33 Nevertheless, 
Berlei was less enthusiastic about Launceston than it about him, mainly because 
Tasmania did not look "particularly attractive owing to the likelihood of hold-ups 
during the ever recurring shipping strikes".34 He did, however, agree to consider the 
city, inquiring (amongst other issues) about the possibility of a free site being made 
available. The Council responded that it was "not empowered to give land", instead 
offering a site for 50 year lease at £30 per acre p.a.35 Berlei went elsewhere. Despite 
the Council's contentions, there was at least one instance, in early 1924, when 
Launceston Council had offered a free five acre site to a proposed cotton industry.36 In 
the past the Council had claimed that it was not empowered to give free water, but had 
gotten around that problem by applying a token charge of £ 1 p.a. Perhaps the Phillip 
and Berlei incidents close together led the Council to reassess its stance on offering 
land. Launceston Council was also negotiating with Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co 
31 Sidebottom's 'Fairfield Park' consisted of 100 acres, 40 adjoining the site offered. Ockerby's larger 
offer therefore appeared the more generous, particularly as he only owned 33 acres in total, which 
included his own private residence. 
32 Fred Phillips, Managing Director of Phillips Securities Ltd, To Town Clerk, 12/5/1926: Launceston 
City Council, Industries General (1925-27), 21/1.2. 
33 Berlei was recognised as a "first class type of man", and "a most progressive ,Australian 
manufacturer [who] would be an acquisition ... in every way". Evans saw Berlei's greatest worth as 
his ability to influence other Australian manufacturers to consider Launceston. 
Evans, To Mayor, Launceston, 29/5/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
34 Directors Office, Berlei Ltd, To Crawford, Town Clerk, 15/611926: Launceston City Council, 
21/1.3. 
35 The Council had made inquiries about land for sale and could provide details if desired. The 
Council also agreed to allow free rates, electric power and water for two years from the date of land 
purchase (the power offer seeming to breach the HED agreement). 
Town Clerk, To Fred Berlei, 101711926: Launceston City Council, 2111.3. 
36 Acting Town Clerk, To J.H. Butters, 19/3/1924: Launceston City Council, 21/1.2. 
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(Australia) Ltd at this time and, in September, decided to reduce an offer made for 
Council land at the Killafaddy Estate made in April from £25 per acre to £ 1 per acre. 37 
By the middle of the following year Rapson had signed a lease for all the Corporation 
land fronting Gleadow and Foster Streets. 38 Hereafter the Council made similar offers 
to other companies. Meanwhile the Rapson company had also been negotiating with 
Hobart, and it is possible that an offer of land from Hobart Council may have 
motivated Launceston Council's change of heart. Phillips had earlier claimed that 
others within the state were making such offers. 
Another industry inducement offered by Launceston Council in the 1920s was 
implemented because of regional competition. In August 1929 Launceston Council 
discovered that Hobart was charging less than Launceston for factory lighting (which 
was charged at a higher rate than power). It was also revealed that Hobart gave 
concessions to bulk power users, whereby lighting was allowed at power rates. The 
Council's electrical engineer recommended this anomaly be altered in Launceston's by-
laws. The annual reduction for P&B was estimated at around £700 p.a.39 P&B was 
informed of the policy change in November.40 In 1922 K&K (Tas) had pushed for 
lighting to be charged at power rates, and had pointed out that this was done by 
municipal authorities in England. The Council had maintained power rates were 
already too low to grant such concessions.41 Ongoing civic rivalry therefore achieved 
what the companies themselves could not. 
Another characteristic commonly seen in efforts to attract industry during this 
period was that many of the companies with whom Launceston Council negotiated 
remained anonymous. Negotiations often took place through agents. One such man 
with whom the Council had dealings was Melbourne based P.B. Coulston. Acting as a 
middle man between companies and Councils, he was seen as a useful ally in the 
Council's efforts to attract new industries. In August 1927 Coulston was therefore 
elected as Launceston's consulting engineer, with the specific aim of contacting any 
visitors interested in establishing new industries in Australia and boosting Launceston' s 
37 Town Clerk, To Herber Butler, Rapson Tyre and Rubber Company Australia Limited, 19/10/1926: 
Launceston City Council, Rapson Tyre Industry, Industries General (1926-1927), 21/1.5. 
38 Town Clerk, To Secretary, Marine Board, Launceston, 27/611927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.5. 
39 Strike, City Electrical Engineer, Memo to Finance Committee, 21/8/1929: Launceston City Council, 
Inquiries General (1928-29), 21/1.9. 
4° City Electrical Engineer, To P&B, 13/11/1929: Launceston City Council, 2111.9. 
41 Danvers Walker, K&K, To City Manager, 1117//1922: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
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claims.42 Paid a retaining fee of 50 guineas per annum for his services, Coulston held 
the position until 1929, when the Council thanked him for his excellent work but 
decided not to continue their arrangement. 43 Economic conditions presumably made 
the establishment of new industries unlikely and meant the position could no longer be 
justified. One wonders if the companies Coulston represented were aware of his 
conflict of interest in promoting Launceston. When acting as representative for 
Horrockes Crewdson Ltd, the biggest producer of household cottons, sheets, and so 
forth, in the world, the company had expressed surprise at Coulston's suggestion that 
their proposed Australian works be erected in Launceston. Claiming to be convinced 
by his arguments, they held that Coulston's advice "would certainly be the deciding 
factor as to locality."44 The agreement does appear to have had some benefits for 
Launceston. Coulston put such energy into securing Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co, for 
example, that he was forced under doctor's instruction to take a "short rest".45 
Of the numerous textile companies unsuccessfully courted by the Launceston 
Council in the 1920s, a cotton manufacturer seemed the most likely prospect. In 1927 
two proposed cotton manufacturing companies were considering establishment in 
Launceston. Although details are sketchy, the larger concern was Nelson Cotton 
Manufacturing Company Ltd. With a nominal capital of £500,00046 (later reduced to 
£200,000),47 its draft prospectus listed Sir Amos Nelson as "the principal factor in the 
establishment of these mills. 48 Described as "one of the leaders of the Lancashire 
cotton trade", Sir Amos controlled ten textile companies in England and was chairman 
of seven. The smaller venture was Texo Cotton Manufacturers' Company Ltd which 
had a nominated capital of £40,000. 
Instead of competing against each other for capital, the two comparues 
eventually decided to combine forces and promote the smaller venture, which, if 
42 Town Clerk, To P.B. Coulston, 30/8/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
43 Coulston, To Mayor Barber, 3/9/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.7. 
Town Clerk, To Coulston, 10/8/1929: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1928-29), 21/1.8. 
44 Coulston, To Town Clerk, 4/12/1928: Launceston City Council, 2111.8. 
45 Coulston, To Town Clerk, 2/2/1927: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1927-1928), 
21/1.6. 
These must have been particularly gruelling negotiations. Remember that Sir Henry Jones died of a 
heart attack after leaving one such meeting. 
46 Draft Prospectus of Nelson Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd.: Launceston City Council, 21/1. 7. 
47 Town Clerk, To F. Thonemann, Melbourne, 28/5/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
48 Draft Prospectus of Nelson Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd.: Launceston City Council, 2111.7. 
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successful, could then be expanded.49 Negotiations proved long and frustrating, but on 
2 November 1928 the Examiner announced, "All going well", Launceston would soon 
be able to boast another textile industry. Texo Cotton Manufacturers' intended to 
produce popular demand cotton cloths covered by tariffs.so While the Examiner told 
the public that £15,000 of the £40,000 capital was to be raised locally, Texo's backers 
were seeking closer to £20,000-£25,000 public input. Problems arose because local 
money could not be raised. Even before the scheme's public announcement problems 
were evident. Privately the company's backers had been pessimistic, and could not see 
how even £20,000 could be found.s 1 J.S. Dickson, the company's general manager, 
was also told there was no chance ofraising £20,000-£2S,OOO.s2 Launcestonians were 
accused of not being interested in establishing this new and payable industry in their 
city.s3 With yet another industrial stoppage under way, it was pointed out that "this 
infernal strike had accentuated the distaste of investors for any industrial concern". s4 
Correspondence on this proposal petered out soon after. This may have been one 
instance where Tasmania's continually disrupted shipping service directly undermined 
investor confidence and led to the loss of an industry. More likely, however, economic 
conditions were simply not conducive to investment at that time. When Sir Amos 
Nelson had visited Australia,ss he later pointed out that it was a very bad time to get 
the large amount of capital required for such a venture.s6 Conditions later worsened. 
In February 1929 Launceston papers again ran headlines "New Industry for 
Launceston", and claimed that the establishment of newly formed Textile Manufactures 
Co. was "practically assured" .s7 Although using a different name, this company 
appears to have been a revamped Texo Cotton Manufacture. The new company 
49 Fred Thonemann, To Barber (Mayor), 6/9/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.7. 
John S. Dickson, To Mr. Barber, Undated: Launceston City Council, 21/1.7 & 21/1.6. 
Town Clerk, To F. Thonemann, Melbourne, 28/5/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
50 Examiner, 2/11/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.7. 
51 Dickson, To Barber, 17/9/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
52 C.J. Weedon Pty. Ltd., To Dickson, 14/9/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
53 Dickson, To Barber, 17/9/1928: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
54 C.J. Weedon Pty. Ltd., To Dickson, 14/9/1928: Launceston City Council, 2111.6. 
55 Extract from Argus, 25/2/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
56 Claiming that he had been trying to point out to "the people with money, what an opportunity we 
are missing", Sir Amos had asked whether they were going to allow the Italians and other 
nationalities "to take the place that we should occupy"; implying that the English had a right to profit 
from its colonies whilst others did not. 
Amos Nelson, of James Nelson, Limited, To Mr. H.M. Hill, 15/6/1927: Launceston City Council, 
21/1.3. 
57 
'New Industry for Launceston', 25/2/1929: LCC Press Cuttings 1926-30. 
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intended to manufacture tariff protected cotton goods, had the same £200,000 nominal 
capital of which only £40,000 was to be immediately issued and £ 15,000 to be raised 
locally, and had J.S. Dickson as general manager and a director. Possibly an attempt to 
disassociate the new company with the fund-raising and other difficulties experienced 
by Texo, the timing of these companies' flotations ensured their fate. Capital was 
difficult to secure on the eve of the Depression. Nevertheless, these negotiations were 
still significant for Launceston as they focussed Sir Amos Nelson's attention upon the 
city. One of his companies, James Nelson, Limited, of Nelson, Lancashire, did 
subsequently establish a branch plant in Launceston in 1951. This would be the only 
other textile manufacturer to establish in Launceston after the 1920s boom. The 
decade therefore ended with the industrial promise associated with the arrival of K&K 
and P&B still unrealised. The economic conditions which hampered further industrial 
development in the region during the 1920s, would also confront K&K and P&B 
during their first years of operation in Launceston. The regionalists had done much 
and secured something, but scarcely had fulfilled all their hopes for either locality or 
nation. 
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CHAPTERS 
PROGRESS DURING THE 1920S 
Unfulfilled Promise: c.1923-1925 
How a company fares in the first years of operation can be significant to its 
future development. As already seen, both Kelsall & Kemp and Patons & Baldwins 
were established during a wave of post-war optimism, when conditions promised great 
rewards for those willing to invest. Soon after K&K' s decision to establish in 
Launceston, Tasmania's Chief Inspector of Factories, Henry Reynolds, informed 
Parliament that Tasmania was "entering upon a period of increased prosperity and 
never before in its history [had] the outlook been so bright for the successful 
development of the industries of the State" .1 This seemed especially true for the 
State's textile industry. Reynolds maintained that "even if mills were double their size 
the orders could not be executed".2 In mid-1921 Reynolds again spoke of the 
"advancement" made by the Tasmanian textile trade throughout the past year.3 He 
reiterated this point the following year after the attraction of P&B. Buoyed by recent 
industrial agreements, authorities believed that Tasmania was finally "proving its 
adaptability as a place for manufacturing textile fabrics, woollens, and spinning yarns".4 
The 1921-22 financial year generally was described as an exceptionally busy one, with 
woollen mills working full-time, and some on over-time. 
Unfortunately for K&K (Tas) and P&B Launc~ston, the start of production 
coincided with the end of this post-war textile boom. By 1923 the backlog of orders 
temporarily diverting the focus of British textile manufacturers towards their own 
domestic market was largely met. With some of Britain's most important export 
markets also contracting as more countries industrialised, remaining markets were 
1 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1919-20, No. 21, p.3: Tasmania. Journals & 
Printed Papers of Parliament, 1920-21. 
2 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1919-20, No. 21, p.30: Tasmania. Journals & 
Printed Papers of Parliament, 1920-21. 
3 Sixth Annual Report of the Indqstrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.31: Tasmania. Journals & 
Printed Papers of Parliament, 1921-22. 
4 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1921-22, No. 14, p.32: Journals & Printed 
Papers of Parliament, 1922-23. 
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aggressively targeted and imports of woollen piece-goods again began to rise. 5 
Reynolds was, however, still positive about the Tasmanian textile industry's prospects 
in mid-1923. The "old established factories" had maintained full-time production 
throughout the year and, in some cases, installed new machinery. 6 Waverley was a 
case in point. Nevertheless, with new mills opening, existing mills expanding, and 
imports re-entering a limited domestic market, the possibility of over-product~on 
increased. This chapter therefore examines how the two companies under 
consideration fared during their first years of operation in Launceston amidst 
conditions which failed to live up to their original promise. Complementing material 
offered in the previous chapter, other industrial developments of significance during 
this period are also considered. A brief analysis of the early 1930s is also provided to 
demonstrate the effects of decisions made at the previous decade's end. While 
chronological order generally prevails, an exception is analysis of water problems and 
the 1929 flood. 
By the time K&K (Tas) began operations in February 1923, the effects of the 
economic down-tum were already apparent. K&K (Tas) had difficulty securing 
sufficient orders to maintain full production almost from the start. Their scouring 
machine and carding engines were stopped within weeks of commencing production 
because supplies were seven to ten days ahead of schedule. Several hands were 
temporarily laid off. 7 Small orders came in slowly during the first few months. K&K 
(Tas)'s product distributor, Messrs. Dudfields, had previously sold considerable 
quantities of material for K&K Ltd8 and suggested K&K (Tas) try keeping the mill 
occupied by producing a heavier flannel, claiming such products were selling freely. 
Quick production changes were not easily achieved, what with inexperienced labour, 
difficulties procuring wool, and quality problems (early yarn proving not "sufficiently 
satisfactory for the weavers to cope with").9 Nevertheless, shareholders at the May 
AGM were told that Dudfields remained optimistic about future prospects, foreseeing 
no difficulty disposing of all K&K (Tas)'s product, although making no promises 
5 Tweed and cloth output declined after 1920-21, but flannel and blankets continued to increase for 
several more years, local companies enjoying a period of great prosperity during the 1922-23 season. 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.78. 
6 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1922-23, No. 24, p.32: Tasmania. Journals & 
Printed Papers of Parliament, 1923-1924. 
7 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 10/4/1923. 
8 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fourth AGM, 25/511923. 
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before the mill was fully operational. 10 Some orders were acquired by August and, 
demonstrative of the increasingly competitive market, "further large orders" were 
anticipated upon price reduction. 11 K&K (Tas) were already unhappy with some of the 
prices Dudfields had arranged, only accepting some of these orders "to keep face with 
the customers". The mill also experienced cash flow problems during this early period, 
by May recording liabilities of £ 13,500 backed by only £6,067 in liquid assets. With 
no working capital, it was necessary to arrange a substantial overdraft (of up to 
£50,500). 12 The mill's working life thus began in debt, the issued share capital 
insufficient to adequately sustain the company. 
Although P&B Launceston did not begin production until late 1923, economic 
conditions for manufacturers of knitting wool still appeared good. Reynolds told 
Parliament that, despite keen overseas competition and falling prices, the volume of 
trade in knitted goods during 1922-23 was "greater than at any time since the inception 
of the industry in this state" .13 With both new mills now working, the Launceston 
mayor's annual review of the city's progress in December was also optimistic, the 
report described as "pleasant reading" .14 This optimism appeared born out by P&B 's 
initial trading results. In February 1924 P&B Launceston transferred £4,994 to central 
office after only three months of trading.15 
Problems evident at K&K (Tas) in 1923 had escalated by the following year. 
Along with concerns about wage instability, 16 import competition intensified. K&K 
(Tas) was a member of the Associated Woollen and Worsted Textile Manufacturers of 
Australia, a national organisation that embraced "almost all woollen textile 
manufacturers" and whose members adhered to minimum prices specified by the 
Association for flannel and blankets. 17 The Association held a special meeting in 
Melbourne in late July to devise action against British competition and tariffs; Noel 
9 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1923. 
10 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fourth AGM, 25/5/1923. 
11 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 3/8/1923. 
12 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fourth AGM, 25/5/1923. 
13 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1922-23, No. 24, p.36: Tasmania. Journals 
& Printed Papers of Parliament, 1923-1924. 
14 
'The Progress of Launceston', 12/12/1923: LCC Press Cuttings, 18/411923-19/1/1926. 
15 Trading account for period 1/12/1923-29/4/1924: P&B Trading accounts & balance sheets 1923-36. 
16 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fifth AGM, 30/5/1924. 
17 First reference to Association in Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 7/3/1924. 
The standardisation of blankets agreed upon in 1916 also came as a result of the Association. 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.92. 
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Walsh, the manager of K&K (Tas), attended. 18 Afterwards Walsh and K&K 
distributor, Dudfield, visited mainland buyers. Although competition was keen, they 
believed the company was "well in the market with the cloth [they] were offering".19 
This optimism appear validated when, despite untrained labour, stints of short-time, 
and the entire mill working "much below · ... normal output", a £6,645 profit on 
manufacturing was recorded for the 1923-24 financial year. K&K's Rochdale directors 
sent congratulations on these results, and felt that estimates "were very promising". 20 
At the same time K&K (Tas)'s first profit was announced, Launceston's original 
woollen manufacturer, Waverley Woollen Mills, celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. The 
Launceston mayor sent a congratulatory letter to mark the occasion.21 Although there 
were signs that conditions were worsening for the textile industry, such positive news 
created a sanguine atmosphere about Launceston's future as a textile centre. 
Possibly caught up in the enthusiasm of Launceston's textile successes, another 
woollen manufacturer, Reliance Worsted Mills Pty Ltd, was started at this time. Local 
produce merchants and seedsmen, J.J. Broomby and Dent, began manufacturing 
worsted materials from purchased yarns in their converted store on the comer of 
William and George Streets in August. 22 Experienced staff were recruited from 
Britain. Reliance had some initial successes, winning contracts over older established 
companies. Since 1916, for example, the Tasmanian Supply and Tender Department 
had acquired cloth and fine serge for uniforms from Geelong. When Reliance began 
production, however, the Department found that the Launceston company could 
provide heavier serge at the same price as Geelong and changed suppliers. 23 Little 
information is available about Reliance, but it appears the company was never a large 
concem,
24 
and was hampered by lack of capital. The ability to diversify, modernise and 
expand would be the hall-marks of successful textile manufacturers, at least as much as 
new industry generally, throughout the twentieth century. 
Positive mid-year indicators were short-lived, and conditions deteriorated 
markedly for textile manufacturers just as Reliance commenced production. K&K 
18 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 18/711924. 
19 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 8/5/1924. 
20 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fifth AGM, 30/5/1924. 
21 Mayor, To Robert Hogarth, 15/5/1924: Launceston City Council 2111.2. 
22 J.J. Broomby, Director of Reliance Worsted Mills Pty Ltd, To Premier Lyons, 1/12/26: PDl 22/3/26. 
23 Manager, Supply and Tender Department, To Secretary to Premier, 1/1111929: PDl 101/3/29. 
24 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/11/1996. 
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(Tas) at first thought that the failure of expected orders to eventuate in July and 
August was the result of customers holding back orders due to high wool prices. By 
October 1924 it became apparent that the situation was more serious and constituted a 
"very acute slump."25 The company was soon discussing reversion to short-time,26 
which was implemented before the year's end. 27 
Despite knitting wools faring well in the early phase of the down turn, P&B 
also experienced difficulties securing sales by late 1924. In October P&B Alloa28 
warned P&B Launceston to clear "bad stock" by such means as redyeing old wool, 
claiming "we do not wish to turn any of our branches into a graveyard". 29 Conditions 
had not improved by the end of the year, with orders for the last two weeks of 
December "disappointingly small".30 Despite such problems, P&B Launceston had a 
distinct advantage over K&K (Tas) during difficult economic times. P&B Launceston 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent company, while K&K (Tas) was a 
financially autonomous company from K&K Ltd. In July 1924 P&B Ltd reported that 
the past year had been "very difficult", with most of its mills running on short time.31 
In light of current conditions P&B Ltd's directors felt their £361,686 profit32 was "not 
a bad one".33 When K&K (Tas)'s financial situation (highlighted by a lack of working 
capital the previous year), is compared with P&B Launceston's backing by a company 
whose profits in a bad year could still be substantial, the advantages to the latter 
company are obvious. 
This is not to imply that K&K (Tas) was left to its own devices. K&K Ltd and 
its English directors held a controlling interest in K&K (Tas) and were able to exert 
considerable influence. Moreover, when K&K (Tas)'s Articles of Association were 
drawn up the English company had been "somewhat reluctant to give local Directors, 
25 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Sixth AGM, 29/5/1925. 
26 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 10/10/1924. 
The decision was left to enable consultation with Rochdale. 
27 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 17/111925. 
28 P&B Alloa refers to the company branch at Alloa which was previously the headquarters of the 
Paton side of the business. For reasons later elaborated upon in chapter 6, most of the instructions for 
the Launceston mill appear to have emanated from P&B Alloa. The other branches of the company 
are likewise referred to by indicating their location after the company title. 
29 W.T. Procter, To Arthur Robert Procter (ARP), 13/10/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. 
Alloa. 
30 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/111925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
31 P&B Ltd, Report of the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 16/7/1924. 
32 P&B Ltd, Fifth Report & Balance Sheet, 30/4/1924. 
33 P&B Ltd, Report of the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 16/7/1924. 
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with whom they were not well acquainted, all the usual powers".34 The Articles were 
structured accordingly and restrictions upon Tasmanian directors would long cause 
problems. An extraordinary general meeting was necessary in December 1920, for 
example, to redress an impractical clause in the agreement between the two companies 
under which K&K (Tas) required authorisation from K&K Rochdale before wool 
purchases could be made. 35 Again in December 1926, an extraordinary general 
meeting was called to alter the articles and allow local directors to purchase wool 
requirements and make customer agre~ments as they saw fit without English 
approval.36 A significant change to the status quo was not made until 1936, when local 
directors publicly admitted that these restrictions were "rather a handicap". 37 
Maintaining that K&K Ltd's caution was no longer necessary, it was finally resolved to 
extend local directors' powers in accordance with usual practice. It seems that P&B 
Ltd was more open about the control held over its Launceston mill. 
Although they were differently structured, time and place determined that both 
mills shared similar experiences; their basic raw material causing !11-any problems 
throughout the 1920s. Before production commenced, government representatives 
had commented upon the supply of "excellent" wool available. 38 Nevertheless, K&K 
(Tas )' s production was originally hampered by commencing late in the wool season; 
local directors acknowledging the firm's "indebtedness to the pastoralists of the district 
who had willingly helped us through a difficult period".39 P&B Launceston also 
appeared to have difficulty acquiring sufficient wool. In July 1924 P&B Alloa 
indicated that P&B Launceston was working "too near the bone to be comfortable" 
regarding the quantity of wool carried.40 P&B Ltd also believed that its Launceston 
mill had been "rather up against it" in being forced to rely upon a particular Australian 
supplier of scoured wool. After suppliers had promised to deal "reasonably" with P&B 
Launceston, scoured wool had cost the same as in Bradford, the English centre of the 
woollen industry. P&B Alloa felt this was not "playing the game", considering 
transportation savings. By October 1923 P&B Launceston concluded that prices for 
34 Not~sfrom K&K Chairman's Speech for 17th AGM, 1119/1936. 
35 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 6/12/1920. 
36 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 1711211926. 
37 Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech for 17th AGM, 11/9/1936. 
38 Sixth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1920-21, No. 17, p.6: Tasmania. Journals & 
Printed Papers of Parliament, 1921-22. 
39 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fifth AGM, 30/511924. 
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scoured wool from this firm were simply too high to be paid.41 Wool scouring likewise 
caused problems at K&K (Tas), who had been provided with a scouring plant to enable 
their Launceston mill to purchase and scour wool for themselves and K&K Rochdale. 
The plan soon proved uneconomical. Much of K&K's wool was purchased on the 
mainland, meaning that it had to be shipped to Tasmania, then scoured, and returned 
via Melbourne to England. K&K Ltd soon deemed it more economical to have 
mainland purchases scoured on the mainland; K&K (Tas)' s plant was therefore sold to 
local wool-scouring and fellmonger firm, L.W. Smith, who gave K&K a priority deal to 
scour their Tasmanian wool purchases.42 
The severity of conditions in the textile industry had intensified by the following 
year. K&K (Tas) began 1925 by reverting to full-time with half labour.43 A few orders 
were filtering in by March, and Dudfields were optimistic about future prospects for 
several new lines under production.44 At the May AGM, K&K {Tas)'s Chairman 
reported that, while most trades in the Commonwealth had gone through a "difficult 
period" in the last financial year, the woollen industry had experienced "a most severe 
depression".45 Trade had fallen off to such an extent that many Geelong mills, at the 
heart of Australian textile industry, were working half-time,46 and the papers provided 
almost daily accounts of mill closures; some long established mills forced onto short 
time for the first time ever. With K&K (Tas) "scarcely on its legs", the Chairman felt 
they were bound to suffer more than well established firms. 47 K&K ended the 1924-25 
financial year with a £3,961 loss. Difficulties associated with a fall off in trade were 
not the textile industry's only problem. The general economic slump affected 
customers ability to pay, and there was continual evidence of K&K's customers not 
paying bills or going into liquidation. Despite much competition, this led K&K (Tas) 
to be cautious when accepting orders, only confirming the second half of a large order 
from D.G.S. Shirt Co, for example, after payment for the first half was received.48 
While the textile industry enjoyed relative industrial harmony during the 1920s, 
40 T. Stirling, To .ARP. 221711924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
41 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 26/10/1923: P&B Alloa, Correspondence 1923-24. 
42 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1111/1996. 
43 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 17/111925. 
44 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 27/3/1925. 
45 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Sixth AGM, 29/5/1925. 
46 Forster, Industrial Development, p.78. 
47 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Sixth AGM, 29/5/1925. 
48 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 13/2/1925. 
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Launceston' s textile manufacturers were, nevertheless, affected by ongoing industrial 
unrest in other industries. In mid-1925 industrial disputes loomed in the railway, 
maritime and coal industries.49 With the prospect of yet another maritime strike, 
Premier Lyons informed the Prime Minister that "Something akin to a state of panic" 
existed in Tasmania's commercial circles, and believed that materialisation of this strike 
would spell disaster for the state.50 
K&K (Tas)'s relationship with the Associated Woollen and Worsted Textile 
Manufacturers of Australia also soured as conditions worsened. Until early 1925 
Tasmanian mills were disadvantaged as an island state by Association policy in which 
the fixed minimum price was either "free on road" or "free on board".51 Aiming for 
concessions on minimum price to off-set Tasmania's freight costs, a K&K (Tas) 
representative attended an Association Conference in Melbourne in January 1925, and 
secured a change to "cost, insurance, and freight"52 at capital ports or cities, 
Launceston included.53 Although a victory for Tasmania mills, the return to 
competitive conditions made even limited price control difficult to maintain. 54 In mid-
1925 K&K (Tas)'s manager noted that non-Association mills were capturing many 
orders. 55 As Association members lost trade to mills outside the organisation, member 
dissatisfaction increased. Warrnambool Mill was one manufacturer who subsequently 
withdrew its membership because sales had been affected "by a few mills outside the 
Association" undercutting fixed prices.56 Warrnambool's case also highlights the 
Association's difficulty in maintaining price control and retaining members. In mid-
1925 (before Warrnambool's withdrawal from the Association), news leaked out that it 
had sold 12,000 "so called faulty blankets" below minimum price. Breaking 
Association rules was made worse because Warrnambool's manager was the 
Association's President.57 Claiming to no longer have full confidence in the 
Association, K&K (Tas) resigned over this incident. Although urged to reconsider, 
49 T. Stirling, To ARP, 13/7/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
50 Premier, Memo to Secretary to Premier, 30/6/1925: PDl 99/14/1925. 
51 Forster, Industrial Development, p.93. 
"Free on board" and "free on road" respectively indicate that the supplier bears the cost of sea and 
road transportation. 
52 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 111/1925. 
Cost, insurance and freight were henceforth included in the price quoted. 
53 Forster, Industrial Development, p.93. 
54 Forster, Industrial Development, p.93. 
55 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 61711925. 
56 Jobson's Investment Digest 1926, p.45 in Forster, Industrial Development, p.93. 
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"otherwise 'open warfare' would result", K&K stood firm.58 Before commencing 
production K&K (Tas) had also joined the Chamber of Manufacturers for a year, but, 
with conditions worsening by August 1925, company director Percy Hart proposed 
that the company withdraw its membership "as little if any good accrues". 59 While the 
decision was temporarily postponed, this was another example of economic depression 
weakening representative organisations. 
Despite all indicators to the contrary, in mid-1925 K&K (Tas)'s directors 
publicly denied that the Australian market was over-serviced. Shareholders were 
instead told that Australian trade was "satisfactory", and that initial faith that the mill 
could be kept busy supplying the Australian market seemed to be supported by 
experience. 60 With the company's product range increasing, directors felt that their 
new lines would meet less competition and that "it only remained for trade to revive to 
ensure the success of the mill". Since the end of its financial year the company had 
been operating on roughly half production, and directors believed this would continue 
until new season orders arrived in July and August. No longer subject to price control 
by the Textile Association, K&K (Tas) instructed Dudfields on its own minimum price, 
being willing to use their lowest level only for orqers over 1,000 pieces and then only 
when absolutely forced by competition.61 As pr~dicted, a number of orders were 
received by August: One for 4,000 blankets was accepted at cut price in an attempt to 
get the mill workfug full time again. Efforts to bring all looms into production were, 
however, hampered by difficulties procuring labour. The constant reversion to short-
time made retention of staff an ongoing problem in the first years of operation. 62 
Although P&B Launceston were able to send home a profit of £ 7,445 for the 
twelve months ended February 1925,63 the parent company appeared dissatisfied with 
progress. P&B Alloa had expressed hope for an improvement at their Launceston mill 
by early 1925, but were disappointed. Despite a number of orders imminent in 
January, conditions made it difficult to keep the mill going full time.64 This fear was 
57 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 61711925. 
58 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 15/7/1925. 
59 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 26/3/1923 & 29/8/1925. 
60 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Sixth AGM, 29/5/1925. 
61 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 12/8/1925. 
62 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 29/8/1925. 
63 Trading account for 12 months ended 28/12/1925: P&B trading accounts and balance sheets, 1923-
1928. 
64 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/1/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
92 
realised by mid-March.65 The state of the wool market aggravated the situation, with 
wool prices in February 1925 "tumbling all round".66 This led to P&B Launceston's 
wool purchases for the season being written down, turning a possible profit into a 
serious loss.67 P&B's British mills were likewise floundering by mid-1925, with all 
branches ,on half-time, and no prospect of immediate improvement.68 P&B Alloa 
director, William Procter, sympathised that conditions were probably as difficult in 
Launceston, and feared no change until wool values bottomed. 69 Despite such troubles 
P&B Ltd were able to pay a 7.5% dividend for the 1924-25 financial year, P&B 
Launceston' s general manager being pleased because he had not expected anything 
more than 5%.70 He did, however, fail to mention that P&B Ltd's profits had 
dramatically declined that financial year to only £151,755 and that only transferral of 
funds from the company's substantial monetary reserves had allowed this dividend. 
Such options were not available to shareholders of K&K (Tas).71 
Textile companies lacking the type of support available to P&B Launceston 
suffered more severely as import competition increased. The case of Hobart-based 
James Aiken and Sons Ltd is indicative of the problems associated with over-extension 
in Australia's textile industry after the war. This long established firm employed 
around 80 people, and came close to bankruptcy in 1925. A combination of bad 
management, additions to machinery and dramatic rises in the wool price, had seen the 
mill suffer "astonishing" losses for the previous two years.72 With most of Aiken's 
working capital used up, their bank refused to extend further credit, while insisting 
their debt be reduced. Raising additional capital was not possible because, prior to the 
down-tum, the company's remaining shares had been specifically called to build a new 
mill at Wagga. Without intervention the company's only option was closure and, by 
May, the mill was temporarily shut. Local director, C. McKay, petitioned Premier 
Lyons to intervene with the banks on the mill's behalf, and joined what would become 
a national cry by textile manufacturers for greater protection: 
65 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 28/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
66 T. Stirling, To ARP, 18/2/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
67 P&B Ltd praised Launceston wool buyer, Watson Dawson's, recent wool purchases, despite the fall 
in prices making them unprofitable. 
T. Stirling, To ARP, 18/211925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
68 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 16/6/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
69 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 16/6/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
70 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 9/9/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
71 P&B Ltd, Sixth Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 30/411925. 
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I do not hope for good profits in the woollen business until such time as a little more 
protection is given ... But if we can keep [Aiken mill] going, even with a small profit, the 
Federal Government is, in my opinion, bound to afford protection to so important an 
"d thi" d · 73 m ustry as s, m or er to preserve 1t. 
While the nature of the government's intercessory role is unclear, by early June McKay 
was thanking the Labor government for its foresight in stepping in to assist the mill, 74 
although problems finalising assistance caused further delays in restarting production. 75 
A Tariff Induced Respite: c.1925-1929 
McKay's calls for increased protection to counter increased competition was 
typical of the textile industry's response. With the textile industry increasingly hard hit 
by overseas competition, in 1925 the Tariff Board finally bowed to pressure and 
reassessed protection levels. First examined was assistance for woollen yarn. Lower 
wages and longer working hours meant that English yarn sold at approximately 15% 
less than Australian yarn; the Board recommended an increase in the B.P.T. from 10% 
ad valorem to 20%.76 Subsequently addressed were woollen piece goods, the Board 
deeming a duty increase unnecessary, but allowing a 5% increase to compensate for the 
increased duty on yarn.77 These increases took effect from September 1925, even 
though larger concerns manufacturing the better class of materials admitted increased 
protection was unnecessary and served mainly to keep inefficient mills viable.78 For 
new mills not yet on their feet as the downturn hit, however, tariff increases came at an 
opportune time. Coinciding with the introduction of the new tariff, P&B Launceston 
reported home that their mill was again busy. They had even recently been able to 
recommence a night shift.79 The specific duty had amounted to a virtual prohibition on 
lower priced woollen piece goods, so and was particularly beneficial to companies such 
as K&K (Tas) who catered for the cheaper end of the market. According to K&K 
72 C. McKay, Local Director of James Aiken & Sons Ltd, To J.A. Lyons, 15/4/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
73 McKay, To J.A. Lyons, 15/511925: PDl 179/8/25. 
74 McKay, To J.A. Guy, Chief Secretary's Office, Hobart, 12/6/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
75 McKay, To Lyons, 24/6/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
76 Tariff Board Report on Yarns - Woollen, 1925 as cited in Forster, Industrial Development, p.79. 
77 The Board felt the main competition came from the importation of shoddy and cotton tweeds, a 
situation best met by imposing a specific duty on ls. per square yard B.P.T. 
Tariff Board Report on Woollen Piece Goods, 1925 as cited in Forster, Industrial Development, p.79. 
78 Forster, Industrial Development, pp.79 & 91. 
There was undoubtedly truth in these claims, but the larger mills' self-interest is also apparent. 
79 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 9/911925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
80 The industry entered upon a new period of rapid expansion. For most woollen mills, production 
peaked in 1926-27, except for yarn which continued to increase with demand from knitting mills. 
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(Tas), rumours of tariff increases temporarily aggravated the problem of overseas 
competition, importers rushing large quantities of goods into the country before the 
proposed new tariff took affect.81 Nevertheless, by early September the company was 
forced to reject further orders for dyeds and blankets because they already had orders 
at hand for eight months work. 82 Several months later, K&K (Tas)'s Chairman 
reported that prospects were "distinctly brighter", with the new tariff having a healthy 
effect.83 
Soon after the September tariff increases took effect, James Edward Thyne of 
Sandringham, Victoria, contacted Tasmanian authorities about establishing a knitting 
mill in Launceston.84 A director and general manager of Australian Knitting Mills and 
a director of Yarra Falls Ltd (Vic),85 Thyne proposed establishing a proprietary 
company with his two sons; their preferred location was either Launceston or 
Melbourne.86 While Thyne maintained that Melbourne's superiority as a manufacturing 
centre was "in certain respects, undoubted", Launceston was being considered because 
the company intended to purchase most of its materials from P&B Launceston. Thyne 
thus inquired whether a free site near P&B Launceston could be made available, or one 
at "a price which would help to reduce initial capital expenditure"; what conditions 
could be offered for water, electric light and power (the State government 
subsequently informing Launceston they would handle power negotiations);87 and what 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.79. 
81 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Seventh AGM, 26/5/1926. 
82 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 51911925. 
83 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Seventh AGM, 26/5/1926. 
84 Expansion of the manufacture of hosiery and knitted goods was even more rapid than in woollen 
textiles. Before the war the hosiery and knitted goods industry was small, only one knitting company 
manufacturing its own yarn, all other yarn being imported. The war offered the opportunity for 
expansion, hindered only by difficulties in obtaining yarn. With tariff assistance the industry grew 
swiftly until 1927-28, aided by fashion changes, new materials and innovations in hosiery 
manufacture. After a pause in which further duties were imposed, the industry again expanded, the 
general tariff increases at the end of 1929 raising duties to "an almost prohibitive level". 
Forster, Industrial Development, pp.72, 93-99. 
85 Examiner, 11/8/1964. 
Both were significant woollen manufacturers. Y arra Falls was one of the largest and most efficient 
woollen mills in Australia during the 1920s. It was formed principally to spin yarn for Australian 
Knitting Mills, which, like K&K and P&B, was one of the five known woollen manufacturers 
established in Australia with British capital after World War I. 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.83. 
86 J.E. Thyne, To Manager, Tasmania Government Tourist Bureau, 29/12/1925: Launceston City 
Council, Industries General (1925-1927), 21/1.3. 
87 Chief Secretary's Department, Hobart, To A.A. Evans, Launceston, 5/1/1926: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.3. 
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other advantages Launceston had to offer over Melbourne as a manufacturing centre. 88 
As P&B Launceston's distributor, P&B (Australasia) Ltd, was Melbourne based, it is 
unlikely there was any great benefit for Thyne to locate near the Launceston mill, 
particularly if he was really convinced of Melboume's superiority. More likely, Thyne 
was attempting to get the best possible deal from Tasmanian authorities. Thyne was no 
doubt aware that, after the war, Tasmania's Chief Inspector of Factories noted for 
three consecutive years that Tasmanian demand for knitted goods exceeded supply, 89 
and was likely interested in targeting the State's domestic market. Although 
Tasmania's domestic market was limited, it was probably less competitive than the 
Victorian market and suited to small beginnings. Supporting contentions that Thyne 
was not interested in establishing in Melbourne, the first discussions between Thyne 
and Tasmanian government representative, H.D.J. Webb, led Webb to conclude that 
Thyne "appeared very anxious to establish ... in Tasmania". 90 
Negotiations to secure Launceston's fourth textile industry that decade 
progressed rapidly in the new year. In early January the Chief Secretary's Department 
requested that Launceston mayor, A.A. Evans, and Claude James, MHA, work 
together to help Thyne secure a site.91 L.S. Bruce, manager of Launceston's Tourist 
Bureau, had previously ascertained that a building suitable for knitting mills was 
available. 92 Thyne Brothers Proprietary Limited was incorporated on 13 January 
1926,93 with a capital of £30,000. The business' stated objectives were to manufacture 
knitted goods and operate as spinners and weavers94 (although the company initially 
88 J.E. Thyne, To Manager, Tasmania Government Tourist Bureau, 29112/1925: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.3. 
89 Annual Reports of the Industrial Department 1919-1922, Tasmania. Journals and Printed Papers of 
Parliament as cited in Forster, Industrial Development, p.94. 
90 H. Webb, Tasmanian Government Representative, To J.A. Lyons, 31112/1924: Launceston City 
Council, 2111.3. 
91 Chief Secretary's Department, Hobart, To A.A. Evans, Launceston, 511/1925: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.3. 
92 H. Webb, Tasmanian Government Representative, To J.A. Lyons, 31/12/1925: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.3. 
93 Certificate oflncorporation of Proprietary Co: Thyne Bros. Pty Ltd Business Records, LMSS 136. 
94 Memorandum and Articles of Association of Thyne Bros. Proprietary Limited: Thyne Bros. Pty Ltd 
Business Records, LMSS 136. 
Very much a family business, the company's directors initially consisting of S.J. Thyne, who was also 
company secretary and Public Officer (and later served as Launceston mayor), J.E. Thyne (who 
doubled as Chairman) and F.E. Thyne. 
Minutes of Thyne Bros. Directors' Meetings, 2/211926 & 18/2/1926: Thyne Bros. Business Records, 
Minutes 1926, LMSS 136. 
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operated as a knitting mill only, a woollen spinning plant not installed until 1937).95 
Purchasing the old Union Brewery site at 214 York Street, Thyne Bros. hoped to start 
work only a month after the site's purchase96 and Thyne was in Launceston by 14 
January personally negotiating matters. 97 Within only a few months of operation it was 
necessary to increase the company's capital from £30,000 to £40,000,98 and by mid-
1926 the company had purchased a second property in Wellington Street for £2,150.99 
(See illustration Nos. 17 & 18.) 
Although continued expansion of Launceston's textile industry appeared 
positive for the State, economic conditions in Tasmania during 1926 were weak. With 
State debt increasing, taxes high, population deserting, and other problems unique to 
its island status, Tasmania was struggling to survive as a self-governing State under 
current federal funding levels. This was the picture presented in 'The Case for 
Tasmania' in early 1926. This review of the State's disabilities was presented to Sir 
Nicholas Lockyer, the special investigator appointed by the federal government to 
examine Tasmania's economy. While Tasmania's own investigations pointed to 
inadequate federal funding as the main cause of the State's problems, Lockyer placed 
much of the blame upon State government policy. 10° Few were happy with Lockyer's 
conclusions, 101 and Launceston was no exception. Discussing the 'Case for Tasmania' 
in September 1926, the Launceston Chamber of Commerce believed the need for 
special consideration was particularly felt in the Launceston region. 102 The State also 
continued to be blighted by industrial action, the previous year's threatened coal strike 
95 Thyne Bros., To Director, Industrial Development Department, 13/3/1958: Thyne Bros. Business 
Records, LMSS 136. 
96 Launceston Mayor, To J. Allan Guy, Chief Secretary, Hobart, 15/111926: PDl 17911/26. 
97 Town Clerk, To Premier, 14/1/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.2. 
98 Minutes of Thyne Bros. Directors' meeting, 211911926: Minutes, 1926-1926: Thyne Bros. Business 
Records, LMSS 136. 
99 Minutes of Thyne Bros. Directors' meeting, 17/6/1926: Minutes, 1926-1926: Thyne Bros. Business 
Records, LMSS 136. 
Thyne Bros' recorded a £3,529 loss for the financial year ended June 1927, again making a £3,313 
loss in the 1927-28 financial year. While details of their results for the rest of ·the 1920s are not 
available, their 1928 result came at a time when the larger textile companies achieved their best 
results for the decade. 
Thyne Bros. 1928 Balance Sheet: Thyne Bros. Business Records, LMSS 136. 
100 See W.A. Townsley, Tasmania. From Colony to Statehood 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991), p.311-4. 
101 Mercury, 20/4/1926. 
102 With orcharding the north's main primary industry, the Chamber felt that "the almost complete 
collapse of the London market for Tasmanian apples" strengthened its claims for assistance. 
Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM 16/9/1926: Minutes 28/10/1915-29/11/1937. 
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eventuating by mid-1926 and causing concern for Launceston's textile 
manuf acturers. 103 
Apparently also causing some concern amongst locals during periods of 
economic hardship was that much of K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston's· wool was 
purchased outside the State, and even outside Australia - an ironic twist for a country 
using the availability of wool as an incentive for mills to establish in Australia. In 
February 1926, for example, P&B Alloa informed P&B Launceston that they would try 
to supply the mills' request for English Down wool if P&B Launceston could get the 
requested amount of wool into the State "without setting your Tasmanian Farmers by 
the ears" .104 Dismissing the desire of locals to see Tasmanian products consumed by 
industry, Alloa director, Thomas Stirling, suggested that publicists were exaggerating 
an overseas anthrax scare in order to boost this cause. 
Tariff increases occurred too late to impact upon K&K's results for the 1925-
26 financial year. With K&K's balance sheet again adverse, local director, Carl 
Stackhouse, pointed out that this was an Australia wide trend and the past year had 
been "very depressed" for the woollen manufacturing trade. 105 With wool prices at the 
start of the year ·very high, manufacturers had been unable to obtain profitable returns. 
After a sensational fall in wool prices, buyers had then withheld orders in anticipation 
of price decreases. Consequently almost all Australian mills had accumulated stock 
and were subsequently forced to clear at belm~' cost. K&K (Tas) suffered this fate, 
offering certain stock below cost in April 1926.106 With orders down in the early part 
of the year, K&K had also been forced on to short-time. When conditions picked up 
enough to keep the mill fully occupied, management again could not reach full 
production as quickly as desired because of difficulties obtaining labour. 107 In hindsight 
K&K would recall: 
The company was born at the most unfortunate time when buildings and machinery were 
right at their peak, and following quickly on the heels of this disastrous start we 
encountered an acute depression in trade and exceptionally heavy fall in wool values with 
the net result that in 1926 preference dividends were 6 years in arrears and there was a 
debit in the Profit and Loss Account of £16,600. 108 
103 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 41611926. 
G.W. Fulton, Cornwall Coal Company, To Town Clerk, 16/11/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.5. 
104 T. Stirling, To ARP, 24/211926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
105 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Seventh AGM, 26/5/1926. 
106 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 23/4/26. 
107 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Seventh AGM, 26/5/1926. 
108 Notes from K&K's Chairman's Speech for Fifteenth AGM, 19/9/1934. 
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P.M. Hart, a long-time employee of K&K (Tas) and grandson of original 
director, Percy Hart, recalls the severity of the company's financial constraints during 
this early period, and the extremes to which the company went to save money. When 
the company engineer, Sam Tuting, asked management for a small amount of screws to 
complete a job, Noel Walsh allowed him to purchase only the exact amount required. 
While Les Overstall replaced Walsh as K&K (Tas)'s general manager in 1926, 
conditions ensured managerial attitudes remained much the same and, according to 
Hart, led to Overstall being "tight all the time" - a characteristic also credited to his 
English upbringing.109 
Increased tariffs did, however, have a positive effect at P&B Launceston by 
1926. For the 13 months ended March 1926, P&B Launceston transferred a balance of 
£29, 151 to central office. 110 In contrast, P&B Ltd' s English mills were on short-time, 
competition was "cut-throat", there was practically no profit margin, 111 and profit for 
the entire group had declined to £33,408 for the 1925-26 financial year. 112 With little 
other positive news to relate in its annual report, P&B Ltd made special reference to 
recently building and equipping their Launceston mill at a cost of £260,000. They also 
mentioned that, because Australian supplies were now provided by the Launceston 
mill, P&B (Australasia) Ltd could hold less stock than previously necessary when all 
goods were shipped from England,113 a saving for the company. 
Privately P&B Launceston's £260,000 price-tag was causing concern. In 
August 1926 P&B Alloa raised with P&B Launceston recent comparisons between 
costs at both mills. Launceston's heat, light and power were "very economical", labour 
costs were only 0.86d. per lb. more than at Alloa, and materials used were more 
expensive in Launceston "owing to freight outwards" (which deepened the irony that 
ready access to wool had been pushed as an incentive for woollen manufacturers to 
establish in Australia). The outstanding feature of the analysis, however, was 
109 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
110 Trading account for 13 months ended 3113/1926: P&B Trading accounts & balance sheets, 1923-
36. 
ll1 Artificial silk was also beginning to impact upon woollen manufacturers. The company was, 
however, still able to offer a 5% dividend on ordinary shares by again transferring reserve funds. 
P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Seventh Annual Meeting of Shareholders & Special Meeting of 
Shareholders, 2117/1926. 
112 P&B Ltd, Seventh Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 30/4/1926. 
113 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Seventh Annual Meeting of Shareholders & Special 
Meeting of Shareholders, 21/7/1926. 
99 
Launceston's heavy interest and depreciation costs, due to the cost of machinery and 
high freight charges, coupled with "perhaps a rather costly style of Mill Building" .114 
With Tasmanian yarn production costing 4.75d. per lb. more than at Alloa, virtually the 
entire difference was attributable to the interest and depreciation figure. Predicting this 
would be "a millstone around our neck", and that Launceston could not compare 
favourably until this figure was reduced, Alloa saw only two ways of overcoming the 
problem. First was to achieve a high productive efficiency and output, spreading the 
costs over more income per year: aims made difficult by problems of securing orders 
and maintaining full production. The second was to drastically write down capital 
charges "when a good year [came] along". A substantial one-off depreciation write-
down to bring the Launceston mill to a satisfactory level was eventually made by P&B 
Ltd in 1933-34.115 
P&B Launceston was also visited by Alloa director, John Forrester-Paton in 
October 1926. At a farewell reception arranged by the Launceston Chamber of 
Commerce, 116 Forrester-Paton claimed that P&B Ltd viewed the establishment of their 
Launceston mill "as a big experiment" which had "been perfectly justified", m a 
contradiction to concerns about cost structures at the mill. Taking "an optimistic view 
of the future", Forrester-Paton would have won local favour by looking forward to a 
time when the Glen Dhu Mills would be double their present size. The initial steps 
towards realising this prediction came with the company's first expansion in the 1926-
27 financial year. 
Reliance Worsted Mills were also expanding in 1926, purchasing new 
machinery from England in early January and bringing out another English operative to 
train locals in its use.118 Although Company director J.J. Broomby later claimed that 
the period since establishment in 1924 had "passed with very satisfactory results", 119 
Reliance's expansion was motivated by necessity. In December 1926 Broomby told 
how the business was growing so rapidly that that the company was being affected by 
114 T. Stirling, To ARP, 31/8/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
115 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at Sixteenth Annual Meeting of Stockholders, 17/7/1935. 
116 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee, 21/10/1926: Minutes 8/3/1917-
19/6/1930. 
'Manufacturer farewelled', undated press cutting: Launceston City Council, 2111.5. 
117 
'Manufacturer farewelled', undated press cutting: Launceston City Council, 2111.5. 
118 Immigration Officer, To Director of State Immigration, 5/1/1926: SWD4 M9/601. 
Director of Labour & State Immigration, To Townsend, Reliance Worsted Mills, 9/3/1926: SWD4 
M9/601. 
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inability to purchase new equipment. With six months business lined up, Reliance were 
forced to turn down several large orders through inability to cope. Broomby therefore 
applied through Premier Lyons for a £5,000 loan from the Development and Migration 
Commission (an agency just established by the federal government) to purchase 
additional machinery, including a finishing plant. Reliance wished to take advantage of 
a British Government scheme whereby Dominion Manufacturers could acquire 10 year 
loans at 1 % interest, provided British machinery was purchased and the company 
employed British migrants. Demonstrating a willingness to comply with criteria, 
Broomby pointed out that existing plant was English-manufactured and that he and a 
number of the company employees were English migrants.120 Broomby' s request was, 
nevertheless, rejected because the British government deemed private companies 
ineligible. 121 While the mill would eventually acquire its finishing plant in 1928, 122 
inability to expand when necessary might have influenced the venture's ultimate 
demise. 
By 1927 prospects were finally looking up for both companies under 
consideration, the tariffs impact now being felt. K&K (Tas) recorded a net profit of 
£10,163 for the 1926-27 financial year, reducing its deficit to £6,455. This outcome 
was particularly pleasing considering ongoing difficulties retaining labour, and that six 
of the 15 month period covered by the accounts included unremunerative orders 
booked during the "previous depression". 123 With demand exceeding supply, K&K had 
not only been able to sell their entire output, but merchants had taken delivery upon 
manufacture. To help cater for increased demand, K&K (Tas) had also expanded, 
extra looms running since January and some machinery working more than one shift. 
Orders had also been taken up until the following April, as far forward as deemed safe 
due to impending legislation to reduce the working week. Believing that improved 
labour efficiency had aided results, K&K (Tas)'s directors congratulated management 
and foremen on increased output, believing "we are getting the utmost possible from 
our available plant at present" - possibly as much an indictment of the company's plant 
as a compliment to staff. According to an English textile mechanic engineer, A.E. 
119 J.J. Broomby, Director, Reliance Worsted Mills Pty Ltd, To Lyons, 1/12/1926: PDl 22/3/26. 
120 Broomby, To Lyons, 1112/1926: PDl 22/3/26. 
121 Premier Guy, To J.J. Broomby, 10/12/1926: PDl 22/3/26. 
122 Courier Christmas Annual, 5/11/1930. 
123 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eighth AGM, 17/8/1927. 
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Briggs, during his July 1927 Australian visit, Australia had an advantage over the 
English textile manufacturers. Not only did Australia have the best wool available 
close to manufacturing centres (the purchasing habits of our two companies 
notwithstanding) but Australian factories installed the latest machinery, while many 
English textile plants were using out of date machinery and were not in a position to 
upgrade. 124 While this may have been true for P&B Launceston, K&K (Tas), had been 
handicapped by originally purchasing much second hand machinery. Its continuing lack 
of capital meant that the mill often had to improvise or make do. K&K (Tas)'s first 
boiler, for example, was a single furnace which lost pressure when raked out. A two 
furnace boiler was added, but within a couple of years again did not have enough 
capacity. With little hope of a replacement, engineer Sam Tuting located a discarded 
mining wood fire burner in the bush, transported it back to the mill, and adjusted it to 
handle coal. These three boilers were not scrapped until the 1960s, when a new 
automatic model was finally installed.125 
Unaware of problems with some antiquated machinery, K&K (Tas)'s 
shareholders were simply gratified the company had turned a corner and were in sight 
of substantial profits. Shareholder, W. Martin, inquired whether dividends might be 
paid the following year. The chairman felt this was a distinct possibility; another 
shareholder pointing out that while shareholders would naturally like to see a return on 
their investment, comfort could meanwhile be taken from the industry being "of great 
benefit to Launceston" .126 
P&B Ltd's Chairman, William Procter, was likewise pleased with P&B 
Launceston's results. Transferring a balance of £52,024 to the capital account for the 
12 months ended March 1927, 127 the final figure showed a profit of around 5 % of total 
capital investment for 1926-27 financial year. Maintaining that this figure was 
currently satisfactory, Procter added that P&B Launceston should look for better 
returns in the future, and predicted that when the mill achieved full output "a very 
satisfactory profit should result".128 Shareholders at P&B Ltd's 1927 AGM were thus 
told that the Launceston mill was "still carrying on successfully", and directors 
124 West Australian, Perth, 18/7/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.7. 
125 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/11/1996. 
126 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eighth AGM, 17 /8/1927. 
127 Trading account for 12 months ended 31/3/1927: P&B Trading accounts and balance sheets, 1923-
36. 
128 Managing Accountant, To ARP, 9/5/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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reiterated Forrester-Paton's claims to Launceston residents the previous year, "that the 
policy of laying down plant in Australia [had] been fully justified" .129 Shareholders 
were also told that increases in subsidiary shares and advances were "entirely due to 
increased business done by the Melbourne based Australasian distributing Company", 
the distributor of P&B Launcestoil's product. With a successful year achieved, 
extensions were being made at P&B Launceston by mid-1927. 130 Floor space was 
increased by a further 32,880 sq. ft., the first step in an on-going expansion programme 
which would see the mill almost treble in size by 1966; from 234,605 sq. ft. at the start 
of production, to 648,090 sq. ft. 131 
While an improvement was also evident in P&B Ltd's results (profits for the 
year ending April 1927 up to £160,748),132 the British textile industry was still 
struggling. Shareholder, W. Morison, recognised the complexity of this issue at P&B 
Ltd's 1927 AGM. Bemoaning British manufacturers' "habit" of "crying out for 
assistance from the state", he suggested the cause of Britain's current situation lay in 
several directions. One was the "laying down of large plants and machinery abroad", 
increasing costs and competition, both abroad and at home - implying that the British 
textile industry, including P&B Ltd, had to accept some responsibility for their own 
problems. 
For small local mills attempting to compete against large British concerns, 
problems were even greater, Reliance Woollen Mills providing a good example. Not 
only did Reliance Worsted Mills' lack of capital make it difficult for the company to 
expand, but its small size made it harder to attract the same sorts of concession granted 
to the larger mills. In November 1927 Reliance informed the mayor of its intention to 
expand by adding a finishing plant for worsted suitings. They had tried to borrow 
money to purchase the same plant the previous year. Claiming this plant would 
consume "a fair quantity of water", Broomby requested the same treatment given to 
other Launceston mills, namely free water for a period of years. 133 He also pointed out 
that the new plant would increase employee numbers and allow considerable future 
expansion, in tum further increasing employment. When pushed on exactly how many 
129 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Eighth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 20/7/1927. 
130 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 28/6/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
131 
'Historical & General Aspects of P&B Mill Launceston', Miscellaneous Information held by CP. 
132 P&B Ltd, Eighth Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 30/4/1927. 
133 Broomby, To Mayor, 1111111927: Launceston City Council 21/1.7. 
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new jobs would be created, 134 Broomby said that the new plant would employ only an 
extra six hands, adding that he hoped to double that number as business increased. 135 
While it is uncertain whether the concession was granted, it is unlikely: K&K and 
P&B's concessions were made in relation to hundreds of new jobs. 
Although generally a positive year for both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston, 
1927 ended on a sour note. Tasmania was again isolated through industrial action. 
Upon hearing that a docking strike was under way in December, P&B Alloa feared its 
Launceston mill was being placed in an "awkward and difficult position", and 
expressed hope of an imminent settlement.136 For K&K (Tas), at least, the strike 
appeared to cause little difficulty apart from briefly postponing a delivery of flannel to 
Sydney.131 
While demand for woollen goods outweighed supply in 1927, by 1928 
conditions were again increasingly competitive. Although in the autumn months 
directors pondered the very keen competition then prevailing within the industry, they 
also cut down an order for blankets from 14,000 pair to 5,000.138 With an increase in 
wool prices reducing profit margins,139 K&K (Tas)'s decision to accept only part of 
this order may have been due to a reluctance to accept large orders at low prices. 
Conversely, buyers were keen to place orders before prices rose. The Associated 
Woollen and Worsted Textile Manufacturers new price list was also due within a 
month of this decision, and price increases to their list were a possibility. Although 
K&K had withdrawn from the Association in 1925, it appears as if they continued to 
base their minimum price upon Association prices. With competition severe, the 
Association's minimum price could only have allowed minimal profit. Undercutting 
would have provided little return, and charging higher rates would have been suicide. 
When the Association's price list was released, however, there was no change from the 
previous year, with the exception of a 3d. per lb. increase for blankets and a small 
advance on fine flannel prices. This was despite the fact that wool costs had increased 
between 33% to 50% over the last season. 140 Despite already being concerned about 
134 Town Clerk, To Broomby, 13/12/1927: Launceston City Council 2111.7. 
135 Broomby, To Town Clerk, 16/12/1927: Launceston City Council 2111.7. 
136 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 5/12/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
137 Minutes of K&K Director' Meeting, 3/12/1927. 
138 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 2114/1928. 
139 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 5/5/1928. 
140 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1928. 
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low returns, in early June K&K (Tas)'s national selling agent, J. Baragwanath, 
informed the company their prices were too high to secure early bookings. 141 Over-
supply continued to force prices down. K&K (Tas) decided not to reduce its prices at 
this time, but within weeks Baragwanath reiterated his claim, pointing out that the 
order position was becoming serious. Non-Association mills were reported to be 
booking 'union' 142 and all wool flannels at 2.5d. per lb. below Association prices and 
blankets at 4d. below - this observation again suggesting that K&K (Tas) had 
continued to adhere to Association prices. While K&K (Tas) again decided not to 
issue a reduced price list, they did authorise Baragwanath a small margin of leeway 
when securing an order looked possible. 143 Since this decision was made at stock-take 
time of year when orders were generally delayed, K&K (Tas)'s order position did not 
immediately improve, although they were able to continue working full time in July. 144 
The impact of these many problems would not, however, be manifest in 
company results until the following year. Shareholders at K&K (Tas)'s August AGM 
were instead told that maximum output and volume of business had been maintained 
throughout the past year. They were also informed that prices had been remunerative, 
with K&K (Tas) "working under better conditions than ever before".145 K&K (Tas) 
had even been considering expansion earlier that year. R.C. Roe, the English Director 
involved in the mill's establishment, had again visited Launceston in March 1928, 146 
this time to investigate all K&K (Tas)'s departments. Extensions would proceed as 
soon as conditions were "deemed satisfactory".147 Satisfied with the mill's progress,148 
Roe was reputedly "both pleased and disappointed" to find he was able to do so little -
"pleased because the problems of the Mill had been tackled so well and disappointed 
because he felt he had not fully justified the expenditure incurred by his visit". 149 K&K 
141 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 9/6/1928. 
142 The term 'union' indicates flannel made from two different kinds of yarn. 
143 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 23/6/1928. 
144 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 717/1928. 
145 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 3/8/1928. 
146 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 17/3/1928. 
147 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 5/5/1928. 
148 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 31/8/1928. 
149 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1928. 
If Roe had felt the need to apologise for achieving little, by the time of the next English directorial 
visit from K&K (Tas)'s former general manager, J.N. Walsh in 1933, he made "no apology for the 
absence of tangible benefits from his visit". Claiming "Such benefits should accrue from re-awakened 
interest", Wais~ maintained that visits from somebody were periodically necessary "as long as the 
home firm maintained even a nominal control in Tasmanian affairs". 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 13/5/1933 
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(Tas)'s results for the 1927-28 financial year saw a net profit of £ 12,026, and a 
disposable balance of £5,570. Believing the company had finally "turned the corner" 
and that results justified the establishment of the Launceston mill, preference 
shareholders were "very gratified" to receive their first dividend, along with back 
payment of preference dividends for the first two broken periods from October 1920 -
March 1921 and March 1921 - March 1922.150 
Shareholders were not, however, happy with a decision to deduct income tax 
from dividends, seeing this as placing a double tax upon them. 151 Acknowledging that 
the "general practice" in Australia was not to do so, directors believed that their 
information deemed that this was a matter of law. 152 After seeking local legal 
consultation, Tasmanian directors referred the matter to their English counterparts. The 
matter was then placed before counsel, who decided that income tax should be 
deducted, and advised that there was a fairly simple procedure under the Companies' 
Act by which shareholders could take the matter before the courts if dissatisfied. 153 
After much debate, a compromise was accepted in which the report and accounts 
would be adopted, and if the company were wrong, the matter be adjusted later. 
Although shareholders continued to voice their protests over subsequent months, 
directors confirmed their decision at the year's end and advised that shareholders must 
take the matter to court if they wanted the policy altered. 154 When discussed at the 
following AGM, it was explained that, after receiving further judicial advice and 
placing the matter before the board of directors, the expense of continuing with the 
matter was not justified.155 As the woollen industry had since taken another downturn, 
most shareholders saw the futility in pursuing this matter. The issue did continue to 
cause ill-feeling, William Baird (an employee of the Launceston Stock exchange)156 
refusing to accept his dividend because of the income tax deduction.157 
150 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 31/811928. 
151 Shareholders claimed that K&K (Tas) was the only Australian company following this practice. 
The company pointed out that there was one other - hardly strengthening their case. 
152 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, K&K, 3/3/1928. 
153 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 31/8/1928. 
154 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 8/1211928. 
The issue was also discussed by directors at most meetings in the months leading up to this date. 
155 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Tenth AGM, 28/811929. 
156 Baird had been a long-time manager of the Bank of Tasmania's Launceston branch, joining the 
Launceston Stock exchange in 1925. 
A Biographical Register 1788-1939. 
157 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 18/6/1930. 
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The luxury of arguing over profit distribution was short-lived. In announcing 
its first dividend payment in July, K&K also noted a falling away of woollen goods 
trade throughout the Commonwealth. This was largely attributed to a general trade 
depression which had been particularly marked on the mainland in recent months; the 
implication was that Tasmania had fared better than other states. The Chamber of 
Commerce took this claim one step further in October that year, pointing out that the 
Launceston district "had stood up to the recent trade depression better than any other 
portion of the state". 158 In contrast, Victoria's Warrnambool Woollen Mills (the 
catalyst for K&K (Tas)' s withdrawal from the Textile Manufacturers Association) 
reported that its business had been badly affected by the 1927-1928 slump. 159 With 
many mills across Australia forced on to short-time, K&K (Tas) soon joined the 
trend. 160 By August the fluctuating wool market was again causing problems, with 
wool prices steadily increasing and flannel and blanket wool showing marked 
advances. 161 Short-time at K&K continued into October at which time an order 
equivalent to over 1,000 pieces was received and the company decided to work up to 
full production.162 The reversion from short-time to full-time production yet again 
caused problems. 
In line with K&K (Tas)'s positive results for the 1927-28 financial year, P&B 
Launceston was likewise "going on satisfactorily".163 Increasing yam demand had led 
to the installation of extra machinery at the Launceston mill, and a 14,200 sq. ft. wool 
store extension was added. This involved the addition of two extra stories on to the 
In mid-1930 Baird finally requested the return of this Dividend Warrant. The company obliged. 
Dissatisfaction with deduction of income tax from dividends re-emerged intermittently in future years. 
In late 1934 a solicitor representing Mr. A.R. Dudfield, sent a circular to preference shareholders 
seeking support to test directors' actions on this issue. Dudfield's family company had been K&K 
(Tas)'s original product distributor, their Agency Agreement terminated from 31 March 1928 and the 
local distributorship given to P.O. Fysh & Co. (1920) Ltd., Launceston. The company responded to 
Dudfield's action by sending a letter to shareholders explaining the company's position; the practice 
continuing throughout the company's life irrespective of local custom or desires. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 19/12/1934; & Records of P.O. Fysh & Co., held at Launceston 
Library, LMSS 050. 
158 The Chamber pointed out that new secondary industries had actually been established in the midst 
of this, Rapson being the most notable, with "several" textile firms also considering establishing 
manufacturing plants in the city (although none eventuated). 
Launceston Chamber of Commerce AGM (press cutting), 4/10/1928: Minutes 28/1011915-29/11/1937. 
159 
'Warrnambool Woollen Mills', 16/11/1928: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z'. 
160 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 31/8/1928 & 18/8/1928. 
161 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Ninth AGM, 31/8/1928. 
162 In September the manager had informed directors that the company had around 15 weeks orders on 
hand at the current short-time rate of production, and decided to carry on as is. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 29/9/1928 & 13/10/1928. 
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front office building for warehouse purposes. 164 Deciding to preserve the existing 150 
ton, 130 x 100 ft. roofing structure, the roof was gradually raised in stages by 30 
manually operated jacks. After each rise, builders constructed to the new level, the 
process repeated until the roof was 30 ft. higher than originally positioned. Local 
builder, Joe Mackrill, headed these operations. Sitting in a swivel chair in the middle of 
the building to gain the best view, Mackrill would blow a whistle signalling his team to 
begin raising in unison165 - a sign of great confidence on his part and the sort of 
behaviour focussing public attention upon signs of progress within the city during a 
time of general economic depression. 
Although K&K (Tas) had experienced a fall off in trade in late 1928, business 
at P&B's Launceston mill remained hectic up until early 1929. 166 There were also 
signs of improvement for P&B Ltd, recording a profit of £237,221 for the year ended 
April 1928.167 Paying a 10% dividend to ordinary shareholders (and in this case no 
income tax was deducted!), it was noted that, despite the difficult times experienced in 
recent years, ordinary dividends had averaged 11.25% gross return for the last eight 
years. P&B Ltd also became involved in its second overseas venture in the financial 
year ended July 1928. They purchased an already operational company in Toronto by 
the name of Aked & Co, Ltd, which was "one of the best known and most successful 
businesses of Worsted Spinners in Canada". P&B claimed to have long been interested 
in the Canadian market. 168 With distance from this market "an increasing handicap", 
the purchase was intended to be the nucleus for further developing the Canadian 
market. 
As indicators in the latter half of 1928 suggested, conditions for the textile 
industry were bleak in 1929. K&K (Tas) did manage to end the 1928-29 financial year 
in the black, although no dividend was paid. Directors described the past financial year 
as a lean one for Australian flannel and blankets, explaining that orders were difficult to 
secure because a general depression in the trade had led to over-production as mills 
attempted to continue on full time. With most mills in K&K' s field forced to curtail 
163 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Ninth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 1817/1928. 
164 
'Historical & General Aspects of P&B Mill, Launceston, 23/5/1969': Miscellaneous material held 
byCP. 
165 Dennis Hodgkinson, A Sandhill Story, p.12b. 
166 J. Forrester-Paton, To ARP, 19/2/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
167 P&B Ltd, Ninth Annual Report & Balance Sheet, 30/411928. 
168 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Ninth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 18/7/1928. 
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output and temporarily revert to short-time, K&K (Tas) saw themselves as fortunate, 
in that the period of short-time they had worked was less than most of their 
competitors. The chairman at K&K (Tas)'s 1929 AGM told shareholders he was not 
'1ustified in being optimistic to the current year's prospects", citing the continued 
difficulty in securing trade and labour troubles for his lack of confidence. 169 Figures do 
not, however, always tell the true story. In July 1929 K&K (Tas) chose to repay in 
total a £5,000 debt to K&K Rochdale, plus £4,000 and £570 respectively to the 
Tasmanian Finance Agency and Company Ltd and Messrs Martin Shields and Heritage, 
"thereby repaying all deposits held by us" .170 It is uncertain whether this influenced the 
1928-29 or 1929-30 results, but would certainly have affected the balance sheet for 
either year. 
By contrast, the atmosphere surrounding P&B Launceston in early 1929 was 
positive. Despite a slackening of trade by February, management saw no difficulty 
keeping the mill running full time until the next push. 171 P&B Ltd was even 
considering expansion into other Australian centres at this time. At P&B Ltd's 
request, Launceston manager, Arthur Procter, made a trip to Melbourne and Sydney to 
inquire about factory sites, electricity charges, and so forth, claiming to be impressed 
with the volume of business done in those centres. With the company showing a 
willingness to invest in further expansion and the Launceston mill still busy in April, 
Arthur Procter suggested certain alterations be made at P&B Launceston. 172 Precisely 
what alterations were requested was unspecified, but additions to plant and buildings 
valued at around £64,000 were under-way in the latter half of the year173 and into 
1930. 
Keeping watch on Launceston's production figures was P&B Westbridge in 
Leicester which, in March 1929, anticipated sending P&B Launceston "very hearty 
169 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Tenth AGM, 28/8/1929. 
170 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 21711929. 
171 J. Forrester-Paton, To ARP, 19/2/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
172 ARP, To J. Forrester-Paton, 16/4/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
Upon first taking up the position at Launceston, Arthur had expressed dissatisfaction with the 
arrangement of some of the buildings. Alloa based director, William Procter, had also not approved of 
the original plans but because some of the disputed areas had "embodied" another director's ideas the 
company had deemed it prudent to allow "some of his pet schemes without alteration". Arthur was 
therefore told that the situation was unfortunate, but to make do. 
W.T. Procter, To ARP, 6/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
173 From 64 Cameron St, Launceston, To Messrs. Geo S. Hirst & Co Ltd, Batley, England, 25/9/1929: 
Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
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congratulations on a good years work". 174 Praise was not forthcoming, however, since 
the Launceston mill's results for the 1928-29 financial year were disappointing. As the 
factory had been running "fairly continuously at full output", P&B Alloa felt that a 
much higher profit than the previous year had been expected. 175 Since the previous 
year, the gross profit had fallen from £141,000 to £86,000. The parent company had 
expected the figure to be around £100,000.176 P&B Launceston mill's disclosed profit 
for the 1928-29 financial year was therefore only £ 13,664.177 While acknowledging 
that profitability had been affected by wool values falling during the year, Alloa felt 
there was no justification for the difference between actual result and reasonable 
expectations. 178 Concluding that P&B Launceston's results were due to an error in 
stocktaking, P&B Alloa asked for immediate clarification. 179 Unable to find any errors 
in their calculations, the only explanation Procter could offer the parent company was 
that insufficient selling prices had been charged.180 Privately Procter appears to have 
laid some blame upon William Stewart, manager of P&B (Australasia). 181 Although 
providing no explanation as to why this might have been the case, the relationship 
between these two men had long been strained. Despite dissatisfaction with P&B 
Launceston's financial results that year, shareholders at P&B Ltd's 1929 AGM were 
told that both the Launceston and Toronto Mills had been fully occupied throughout 
the year, and again that "our ventures in both directions have been fully justified" .182 
P&B Ltd's chairman of directors, William Procter, also visited Launceston in 
late 1929. Procter's visit may have been motivated by a number of reasons - concern 
over the mill's profit figures that year; the desire to view the extensions currently under 
way; or simply to familiarise himself with the mill, earlier admitting to difficulty 
174 P&B Westbridge, Leicester, To ARP, 26/311929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
175 Accountant, P&B Alloa, To ARP, 5/6/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
176 Accountant, P&B Ltd, To ARP, 5/6/1929: P&B Correspondence from Alloa, 1929-1934. 
177 Trading account for 12 months ending 31/3/1929: P&B Trading accounts and balance sheets, 
1923-1936. 
178 Accountant, P&B Alloa, To ARP, 5/6/19.29: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
P&B Alloa' s expectations appear somewhat unreasonable considering that P&B Ltd' s profit for the 
period had fallen to only £133,275, a decline which Alloa attributed to the fluctuating wool market -
the same explanation they refused to accept from P&B Launceston. The company was again able to 
pay a 5% dividend on ordinary shares. 
P&B Ltd, Tenth Report & Balance Sheet, 30/4/1929; & P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Tenth 
Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 17/7/1929. 
179 Accountant, Alloa, To ARP, 5/6/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa 
180 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 16/7/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa 
181 W. Stewart, To ARP, 13/5/1929: P&B Correspondence from Alloa, 1929-1934. 
182 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Tenth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 17/711929. 
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visualising problems described.183 As done previously for a K&K (Tas) director, the 
Chamber of Commerce held a function in Procter's honour, 184 and Procter also 
attended a reception at the Town Hall to meet the mayor and aldermen. 185 At the first 
of these receptions, Launceston's mayor used the occasion to comment on 
Launceston' s industrial progress during the past decade, quoting figures on the number 
of new buildings and the costs thereof. 186 With unemployment high and no real 
prospect of new industries establishing, the mayor's claims appeared hollow. The 
Council had achieved little success in encouraging further development within the city 
since the early years of the decade. The year ended on a positive note for the textile 
industry, however, with general tariff increases raising protection to an almost 
prohibitive level.187 
While the Council was able to do little to assist the economic health of its 
region during the late 1920s, one way in which the State government could provide 
assistance to industry during difficult economic times was to give preferential treatment 
to local companies over inter-state rivals in tendering for government contracts. At 
least one Launceston textile manufacturer benefited from this practice in the 1920s. In 
October 1929, T.S. Nettlefold, chairman of directors of Cement Distributors Pty Ltd, 
wrote to Premier J.C. McPhee regarding the tendering process in Tasmania. Despite 
tendering the same price as a Victorian company for a contract with the Ballarat 
Council, Nettlefold's company had lost. Ballarat Councillor, A. Bell, had declared 
himself "adverse to giving the Tasmanian companies any business" after a Tasmanian 
manufacturer had been awarded a government contract despite a Ballarat Woollen 
Manufacturer submitting a lower tender. 188 Nettlefold told McPhee that Bell's claims 
needed investigation because such actions were "in direct contradiction of the policy 
laid down by you, that preference must not be given to State manufacturers". 189 An 
investigation revealed that Launceston's Reliance Worsted Mills had been awarded a 
government railway contract in May 1928, despite Ballarat Woollen and Worsted 
183 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 6/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
184 Town Clerk, To Secretary, Launceston Chamber of Commerce, 30/11/1929: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.8. 
'Statement by Mayor', (undated press cutting): Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
185 W.T. Procter, To Crawford, Town Clerk, 4/1211929: Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
186 
'Statement by Mayor' (undated press cutting): Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
187 Colin Forster, Industrial Development, p.96. 
188 T.S. Nettlefold, Chairman of Directors, Cement Distributors Pty Ltd, Melbourne, To J.C. McPhee, 
26/10/1929: PDl 101/3/29. 
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Company tendering a marginally lower quote. Secretary to the railway commissioner, 
C.J. Rollins, pointed out that the following year Reliance had won the contract without 
preference.190 Directly contradicting Nettlefold' s claims, Rollins maintained: 
it is the policy of the present Government, and it was also the policy of the previous 
Government, to give preference to Tasmanian made goods. For some years a preference of 
10% has been allowed to tenders of Tasmanian made goods when dealing with tenders for 
·1 191 rai way stores. 
Suggesting that Rollins' rather than Nettlefold's interpretation of events was correct, 
the Premier informed Nettlefold that accusations of ''undue" preference to Tasmanian 
manufacturers were groundless.192 It is also likely that Bell simply used this case as 
justification to do the same as he criticised the Tasmanian government for doing. 
Problems Caused by Water Quality 
One unique event affecting Launceston in April 1929, was the city's worst 
recorded flood. Arthur Procter outlined the devastation to P&B Alloa and reported 
early damage estimates at around £ 1,000,000. Standing 90 ft. above the water level, 
P&B's Launceston mill escaped unscathed, although the firm did suffer "a considerable 
amount of damage in respect of a lot of wool and yam ... in other stores" .193 K&K was 
also fortunate to escape with little loss. Their mill was totally surrounded by flood 
waters, cut off from communication with the city, nearly 50% of mill employees had 
been forced to evacuate their homes, 194 and a number of people were trapped in the 
mill for two or three days. 195 (See illustration No. 19.) K&K's Tasmanian directors 
acknowledged their good fortune, and expressed gratitude for _the English directors 
"foresight" in choosing a site above the flood level. 196 The day power supplies were 
189 Nettlefold, To McPhee, 26/10/1929: PDl 101/3/29. 
190 In the 1928 tender the Ballarat company had quoted 10s. 4d. per yard for serge, Reliance 1 ls. per 
yard. In 1929, Reliance had quoted 10s. 6d., Ballarat 1 ls. 
Manager, Supply & Tender Department, To Secretary to Premier, 1/11/1929: PDl 101/3/29. 
191 C. Rollins Secretary, Government Railways of Tasmania, Commissioner's Office, Memo to 
Secretary to Premier, 20/11/1929: PDl 101/3/29. 
192 Premier, To Nettlefold, 28/11/1929: PDl 101/3/29. 
193 ARP, To J. Forrester-Paton, 16/4/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
194 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Tenth AGM, 28/8/1929. 
195 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
196 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Tenth AGM, 28/8/1929. 
More likely, K&K (Tas)'s positioning was good fortune rather than foresight. Other companies were 
not so lucky. Launceston's other British industry established in the 1920s, Rapson Tyre and Rubber 
Company, received the flood's full brunt. Operational for just over a year and employing almost 400 
people, their factory had been constructed two and a half feet above the highest flood level previously 
recorded. By July 1929 Rapson's bill for stock lost, damaged machinery and wages paid whilst not 
producing was estimated at over £10,000 and increasing due to unproductive machinery. With the 
19. Launceston during the 1929 flood . Central in the background is Rapson 
Tyre and Rubber Company. K&K (Tas) is situated in the top left corner. 
112 
resumed, K&K's mill was working at 75% capacity, the subsequent day at almost full 
capacity. Nevertheless, once production recommenced both mills experienced on-
going difficulties due to flood-related water contamination. Coming at the height of 
K&K' s delivery season, this led to delays in filling some orders, although they admitted 
that customers had been very sympathetic to their plight. While flood-related water 
problems were an extraordinary event, water contamination had plagued both woollen 
mills throughout the 1920s. 
In an attempt to attract industry, Launceston Council made much of the quality 
of its water supply during this decade. Robert Hogarth was a principal advocate of this 
cause. When K&K Ltd's representatives were in Tasmania in early 1920, Hogarth 
claimed that with 40 years experience in the region he knew of no water more suitable 
for dyeing or scouring,197 and that "the water ... had much to do with [his company's] 
success in making good woollens, especially good whites". 198 Hogarth was also used 
as a reference for other interested textile manufacturers, in 1921 informing 
Amalgamated Textile Company Ltd of London that Launceston' s water was both 
inexpensive and "equal for woollen goods manufacture to that of England and 
Scotland" .199 
A constant and pure supply of water was a significant issue for woollen mills. 
P&B Launceston, the city's largest water consumer, used 25,472,000 gallons in 1928. 
K&K (Tas) was Launceston's third largest consumer at 13,467,000 gallons for the 
same period.200 However, an indication that Launceston's water supply was not all 
thus claimed became evident before either of the new mills arrived. In early 1919 a 
newspaper article commented that attention had been drawn "from time to time" to 
situation at crisis point, the company was close to closure, employee wages even being paid by 
individual directors for two or three weeks to keep the works going - the company's monthly 
expenditure for wages and salaries being around £6,000. While confident of the company's chances 
of success, the company requested Council assistance to survive the next few months. 
Chairman of Directors, Rapson Tyre & Rubber Co. (Australia) Ltd, To Mayor, 1017/1929: Launceston 
City Council, Industries General (1929-29), 21/1.9. 
197 Robert Hogarth, To Acting Town Clerk, 24/2/20: Launceston City Council, 19/4.1. 
198 Robert Hogarth, Managing Director, Robert Hogarth & Sons Ltd., To Acting Town Clerk, 
27/2/1920: PDI 179/3/1920. 
199 Acting Town Clerk, To Amalgamated Textiles Co Ltd, London, 14/7/1921: Launceston City 
Council, Electric Power Enquires for 1920, 1921. 
200 Second largest water consumer for the same period was the railway workshop at 13,467 ,OOO 
gallons and, demonstrating the high consumption of the three industries mentioned, fourth after K&K 
was Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd at only 4,851,000. 
'List of Large consumers of water': Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
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impurities in the Launceston water supply and the need for filtration beds. 201 It was not 
until the new woollen mills commenced production and problems emerged that 
installation of a water filtration system was actively pursued. In August 1923 K&K 
(Tas) invited a Council representative to see the damage caused to its white goods,202 
in particular, through organic matter in the water.203 In late 1923 Launceston's mayor 
admitted that, while the city's water supply had been "the envy of other towns" in the 
past, numerous complaints ill recent months had highlighted the necessity of a water 
purification scheme, and these now began.204 Maintaining that water discolouration did 
not greatly affect the general populace and was largely due to abnormally heavy 
rains, 205 authorities took long to admit that the deleterious effects on woollen goods 
necessitated action. By mid-1924 K&K (Tas) had made many claims against the 
Launceston Corporation for damage caused by impure water,206 maintaining that their 
company was worse affected by losses than was P&B. 207 The matter was not quickly 
or easily resolved. Correspondence between K&K (Tas) and the Council on this issue 
continued for many months, the former claiming compensation and the latter 
refusing.208 Despite K&K's suggestion to the contrary, P&B was also suffering. In 
early 1924 the mill reported to P&B Alloa that, since beginning operations, water 
problems had prevented them from dyeing certain shades and they could not accurately 
match their colour charts.209 Progress on the purification scheme was slow, with the 
Council admitting in August 1924 that initial forecasts for the scheme's completion had 
been overly optimistic. 210 Authorities held the compensating boon was that, when 
completed, Launceston would "have the finest supply of pure water in the world".211 
This proved to be a questionable claim. Launceston's assistant engineer had also told 
201 
'Quantitative exam', 21/3/1919 (press cutting): Launceston City Council, Water Analysis. 
202 White goods was the term used by the mills in the 1920s for white coloured woollen products. 
203 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 3/8/1923. 
204 
'The Progress of Launceston', 12/12/1923: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1126. 
205 The city had experienced flooding in May 1923, K&K (Tas) reporting that bad weather conditions 
had upset output at that time. 
'Heavy Storm Inundates Launceston', 18/5/1923: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 9/6/1923. 
206 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 417/1924. 
207 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 8/8/1924. 
208 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 13/3/1924. 
209 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 28/2/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-1924. 
210 Dated 23/8/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
Initial time-frames had placed completion around May 1924. 
ARP, To P&B Alloa, 28/2/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
211 Dated 23/8/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
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P&B's general manager that the required plant was not expected to be particularly 
expensive.212 The scheme's progress was, however, further delayed by a battle 
between the Council and Federal Customs Department over the importation of 
necessary gear. Choosing a British plant valued at £8,000 less that the only Australian 
quote received, the Corporation unsuccessfully sought a tariff exemption on its 
purchase. The Customs Minister explained that an exemption granted for similar plant 
to a private company was approved because of that company's "industrial 
importance". 213 The Council believed this was a case of protection "running mad", and 
responded that the installation of their plant was also of industrial importance, installed 
primarily for Launceston's textile manufacturers. 
Continual delays frustrated P&B's management. In early 1925 P&B Alloa 
expressed disappointment that the promised filtration plant would now not to be 
operational by the end of February as expected, and felt that the Corporation had been 
"very slack" in pushing the work forward and had "rather let us down". 214 Only when 
the plant became operational in mid-May would P&B Launceston receive "reasonably 
clear water", finally able to undertake dyeing of delicate shades and bleaching.215 
Launceston's water troubles were probably accentuated by the volume used in 
the 1920s. In December 1925 the city engineer revealed that Launceston's winter 
water consumption, expressed in gallons a head per day, exceeded Sydney's usage by 
approximately 50% and almost equalled the Melbourne average for an entire year. 
Putatively half this water was wasted, and the result was a continuous overload on the 
filtration plant.216 It is therefore understandable that the system continued to 
experience problems. In June 1928 K&K (Tas)'s manager again visited the city 
engineer and requested tests be carried out to ascertain if problems with its white 
goods were due to the presence of iron in the water. K&K (Tas) also reported that, 
during the past week, water had been very dirty because the filtration plant had broken 
down. The Council gave assurances that steps were being taken to ensure no 
repetition of this problem.217 
212 ARP, To John Forrester-Paton, 14/9/1923: P&B Correspondence, 1923-1924. 
213 
'A Tariff Extortion', 28/8/1924; 'Council Filtration Plant', 29/811924; & 'Tariff Concessions', 
30/8/1924: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-1911/26. 
214 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/1/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
215 ARP, To Stirling, 29/5/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
216 
'Water Consumption', 15/1211925: LCC Press Cuttings 18/4/23-19/1/26. 
217 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 71711928. 
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Following flood-related water contamination in 1929, water problems had 
reached crisis point by early 1930. Water contamination was so bad in February that 
K&K (Tas) were forced to suspend 120 employees for a week. K&K (Tas)'s general 
manager, Les Overstall, provided an Examiner reporter with a demonstration. He 
placed a piece of cloth over the mouth of pipes leading into K&K' s dye vats, which 
revealed "an almost incredulous amount of residual matter including pieces of gravel, 
corroded iron, and pieces of bitumen". 218 At fault this time were badly corroded water 
mains. 
K&K (Tas) approached the Council in April 1930 for compensation ''to help 
defray the expense of a filtration plant" installed by the company to counter on-going 
problems with the Council water supply. Overstall met with Mayor Monds and the city 
engineer, the mayor intimating that while there were difficulties in providing cash 
payments, the Council might consider granting two or three years free water supply.219 
Three years free water was subsequently approved. 220 The following month P&B 
Launceston' s general manager, J.B. White, also met with the mayor to discuss partial 
reimbursement for a water filtration plant his company had likewise installed to tackle 
continuing water contamination. White pointed out that during the last year: 
we have been severely handicapped by the water which you have been supplying us with 
and while we realise you have been losing no time arranging to have the council :filtration 
plant put in order, we must point out that our losses due to dirty water have been 
221 
enormous. 
He claimed that P&B Launceston had been unable to accept orders for lighter shades 
"with any confidence" of being able to deliver, and were regularly required to dye three 
or four lots of yarn222 before achieving satisfactory results. Only that week they had 
stopped dyeing operations altogether "as the water was so dirty that our filter could 
not cope with it". 223 In light of "severe losses" sustained and the filtration plant's cost, 
White maintained ·that three years' free water would be fair compensation. The 
Council, however, refused to accept any liability or give future guarantees on water 
quality or colour, instead offering only six months' free water, subject to full settlement 
218 Examiner 13/2/1930: LCC Press Cuttings 1926-1930. 
219 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 51411930. 
220 J.B. White, To ARP, 23/10/1930: Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-1939. 
221 White, P&B Manager, To Mayor, 15/5/1930: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1930-
31), 2211.5. 
222 A 'lot' of yarn was a quantity not less than 100 lbs. 
223 White, P&B Manager, To Mayor, 15/5/1930: Launceston City Council, 22/1.5. 
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of claims against the Council.224 Unhappy with this response, P&B Launceston called 
attention to a clause in its original water and power agreement.225 Due to ill-feeling 
over K&K (Tas)'s lower power rates when original deals were arranged, P&B 
Launceston had sought assurances of no future differentiation in the treatment of 
customers "in the same line of business". 226 Stipulating that if prices increased when 
contracts were renewed, all companies would bear proportional rises, the Council 
agreed.227 Aware of the Council's more generous offer to K&K (Tas), P&B referred 
to this agreement and maintained that if another mill were to be exempted their 
company should have a legal claim to free water for the same period. 228 The Council 
subsequently increased its offer of free water to twelve months in full settlement of any 
claim against them, and the company accepted. 229 
The incident also revealed that P&B's relationship with both K&K and the 
Council was strained. P&B claimed that a verbal agreement had been made with the 
Council regarding reimbursement for the new filtration plant, but that Percy Hart had 
been the "chief snag" in reaching a conclusion.230 P&B Launceston's new general 
manager, J.B. White, felt that, as a director of K&K and a Councillor, Hart exerted 
undue influence upon the Council in favour of his firm and against P&B. He also 
questioned Hart's profession of "absolute neutrality when textile matters came before 
the Council", and declared himself "absolutely fed up" with the Council generally and 
with Hart in particular. White explained to P&B Alloa that Hart was: 
a very wealthy man and the power of wealth in Australia is greater than at home. You 
know the old adage 
'Money is honey my little sonny, 
And a rich man's joke is always funny'. 
Well I think that it is as true a word as ever spoken, and has some bearing on our case 
here.231 
After K&K had been granted three years free water, P&B believed that Hart had 
spread a number of stories to minimise P&B's chances of acquiring the same. These 
reputedly included claims which down-playe~ P&B's losses through water damage, 
224 Town Clerk, To Manager, P&B, 1/10/1930: Launceston City Council, 22/1.5. 
225 White, Manager, P&B, To City Corporation, 3/10/1930: Launceston City Council, 22/1.5. 
226 Acting Town Clerk, To P&B, 23/6/1921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
227 Strike, City Engineer, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 9/611921: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
228 White, Manager, P&B, To City Corporation, 3/10/1930: Launceston City Council, 22/1.5. 
229 Town Clerk, To Manager, P&B, 7/10/1930; & Manager, P&B, To Town Clerk, 9/10/1930: 
Launceston City Council, 2211.5. 
230 J.B. White, To ARP, 23/10/1930: P&B Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-1939. 
231 J.B. White, To ARP, 23/10/1930: P&B Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-1939. 
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and up-played the "huge profits" being made by the company.232 Also circulating were 
rumours that P&B did not intend to put down any further plant in Australia. White 
believed that such misrepresentations had been detrimental to negotiations. The result 
was strained relations all around. Hart in particular came under attack. White 
concluded that he was "an old humbug" and, although the two had only met once, that 
Hart need never come up to their mill again. 
The problems experienced with water also suggested that, in its enthusiasm to 
attract new industry, Launceston Council often overestimated its ability to cope with 
industrial problems and demands. One such problem was the environmental damage 
associated with industry. The Council appeared to have few guidelines governing this 
issue. In 1927, for example, an unidentified cotton manufacturer was considering 
establishment in Launceston and inquired about restrictions upon the discharge of 
effluent into the North Esk. Although purportedly the effluent would not be "of a 
noxious type", it was to contain a certain amount of colouring from the dye works; 
"the nature of this you will no doubt appreciate from the works of Messrs. Baldwins 
and Patons' Dye Department".233 While P&B Launceston made much of water 
contamination affecting its operations throughout the 1920s, this seems to have been 
the only reference to either company so adding to Launceston's water quality 
problems. With pollution of the water-ways a matter for the Marine Board, its 
wardens agreed to use every endeavour to secure establishment of the proposed cotton 
industry. No restrictions were therefore imposed, ''unless of course, the effluent in the 
opinion of the Board became objectionable". 234 
Launceston Council also continued to guarantee large water supplies to other 
manufacturers considering establishment in Launceston, 235 despite problems adequately 
coping with the ones it had. One example of the Council's over-extension of its 
resources is seen in the case of Rapson Tyre and Rubber Company. In April 1927 the 
company's consulting engineer told the Council that their estimated water requirements 
would be from 30,000 to 90,000 gallons per day. The Council failed to confirm this 
claim. By 1929 the company was using 300,000 gallons per day and, even though 
Rapson was permitted to pump cooling water directly from the river, the Council 
232 As later seen, P&B actually made a loss for the 1929-30 financial year. 
233 Coulston, To Town Clerk, 21211927: Launceston City Council 2111.6. 
234 Master Warden of the Marine Board of Launceston, To Mayor, 14/2/1927: Launceston City 
Council 2111.6. 
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filtration plant's capacity was over-taxed several times during January 1929. Supplies 
had therefore been supplemented with raw water, which the City Engineer predicted 
"may occasion trouble with the textile people". 236 This was confirmed by the action of 
both companies to install their own filtration plants early the following year. 
From Economic Depression to Financial Success: Beyond c.1930 · 
In 1929 K&K (Tas) director, Carl Stackhouse, had forecast that prospects for 
the coming year were not good. His prediction was borne out. While working better 
times than most of their competitors, K&K (Tas) were unable to keep the mill at full 
production throughout the 1929-30 financial year. At the AGM Stackhouse told 
shareholders it had been apparent for some time there was more blanket and flannel 
machinery in Australia than required: 
Four years ago the Australian Mills were unable to supply the demand for flannels and 
blankets, and most firms like ourselves installed additional machinery. Since then the 
demand has fallen away . . . and the position today is that the Australian market cannot 
absorb the production of which the mills are capable when working at full capacity and as 
will be obvious, the export market is closed to us on account of the comparative high cost 
f d . . A 1. 237 o pro uction m ustra ta. 
The result was keen competition, unremunerative prices and short-time. Although 
customers were giving K&K (Tas)'s flannels and blankets a pleasing reception, they 
were only ordering "hand to mouth". Reduced demand was blamed on a number of 
factors, including fashion changes which had seen a high demand for dress flannel fall 
away in the previous two years. More significantly, high wool values and wages had 
increased the cost of blankets and flannel. Blankets had become an expensive article 
and t~e public were resorting to cheaper alternatives such as imported eiderdown 
quilts. Low prices were also essential to foster trade in domestic flannel for 
underwear. Stackhouse was, nevertheless, hopeful of an imminent improvement.238 
With the plain flannel trade over-machined, the recent tariff alterations had 
allowed K&K (Tas) to begin addressing some of its problems. As tariff increases had 
virtually eliminated import competition in some lines by rendering the imported article 
235 For example see Coulston, To Town Clerk, 2/2/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6. 
236 City Engineer, Memo to Works Committee, 25/1111929: Launceston City Council, 21/1.9. 
237 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eleventh AGM, 10/9/1930. 
238 Wool prices had slumped and there were signs of a revival for flannel as a dress material. 
Stackhouse also believed that the inferiority of alternatives to blankets would soon be recognised and, 
that despite recent labour troubles and unemployment affecting one of the company's major markets 
(the man in heavy industry), flannel was the cheapest woollen material and worthy of considerati<;m in 
hard times. 
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"more or less prohibitive", K&K (Tas) had turned a port~on of its production to the 
fancy flannel trade and were offering several new lines. 239 The mill had also made 
many improvements and alterations aimed at decreasing production costs. While 
making no "optimistic promises", directors had "every faith in the future of this mill", 
despite immediate prospects not appearing "particularly bright". Percy Hart claimed, 
'We are better situated financially than ever before, we are making an article that is 
admittedly good and we are in a better financial position to face the problems of the 
future than we have ever been previously". Despite much worrying by K&K (Tas) 
over difficulties affecting trade, the company made only a small loss in the 1929-30 
financial year. The loss was attributed to a writing down of stock due to decreasing 
wool prices, rather than the problems otherwise specified. This explanation was 
reiterated in 1934.240 
Despite the recorded loss and stints of short-time throughout the year,241 
trading conditions at K&K (Tas) in early 1930 showed promise. Management was 
discussing the mill's congestion and the need to increase future production, which 
suggested that orders were coming in. Extensions were therefore being planned,242 and 
in August a contract was signed for Messrs J. & T. Gunn Pty Ltd to undertake this 
work.243 Another indication of improving conditions was K&K (Tas)'s re-affiliation 
with the Associated Woollen and Worsted Textile Manufacturers. Since the 
company's withdrawal in 1925, the Association had issued many invitations to rejoin, 
and K&K (Tas) had repeatedly declined. In April 1930 the Association again 
requested that K&K (Tas) consider adhering to fixed minimum prices, and, although 
K&K (Tas) refused,244 they did begin attending Association meetings.245 By 
September 1931 the company decided to rejoin. Their decision coincided with a return 
to profitable trading conditions within the industry.246 
239 A later directorial reference indicates that K&K's entire flannel production until the mid-1920s 
centred around the plain flannel trade. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 25/5/1966: R.A.K. Minute Book, June 1965-June 1975, Held by 
CP. 
240 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Eleventh AGM, 10/9/1930. 
Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech/or FifteenthAGM, 19/9/1934. 
241 See Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings for 1930. 
242 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 11/111930. 
243 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 2/8/1930. 
244 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 51411930. 
245 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 14/5/1930 & 3/7/1930. 
246 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 11911931. 
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The 1929-30 financial year saw P&B Launceston's worst period since 
commencing production. The mill recorded a £9,000 loss. As at K&K, a decrease in 
wool prices was blamed.247 P&B Ltd's overall profit for the 1929-30 financial year 
was only £ 17 ,596. With sales actually higher than the previous two years, the 
company blamed reduced profits upon decreasing wool values, and pointed out that 
their results would otherwise have been satisfactory.248 Nevertheless, P&B ·Ltd 
proclaimed their dissatisfaction with Launceston's trading results, even though they 
could identify no area in which improvements could be made. 249 Adding insult, the 
parent company decided that, in future, the Launceston mill's results would be 
calculated by the Melbourne branch. P&B Launceston protested over this issue for 
some time, but the parent company stood firm.250. 
K&K (Tas)'s 1930 predictions about the benefits of the new tariff proved 
correct. The following year the "tariff and exchange rate combined had practically 
prohibited the importation of woollen goods", and allowed K&K (Tas) to again pick 
up extra business by replacing goods previously imported. 251 When combined with 
national wage decreases and a voluntary decrease in the interest rate on monies owed 
to K&K Ltd, K&K (Tas) made a small profit and were able to pay preference dividends 
for 1930-31. By 1932 the company paid current year preference dividends, and 
dividends in arrear for the periods, 11411922 - 18/10119.22, 19/10/1922 - 31/3/1923, 
and 1/4/1923 - 31/311924.252 In 1933 the company was boasting that results were "the 
best the Mill has ever shown", and allowed payment of the current year's preference 
dividend and back payment for the periods 1/4/1924 - 31/3/1925, 114/1925 -31/3/1926 
and 1/4/1926 - 31/611927.253 The last arrears on preference shares for the 1920s were 
cleared in mid-1934, the company also paying its first 5% dividend on ordinary shares. 
At this time K&K (Tas)'s chairman reminisced on the company's past. He pointed out 
that since 1926 the company had experienced its ups and downs, but had always 
managed to balance its ledger, except for 1930 when a small loss made was entirely 
247 J.B. White, To W.T. Procter, 29/4/1930: Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-39. 
248 The company transferred £ 100,000 out of a Reserve Fund to meet this situation, still leaving them 
with £400,000 in reserve. 
P&B Limited, Report and Proceedings at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 1617/1930. 
249 W.T. Procter, To J.B. White, 10/6/1930 & 23/7/1930: P&B Correspondence from Alloa, 1929-34. 
250 See P&B Correspondence from Alloa, 1929-34, July 1930 onward. 
251 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Twelfth AGM, 3/911931 
252 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Thirteenth AGM, 3118/1932. 
253 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Fourteenth AGM, 25/8/1933. 
121 
due to decreasing wool values resulting in stock depreciation.254 When Les Overstall 
(K&K (Tas)'s managing director from 1926-1961) retired from the company's Board 
of Directors in 1966, colleagues paid tribute to him for guiding the company ''through 
the dark days of the Depression".255 As the figures indicate, however, for K&K (Tas) 
the Great Depression was not the period of darkness later portrayed. Instead, in a 
relatively short space of time, increased tariff protection implemented at the end of the 
1920s enabled K&K (Tas) Ltd to tum a comer. 
Although prospects had improved slightly for P&B Ltd by mid-1931, 
Australian results were reported as the notable exception. Describing "the unfortunate 
financial position in Australia and the enormous inflation of currency in that Country'', 
chairman of directors, W.T. Procter, told shareholders this had resulted "in a very 
serious writing down of our assets in Australia".256 This was not, however, a reflection 
upon the profitability of P&B's Launceston mill. As noted by K&K (Tas), changes to 
the exchange rate had actually assisted in decreasing import competition, which was 
also of benefit to P&B Launceston and its Australian distributor. In fact P&B 
Launceston recorded a profit of just over £60,000 for the 1930-31 financial year.257 
The figures surprised even P &B Launceston, who had again expected the mill to 
record a loss.258 In 1932-33, P&B Launceston's profits rose to £163,026, and again 
topped £ 100,000 for the following two financial years, at which point the relevant 
records held by the Launceston mill cease.259 While never specific about P&B 
Launceston's profitability, from 1933 onward the parent company continued to report 
that results in Australia were satisfactory.260 One unacknowledged benefit that P&B 
Launceston provided the parent company during this period was experience in overseas 
manufacturing. While the Launceston mill was P&B Ltd's first "big experiment"261 in 
this area, by 1928 the company had added a Canadian mill to their holdings, and 
254 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, Fifteenth AGM, 19/9/1934. 
255 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 25/5/1966: R.A.K. Minute Book, June 1965-June 1975. 
256 P&B Ltd, Report and Proceedings at the Twelfth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 1517/1931. 
257 Tracling account for 12 months ended 31/3/1931: P&B Trading accounts and balance sheets, 1923-
36; & Telegram to W.T. Procter, 21/4/1931: Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-39. 
258 J.B. White, To Chairman of Directors, 27/4/1931: Alloa Outward Correspondence, 1930-39. 
259 Trading accounts for years ending, 31/3/1932, 1933 & 1934: Trading accounts and balance sheets, 
1923-36. 
260 P&B Ltd, Report on Proceedings at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 19/7/1933. 
261 'M~mufacturer Farewelled', undated press cutting: Launceston City Council, 21/1.5. 
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subsequently erected a new factory in Toronto in the financial year ended July 1932.262 
In 1933 P&B Ltd also announced its intention to move inside the Asian market by 
erecting a mill in Shanghai, China.263 While the timing of the Shanghai venture was 
unfortunate (P&B Ltd temporarily lost control of this mill during the war, its staff were 
interned, and the war was followed by revolution),264 these overseas ventures were 
significant in provided the grounding for P&B Ltd's rapid expansion after World War 
II. 
In his study of Australia during the Great Depression, C.B. Schedvin noted that 
"manufacturing appears to have been the initiating factor in the upturn of 1932" and 
"the driving force in exJ;>ansion for the remainder of the decade".265 He also observes 
that textile manufacturers did not suffer as greatly as other industries during the 
Depression and enjoyed an early recovery. This was certainly borne out by the 
experiences of K&K and P&B. After the ongoing economic problems of the 1920s 
both mills emerged from the period as strong, financially viable concerns which would 
thrive for decades to come. 
262 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Ninth & Thirteenth Annual Meetings of Shareholders, 
1817/1928 & 2017/1932. 
263 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 1517/1933. 
264 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at Annual Meetings of Shareholders, 1933-1948. 
The example of cotton thread manufacturers, J. & P. Coats, who later joined forces with Patons & 
Baldwins to create Coats Patons, further highlights some of the pitfalls of overseas expansion. A 
pioneer of mergers and expansion since the late nineteenth century, J. & P. Coats had amongst its 
overseas holdings an immense Russian organisation prior to the 1918 Revolution, along with mills in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and China prior to World War II. 
'Coats Patons (Australia) Ltd., Training Notes (Central Agency) ... Formation and Brief History & 
Structure', p.2: Miscellaneous Material held by CP. 
265 C.B. Schedvin, Australia and the Great Depression: A Study of Economic Development and Policy 
in the 1920s and 1930s (Sydney, 1970), p.291. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LAUNCESTON'S :(NDUSTRIAL MIGRANTS 
Introduction 
Rapid expansion of Australia's woollen industry after World War I resulted in a 
shortages of skilled labour. While the majority of new hands were trained on the job, 
experienced and managerial staff could not be produced quickly enough to satisfy 
demand. Many new mills therefore turned to the United Kingdom to alleviate this 
problem. Unlike Australia, total numbers employed in Britain's textile industry 
remained relatively stable between 1851 and 1921. Britain's method of recruiting 
untrained labour and providing on-the-job training meant the proportion of unskilled or 
semi-trained operatives remained small and caused no great inefficiency. Colin Forster 
concluded that it was difficult to gauge the extent to which imported skilled labour was 
used by new Australian mills in the 1920s, but all five woollen mills connected with 
English capital introduced skilled workers from Britain.1 It would not, however, be 
accurate to view the introduction of migrant textile workers in the 1920s as wholly due 
to labour shortages caused by rapid expansion. Closer analysis of the development of 
Australia's textile industry would probably reveal that many mills commencing prior to 
World War I also relied upon British migrants with a background in textile production. 
The number of skilled migrants introduced after the war would certainly have made this 
phenomenon more visible than when mills were fewer. A reliance upon skilled textile 
migrants in Tasmania's textile industry was apparent from the industry's inception. We 
have seen that when Tasmania's first woollen mill was established near Launceston in 
1873, the founder introduced a number of Scottish workers.2 
Although concentrating upon industrial migrants connected with Launceston' s 
two British funded woollen mills, this chapter also considers skilled labour introduced 
by Launceston's other textile mills. All Launceston's textile mills started in the 1920s 
introduced some migrant labour, as did that other British company established in 1926, 
Rapson Tyre and Rubber (Australia) Ltd. Many issues relating to migrant workers are 
further discussed, from a different perspective, in chapter 7. 
1 Forster, Industrial Development in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra, 1964), pp.86-87. 
2 Cornwall Chronicle, 22/111873; see above, p.20. 
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Industrial migrants cannot be viewed in isolation from broader policy issues. 
According to a statement from the Prime Minister's office in January 1921, Australia's 
immigration policy was concerned with a number of basic principals, "the defence of 
Australia, the maintenance of a White Australia, the development of national industries, 
and the payment of interest on the huge indebtedness incurred in connection with the 
war".3 The establishment of the British textile mills should therefore have been the 
perfect arrangement for Australia; contributing in some way to all the basic 
requirements defined for immigration. The mills brought with them the right type of 
migrants, thus increasing Australia's population and ability to defend itself. Desired 
new industries were also added in which the migrants (along with many Australians) 
had ready-made jobs. In particular, such mills would help prove the economic benefits 
of migration, an argument which remained unconvincing to many Australians. Nor 
was migration lauded as serving merely Australian interests. ' British governments of 
the day were anxious to relieve socio-economic pressures by this means, and in the 
post-war decade helped finance the movement of its people throughout the Empire. 
Thus the migration story relates to all three of the forces which dominate this study: 
local, national, and imperial. It well reveals both complementarities and tensions in the 
relationships between them. 
The majority of migrants arriving in Launceston after the war fitted into 
Australia's preferred group of immigrants - good British stock. Nevertheless, the 
experiences of these migrants upon arrival revealed (if less grimly than that of many of 
their counterparts throughout Australia) an ambivalence between the federal 
government's post-war enthusiasm to increase the country's population, and the 
attitude towards migrants of the communities into which they settled. With industrial 
nominees, responses were further complicated by contradictions between an 
enthusiasm to attract job-creating, development-promoting, and money-generating 
industries, and a general uneasiness towards migrants seen as competing for jobs, 
perceived as scarce after the war. At the same time as the Examiner enthusiastically 
proclaimed, "We want population in Tasmania, and industries such as [K&K] will 
attract people",4 a statement by Robert Hogarth (proprietor of Waverley Woollen 
3 Federal authorities were requesting Tasmania's Premier join in organised, apolitical, federal/State, 
co-operative "leadership and education" to change public apathy toward large scale immigration. 
Russell, PM's Office, To Tasmanian Premier, 13/1/1921: PDl 55/2/21. 
4 Examiner, 17/3/1921: K&KPress Cuttings. 
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Mills) implied there was some public disquiet over the introduction of migrant workers. 
Hogarth commented that, although "necessary to import the skilled labour", the 
venture would "receive the hearty support of the civic authorities and the people 
generally". The wording of Hogarth's statement suggests that the introduction of 
migrant workers was viewed as a necessary evil to aquire the company, rather than a 
positive for Launceston. Another article by the Examiner soon after P&B began 
production indicates that public concern over imported labour continued. The paper 
offered justification, but an agonised one, for importing P&B's foremen: 
Without exception they are experts who have been intimately associated with the firm's 
activities in the old country for very lengthy periods ... While this may be regarded as a 
policy which indicates extreme caution, it must also be admitted that the firm cannot be 
expected to take the risk of losing its reputation and obviously does not propose to ... It 
may be considered an excellent safeguard to their clients that the products of the 
Launceston mill are going to be right up to standard.5 
Migrants were easy targets to blame for Australia's labour problems. With 
industrial unrest rife internationally in the post-war period, employer interests saw 
migrant labour as agitators. At an Australian Chamber of Manufacturers meeting in 
1921, for example, it was maintained that allowing the "wrong class" of migrants into 
Australia had ended in trouble. Tasmania's representative, W.R.P. Salisbury 
(proprietor of Launceston's Salisbury Engineering) targeted unions for attack, but 
pointed out that, "The majority of the men at the head of the unions were imported, 
and it had been found that most of the industrial troubles were caused by imported 
men".6 Salisbury believed Australians should encourage their own "flesh and blood", 
and needed to be careful when importing skilled artisans to see that only the best were 
obtained. Simultaneously, unions and employees viewed migrants as threatening job 
availability and labour conditions. Prime Ministerial assurances did little to allay such 
concerns. In 1921 Hughes claimed there was "no greater economic fallacy" than that 
migrants reduced local job opportunities.7 
K&K (Tas) demonstrated an awareness of concerns about introduced labour. 
Before specifics on migrant contracts or individuals involved were available, company 
secretary, Danvers Walker, assured State authorities "that rates of wages and 
conditions of work [would] not be less favourable to men than those current in 
5 Examiner, 26/111924. 
6 
'Immigration of Skilled Artisans', 24/4/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
7 
'Australia's Colonisation, Twentieth Anniversary Speech by Mr. Hughes', 1/211921:· K&K Press ---'-
Cuttings. 
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Tasmania at the present time for workers of the same or similar classes". 8 Danvers 
Walker also guaranteed that contracts were "not being made in contemplation of, or 
effecting any industrial dispute". 
Worries about the introduction of migrants workers were intensified by 
unemployment, and led to some immigration schemes being curtailed before they really 
got under way. Tasmania's Agent-General, Arthur Ashbolt, therefore caused concern 
in early 1921 by claiming there was "plenty of work in Tasmania".9 Premier Lee was 
advised to inform Ashbolt "that employment [was] hard to obtain and likely to be 
harder". The Premier reiterated this point to Ashbolt in September, claiming that 
"present economic conditions" made it was necessary "to put some check upon 
immigration" .10 Ashbolt expressed hope the condition would be temporary. He also 
pointed out that the present industrial and other developments must be greatly 
increasing demand for workers, and warned that if the current (but soon-to-expire) 
Imperial Government Scheme granting free passages for ex-servicemen and their 
families was not taken advantage of immediately, the opportunity for obtaining settlers 
might not arise again. 
Others were similarly keen to ensure that the establishment of new industry saw 
an influx on migrant workers, but for very different reasons. In early 1921, an article in 
the Australasian commented upon a recent short-term closure of the Electrolytic Zinc 
Company's wor~s in the South due to falling metal prices. Although first attacking 
industrial labour for Tasmania's industrial problems, Tasmanian householders were also 
criticised. It was claimed that the current establishment of the Cadbury factory and 
Launceston' s woollen mills were being viewed with "alarm'' because, as large female 
employers, their presence would aggravate the "all pervading scarcity of domestic 
servants" .11 Trying to allay such concerns, it was pointed out that householders had 
not reckoned on the influx of immigrants who would rush out on an unprecedented 
scale when this need became known. This provides a clear indication of the role that 
the more affluent members of society (those concerned about a scarcity of domestics) 
perceived as appropriate for immigrants. It also offers one explanation for wider 
community hostility towards migrant labour. Despite contentions that migrants would 
8 Daiwers Walker, K&K Secretary, To Under-Secretary, Government Building, 711/1921: PDl 
55/3/21. 
9 Minister for Agriculture, Memo to Premier, 7/3/1921: PDl 55/6/21. 
10 Ashbolt, To Premier, 8/9/1921: PDl 55/2/121. 
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rush to Australia to take up positions as domestics, migrants generally sought to better 
their position in life. Such aspirations clashed with the desire of many Australians that 
migrants should remain in what was assumed to be their proper social and economic 
positions. It was against such a background that negotiations to introduce migrants 
textile workers for Launceston' s two new textile mills were set. 
Negotiations to Introduce Launceston's Industrial Migrants 
K&K first sought information on how to go about introducing skilled foremen 
into Australia in 1917. 12 The secretary to the federal Department of Home and 
Territories advised: 
that if the duties of these men do not consist principally of manual labor, but of supervising 
and teaching other laborers, the Contract Immigrants Act 1905 would not apply to them. 
If in any cases the Act should apply (because the actual work to be performed consists 
mainly of manual labor), no difficulty will be raised in regard to admission, provided the 
remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment are as advantageous to the 
immigrants as those current for workers of the same class in the Commonwealth.13 
In order to comply with the Act, the company was also to send a copy of the workers' 
contracts or proposed terms to the Home and Territories Department for ministerial 
approval. Protracted negotiations over K&K's Australian venture, however, led to a 
delay between initial inquires and further progress on introducing migrant workers. By 
the time the issue re-emerged, changes in immigration policy led to some confusion 
about how industrial migrants fitted into the scheme of things. 
Immigration policy in the 1920s would be concentrated around an assisted 
passage scheme whereby most migrants were privately nominated by family members 
within Australia, but with provision also made for special categories of assistees, 
including workers for industrial enterprises with specific needs. Instigating this joint 
federal/state immigration scheme, in February 1921 the Commonwealth announced that 
it would contribute £ 12 toward all assisted and nominated migrants, children eligible 
for reduced passages treated pro rata. On the basis on a £40 fare, this left £28 to be 
paid by the migrant, of which a maximum £ 18 could be loaned at the Commonwealth's 
discretion to the migrant and their family. Domestics and farm labourers were also 
included. While family was initially classified to include only wives, children, brothers 
11 Australasian, 11111921. 
12 Agent-General, John McCall, To Jens-August Jensen, Minister for Customs, 1/8/1917: PDl 
118/19/17. 
13 Jensen, Department of Trade and Customs, To Agent-General, 14/11/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
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and sisters, 14 this was subsequently extended to husbands, married brothers and sisters 
and their families, mothers and fathers, widowed mother-in-laws, nieces, nephews, 
cousins and fiances - all of whom were eligible for loans. 15 The loans were to be repaid 
at £2 per month. In line with existing practice in most States, the maximum age for 
assisted migrants was 45 years for males and 35 for females, 50 years for those 
receiving free passage. Exceptions were possible in special cases. With these 
concessions outlined, the federal government advised the State that, for 1921 at least, 
migrants should be largely confined to those eligible for free passages under the 
(already-mentioned) British scheme for full subsidies of ex-service people's fares. 
Exceptions were to be restricted to cases of hardship, defined as family reunion. 16 
K&K were particularly keen to select migrants qualifying for free passages, as this left 
the company with no travel-related expenses. P&B appeared less concerned about the 
cost of choosing non-servicemen. This was perhaps a more realistic industrial 
approach if the best person for the job was to be selected, rather than the one who cost 
least to relocate. 
Once contractual negotiation with Launceston Council were finalised, K&K 
(Tas) directors again raised the issue of free or assisted passage for migrant labour. In 
late November 1920, the Home and Territories Department outlined anew 
requirements under the Contract Immigration Act, K&K directors inquiring whether 
these regulations were known at the Commonwealth offices in London. 17 Upon advice 
from the Commonwealth Immigration Office, K&K also wrote to the Department's 
undersecretary in early January 1921 regarding the introduction of their British 
workers: 
These men are essential to our business, being specially trained as instructors, as well as 
being Foremen Spinners, Foremen Finishers, Foremen Carders and Loom Jobbers. They 
understand all methods of manufacture employed by Messrs Kelsall & Kemp Ltd., 
Rochdale, who are the promoters of the Company here. 18 
While the number or classes of immigrants the State was prepared to receive was not 
yet known, K&K's estimated requirements were about 25 workmen, mostly ex-
14 PM, To Premier, 14/2/1921: PDl 55/2/21. 
Acting Director of Agriculture, To K&K, 6/4/1921: SWD4, M9/55. 
15 H.S. Gullet, Superintendent, Commonwealth Immigration Office, To Premier, 14/3/1921: PDl 
55/2/21. 
16 PM, To Premier, 14/2/1921: PDl 55/2/21. 
17 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 6/1211920. 
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servicemen, who would largely be accommodated by their families. That K&K would 
be able to find 25 workers from its Rochdale mill, or any other British mill for that 
matter, who were not only willing to migrate to Australia, but were also ex-servicemen 
with family members to accommodate them in Launceston seems unlikely. It is 
therefore understandable that the company was unable to provide specific names or 
terms of employment at that time. They did, however, continue to stress that the men 
were "required for the successful carrying out of work", and promised to forward 
contracts for endorsement soon after the men arrived, or even before. Although the 
government's intention was that contracts be approved before the migrants left 
England, at this point the company did not intend even to submit the contracts until 
after the migrants arrived. There was still much confusion, and K&K' s first staff 
member was due to leave England in the middle of the following month. 
Responses to K&K' s inquiries about introducing migrant labour indicate that 
authorities were themselves uncertain on how the system worked. In light of a recent 
immigration conference, the acting director of Agriculture presumed that any financial 
assistance toward the workers passages would be met by the Commonwealth, although 
there was still some doubt as to financial responsibility if the migrants were nominated 
by the company. Either way he saw no obstacle to their admission provided the 
Commonwealth approve the contracts. It was difficult to see how this could work if 
the contracts were not submitted until after the migrants arrived.19 
In the midst of K&K' s negotiations to introduce industrial migrants, some local 
industries also saw potential in such a scheme. In early 1921, well-known Launceston 
clothing manufacturer, Messrs. Boatwright & Company, made inquiries about 
introducing between 12 to 20 British operatives the following year.20 J.W. Boatwright 
informed Launceston's Acting Immigration Officer that it was "impossible" to find 
female factory hands either locally or on the mainland, and he was being forced to 
refuse work on account of this21 - raising questions about authorities' repeated 
assurances of Launceston' s plentiful labour supply (an issue further developed in 
18 Danvers Walker, K&K Secretary, To Undersecretary, Government Buildings, 7/111921: PDl 
55/3/21. 
19 Acting Director of Agriculture, Agricultural and Stock Department, Hobart, Memo to Minister of 
Agriculture, 18/1/1921: PD 1 55/3/21. 
Director of Agriculture, Memo to Minister of Agriculture, 18/1/1921: SWD4, M 9155. 
20 Immigration Officer, Memo to Acting Immigration Officer, 27/3/1922: SWD4, M9/182. 
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chapter 7). The Commonwealth Superintendent of Immigration, H.S. Gullet, 
responded that the practice of nominating unskilled artisans had been raised at the 
conference in Melbourne in December 1920, and had been operating successfully in 
NSW for some time.22 Nevertheless, there was no current scheme whereby group 
nominations of industrial migrants could travel free (this being the reason K&K were 
interested in nominating ex-servicemen). The only way Boatwright could introduce 
such workers was, first to ascertain through the industrial Department that the 
operatives were not locally available, and then nominate them in the ''usual way". This 
meant the nominator accepting responsibility for the newcomers' housing and 
employment upon arrival, and either paying the £26 per adult fare himself, or having 
that money paid by the intending migrants in Britain. 23 Boatwright had wanted the 
operatives brought to Tasmania and, only if acceptable, would he then employ them, so 
it was very unlikely such a deal would have been pursued. There is no subsequent 
reference to this matter, suggesting Boatwright let it drop. 
K&K (Tas) officially informed the State bureaucracy of its intention to 
nominate 15 to 20 workmen and their families for assisted passages in March 1921. 
With the migrants expected to arrive in Tasmanian some time the following year, K&K 
(Tas)'s company secretary, Danvers Walker, again asked for details on how to 
proceed;24 the company still appeared uncertain of what was involved. Danvers 
Walker was advised to contact Gullet, and the confinement of assisted passages largely 
to ex-servicemen and cases of hardship was reiterated. 25 Already aware of the 
advantages of nominating ex-servicemen, K&K quickly responded that they would 
write to Melbourne as suggested, but that most of the men coming out were ex-
servicemen;26 they informed the Commonwealth Immigration Office of the same. 
Gullett subsequently told L.H. Evans, Tasmania's pertinent bureaucrat, that his office 
were prepared to accept K&K's nominations for skilled artisan on Evan's approval, 
21 Acting Immigration Officer, Launceston, To Commonwealth Immigration Officer, 24/2/1922: 
SWD4, M9/182. 
22 Superintendent Gullet, To Director of Agriculture, Hobart, 22/3/1921: SWD4, M 9/182. 
23 Immigration Officer, Memo to Acting Immigration Officer, 27/3/1922: SWD4, M 9/182. 
24 C.W. Danvers Walker, Secretary, K&K, To Acting Director of Agriculture, Hobart, 15/3/1921: 
SWD4, M9/55. 
25 Acting Director of Agriculture, To K&K, 16/3/1921: SWD4, M 9155. 
26 K&K, To Director of Agriculture, 17/3/1921: SWD4, M9/55. 
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and that the employees being ex-servicemen greatly facilitated matters. 27 Before the 
Commonwealth decision was received, however, State authorities had intended to 
inform the company that, subject to Commonwealth _ approval of contracts, no 
exception would be taken to the workmen's entry into Tasmania. 28 This message was 
mislaid, and when it resurfaced in April, the responsible Minister concluded it was 
probably too late to reply to the company, as some of the workmen were already on 
their way!29 
In June 1921 the Immigration Officer outlined procedure to K&K in greater 
detail. The company was first required to advise the State Immigration Office of the 
number and class of people required, and, once the Department had satisfied itself that 
these were unavailable in the State, the nomination would be accepted. The 
Department believed that the workers required could most likely be found amongst ex-
servicemen, and that no loans would be necessary. It was also explained that, for those 
ineligible for free passages under the still-operating imperial scheme, the nominator or 
his London representative would have to pay £26 on each passage, as well as the 
''usual guarantees" about the migrants not becoming a burden upon the state.30 Such 
migrants were, as a rule, usually selected by a London representative of the nominating 
firm, and it was added that: 
As the men nominated under this scheme will be special workers for whom there will be 
very little chance of employment beyond the job for which they are nominated, it should 
not be necessary for the employer to bind them by a definite contract. If a definite contract 
is not made the engagement will not fall within the scope of the contract Immigrants' 
Act.31 
This passage raises at least two pertinent issues as far as industrial migrants 
themselves were concerned. The first relates to the Department's claim that the 
specialised nature of these job made contracts unnecessary. This was misleading in the 
case of textiles. With the Australian industry expanding rapidly, there was a national 
shortage of trained operatives - the reason migrants were introduced in the first place, 
and also why contracts were needed to keep migrants from transferring to another 
employer upon arrival. Both companies demonstrated an understanding of the labour 
27 Commonwealth Immigration Officer, Superintendent, To L.H. Evans, Acting Director of 
Agriculture, 21/3/1921: SWD4, M9/55. 
28 Signed CS, Hand-written note to K&K, undated: PDl 55/3/21. 
29 Memo attached to above reference, 8/4/1921: PDl 55/3/21. 
30 Immigration Officer, To K&K, 7/6/1921: SWD4, M 9155. 
31 Immigration Officer, To K&K, 7/6/1921: SWD4, M 9155. 
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situation and did insist upon two-year contracts for their introduced work force. Both 
also had difficulties retaining their imported work force once these contracts expired. 
In many cases workers were actively head-hunted by other firms, or simply went 
elsewhere if pay demands or promotions were not met. The federal government's 
stance probably arose from to an awareness of union dislike for contracted migrant 
labour.32 
Later in the decade, to make our second point, officialdom was to cause many 
troubles by falling into opposite error - failure to foresee problems which could arise 
when specialised migrants had too limited a market for their skills. This became 
apparent with workers from Rapson Tyre and Rubber Company, the other large labour 
importing company beginning in Launceston in the 1920s. As later elaborated upon, 
when Rapson went into liquidation less than two years after commencement, their 
work force was stranded in Tasmania and virtually unemployable. This caused public 
ill-feeling towards the migrants involved, and complementary distress and anger among 
the migrants themselves. 
The Arrival of Launceston's Textile Migrants: Kelsall & Kemp (Tas) 
It is unclear how many migrant workers were introduced by K&K (Tas), but it 
was less than the company originally predicted when estimates of required migrant 
workers were provided to authorities. At the first AGM after production commenced, 
shareholders were told that the mill had only 15 skilled operatives;33 although not all of 
these were necessarily British migrants. Reference is made, for example, to K&K 
(Tas) employing three skilled weavers from Western Australia during this period.34 
Although K&K introduced substantially less migrants than P&B, both mills gained 
many additional migrant employees through the process of chain migration. Chain 
migration involved established migrants themselves nominating family and friends. 
This process, as it relates to Launceston's textile mills, is later discussed in some detail. 
While P&B' s larger migrant work force may have been beneficial from a 
production viewpoint, it also made P&B's migrants more visible within the wider 
community and, hence, more susceptible to criticism over P&B' s employment of 
32 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration, 1915-1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes 
(Oakleigh, 1995), p.209. 
33 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fourth AGM, 25/5/1923. 
34 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1923 (See also Chapter 7). 
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migrant labour. Conversely, one long-time local employee of K&K (Tas) maintains 
that K&K' s migrants were so few they simply assimilated. He claims that even the use 
of "pomrnies" was not an issue.35 Any ill-feeling that did exist was seen to have come 
from the outside community, not within the mill. Indicating that numbers and 
consequent visibility were no safeguard against migrant harassment, however, Victor 
Tuting (a young migrant employee who was the son of K&K's engineer) contradicts 
these claims by recalling that "pommie taunting ... 'permeated into everyday life"'.36 
Different situations prompt different memories. 
As already noted, K&K (Tas)'s first skilled foremen began arriving in early 
1921. Seemingly the first was Samuel Tuting. Although no record of Tuting was 
located in assisted passage files, he arrived in the period when negotiations between the 
company and authorities over introducing migrant labour were still under way. This 
suggests that the company sent Tuting before appropriate papers were completed, and 
that he was ineligible for assisted passage. Described as a mechanical expert, 37 Tu ting 
was on his way to Tasmania in late February 1921, calling into Geelong on the way to 
inspect finishing machinery.38 Arriving the following month, Tuting was introduced to 
directors at a meeting on 19 March, and shown around the mill works on 23rd. 39 Four 
months after his arrival, Tuting personally nominated his wife and five children to 
follow.40 The family arrived in Tasmania in January 1922. The Tuting family's fare 
was covered by K&K Rochdale.41 It was in both companies' best interests to show 
concern for the welfare of employees and their families, thus aiding a successful 
transition process and encouraging the workers to stay on after their contracts expired. 
K&K's company secretary, Danvers Walker, therefore attempted to arrange a job for 
Tuting's eldest son soon after the family's arrival. Danvers Walker requested that 
State authorities push an application with the PMG's Department for 20 year old, 
Sydney. Describing Sydney was "a fine type of young man", Danvers Walker believed 
35 Interview with P.M. Hart, 111111996. 
36 Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration, p.244. 
Tuting went on to become Tasmania's Chief Inspector of Factories from the 1950s. 
37 
'State of Tasmania, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 417/1921: SWD4, M9/55. 
38 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 28/211921. 
39 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 19/3/1921. 
40 
'State of Tasmania, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 417/1921: SWD4, M9/55. 
41 Immigration Officer, To Director, Migration and Settlement, London, 51711921: SWD4, M9/55. 
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it would be a pity if Sydney's previous training in the engineering department of the 
English post office were wasted. 42 
Another early arrival at K&K (Tas) was James Butterworth. Butterworth's 
case demonstrates how little input local directors had over the choice of their 
managerial staff and these men's conditions of employment. At a meeting in March 
1921, local directors discussed a service agreement that K&K Rochdale had recently 
made with Butterworth to act as inside manager at their Launceston mill. Subject to a 
solicitor's report validating that the contract met with locaI labour conditions, 
Butterworth's appointment was confirmed because local directors felt they could not 
interfere with such contracts made in England.43 Butterworth's contract highlighted 
that the uneven power balance in decision making processes extended to the hiring of 
staff. This was not just an issue of power, but could cause work-place problems. In 
time this became more evident at P&B: selection of the Launceston mill's pivotal staff 
by the parent company led to some disruptive personality conflicts within that mill. 
Confusion surrounding how the immigration process applied to workers 
nominated by a company continued throughout this early period, as seen with James 
(Jim) Holt. Holt was brought out by K&K in early 1922 to take charge of carding and 
spinning (in today's terminology he would have been yarn production manager).44 
Originally nominated by Mrs. Sam Tuting and family in July 1921, Holt's first 
nomination was rejected. The Tuting family had only just arrived when the nomination 
was lodged, so a minimum period of residence may have been deemed necessary before 
approving a nomination. Alternatively, the application may have been rejected because 
Holt was not related to the nominators. Holt was subsequently nominated by K&K in 
December 1921,45 at which time the company was informed that, if Holt's presence 
was urgent, details should be cabled immediately. Initially responding that Holt's 
presence was not urgent, in March 1922 K&K did an about face to claim Holt had been 
needed in Tasmania by 26 January and, unable to wait until the nomination papers 
arrived, they had sent Holt themselves. In response to the company's claim that the 
£ 12 equivalent of the Commonwealth grant be refunded, the Immigration Officer 
42 Acting Immigration Officer, Memo to Immigration Officer, 31/3/1922: SWD4, M 9155. 
As seen in illustration No. 21, Sydney Tuting was, at least temporarily, employed by K&K (Tas). 
43 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 19/3/1921. 
44 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
45 
'State of Tasmania, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 1/12/1921: SWD4, M9/129. 
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argued that K&K was not entitled to the money, but asked federal authorities for a 
ruling anyway.46 No reply is recorded, but the refund was presumably not approved. 
This meant that K&K' s first three known migrant workers did not qualify for assisted 
passages. Nevertheless, by the time K&K (Tas) began production, the company had 
finally worked the system out. In early 1923, for example, K&K nominated wool 
spinner, Tom Rothwell and his family. Fulfilling all requirements earlier detailed, 
Rothwell was an ex-serviceman,47 and the company promised to arrange 
accommodation for Rothwell and family, who were due to arrive in early September.48 
The introduction of migrant workers by both mills did not finish once the mills 
were established. Colin Forster points out that shortages of skilled labour were 
especially marked after the 1925 tariff increases.49 K&K (Tas), in particular, suffered 
greatly from loss of labour at this time (further discussed in chapter 7). This led to the 
introduction of a second round of migrant labourers, which is detailed in Appendix C. 
The Arrival of Launceston's Textile Migrants: Patons & Baldwins, Launceston 
Although P&B introduced substantially more migrants than did K&K, 
Tasmanian government records shed little light on discussions between State 
authorities and this company. K&K (Tas) - along with confectionery manufacturers, 
Cadbury-Fry-Pascall - had already clarified guidelines on the introduction of industrial 
migrants, so it was perhaps unnecessary for P&B to have much contact with the State 
on this matter. While this means less information is available on negotiations to 
introduce migrant workers, the nature of P&B Launceston's records provide more 
comprehensive details on the experiences of P&B's migrants upon arrival. 
During early negotiations, P&B had initially claimed that only eight to ten 
employees would be brought from England to act as instructors. 50 Presumably 
attempting not to inflame concerns over the introduction of migrant labour, P&B failed 
to mention that virtually the entire managerial staff would also be introduced. 
Subsequent claims about migrant numbers were less specific. In November 1921, for 
46 Immigration Officer, To Acting Director of Immigration, Melbourne, 13/10/1922: SWD4, M 9/129. 
47 Government of Australia, Application Form for Migration, May 1923, No. 119/5/10: SWD4, 
M9/348. 
48 
'State of Tasmania, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 23/4/1923; & State Immigration Officer, 
To K&K (Tas), 16/8/1923: SWD4, M9/348. 
49 Forster, Industrial Development, p.86 
50 
'Land Wanted', Daily Telegraph, 4/7/1921: K&K Press Cuttings. 
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example, the company claimed that, as a "nucleus of their staff', they would introduce 
"a few skilled workers from Halifax and district" to act as foremen.51 
It is uncertain exactly when the first three staff arrived to oversee construction 
of the Launceston mill, but it was sometime in 1922 and two of these men only 
migrated interstate, from Melbourne. Previously employed at P&B (Australasia) Ltd, 
the men involved were P&B Launceston's first general manager, W.M. Stewart 
(Junior), and accountant, AD. Peacock.52 Stewart undertook his duties while 
commuting between Melbourne and Launceston. Seemingly the first British migrant to 
arrive was works manager, John McVann, although no date of arrival was located.53 
P&B's other migrant foremen began arriving in Launceston in early 1923 - assistant 
engineer, William Grierson, in January,54 while William Ferguson, "a highly qualified" 
and experienced chemist55 in charge of all wet-processing sections, arrived in March.56 
Both hailed from Alloa. Departure dates for the majority of P&B' s skilled migrants 
were staggered to allow for building progress of the various departments. The largest 
group left Tilbury Dock, England for Launceston on 26 April 1923; Appendix C lists 
such migrant employees.57 The group's Scottish contingent included three married 
couples, two males and eight girls, accompanied by another two married couples and 
three girls from England. This "nucleus staff' arrived in Launceston on 16 June to a 
not yet completed mill, and were welcomed by most of those already arrived, including 
51 Daily Mail, 26/11/1921: Launceston City Council, Industries, G.H. Hirst & Co. (1921-22), 19/3.1. 
In reality most managerial staff came from Alloa. 
52 Related to the wife ofW. Stewart Senior (general manager of P&B (Australasia) Ltd), A.D. Peacock 
arrived in Launceston in January 1923 as the first accountant at P&B Launceston's mill, and remained 
in charge of the general offices for many years until being recalled to the company's Melbourne office. 
Peacock was still company secretary with the firm in 1962, when director·s expressed regret at the 
death of his wife. 
Cowie, To ARP, 3011/1924: P&B Private correspondence, ex-Alloa; 
Examiner, 261111926 & 'P&B Spinning Mill at Launceston': P&B Mill History File; 
P&B Directors' Meeting, 30 April - 1 May, Minute No.62/68: L. Denham, Book 1, Index of Minutes. 
53 Both Stewart and Mc Vann are subsequently considered in greater detail. 
54 
'Original Staff from P&B Mills in the UK': P&B Mill History File. 
Grierson stayed with P&B Launceston's mill for the rest of his working career. The company made 
reference to supplementing his pension from a voluntary supplementary pension scheme in 1962. 
P&B Directors' Meeting, 24-25/1/1962, Minute No. 62114: L. Denham, Book 1. 
55 Examiner 26/1/1924, p.5. 
Ferguson retired as manager of the dye-house in 1943, his position was taken over by J.B. Boag of 
Alloa. 
Examiner, 20/12/1972, p.9. 
56 
'P&B Spinning Mill at Launceston', 13/511969: Mill History File. 
Hand-written letter from Bill Grierson, Hagley, To A.B. Stirling, P&B Personnel Manager, 
20/11/1968: P&B Mill History File. 
57 See file SWD4, M9/316: 
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Stewart, Peacock, McVann, and Ferguson.58 They were also given a "hearty 
welcome" by Launceston's mayor, whom the company later thanked for attending 
proceedings.59 A second group of migrants arrived a few months later,60 and 
production started on a small scale in August 1923. With machinery continuing to be 
erected as building progressed,61 another handful of migrants arrived to take up 
positions in newly finished departments on 19 November 1924.62 According to a 
newspaper report the following year, the company brought out a total of 24 operatives 
and their families, along with an unspecified number of departmental managers and 
some administrative staff, a total of between 50 and 60 people during the initial 
establishment process. 63 As mentioned, both companies would continue to nominate 
migrants throughout the 1920s, but would acquire many extra British employees 
through chain migration. 
Chain Migration 
The mills were happy to allow their first migrants to take responsibility for 
nominating relatives who were then employed at the mills. By removing the onus of 
housing and financial guarantees from the companies and on to individual nominators, 
chain migration also enabled the companies to distance themselves from criticism at 
continuing to introduce migrant employees, particularly those who did not qualify as 
skilled labour. The introduction of migrant employees by family members already at 
the mill was further smoothed because the nomination system worked primarily to 
reunite family and friends. 64 Concerns about the effect of continued immigration 
during the Depression led the federal government to place restrictions upon all 
immigration during 1929-1930. Debate over re-introduction of the assisted passages 
scheme in the latter half of the 1930s, however, revealed much about community 
concerns over Launceston's migrant textile employees during the previous decade. 
Questioning the value of the assisted passage scheme was A.E. Weymouth, the 
officer-in-charge of Labour and State Immigration at Launceston during the 1920s. 
58 Hand-written extract: P&B Mill History File. 
59 Stewart, P&B, To Mayor, 21/6/1923: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1. 
60 P&B 'Spinning Mills at Launceston': P&B Mill History File. 
61 Hand-written letter from Bill Grierson, Hagley, To A.B. Stirling, 20/1111968: P&B Mill History 
File. 
62 P&B 'Spinning Mills at Launceston': P&B Mill History File. 
63 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.6. 
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One exception, he believed, was the role the scheme played in enabling skilled workers 
to be brought out to inaugurate new industries. Although supportive of the scheme's 
influence in encouraging companies to establish, Weymouth was critical that these 
companies continued to introduce workers after the initial establishment process. 
Specifying P&B and Rapson Tyre & Rubber Co for attention, Weymouth noted that 
Rapson directors, in particular, had wanted to bring out more workers, except he had 
"very strongly pointed out" that Tasmania could supply the company's less skilled 
labour requirements. 65 P&B directors explained that their continued introduction of 
migrant labour was because of doubts over Tasmania's ability to supply sufficient girl 
labour, and were given similar assurances. Probably with undue optimism, Weymouth 
claimed that both companies' management were eventually convinced of the suitability 
of local labour, although he does not mention whether they actually stopped 
introducing workers. 
Blaming the migrants rather than the firms, Weymouth was critical of ·P&B 
employees nominating their friends from the old country for skilled jobs at the mill. He 
believed that excellent local labour was being disregarded. The continual employment 
of migrant workers nominated by its employees suggest that, rather than being 
convinced of Weymouth's argument, P&B used private nominations as a way of 
avoiding bureaucratic interference. The companies likely realised that authorities were 
reluctant to address public concerns over their employment of migrants nominated in 
this way. In October 1927, for example, a letter from an undisclosed source regarding 
"the employment in factories etc., of immigrants", was doing the rounds of various 
business related organisations.66 Launceston's mayor had originally received the letter, 
passing it on to the Chamber of Commerce, who, in turn, handed the letter over to the 
Chamber of Manufacturers. No one wanted to accept responsibility for confronting 
this issue. Tackling large employers such as P&B Launceston, K&K (Tas) & Rapson -
revealed as main culprits in this regard - seemed to be viewed as a political hot-potato. 
Another reason not to address public concerns about the introduction of 
migrant labour through chain migration was that authorities were themselves divided as 
to whether the whole process was desirable. Bartholomew Douglas was an inspector 
64 Tenth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1924-1925, No. 11, p.23: Tasmania. Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, Vol. 1925-26. 
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with the Department of Immigration and Labour during the 1920s and an advocate of a 
migration policy centred around family reunion. He would, however, subsequently 
oppose the Scullin government's restrictions, implemented during the Depression, 
upon assisted passages solely to very close family members. Improved economic 
conditions in the latter half of the 1930s led to discussion on widening the scheme. 
Douglas then used the case of migrants brought out by P&B Launceston, K&K (Tas), 
and Cadbury-Fry-Pascall during the 1920s to argue that the scheme should be extended 
beyond close family members. He pointed out that the nomination of relatives, close or 
otherwise, caused the State least worry, as accommodation and employment was 
always available with kith and kin. After staying a few years and seeing improved 
economic conditions, Douglas argued, it was natural that the original migrants "desired 
to nominate certain relatives who did not come within the category of close relative". 67 
As these nominations could not be approved under the family reunion scheme, in some 
instances skilled operatives had returned to Britain to rejoin the firm's home branch. 
Otherwise evidently happy in Australia, the one element lacking was "their home 
circle". Seeing this as a loss to the country, Douglas believed that a successful settler 
was the best possible advertisement for Australia, while a dissatisfied migrant would 
refrain from recommending the country to others. This point had long been recognised 
by policy makers. At the first interstate conference of the New Settlers' League held in 
Melbourne in October 1921, the Governor General, Lord Forster, warned that every 
settler returning home "a confessed failure" did more to harm Australia's prospects of 
attracting the "best kind of settlers" than anything else. 68 
Industrial migrants introduced by Rapson Tyre and Rubber Company would 
become particularly contentious figures in this debate after the company's collapse in 
the early 1930s. Douglas used Rapson as a negative example of why family reunion 
was the best form of migration. Skilled workers and their families necessary to begin 
this industry had been assisted by the State rather than nominated by family. When the 
company had failed, the workers had no family backing and became stranded, requiring 
State assistance until absorbed by allied factories on the mainland; some still receiving 
66 Launceston Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee Meeting, 20/10/1927: Minutes 8/3/1917-
19/6/1930. 
67 
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unemployment sustenance in 1936.69 As an opponent of the scheme, Weymouth saw 
this same instance in a variant light. He believed the Rapson case proved his 
contention that it was better for the companies to recruit local labour because locally 
trained labour was more adaptable than the introduced specialised workers. 
Weymouth pointed out that, after Rapson collapsed, a Queensland manufacturer had 
come to Tasmania to engage some men, but the Rapson migrants' specialised skills 
meant that only four were suitable. Several other Rapson employees had approached 
the government for assistance to go to Queensland and seek work at this factory, but 
returned to draw the dole. P&B's migrants also came under attack by Weymouth in 
this story because a number of Rapson migrants had used their connections with P&B's 
English employees to obtain jobs at P&B Launceston. Weymouth believed these 
migrants had been given preference over locals for unskilled positions, thus taking jobs 
"that first class local labour" was "waiting to obtain", or actually replacing local men 
(although no proof is offered).70 Some locals may have resented what they saw as the 
preference British owned mills showed towards employing British workers, but such 
preference was also motivated by the bond that many migrants form with others from 
their homeland when in a new and not always friendly environment. Disproving 
Weymouth's theory that skilled migrants were not adaptable - as those involved had 
transferred from tyre making to textile production - his reasoning also left migrants in a 
no-win situation. They were criticised for losing their jobs through no fault of their 
own and needing to draw unemployment sustenance, and criticised for using their few 
Australian connections to obtain employment. Even attempts by Rapson migrants to 
return home, seemingly their only remaining option, had been thwarted. Rapson had 
gone into liquidation before most of its migrant workers had served their required two-
year term in Australia. Migrant requests to waive this residential requirements and 
allow them to return home at their own expense were, however, rejected by federal 
authorities. So too were migrant claims upon the company for assistance to repatriate. 
Authorities deemed that the company had fulfilled its obligations towards the workers. 
Despite State advice that the exemption was warranted, and headlines declaring 
Rapson's migrants "Very Unfairly Treated", federal authorities stood firm.71 
69 
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Whatever side various parties took on the issue of chain migration, the 
nomination of relatives by mill employees started before K&K (Tas) even became 
operational. In July 1922, Sam Tuting nominated his ex-serviceman brother-in-law, 
Alfred Jameson, and wife.72 Jameson's nomination was eventually cancelled because 
he was unable to revoke his current employment contract until November 192373 
(implying he was not a K&K employee himself). This was, however, one of the first 
instances of a Launceston textile employee attempting to introduce other migrants to 
work in the Launceston mills. It is not possible to ascertain exactly how many extra 
migrant workers either K&K (Tas) or P&B Launceston gained through chain 
migration, particularly as not all migrants employed at the mill were nominated by 
workers previously brought out by the companies. 
Some mill employees came to Tasmania for personal reasons and, already 
having a background in the textile trade, were able to obtain employment at the 
Launceston mills. While some locals may have seen this as preference being shown to 
British workers, skilled labour was in short supple, irrespective of the workers' 
nationality. In December 1920, J.W. Barnes, a 60 year old boot repairer who had been 
in Tasmania for five years, wrote to the Immigration Board requesting that his wife, 
Martha, and their sons be able to join him. 74 They eventually left England in late 
1922.75 In 1925, Martha, a silk weaver by profession,76 was employed at K&K (Tas) 
as a weaver on piece work, earning £3 per week when work was plentiful. Her eldest 
son, aged seventeen and a half, was also employed at the mill, earning 27 s. 6d. per 
week.77 While Martha's past experience in the textile trade would have stood her in 
good stead to acquire work at any of the mills, some locals would no doubt have seen 
the employment of her teenage son as preference being given to British labour over 
local labour, when plenty of the latter was available. This may or may not have been 
the case, but ignores an important textile industry tradition; companies hiring 
subsequent generations, a practice aiding the maintenance of company loyalty. Some 
long established migrants also saw Launceston's new textile mills as an opportunity to 
72 Assistant Immigration Officer, To Immigration Officer, Hobart, 12/7/1922: SWD4, M9/235 
73 Immigration Officer, Memo to Assistant Immigration Officer, Launceston, 15/1/1923: SWD4, M 
9/235. 
74 Barnes, To Secretary, Immigration Board, 12/2/1920: SWD4, M 9/31. 
75 Immigration Officer, Hobart, Memo to Assistant Immigration Officer, Launceston, 16/11/1922: 
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reunite with British family members in the textile trade. In April 1923, orchardist and 
investor, John Cameron, nominated his 23 year old ex-serviceman brother-in-law, 
Earnest Burden. As Burden was a woollen mill operative, Cameron promised to 
arrange work for him at the local woollen mills.78 
Not all migrants were wholly honest about their employment intention. While 
Glen Withers calculations of skill indices in the 1920s suggest a decline compared with 
past migrants,79 Michael Roe suggests that many migrants actually denied or disguised 
industrial skills to qualify for assistance as agricultural workers or domestics. 80 There 
were certainly examples of this with migrants intending to seek employment at 
Launceston's textile mills. In early 1925, Tea Tree farmer, William Scott, nominated 
Greaves and Hilda Wood (Hilda his wife's cousin) to work on the family farm. 81 
Following events suggest the couple had little intention of coming to Australia to 
undertake farm duties; Although currently unemployed, both were experienced textile 
workers by trade and, when their nominations were lodged, employment applications 
were also placed, and followed up, at P&B Launceston, K&K (Tas), and Reliance 
Worsted Mills. With no firm employment offers forthcoming,82 the Woods refused a 
subsequent offer from the Director of Labour to undertake farm and domestic work 
other than on their relatives' property (the two occupations specifically wanted by the 
Australian government). The Woods claimed they presently had a few months work in 
England. 83 As this was a time of marked labour shortages in the textile industry and 
both P&B Launceston and K&K (Tas) were shown to have introduced more migrant 
workers during the 18 months these negotiations continued, the Woods' case also 
suggests that Launceston's mills did not employ people just because they were British, 
as some locals implied. It could instead be argued that family connections within the 
77 Office oflmmigration, To Director of Labour & State Immigration, 7/5/1925: SWD4, M 9/31. 
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mill ensured the character of recruits were already known, and family ties helped the 
migrants' transition into a new environment, as well and the continuing transition of the 
nominating relative. 
The marked tightening of migrant entry restrictions by the decade's end might 
have further encouraged migrants to misrepresent their intended employment. In July 
1929, for example, Flora Hood arrived in Australia to take up domestic service. By 
October, however, she had transferred to P&B. Suggesting this may have been her 
original intention is the fact that Hood's nominator, J.L. Gibb, was also a migrant 
employee at the mill. Authorities were powerless to force Hood to remain in domestic 
service, but she was required to refund the government contribution to her fare and 
seemed happy to do so.84 
While Launceston's British controlled companies were most often targeted for 
giving jobs to migrants over local labour, perhaps the most blatant example of a 
company seeking to introduce unskilled labour came from one of Launceston' s locally 
owned mills. In August 1927 Thyne Bros. Pty Ltd nominated typist/book-keeper, 
Lillian Curtis. 85 Her brother had already been introduced from England to work at the 
mill, but it was the company, not he, who lodged the nomination and specified that 
Lillian was being brought out as a company employee. Although a typist/book-keeper 
could in no way have qualified as skilled labour, authorities made no reference to this 
point. Thyne Bros. also requested that Lillian, who was to be accompanied by her 
mother, have her assisted passage up-graded to first class, the difference to be paid by 
the company.86 Not only was it unusual for a migrant worker nominated by a company 
to be accompanied by a parent, but, so too, was the upgrade to first class. When 
deciding upon criteria for assisted passages, the federal government had ruled that no 
concessions would be made to those travelling first class;87 Lillian's assisted 
nomination would therefore not have been approved. It is uncertain why Thyne Bros. 
went to such lengths to introduce a typist/book-keeper, but it was presumably part of a 
previous deal made with her brother to acquire his services. Mr. Thyne also applied for 
a rebate on Lillian's brother's fare when lodging her nomination, and was informed 
84 See file SWD 4, M9/875. 
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87 H.S. Gullet, Superintendent, Commonwealth Immigration Office, To Premier, 14/3/1921: PDl 
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that, because the nomination for assisted passage had been made after the migrant 
arrived, he was not entitled to a rebate. 88 
There were a wide variety of reasons and motivations why both individuals and 
companies continued nominating other migrants, but in many cases the reason 
remained the same as for the first industrial migrants. The requisite skills were not 
available locally. When K&K (Tas) lodged an application to introduce John Stott and 
his wife in 1927, managing director, Les Overstall, claimed the company had been 
"unable to get a suitable man locally, with knowledge of Loom-tuning". 89 This 
contention appeared correct as Reliance Worsted Mills also found it necessary that 
year to nominate loom-tuner, Stanley Hoyle, and his family.90 
Although companies and their migrant employees found ways of getting around 
regulations aimed at limiting the continued introduction of migrant labour, there were 
instances when textile migrants were refused for reasons other than concern over 
unemployment. To understand the rejection of one British male with a job arranged at 
P&B Launceston, for example, background information is necessary. In April 1922, 
the Prime Minister's office corresponded with Premier Lee about its London office of 
Migration and Settlement's concerns over the nomination for assisted passages of 
individuals who had lost the sight of one eye. People with this disability had previously 
been accepted,91 but the office claimed to be "somewhat perturbed" at the frequency of 
such cases and sought advice. While the Home and Territories Department, who 
administered the Immigration Act, had deemed such migrants acceptable provided they 
were otherwise in good health, could earn a living, and were not likely to become a 
burden upon the State, Tasmania's opinion on this disability was sought. The only 
guideline offered was a suggestion the State be more sympathetic to ex-servicemen 
acquiring this affliction in the war. 92 It seems unlikely that Australia was really being 
flooded by Britons with the sight of only one eye. Subsequent correspondence 
suggests that the federal government's real agenda was broader. In a letter received 
the following month, the Premier was told that the joint immigration scheme held the 
88 Director, Labour & Immigration, Memo to Inspector, 26/8/1927: SWD4, M9/754. 
89 Officer-in-Charge, To Director, State Immigration, 7/7/1926: SWD4, M 9/657. 
90 John Broomby agreed to arrange housing and the fare was to be paid half each by the nominator and 
nominee. 
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92 Acting PM Earl, To Premier, 11/411922: PDl 55/4a/22. 
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Commonwealth responsible for repatriation of those found, upon arrival, to suffer from 
disabilities rendering them unsuitable for employment. 93 Financial responsibility for 
repatriating migrants who were fit upon arrival but later became incapacitated and 
likely to be a charge upon the State was, however, a grey area. In cases to date, the 
Commonwealth had been asked to repatriate such people, but Hughes' government felt 
that this should be done at the State's expense.94 
The eye inquiry was presumably advanced to test the State's response. If 
Tasmania agreed to accept migrants with the sight of only one eye and they later lost 
the sight of their remaining eye, financial responsibility would then be upon the State 
rather than the Commonwealth. Premier Lee obviously saw the connection, as he 
replied separately to both Commonwealth letters on the same day. His immigration 
officers concurred that each case involving eyesight should be decided upon its own 
merits, but the Premier refused to accept financial responsibility for repatriating 
migrants found unfit for work. 95 The Commonwealth subsequently offered to accept 
repatriation costs provided the physical condition existed at the time of selection and 
the Commonwealth was notified within six months of disembarking.96 The Tasmanian 
government accepted. 97 As this would still hold the State financially responsible for a 
migrant who lost the sight of their remaining eye after arrival, it might explain the 
State's refusal to accept another nomination the following year. 
In late 1923 Watson Dawson of P&B Launceston nominated his 18 year old 
brother-in-law, John Elliott Rae, a wool sorter, to work in P&B's wool sorting 
department. The company went guarantor to the nomination.98 Rae's nomination for 
an assisted passage was subsequently rejected on medical grounds. With Rae 
"practically blind in one eye", the medical referee determined that "should anything 
happen to the good eye, he would not be able to carry on and might become a charge 
upon the State" .99 Still able to migrant to Australia if self-funded, Rae took up this 
option and arrived in April 1924 to begin work at P&B Launceston. 100 Although the 
93 PM Hughes, To Premier, 5/511922: PDl 55/4a/22. 
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Federal Government's ruling suggested otherwise, less than perfect vision did not make 
Elliott Rae an unsuitable migrant, and P&B's faith in offering him a job proved 
justified. By 1928 Rae already had much responsibility, received a good salary and was 
recommended for another substantial pay increase to ensure the firm retained his 
services. Of a handful of housing loans granted to P&B Launceston employees to 
encourage their best workers to stay with the firm, Rae was the youngest of this select 
group to be awarded a loan during the 1920s. 101 
K&K (Tas) was likewise willing to offer employment to migrants deemed 
unsuitable to receive assisted passages by the government. In December 1922, cotton 
worker and ex-serviceman, Walter Morris, was nominated by his friend William 
Chadwick,102 an employee of K&K (Tas). A position undertaking general work had 
been secured for Morris at K&K. 103 Morris's request for the rebate hit a snag when it 
was discovered that his left leg had been amputated. With permission needed from the 
Minister for Home and Territories before Morris could land in Australia, it was decided 
that no rebate could be granted. Morris subsequently cancelled his nomination, 
intending to make his own way to Australia, and then nominate his wife and family 
upon arrival. 104 
By the late 1920s Launceston's British funded textile mills were increasingly 
aware of the sensitivity surrounding the continued importation of labour. When K&K 
(Tas) nominated finisher, Percy Sykes, and his family in July 1928, the company 
acknowledged it was "not quite fair to bring out unskilled workers whilst the present 
By the late 1920s Elliott Rae had been joined by the rest of his family, and it appears that eyesight 
problems were a family trait and could cause some work-place difficulties. In September 1928, 
Elliott's mother, Mrs. Dorothy Rae, confidentially wrote to P&B Manager, Arthur Procter. She 
complained about the treatment her younger son, David, was receiving from his superior in the dye-
house, William Ferguson. While Procter could not fault David's performance, Ferguson had already 
told David's mother that the boy's eyesight was a serious drawback in his work, a claim Mrs. Rae 
disputed. Dorothy Rae pointed out that optometrists in both Scotland and Tasmania had verified that 
David's eyesight was normal with spectacles (the latter consultation at Ferguson's request), adding 
that Ferguson was the only one who seemed to think David's eyesight was bad. 
Dorothy Rae, To ARP, 11/9/1928 & 21/9/1929; ARP, To Dorothy Rae, 19/9/1928: P&B, Private 
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unemployment exists" .105 While recognising that trade was presently depressed, K&K 
claimed Sykes' introduction had already been delayed, and he was only required 
because of his special qualifications as a finisher. The Department responded that it 
was ''unlikely" nominations for unskilled workers would be approved at present 
anyway, but accepted K&K (Tas)'s nomination for this skilled worker. Sykes arrived 
in Melbourne in late 1928.106 Sykes' skills may not have been locally available, but his 
wife was a weaver. 107 While no information is available to confirm or deny, she was 
almost certainly employed at K&K' s mill, enabling the introduction of yet another non-
essential worker during this period. 
Reservations about approving family-reunion nominations when a job had been 
arranged for the nominee at one of the mills had increased by the decade's end. In 
March 1929, Archibald Donaldson, an employee of P&B Launceston, nominated his 
brother, Alexander, and family. A position had been secured for Alexander at the 
mill. 108 With Alexander's intended job as a wool classer classified semi-skilled, 
Archibald was informed that the nomination was unlikely to be approved unless for a 
skilled position. Archibald responded that his brother had worked alongside the 
present Launceston foreman at P&B's Scottish mill for some years, and only a man 
with years of experience would be employed. This seems to have been one instance 
where the company used its migrants employees to nominate a worker they wanted, 
rather than doing it themselves. Archibald pointed out that the position had been 
arranged for his brother, and was only available to his brother. If the nomination was 
turned down, Alexander intended finding other means to reach Tasmania and take up 
the job.109 The Donaldsons won. Alexander arrived in August that year. no Like K&K 
(Tas), P&B Launceston also continued to nominate skilled workers towards the end of 
that decade. John Dunley and his family were brought out by the company in late 
1929, Dunley to replace a foreman wool sorter who had recently passed away .111 
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Despite difficulties actually stopping the employment of migrants at the mills, 
the government may have been right to hold reservations about the continued 
introduction of skilled textile workers during the late 1920s. This was not necessarily 
to appease locals, but because of the implications for the migrants themselves - as 
already seen through the difficulties experienced by Rapson's unemployed migrant 
workers. In April 1932, textile worker, Robert Heyward of Invermay, nominated his 
wife and four year old son to join him in Tasmania. Robert had come out in December 
1929, following his brother James.112 Unemployment subsequently kept Robert from 
nominating his family for over three years. By April 1932 Robert was described as 
being "in fairly regular employment" at Reliance Worsted Mills, and his wife (a 
weaver) was also to work at that mill. 113 With Reliance recently commencing a night 
shift, the manager was prepared to guarantee Robert three months employment, 
although Robert believed he also had "a good chance" of securing a position at K&K 
(Tas) as a Loom Tuner in the near future. 114 Neither of these prospects eventuated. In 
November that year Heyward began a one month trial at Waverley Woollen Mills after 
another period of unemployment. The position was to be permanent if he proved 
suitable. 115 Heyward's family had finally arrived by early 1933, but difficulties repaying 
the Commonwealth loan suggest their employment situation remained unstable.116 
In cases where the government did clamp down on textile workers introducing 
family members, they appear not to have always discriminated in the most logical 
manner. In March 1930, Stanley Hoyle, an employee at Reliance Worsted Mills, 
nominated his 48 year old widowed mother-in-law, Ellen Parker. 117 Although 
authorities initially suggested Parker's nomination be approved, it was subsequently 
rejected because of unemployment levels. The family made a plea for special 
consideration. Parker had no other living relatives, and intended to keep house for her 
daughter who also worked at Reliance. Obviously aware of authorities' concerns and 
demonstrating some knowledge of immigration regulations, the family pointed out that 
domestics were one clause under which females could be admitted. They added that 
112 
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113 
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Parker's daughter held a skilled position, so her mother's presence would not be 
responsible for allowing the daughter to take up a position that another local could 
assume. The case was thus reconsidered and authorities decided to approve. 118 Before 
Parker left Britain, however, authorities again changed their mind after discovering she 
was illiterate. The nomination was eventually cancelled in November 1930. 119 As 
Parker's illiteracy had no bearing upon her ability to perform domestic duties and 
rather provided a stronger case for needing to be near her family, the decision was 
certainly a reinforcement of original concerns about the unemployment level. The 
cancellation of Parker's nomination coincided with the new Prime Minister, J.H. 
Scullin's, announcement that economic conditions necessitated assisted migration being 
restricted solely to dependents of people already in Australia. This was followed by the 
cancellation of many nominations already approved. As some of the cases so far 
discussed reveal, however, from this point on the government was reluctant to approve 
even nominations which fitted within these guidelines. 120 
Migrant Accommodation 
Responsibility for housing migrants was an important issue in the migration 
process, but no one involved with migration appeared willing to become involved with 
housing. When government assistance to house migrant workers was raised by various 
firms seeking to establish in Tasmania, housing was always specified as the nominators' 
responsibility. Nevertheless, State authorities had little experience with industrial 
migrants until the establishment of K&K (Tas), and sought confirmation as to housing 
responsibility when negotiations to introduce K&K's migrant workers began in the 
early 1920s. Although the pertinent bureaucrat believed housing would be met by the 
company, he conferred with his Minister anyway.121 
With the State free of responsibility for housing and construction of the mill 
under way, K&K (Tas)'s directors first proposal to cater for its migrant labourers was 
118 It was added that there was currently a shortage of females weavers. 
Officer-in-Charge, To Acting Director, State Immigration, 15/5/1930: SWD4, M9/943. 
Secretary, Development & Migrant Commission, Memo to Acting Director, Labour and State 
Immigration, 6/6/1930: SWD4, M9/943. 
119 Director, Migration & Settlement Office, London, To Director, Labour & State Immigration, 
18/8/1930: SWD4, M9/943. 
120 Roe, Australia, Britain, and Migration, pp.139-144. 
121 Acting Director of Agriculture, Agricultural and Stock Department, Hobart, Memo to Minister of 
Agriculture, 18/1/1921: PDl 55/3/21; & Director of Agriculture, Memo to Minister of Agriculture, 
18/1/1921: SWD4, M 9155. 
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to build a number of workmen's cottages upon a portion of their land at Invermay. 122 
This had also been the company's_preferred approach when still considering Hobart as 
a possible location. In 1917 K&K had inquired about housing workers near the 
Cascade Estate, 123 the Hobart Council and Henry Reynolds responding that there was 
ample room in the vicinity of the mill to build housing for the company's work force. 124 
There was no indication that the Council's involvement was to extend beyond making 
land available, so the company was presumably to build the houses. The company's 
financial restraints when mill construction began meant that a similar idea did not 
progress far when raised as to Launceston in 1921. 
In June that year K&K instead requested that local directors bring the matter of 
housing to the attention of local authorities. Wearing dual hats of company director 
and local councillor, Percy Hart asserted that there was no prospect of receiving help 
from either government or municipal authorities. 125 Subsequent inquiries by other 
companies confirmed Hart's appraisal of the Council's position. When a proposed 
cotton manufacturing firm made inquiries in 1927 about housing a work force of 
between 400 and 500 females, the Council twice reiterated that it had no power to 
undertake construction of housing. 126 The Council instead told how a large subdivision 
had been approved in the vicinity of Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co. and that private 
building constructions in that region were increasing. 127 The Council then offered to 
sell additional land to be used for housing purposes by the cotton company. 128 
No further reference to housing K&K's migrants appears until after the first 
contingent of migrants necessary to begin production had arrived. As such, there is no 
indication as to where these migrants stayed upon arrival, or as to what, if any, 
assistance was provided by the company. When the issue of housing next re-emerged 
in April 1923, K&K (Tas) directors were discussing whether to sell or let the remaining 
two blocks of Barnard's land (part of the company's estate) to migrant employee 
122 
'Launceston's Woollen Mills ... First Annual Meeting Held', Telegraph, 25/5/1921: K&K Press 
Cuttings. 
123 Agent-General, To Premier, 5/711917: PDl 118/19117. 
124 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Secretary to Premier, 10/10/1917; PDl 118119117. 
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125 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 24/6/1921. 
126 Town Clerk, To P.B. Coulston, 14/2/1927; & Town Clerk, To Coulston, 2/3/1927: Launceston City 
Council, 21/1.6. 
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George Brooks and other unspecified mill employees for "buildings" - presumably 
meaning housing. The resolution was passed, but it would seem that land was sold 
only to Brooks. Unspecified conditions were imposed upon the purchase if Brooks 
resold the land. 129 
The following year K&K (Tas) were again making arrangements to sell a 55 X 
120 yard plot of the company's land to migrant engineer, Sam Tuting. While the 
motivation for selling company land to George Brooks is not given, Tuting's case 
suggests that whatever housing assistance was provided had some benefit for the 
company. Valuing the land at £ 120, Tuting was to repay the company within three 
years at 6.5% interest p.a.130 At the higher end of market interest rates, these were not 
particularly generous terms.131 In addition, Tu ting' s house was built on the comer of 
the mill grounds because the company wanted Tuting close enough to be on call.132 
Such an arrangement had obvious advantages to the company. Nevertheless, when 
plans were made to fence Tuting's property a month after the original deal, K&K not 
only decided that Tuting should pay half the fencing costs, but that timber off his site 
should be used where possible.133 
Unlike K&K (Tas)'s short-lived proposal to build workers' cottages, P&B 
Launceston went ahead with a similar proposal upon their firm's land. First submitting 
plans in April 1923 for a proposed subdivision of (what had been) the Glen Dhu 
Recreation Ground, P&B wanted to begin construction on a road immediately. 134 
They were keen to hasten approval for eight proposed cottages through Council so as 
to retain builders currently working on the factory site. With builders in much demand, 
the firm feared that a lapse between finishing the factory and starting the cottages 
128 Town Clerk, To Coµlston, 14/2/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6 
129 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 10/411923. 
130 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 13/6/1924. 
131 In January 1924 interest rates for loans over 3 months ranged from 5.5% - 7%. 
S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall, & R.C. White, Australian Banking and Monetary Statistics 1817-1945 (Sydney, 
1971), p.494. 
132 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
133 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 41711924. 
Around 40 years later K&K (Tas) loaned money to a third generation of the Tuting family; company 
minutes noting the discharge of a mortgage held as security for a £300 loan to G.S.G. Tuting for home 
building purposes. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 22/8/1965: RAK Minute Book, June 1965-June 1976. 
134 W. Stewart, P&B, To Mayor, 26/4/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties -
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would make it difficult to secure further men. 135 P&B also submitted plans for its best 
considered-subdivision for additional cottages, but pointed out that this depended 
largely upon the development of business and whether the land was required for mill 
extensions. 136 Subsequent mill expansions meant that, apart from one extra cottage the 
following year, no further housing eventuated. The Council considered the proposed 
lots to be somewhat narrow, only 35 feet wide (demonstrating the British architectural 
influence), but decided the layout was satisfactory137 and granted approval. 138 Only a 
month before the bulk of P&B's migrant workers arrived, the firm was also planning to 
build a hostel, presumably for single migrant workers, 139 but these plans did not 
eventuate either. 
As with K&K, the timing of migrant accommodation proposals in relation to 
when the migrants' arrived implied that P&B did not give housing high priority. When 
the bulk of P&B's migrants arrived in June, construction of the cottages was not yet 
under way, although Reynolds informed parliament that the company hoped to begin 
work immediately. 140 The contract to erect eight cottages at a cost of £7,580 was 
awarded to J. & T. Gunn Pty Ltd, the work to be completed on or before 20 February 
1924.141 As elaborated upon later, the company's housing policy catered for those it 
especially wished to retain. With only eight families able to be accommodated even 
when this housing was completed, it appears that the majority of the migrants were 
expected to find private rental accommodation. This arrangement seems to have 
caused some discontent, 142 as Arthur Procter informed P&B Alloa in mid-1924 that 
housing rentals in Launceston were simply "appalling". 143 Upon arrival the migrant 
girls, at least, were temporarily accommodated in dormitories at the Girls' Friendly 
135 Acting Town Clerk, To Premier, 28/3/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties General 
(1922-23). 
136 W. Stewart, P&B, To Mayor, 26/4/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties, 
Subdivisions General (1922-23), 21/3.1. 
137 City Engineer, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 2/5/1923: Launceston City Council, 2113.1. 
138 Acting Town Clerk, To P&B, 15/5/1923: Launceston City Council, 21/3.1. 
139 City Engineer, Memo to Acting Town Clerk, 2/5/1923: Launceston City Council, 21/3.l. 
140 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1922-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania. Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
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Launceston, 8/8/1923: Held by CP. 
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Society. One migrant amongst these first arrivals, Mrs. Esther Marshall, later recalled 
the placement as "like being in a hospital ward" .144 
By November 1923 the first three cottages were "nearing completion",145 the 
Examiner providing an update on the progress of P&B's small village for married 
English workers in January 1924. Conveniently designed and mostly of five rooms, the 
first cottage was now practically completed.146 (See illustration No. 20.) The cottages 
were, however, the cause of some discontent. Nine married foremen had been 
promised housing before leaving Britain, but only eight cottages were constructed. 147 
The company's solution was to draw lots to determine who would miss out. 148 Only 
taking part in the ballot under protest, George Shields was the unsuccessful candidate. 
In the absence of written documentation confirming Shields' claim that he had been 
promised a house by one of the British directors, P&B Launceston's management 
decided he had fairly lost the ballot. Shields continued to protest. 149 The relevant 
director subsequently confrrmed Shields' claim, so P&B Launceston was authorised to 
build or buy Shields a suitable house. 150 A ninth cottage was therefore ·COnstructed.151 
Problems did not, however, end there. In April 1924 one of the new tenants, George 
Barker, caused dissent amongst other foremen by broadcasting details of the special 
terms by which he paid only 15s. per week rent. 152 As will be later seen, Barker was 
the cause of some trouble within the mill. 
During the 1920s P&B's management was approached on a couple of 
occasions by occupiers of the company's cottages wishing to purchase their residences. 
Procter advised Alloa that it was a common Tasmanian practice "for a man occupying 
a house to pay for it by means of some rent and purchase system", and asked if the 
company would consider either a straight purchase or rent-and-purchase. 153 P&B Ltd 
declined to sell because they felt these houses should be retained "to meet the 
144 
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requirements of our own work people as they may arise from time to time". 154 These 
cottages would remain in the company's hands for many years, a 1961 Examiner 
Supplement reporting that a number of employees were still housed near the factory in 
company cottages. 155 
P&B Launceston also assisted the accommodation needs of certain migrants 
through provision of company housing loans, an established practice at the home firm. 
The loans were only granted to key managerial or senior office staff, however, and 
were used to encourage employees to remain with the firm. The loans included a 
clause, for example, whereby full repayment of all monies owed fell due if the borrower 
ceased to be employed by the company.156 This provided a good incentive to stay. 
The company's motivation for granting loans was even more apparent in a 1928 claim 
that approving a particular loan would make the employee "seriously consider the 
matter" should he feel tempted to leave the company and relocate to the mainland.157 
Problems retaining labour are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter, but 
tt~~~~~~~~b~~~~~~~~ 
incentives were offered. During the 1920s the company granted housing loans to wool 
buyer Watson Dawson, 158 chemist William Ferguson, 159 accountant AD. Peacock, 160 
drawing and spinning overlooker Duncan Ramsay, 161 future general manager J.B. 
White, 162 and the earlier mentioned John Elliott Rae.163 
Although offering more generous interest rates than K&K (Tas), these rates 
still caused some discontent. Dawson and White's interest rates were set at only 4%, 
154 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/11/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
155 Examiner Supplement, 15/8/1961, p.23. 
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157 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 15/11/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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159 P&B Alloa, Telegram to P&B Launceston, 25/2/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
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while the others were being charged 6%. 164 The parent company claimed that Dawson 
and White's rates had been fixed in error. 165 This argument might have been plausible 
for Dawson, as his was the first loan granted, but is difficult to accept for White, since 
Ferguson and Peacock's 6% rates were set over two years before White arrived in 
Launceston. This may have been a genuine mistake, but it is also possible that lower 
rates reflected the relative importance of those involved. As later seen, Dawson 
arguably received greater accolades than any other Launceston emploree, while White 
was being groomed for a top managerial position. Ill-feeling over the different interest 
rates arose largely because Peacock, as the accountant, was aware of the discrepancy 
and "felt somewhat hardly" about his higher charge. 166 Procter therefore suggested 
that Peacock's terms be reassessed.167 Another problem with the scheme was that, 
until late 1928, no arrangements existed for repayment of the loans' principal. P&B 
Halifax asked that this be rectified.168 They also suggested that, if some method of 
repayment was introduced, a reduction of the interest rate for those paying 6% might 
be considered. Peacock's interest rate was subsequently reduced from 6% to 4%, 169 
but there is no mention of similar adjustments for the others. It is more likely that 
Peacock's adjustment was the result of what he knew, and that the company had no 
intention of altering rates for the others affected. 
Further demonstrating that P&B Ltd viewed housing loans purely as a 
necessary ploy to retain certain Launceston staff, the company had long been unhappy 
with allowing any such loans to P&B Launceston staff. Concern about housing loans 
164 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 19/9/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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was first expressed in late 1927, William Procter telling Arthur Procter that he hoped 
these loans would "be kept to a minimum" as the company did not care "to be 
interested in more housing property than is absolutely necessary".170 When approving 
Elliott Rae's loan late the following year, the parent company again told Procter to 
discourage such loans.171 Claiming to be "rather adverse" to granting such advances 
because they did not want a large sum of money invested in housing property, P&B 
Ltd expressed hope that no further applications would have to be considered for some 
time. 172 Nevertheless, subsequent correspondence shows that requests for, and 
approvals of, housing loans continued thereafter. 173 
Repatriating Staff 
While immigration regulations required companies take responsibility for 
initially housing migrant employees, P&B had other obligations as part of the migrants' 
employment contracts. One such responsibility was the payment of fares to repatriate 
female migrants who wished to return to Britain once their term expired. No 
information was. located on what, if any, guarantees, K&K made to its introduced staff. 
A year after the first group of P&B's migrants arrived in Launceston, P&B Alloa 
suggested the Launceston mill begin ascertaining how many female migrants wanted to 
return home when their two year contracts expired. Inquiring whether the mill could 
carry on without the girls if need be, P&B Ltd chainpan, William Procter, pointed out 
that there was a possibility that all the girls might want to leave. 174 No response was 
immediately forthcoming, but in June the following year the girls' contracts were nearly 
up and Alloa again asked how many girls wanted to return home. 175 The mill's success 
in maintaining its female migrant employees was good. Only two girls had already left 
the mill's service; one at the expiration of her two year contract to marry a local 
farmer, and another had moved to Melbourne after only one year and was believed to 
have since married. How P&B handled the second girl breaking her contract was not 
specified. Of the remaining female migrants, all except two of the younger girls chose 
to remain, and even those two had wanted to stay but their mothers insisted they come 
170 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/1111928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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home. 176 This is not to suggest that the female migrants' contracts posed no 
difficulties. As later shown in chapter 7, the girls had a number of battles with 
management over contractual conditions during this period. 
In comparison with their male counterparts, however, the women appeared 
reasonably content. Towards the end of the migrants' second year in Launceston, the 
possibility of repatriating certain unspecified male migrants had also been raised. P&B 
Alloa informed the Launceston mill that, while the company had contracted to 
repatriate any women wishing to return after two years service, no such agreement had 
been made with the men and would not be considered. 177 Closer inspection reveals that 
discontent amongst P&B's male migrants was rife, and suggests why some men were 
keener to return home than were the women. 
Transferral of Parochial Jealousies: P&B Alloa vs P&B Halifax 
Part of the trouble appears to have stemmed from parochial jealousy between 
the two branches of the recently amalgamated firm. Headquarters of P&B Ltd was in 
Halifax, originally the base of the Baldwin side of the business. Nevertheless, 
correspondence indicates that most of the British input into P&B Launceston came 
from the Scottish branch in Alloa, headquarters of the Paton business prior to 
amalgamation. Close links between P&B in Scotland and Launceston are also 
suggested by the Launceston mill having an unbroken line of Scottish managers from 
1923 to 1966.178 Company records offer no reason why P&B Alloa seemed to have 
greater input into P&B Ltd' s first overseas manufactory. One possible explanation 
might be that the Melbourne based distributor, P&B (Australasia) Ltd, had operated as 
part of the Paton company for almost 30 years prior to the 1920 amalgamation. Since 
the Launceston mill and Melbourne distributor were to work closely together, it may 
have been deemed practical to allow P&B Alloa to take an upper hand in the new mill. 
Early experiences at P&B Launceston indicate that some rivalry existed 
between P&B at Alloa and Halifax. A disproportionate number of staff problems at the 
Launceston mill were associated with migrants chosen by P&B' s Halifax branch. One 
176 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 9/91925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
177 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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such migrant previously associated with the Halifax mill was John Mc Vann. Arriving 
in 1922, McVann was the first mill manager179 and P&B's Launceston agent. 180 
McVann's engagement was a short-term one of only 18 months,181 during which time 
he was to oversee installation of machinery, hiring of Australian staff, and progressing 
the mill to operational stage. By early 1924, however, his presence had become more a 
hindrance than help. Describing him as a "thorn in the flesh" for general manager 
Arthur Procter, 182 P &B Alloa bemoaned that Mc Vann was "making himself 
unpleasant", and believed he had "no reason to grouse". 183 McVann's attitude 
stemmed from a perception that he, rather than Arthur Procter, should have been 
promoted to general manager when Launceston's first general manager, W.M. Stewart 
(Junior), was transferred back to Melbourne soon after production began. P&B Ltd 
maintained that Mc Vann had never been given any reason to think this would be the 
case, and knew he had been sent out specifically to help start the mill because of his 
large and varied practical experience. Mc Vann did seem to have a justifiable grievance. 
Arthur Procter had joined the firm in 1914184 and, after receiving special training in 
P&B Alloa' s wool department, 185 had been sent to Launcest~n in early 1923. to take 
charge of the mill's raw wool section186 and act as wool buyer. 187 With Procter's 
experience as mill management acknowledged as "not large", 188 his elevation to general 
manager was likely the result of nepotism. Arthur Procter' s father (deceased) had been 
a director of the Paton's company, while his uncle, William Procter, was a current 
179 Handwritten letter from Bill Grierson, Hagley, To A.B. Stirling, P&B personnel manager, 
20/11/1968: P&B Mill History File. 
180 Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
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permanent". 
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Old Records of interest - From 1923'. 
185 
'Original Staff from P&B Mills in the UK': P&B Mill History File. 
Handwritten letter from Bill Grierson, Hagley, To A.B. Stirling, Personnel Manager, 20/11/1968: 
P&B Mill History File. 
186 
'P&B Spinning Mills at Launceston, 13/5/1969': P&B Mill History File. 
187 
'Original Staff from P&B Mills in the UK': P&B Mill History File. 
Handwritten letter from Bill Grierson, Hagley, To A.B. Stirling, Personnel Manager, 20/11/1968: 
P&B Mill History File. 
188 P&B Alloa, To ARP, 28/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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director of P&B Ltd (becoming chairman in 1925), 189 and their family tree traced back 
to the origins of the Paton's company. Arthur's paternal grandmother was grand-
daughter of company founder, John Paton.190 William Procter subsequently advised 
Arthur to "get all you can out of [McVann]", as the company felt McVann was 
unlikely to stay on once his contract expired. 191 P&B Alloa also asked whether, 
character faults aside, Arthur Procter felt it desirable for the "efficient conduct of the 
business" to retain McVann's services for a little longer.192 Arthur expressed surprise 
at this inquiry, pointing out that, because he had no experience in "the coating trade", 
and Mc Vann claimed to have plenty, the latter's retention was necessary;193 presumably 
this was why Mc Vann thought the position of general manager should have been his. 
McVann's disruptive behaviour appears widespread. Letters home from other 
migrant over-lookers show Mc Vann interfering with, and undermining the authority of, 
senior personnel. In the only recorded instance of religious motivated ill-will during 
this period, Mc Vann, evidently himself a Catholic, upset many by granting leave of 
absences and "other privileges" without the consent of the relevant foremen, 
"especially in the case of Roman Catholics". 194 With Mc Vann continuing to make a 
nuisance of himself, in October 1924 P&B Alloa informed P&B Launceston that they 
did not consider him a permanency and suggested Procter "dispense of his services as 
soon as ... the need for him ... past". 195 McVann was repatriated, his presence noted 
back in Britain by the following December. 196 
Mc Vann was not the only migrant chosen by Halifax causing problems. 
George Barker had arrived in 1923 to take charge of the Launceston mill's carding and 
189 William Procter had been associated with P&B Ltd since its inception, and before that with John 
Paton, Son & Co. When he died in January 1938, his services with these companies had extended 
over 59 years, the last 13 as Chairman of Directors. Procter was well respected amongst his 
colleagues, remembered as winning "the universal esteem of all who worked under him". 
Report of Proceedings at the 19th Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 201711938: Held by CP. 
190 
'The Romance of Patons Yarn' by Alex Forrester-Paton, To A.P. Mitchell, 19/511952: P&B, 'Some 
Old Records of interest - From 1923'. 
191 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 6/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
192 P&B Alloa, To ARP, 28/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
193 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 11/4/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
194 P&B Alloa, To ARP, 28/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
195 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 13/10/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
196 The reference related to a recent interview William Procter had held with McVann to discuss 
certain issues at P&B Launceston. McVann was reported to be "almost" enthusiastic about the 
position of things in Launceston, but also criticised a number of practices. 
W.T. Procter, To ARP, 30/911925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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combing department. 197 By February 1923 Barker was already noted as being "a little 
difficult", but beginning to settle down. 198 P&B Alloa blamed P&B Halifax for the 
problems with Barker, contending that Halifax had failed to clarify Barker's position 
when he was engaged. In June 1924 Barker began making "preposterous" claims199 for 
additional payments to which the mill believed he was not entitled. 200 Maintaining that 
these claims must be ignored, P&B Alloa expressed regret that Barker was being 
difficult.201 Arthur Procter was advised that if Barker gave further trouble, a suitable 
replacement would be sought for when his contract expired. In April the following 
year, however, Alloa informed Launceston they were having difficulty finding a 
successor for Barker and could not consider replacing him. They therefore advised 
P&B Launceston to offer Barker a pay increase of up to £2 per week to retain him if 
satisfied with his work. 202 He accepted a £ 1 increase. 203 With no replacement 
available, P&B Launceston would have had little choice but to retain Barker even if 
dissatisfied, the forced retention of troublesome managerial staff adding another 
dimension to the problems of textile labour shortages in the 1920s.204 
In April 1924 Arthur Procter tried to convince P&B Alloa that friction within 
the mill had decreased, and that the men were settling down. He then contradicted this 
claim by reporting a recent flare up between Mc Vann and William Ferguson, details of 
which were not provided.205 Although Mc Vann was from Halifax and Ferguson from 
Alloa, this was one dispute likely motivated as much by personality clash than by 
regional parochialism. McVann's temperament has already been noted, but Ferguson 
(a chemist who was in charge of the dye house )206 also appeared to have an abrasive 
197 Hand-written extract: Mill History File. 
198 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 6/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
199 P&B Alloa, To ARP, 2217/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
200 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 9/6/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
Barker and family hailed from Bradford, recognised as the centre of Britain's textile industry. 
'Original Staff from P&B Mills in the UK', in Mill History File. 
201 P&B Alloa, To ARP, 22/7/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
202 Cablegram, Alloa, To ARP, Rec~ived 27/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
203 ARP, To Alloa, 28/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
204 Barker was eventually dismissed without notice for "insolent behaviour" in April 1932. 
J.B. White, To Directors, Alloa, 19/4/1932: Outward Correspondence 1930-39. 
205 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 11/411924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
206 Examiner 26/111924, p.5. 
'P&B Spinning Mill at Launceston', 13/5/1969: Mill History File. 
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personality.207 Any illusfons Procter may have had about harmonious relations within 
the mill were soon shattered. Mid-way through writing the letter which related 
McVann and Ferguson's trouble, Procter was informed that George Barker had been 
telling other employees about his special rent concession (as previously mentioned). 
Procter was also advised that George Shields had been granted a pay increase of 1 Os. 
per week, even though his contract allowed for him to be paid at the same rate as other 
foremen of equal status. When this got out Procter predicted further unrest. 208 P&B 
Alloa admitted these were "nasty snags" which might cause trouble, but claimed the 
changes had been made by Halifax "without our knowledge".209 Barker and Shields 
had both been selected from Baldwin branches. Not only does this imply a lack of 
communication between P&B Halifax and Alloa, but the branches appear to have 
looked after the interests of their selected migrants, sometimes irrespective of 
consequences. While impossible to prove either way, it is also conceivable that the 
branches from which the migrants were drawn may have seen their migrant 
contribution as an opportunity to rid themselves of certain troublesome employees. 
Both P&B Alloa and P&B Launceston appear to have blamed disruption within 
the Launceston mill upon migrants other than those selected from its Scottish branch. 
In 1927 Alloa director, John Forrester-Paton, agreed with Procter on "the advisability 
of sending out Alloa men as far as possible". 210 The statement was in connection to the 
introduction of a new spinning overlooker for the Launceston mill. As P&B Alloa 
"unfortunately" did not have a suitable man available, Halifax based William Batty had 
instead been chosen. Procter's statement suggests that both P&B Alloa and 
Launceston wanted to avoid future vacancies being filled by migrants of Halifax's 
choice. This is not to imply that all migrants chosen by P&B Halifax were disruptive. 
Problems at the Launceston mill were often aggravated by decisions made outside the 
mill. Migrants causing such problems were also likely a minority. In early 1924, for 
207 Following a complaint in September 1928 about Ferguson's treatment of a young employee and 
"abrupt manners", Procter admitted that he was "aware" of Ferguson's "particular temperament and 
manner". 
Dorothy Rae, To ARP, 1119/1928; & ARP, To Dorothy Rae, 19/9/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence 
Ex. Alloa. 
208 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 11/411924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
209 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 22/511924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
210 John Forrester-Paton, To P&B, Launceston, 20/411927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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example, Arthur Procter claimed that he had found most of the men sent out to be 
"wholeheartedly loyal".211 No comment was made regarding the women. 
Although concentration throughout this chapter has focused predominantly 
upon the negative aspects of the migrant experience, this does not necessarily reflect 
upon the migrants' perception of their own experience. Negative incidents were simply 
more likely to be recorded than were the positives, of which there were many. 
Industrial migrants arrived with a job already lined up for a company with which most 
were familiar. Many held positions of authority and this guaranteed them a certain 
social standing within their new communities. The migrants also had the support of a 
number of other workers who shared similar experiences to themselves. Factors such 
as these meant that the industrial migrant generally had many advantages over the 
ordinary migrant. The differential was probably as wide in the case of Launceston' s 
textile workers as anywhere in Australia. 
211 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 6/2/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
21. K&K (Tas)'s industrial migrants assembled in l923. 
Back row: Sydney Tuting (middle); M. Whitfeld (thi rd from right) ; Dave Westwood (far right). 
Front row from left: unknown; Sam Tuting; unknown: James Butterworth; William Chadwick: 
George Brooks; James Holt. 
22. Above - J. McVann, W. Ferguson and W.M. Stewart (the behatted gentlemen from left to 
right) welcome Robert & Mary Snadden (on the left) and Agnes & William Comrie (on the right) 
and tl1eir families to Launceston on behalf of P&B. The Snaddens and Comries were amongst 
tl1e firs t group of migrants to arrive in June L 923 to take up positions with P&B Launceston. 
23 . Below - P&B Launceston ' s first group of industrial migrants pose for a photograph upon 
arrival in tl1e city. Launceston s mayor, George Shields joins tlle group (second from the right in 
the back row). 
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CHAPTER7 
LABOUR ISSUES WITHIN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
In the early nineteenth century the principal of laissez-faire dominated industrial 
organisation, and governments opposed interference in the freedom of contract 
between employer and employee. 1 The textile industry had led the Industrial 
Revolution, and would also lead the way in abuses of labour inherent under such a 
system. It is not therefore surprising that Tasmania's 1907 Royal Commission on 
wages and wage earners revealed some of the State's worst labour abuses were 
occurring in the local textile industry. Anglican Bishop Edward Mercer told the 
Commission "that the sweating of seamstresses in Hobart was worse than in 
Manchester".2 This revelation influenced the implementation of Tasmania's first 
Wages Board Act in 1910, which guaranteed workers a minimum wage based on cost 
of living. In 1916, Tasmanian Labor politician W.E. Shoobridge urged Tasmanians not 
to allow the State's manufacturing industries to develop upon the lines of the crowded, 
unhealthy manufacturing cities. Shoobridge pointed to Sydney and Melbourne as 
examples from which to taking warning "of the pernicious effects of the old system". 3 
The establishment of K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston in the early 1920s did 
much to allay fears that Tasmania's industrialisation drive would recreate the problems 
apparent in the British system. As later seen, both mills placed much emphasis upon 
providing ideal working conditions and other schemes of benefit to workers. Similar 
schemes at Hobart's two major post-war industries, Electrolytic Zinc and Cadbury-Fry-
Pascall, likewise reinforced a positive perception about the path that Tasmania's 
industrial development was taking. As this study so far has concentrated upon the 
establishment process of the two companies under consideration, the present chapter 
concentrates upon labour issues during the establishment process. It therefore focuses 
more upon such matters as they affected managers and investor, rather than workers. 
1 F.J. Wright, The Evolution of Modem Industrial Organisation (London, 1967) pp.126, 128, 145 & 
160. 
2 W.A. Townsley, Tasmania, From Colony to Statehood, 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991), p.249. 
See also Richard Davis, Eighty Years Labour, 1903-1983 (Hobart, 1983), p.8. 
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The two viewpoints, however, have obvious overlap. As migrant workers were 
particularly significant to the company's establishment process, they continue to bulk 
large in our story. 
Freedom from Industrial Unrest 
Rather than emanating from any altruistic concern for the rights of labour, the 
conditions K&K and P&B introduced sought to counter that industrial unrest which 
characterised the post-war period. Tasmanians saw their relative freedom from such 
turmoil as particularly important. It was used as a means of selling the State to 
prospective industry. When Launceston Council was attempting to persuade Henry 
Ford to establish a car manufactory in Launceston in 1924, for example, he was told 
that the city was "singularly free from industrial disturbances, indicating that the 
worker in Launceston is more contented than in the larger centres of the Mainland". 4 
When trying to persuade Fred Berlei to establish a corset factory in their city in 1926, 
Council claimed that Launceston was "particularly free of labour troubles". 5 
Competition to attract industry was such that companies considering establishment 
even sought guarantees about stability of labour in their list of demands. In September 
1927, Launceston Council received advice that artificial silk manufacturer, British 
Celanese Company, was considering erecting mills in Australia. Without definite 
assurances regarding "a fair run both as to tariffs and freedom from labor unrest", the 
company refused to commit to the move. 6 The company was promptly informed that 
establishment in Launceston would "automatically eliminate . . . the possibilities of 
labour worries". Some companies agreed. During negotiations between Launceston 
Council and Rapson Tyre and Rubber Co. in late 1927, Rapson's general manager, 
H.L.J. Butlin, claimed to be "impressed with the Tasmanian worker", whom he 
considered "a better type than the Mainland product". 7 
3 W.E. Shoobridge, Tasmania's Water Power. Its Probabilities and Possibilities. How Natural 
Resources Can Make Industries. A Series of Articles (1916), pp.8-9. 
4 Launceston Mayor, To Henry Ford, Ford Motor Company, Canada, 16/111924: Launceston City 
Council, Industries General (1924-25), 21/1.2. 
5 Town clerk, To Fred Berlei, 24/6/1926: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1925-27), 
21/1.3. 
6 P.B. Coulston, To Mayor Barber, 3/911927: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1927-29), 
21/1.7 
7 Butlin did not have a high opinion of mainland labour. One argument he put forward for Rapson 
introducing British workers was "that he objected to bringing men from Melbourne and Sydney, as he 
feared he would be importing all kinds oflabour troubles". 
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Despite such contentions, Tasmanian and mainland workers did share certain 
values unpopular from an employer's perspective. Foremost was the Australian work 
ethic. After P&B's first Christmas-New Year break, 33 female employees (from a total 
work force of 150) failed to show for work on the day after the holidays. Management 
put up a notice aimed at discouraging a repeat of this practice. 8 Furthermore, an 
industrial sales pitch based upon freedom from industrial unrest had to ignore not only 
Tasmania's continual isolation through shipping strikes, but also that the State did 
experience some industrial action throughout the 1920s. Tasmania was, for example, 
affected by a strike at the Cornwall and Mt. Nicholas coal mines in late 1923 and early 
1924. Both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston used coal and were concerned by such 
events.9 Nevertheless, the textile industry was fortunate on a national basis to 
experience "almost" no industrial stoppages throughout the twenties. 10 When 
Tasmanian Flax Mills' issued its prospectus in February 1926, they concentrated upon 
this story, rather than Tasmania's particular freedom from labour troubles. Under the 
heading, "Lab9ur Conditions", the Prospectus stated: 
It is noted with satisfaction that no class of manufacturing has been so free from industrial 
trouble as the Textile. Australian Woollen Mills have enjoyed practical immunity from 
troubles of this nature and the Company's operations will be of a similar character. 
Consequently similar immunity may be expected. 11 
It appears that throughout the 1920s textile workers Australia-wide were relatively 
placid, with Tasmanians more so than most. Data on unionisation is very scant, and 
still more extraordinary is the near-complete absence of comment about unions in the 
1920s company records; the managers and investors did not care enough to abhor 
them. 
Yet the story had its subtleties. In 1926-27 Tasmanian workers in the industry 
succeeded in having their conditions brought under the Federal Arbitration Court, 
thereby breaking away from the State Wages Board which had earlier prevailed in such 
E.A. Weymouth, To Director, State Immigration, 1/11/1927: SWD4/14 - Albert E. Wood, Rapson 
Tyre and Rubber Co. 
8 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 4/111924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
9 Cornwall stopped work on 8 December and Mt. Nicholas on 9 January, work eventually resumed in 
early February. 
Report of J.B. Brigden on the Situation at the Cornwall and Mt. Nicholas Coal Mines, To Chief 
Secretary, 16/2/1924; & Premier, Telegram to Hibble, 3/3/1924: PDl 88/1/24. 
1° Forster, Industrial Development in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra, 1964), p.92. 
11 Prospectus of Tasmanian Flax Mills Ltd, 15/2/1926: PD 1 179/6/26. 
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matters. 12 One informed observer, not meaning to be humorous or cynical, has 
proposed that strikes were rare because wages were too low to allow building of funds 
which might sustain such action.13 If that were at all true, one could imagine an 
underlying potential for protest. Such dissent became action in a few episodes related 
below and then on a big scale just after the end of our period of concern: in late August 
1932 Launcestonians were forthright in nation-wide anger when the textile industry 
was brought within the Arbitration Court's cutting of Australian wages generally. 14 
Protesting against the strike, company director Percy Hart pointed out that K&K and 
P&B had come to Launceston "on the representation, among others, that in this city 
they would be free from industrial trouble" .15 Hart believed this would "permanently 
damage the prospect of Launceston getting other British industries to establish 
themselves here, and seriously hamper the efforts of those of us who are actively 
engaged [in] trying to get industries established here for the benefit of the citizens". 
Availability of Labour, Especially Female 
When considering establishment in Hobart in mid-1917, K&K had requested 
information from Hobart Council on the prospect of attracting workers to the chosen 
area. 16 Hobart Council's response was ambiguous, claiming on the one hand that the 
Council was not in a position to give particulars on the prospect on acquiring workers 
(suggesting the Chief Inspector of Factories might be able to assist), then claiming 
there should be no difficulty in obtaining the necessary labour. 17 As at Launceston, 
authorities often told companies what they wanted to hear. Henry Reynolds did, 
12 Examiner, 27/8/1932. 
13 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/1111996. 
14 The strike was the result of an Arbitration Court ruling which decreased textile workers wages in 
line with the decreased cost of living. At a mass meeting of over 1, 100 Launceston. textile workers on 
19 August 1932, it was "almost unanimously decided" that unless their entire pay decrease be 
restored, work would cease the following day. With four out of Launceston's five mills represented, 
employers offered to restore half the decrease. Thyne Bros. remained out of the dispute and did not 
attend the meeting; Reliance Worsted Mills did attend but decided not to implement the wage cuts; 
and Waverley operatives accepted the employers' offer. The two British mills therefore went out alone 
with almost total employee participation of over 1,600 workers. Waverley Mill's 120 employees were 
pressured to join through a picketing campaign of mainly P&B employees. Aged eleven years at the 
time, Bob Hogarth vividly recalls charging his small pony through the picket line on his way home 
from school. The strike was over by 8 September, the workers having lost. Management blamed 
mainland agitators. 
See Examiner, 20/8/1932 - 8/9/1932; Bob Hogarth, Talk to Launceston's Industrial Heritage Group, 
1116/1996; & P&B Outward Correspondence 1930-39 (August - September, 1932). 
15 Examiner, 1/911932. 
16 Agent-General, To Premier, 51711917: PDl 118119/17. 
17 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Secretary to Premier, 10/1011917; PDl 118/19/17. 
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however, substantiate Hobart Council's claims. After making inquiries at Hobart's 
existing textile manufacturers, two woollen mills and a knitting factory, Reynolds 
found that the mills had experienced no difficulties acquir~g labour, and concluded it 
was reasonable to assume the same would be true for K&K. 18 Nevertheless, while 
guarantees of labour availability would continue to be made by both State and local 
authorities throughout the 1920s, Tasmania's labour supply was by no means assured. 
There was certainly much concern about Tasmania's lack of job opportunities 
and unemployment when the two woollen mills chose to establish, suggesting that 
procurement of labour should not have been a problem. Local press also saw the 
announcement of K&K' s decision to build in Launceston as more significant than just 
easing unemployment levels. Rather it served "to give employment to numbers of the 
rising generation of the state, who for years past had been driven to the mainland to 
seek employment". 19 The Australasian reiterated this idea the following year. With 
"altogether too great a tendency during the past 20 years for the younger generation to 
tum their backs upon their island honie and seek advancement elsewhere", the journal 
recognised that the woollen industry and the Cadbury chocolate factory created 
opportunities to retain the State's youth.20 
There is little doubt that job opportunities were much needed in the early 
twenties. A number of factors combined in early 1921, for example, to worry the State 
government that "considerable" unemployment was pending.21 With the partial 
suspension of mining operations throughout the State on account of low metal prices, 
the general stringency of the money market affecting industry, and the impending 
discharge of men from the HED works for the winter, such anxiety indeed had much 
force. The Premier therefore requested information on employment numbers and the 
timing of future labour discharges from 52 Tasmanian industries and businesses, 
including K&K (Tas) and Waverley Woollen Mills.22 In the midst of construction, 
K&K (Tas) was employing 43 builders and intended to employ as many again when 
materials came to hand, particularly carpenters. Estimating that construction would 
not be completed until the same time the following year (which of course turned out to 
18 H. Reynolds, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, To Secretary to Premier, 23/10/1917: PDl 
18/19/17. 
19 
'Woollen Industry, New Mills for Launceston', 17 /3/1920: K&K Press Cuttings. 
20 Australasian, 1/111921. 
21 Premier Lee, To various industries, 4/2/1921: PDl 84/3/21. 
22 Premier Lee, To various industries, 4/2/1921: PDl 84/3/21. 
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be optimistic), the company planned then to exchange builders for textile workers. 23 
The Hosiery Company in Hobart employed 38 females and five males and anticipated 
hiring more labour.24 The Tasmanian Woollen Factory (or James Aileen and Sons Ltd) 
also of Hobart, did not propose discharging any operatives. 25 While employment 
prospects in Tasmania's textile industry looked encouraging, K&K (Tas) director, Sir 
Henry Jones, was experiencing difficulties at his Hobart jam manufacturing enterprise. 
With substantial numbers of employees already laid off, Jones' business was, for the 
first time, faced "with a total lack of demand for our product"; claiming increased 
selling costs had made jam a luxury item. 26 With much of his work seasonal,. and the 
woollen industry offering full-time employment (theoretically at least), workers would 
presumably have been attracted to the latter occupation. Jones was therefore one 
employer likely to welcome high unemployment. Full employment not only pushed 
wages up, but a transient work force was essential to the seasonal nature of his 
industry.27 
At the same time as unemployment was causing the government concern, 
however, the new industries being established in Tasmania were experiencing 
difficulties acquiring skilled labour for construction work. As discussed in chapters 2 
and 3, both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston expressed concerns about, and were 
affected by, the sudden demand for skilled construction workers. One of the reasons 
K&K's contractor, E.G. Stone, listed for changing the location of his proposed cement 
company from Fingal to Launceston in 1921, was that a town posed fewer labour 
troubles;28 presumably he referred to supply of labour, rather than industrial disputes. 
Stone's experiences at K&K (Tas) and other Tasmanian building sites demonstrated 
the scarcity of skilled labour. Unemployment did not automatically guarantee 
availability of workers. This was especially true in the textile industry. Launceston 
Council's decision to place much emphasis upon attracting textile manufacturers in the 
23 K&K, To Premier, undated: PDl 84/3/21. 
24 The Hosiery Company, Hobart, To Premier, 9/2/1921: PDl 84/3/21. 
25 The Tasmanian Woollen Factory, To Premier, 7/2/1921: PDl 84/3/21. 
26 Henry Jones, To Premier, 10/211921: PDl 84/3/21. 
27 In Jones' business employee numbers see-sawed. Jones employed 418 people, excluding casuals, in 
February 1921. 100 had been put off on 26 January, SO put back on two days later. Between February 
and April he estimated 300-350 would be discharged, retaining only about SO workers; the firm 
intended closing their manufacturing plant at the end of April. Jones remembered as an after-thought 
that, the week following these predictions, around 200 would also be employed for two months during 
the pear canning season. 
28 E.G. Stone, To Premier, 20/5/1921: PDl 100/5/21. 
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1920s created special difficulties with the provision of sufficient workers. 
Predominantly women and girls were required, but a good supply of such was less 
likely in the absence of complementary employment for men; this was scant in 
Launceston, and so weakened the plausibility of claims that the city offered adequate 
numbers of females. Yet such claims continued. 
Around the same time as K&K and P&B choose to establish in Launceston, the 
Council also learnt that London based Amalgamated Textile Co Ltd was looking to 
build a factory in Australia to produce worsteds. 29 They therefore wrote to the 
company in mid-1921, promoting the city's assets.30 Later that year the company made 
further inquiries as to whether labour, particularly female labour, would be available in 
Launceston. The Council responded that labour was not seen as a problem, and 
offered Robert Hogarth of Waverley Woollen Mills as a reference.31 In February 1922 
Launceston Council reiterated these claims to Amalgamated Textiles, maintaining that 
during Hogarth's 40 years in the textile trade he had experienced no difficulty acquiring 
all the hands he needed, the majority being young women. Hogarth did not believe 
other factories would drain local labour markets.32 Until this point of time, however, 
Hogarth had not experienced any substantial competition for female labour in 
Launceston, a fact not stressed to the company. 
In August 1923 federal authorities inquired about availability of Tasmanian 
labour for a cotton mill proposing establishment within the State. "Exhaustive" state-
wide inquiries found that recently established industries including Electrolytic Zinc 
Company (which employed 700-800 continuously and over 1,000 during construction 
periods), along with Cadbury, K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston had experienced "no 
difficulty whatsoever" acquiring labour. State authorities were consequently satisfied 
there would be no difficulty securing labour for a cotton mill. 33 The accuracy of this 
survey was, however, questionable and suggests that the government's findings largely 
suited their purpose. Cadbury, K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston had all experienced 
29 Secretary to Premier, To Town Clerk, 7/6/1921: Launceston City Council, Electric Power Enquiries 
etc, for 1920, 1921. 
30 Acting Town Clerk, To Amalgamated Textiles Co Ltd, London, 1417/1921: Launceston City 
Council, Electric Power Enquiries etc, for 1920-1921. 
31 Amalgamated Textiles, To Town Clerk, 4/11/1921: Launceston City Council, Industries, G.H. Hirst 
& Co (1921-22), 19/3.1. 
32 City Manager, To Amalgamated Textiles, 2/2/1922: Launceston City Council, Industries -
Amalgamated Textiles, 19/2.1. 
Table A 
DATE 
RECEIVED 
6/7/1926 
7/7/1926 
7/7/1926 
7/7/1926 
8/7/1926 
13/7/1926 
COMPANY 
P&B 
K&K 
Waverley Woollen 
Mills 
F. Boatwright, 
Kingsway 
Thyne Bros. 
J.W. Boatwright, 
Shirt & Clothing 
Manufacturer 
NO. OF COMMENTS 
FEMALES 
EMPLOYED 
273 So far have had no difficulty getting 
labour. 
70 Considers there is a plentiful supply of 
unskilled labour. 
80 Unable to give an opm10n as to the 
(+ 60 males) supply of female labour available, but 
feels that with the present extensions at 
P&B and extra plant at Thyne Bros. 
"there will be a shortage of required 
labour". 
55 Feels sure there is plenty of labour 
available, and have had "a good many 
inqumes from girls wanting 
employment", especially in the last few 
weeks. 
40 So far have had no difficulty securing 
female labour. 
50 Have had no difficulty obtaining female 
labour, and believe that a new industry 
would draw the necessary labour. 
Doesn't think that any of Launceston's 
industries using female labour have had 
difficulty securing hands - although all at 
first are ine:\."Perienced. 
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problems securing staff during construction, had imported their core staff from Britain, 
and had only just commenced production. This was hardly a basis for definitive 
statements on labour availability. 
When Launceston Council was attempting to attract Berlei in 1926, two areas 
of particular concern were availability of girl labour and freight. Launceston's main 
negotiator in this deal, A.A. Evans, believed that if Launceston could provide 
"intelligent girl labour" (defined as "something superior to the ordinary slow machine 
winding girl"), the main objection to Launceston as a site would be overcome. 34 P&B 
Launceston and Waverley Woollen Mills were therefore asked to provide Berlei with 
their opinion of girl labour. Berlei was subsequently informed that the "class" of labour 
required was highly spoken of by the management of another recently established mill35 
- presumably P&B. Berlei later reiterated his desire for information on female labour, 
outlining more specific issues. These included details as to sizable Launceston 
factories employing female labour, numbers employed therein, and whether Launceston 
could provide an ample supply of females over 16 years. 36 Attempting to address 
Berlei's queries, the Council wrote to Launceston's textile manufacturers.37 All except 
Reliance Worsted Mills responded. As seen opposite in Table A,38 by 1926 Hogarth 
was no longer as confident about the availability of female labour as he had been earlier 
in the decade. Berlei was informed of the survey's results in July, being told that the 
five principal female employers, engaged a total of 518 females between them.39 Again 
demonstrating a propensity to ignore any findings which did not suit their purpose, the 
Council omitted any reference to Hogarth's concerns, even though his opinion had 
been used extensively in the past. They instead informed Berlei that "general opinion" 
held there would be no difficulty securing female labour.40 
When a cotton manufacturing industry was again mooted in early 1927, 
information on the availability of female labour was requested. Although the industry 
33 Director, Bureau of Science and Industry, To Director, Bureau of Commerce and Industry, 
15/8/1923: PDl 179/2/23. 
34 Evans, To Mayor, 29/5/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
35 Town Clerk, To Fred Berlei, 24/6/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
36 Berlei, To Town Clerk, 28/6/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
37 Town Clerk, Copies to various companies, 6/711926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
38 From companies listed, To Launceston City Council, dates as listed: Launceston City Council, 
21/1.3. 
39 Town Clerk, To Berlei, 10/7/1926: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
One of the Boatwright companies employing 50 did not respond until after the letter was sent to 
Berlei, raising the total, as shown in Table A, to 568. 
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was substantial, intending initially to employ between 400 and 500 women and, if 
successful, at least 2,500 women within four years;41 the Council assured no difficulties 
were anticipated with labour availability.42 Nevertheless, during an extension 
programme under taken by P&B Launceston in the middle of that year, Arthur Procter 
had told of difficulties securing sufficient labour. P&B Alloa saw this as "a most 
disturbing state of affairs", likely to have a serious bearing when contemplating further 
extensions.43 Requesting information on whether _this was simply a temporary 
shortage, P&B Alloa suspected that business in Launceston was far from satisfactory, 
and that Launceston was "going back at the present moment rather than advancing". 
They predicted a "large exodus" of families to the mainland (as already experienced by 
K&K (Tas)), which was considered "rather disastrous" from the mill's viewpoint. 
P&B's management recognised what local authorities had, as yet, to acknowledge - the 
connection between employment for men and availability of female employees. If 
unemployed males moved interstate seeking work, they generally took their families 
with them, including daughters of working age. This group constituted much of the 
textile industry's labour force. P&B Launceston was requested to investigate the 
"whole labour position", acquiring information about potential labour from educational 
authorities, and advising P&B Alloa about future prospects as soon as possible. No 
follow-up to this request has been located, but there is a later reference showing that 
P&B directors expressed concern to State authorities about Tasmania's ability to 
supply sufficient girl labour. A.E. Weymouth, officer in charge of Labour and State 
Immigration at Launceston, had assured directors that this was not a problem.44 
Evidence so far seen, however, suggested otherwise. Despite indication that the city 
was having difficulty catering for the labour requirements of its current manufactories, 
the Council continued seeking similar industries. In August 1927 Launceston's 
consulting engineer advised the Council that he had been approached to be the agent 
for American firm, Jenson Stocking Company. The company proposed building a 
40 Town Clerk, To Berlei, 10/7/1926: Launceston City Council, 2111.3. 
41 P.B. Coulston, To Town Clerk, Crawford, 2/2/1927: Launceston City Council, Industries General 
(1927-28), 21/1.6. 
42 Town Clerk, To Coulston, 8/3/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.6 
43 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 28/6/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
44 
'Assisted Migrants', by A.E. Weymouth, 1937: SWD4 5/1. 
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factory to employ around 500 hundred - principally girls, with the view to later 
extending to do their own spinning and weaving.45 
Apparently the next attempt to gauge Launceston' s available female labour 
came late in 1929. No reason was given for the urgency credited inquiries at this time, 
but P&B Launceston was expanding, K&K (Tas) was considering such a move, and 
the establishment of a cotton industry was proposed. Attempting to ascertain the 
number of girls available for factory labour, the Education Department informed 
schools in the Launceston district that the Chairman of the Board of Advice urgently 
required numbers of girls intending to leave school and take up employment at the end 
of the year.46 Of the eight schools surveyed, only around 103 girls (a few of whom 
were still non-committal), intended leaving school at the year's end. How many of 
these were prospective factory workers is uncertain, but around a third of the girls 
from one school estimated to have 60 leavers, proposed taking up positions with the 
Education department.47 Inquiries were also made about the availability of female 
labour for factory work from outside Launceston should the demand arise. 48 
Recognising that exact numbers were impossible to ascertain, Henry Reynolds 
suggested that advertisements be placed in southern and coastal newspapers calling for 
applications for 500 female workers, stating wages and conditions. 49 Numbers 
available were expected to be governed by wages and conditions. Reynolds also 
provided rough estimates of the numbers of girls who might be attracted from Hobart. 
Of those aged between 14 and 18 years, he estimated there would be 25 who would 
receive parental consent and who had friends or family to live with in Launceston. If 
wages covered board and lodgings, there would also be 50 girls in the 18 to 21 year 
age bracket, and 250 girls 21 years or more. Reynolds calculated that earnings needed 
to be in the vicinity of 42s. per week. As later discussed, the facts as to wages in 
Launceston' s existing textile mills suggest that this rate of pay would not have been on 
offer. When this survey was being undertaken, Reynolds pointed out that if labour 
were available for adult males, many men with large juvenile families would be induced 
45 Jenson Stocking Company was believed to be the biggest hosiery firm in the USA, and Jenson 
himself had just arrived in Australia to investigate establishing a factory. 
Coulston, To Barber, 15/8/1927: Launceston City Council, 21/1.3. 
46 Secretary, Education Department, To various schools, 28/11/1929: Launceston City Council, 
Industries General (1927-29), 21/1.8. 
47 See correspondence dated between 28/11/1929 & 3/12/1929: Launceston City Council, 2111.8. 
48 Weymouth, Industrial Department, To Town Clerk, 1/12/1929: Launceston City Council, 21/1.8. 
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to come to Launceston, thus solving the female labour problem. This was the first real 
admission that there was a shortage of female labour. Reynolds used the example of 
Electrolytic Zinc Works at Risdon (employing around one thousand men), and claimed 
the existence of this company ensured a good supply of female labour for Hobart. 
Suggesting that even Hobart did not have the abundance of female labour implied, 
Weymouth mentioned that Hobart based Messrs. Jones & Co recruited a number of 
females from Launceston during the fruit season, paying the girls extra for board and 
temporary lodgings. 
Availability of female labour for textile work in the 1920s may also been 
influenced by a long held association between factories, textile factories in particular as 
the first large scale factories, and the moral character of women who worked in such 
places. In eighteenth century France, for example, the word for female wage earners, 
which most often referred to those within the textile trade, was also the word for 
clandestine prostitutes. 50 While by the 1920s it was acceptable for single girls, even 
from the best families, to work outside the home,51 suspicions about factory work 
remained. Demonstrating the endurance of such stigmas, the author's Tasmanian born 
grandmother tells of her father's determination that she avoid conscription to factory 
work though manpower regulations during World War II. Factory work was for the 
intellectually backward and led to moral ruination. An early marriage, however, 
allowed the problem to be avoided.52 One response aimed at overcoming the stigma of 
factory work was the development of a culture of protective practices toward women 
in factories. Women, for example, were not legally allowed to work night shift.53 
There were also regulations about the type of work females could undertake. In the 
49 The call for 500 workers suggests the inquiry related to the proposed cotton mill. 
50 
'L'ourvriere! Mot Impie, Sordide ... ': Women Workers in the Discourse of French Political 
Economy, 1840-1860', in Patrick Joyce (ed.), The Historical Meaning of Work (Cambridge, 1987), 
p.122. 
51 Raelene Frances & Bruce Scates, Women at Work in Australia, From the Gold Rushes to World War 
II (Oakleigh, 1993), p.144. 
Frances and Scates point out that textile work was not originally seen as respectable work, but claim 
that "By the 1920s it was quite acceptable for single women of even the 'best' families to work outside 
the home". 
52 Conversation on 1217/1997. 
53 During World War II, K&K (Tas) commenced a twilight shift which continued for most of the 
mills' life. This allowed the husband to go home around 4.30pm and the wife would commence work 
at Spm and work until lOpm. The system was designed so that children were not left alone for too 
long. A similar system also operated at synthetic manufacturer, James Nelson. The result was often 
husbands and wives who saw very little of one another. 
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rnid-1920s K&K (Tas) was forced to replace a couple of girls in the spinning and 
carding departments because of limits on the weights women were allowed to lift; the 
limit was around 30 lbs. These rules were not, however, stringently enforced, one 
employee recalling that, when it came to women lifting heavy weights, the company 
"got away with it a bit".54 
As part of this protective attitude, P&B Launceston had secured the services of 
one Mrs. Robinson by late 1923. A prominent local Red Cross Worker and 
commandant of the local V AD,55 Robinson was fully qualified in first-aid and held 
various sanitary certifications.56 Designated as Welfare Superintendent, she was also 
intended to supervise the canteen and care for the health of female employees. The 
latter role included watching "the girls' interest with regard to the conditions under 
which they are working" and being "invested with certain power to investigate 
complaints".57 In an accolade to Cadbury-Fry-Pascall's innovative welfare programs, 
P&B arranged for Robinson to meet with Cadbury's welfare superintendent, Miss 
Gallimore, to "pick up as much as she can".58 K&K (Tas)'s financial restrictions did 
not allow them to provide their female workers with the same facilities in the 1920s. 
George Brooks, the migrant foreman who had been a medical orderly in the war, 
doubled as K&K's first first-aid officer. It would be some years before the company 
obtained a specially qualified nurse who also acted as "a confidante to the girls".59 
Training of Local Labour 
Availability of labour may have been a primary concern for Launceston's textile 
industry when considering establishment or expansion, but the next priority was 
training the unskilled local labour. No information was located on the way in which 
K&K (Tas) approached training its first recruits, but it appears that P&B Launceston 
many have started training locals before K&K (Tas), despite arriving later. With 
construction of the mill well under way, P&B Ltd sent a small spinning frame to 
Launceston to enable an early start to be made training local labour. This arrived in 
Interview with P.M. Hart, 111111996 & Jim Marwood, Ways of Working (Kenthurst, 1986), pp.109-
134. 
54 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
55 V AD stood for 'Volunteer Aid Detachment'. 
56 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 7/1211923: P&B Alloa, Correspondence 1923-24; & Examiner, 26/111924. 
57 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.6. 
58 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 7/12/1923: P&B Alloa, Correspondence 1923-24. 
59 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24111/1995. 
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mid-November 1922. Claiming the company was "anxious to train some young girls to 
be ready when the larger spinning frames arrive" (the bulk of the machinery was 
expected to arrive in January the following year), mill manager, McVann, requested 
Launceston Council supply the P&B site with 1 h.p. of electricity to run these 
machines. 60 The machinery was housed in "a hut" or "a corrugated iron shed" located 
on the comer of Thistle and Glen Dhu Streets on what became the front lawn of the 
offices.61 The shed was divided into two parts, one half acting as an office for J. 
Mc Vann and AD. Peacock62 (respectively the mill manager and accountant), the other 
half installed with small sample machines for spinning, roving and reeling. McVann 
began teaching the first local girls himself. 63 This may have been unusual for a mill 
manager, but McVann was on location when the training machines arrived, while the 
first group of British girls intended to train locals was not due until the middle of the 
following year. Amongst the British instructors was Miss Maggie Boyd, who 
remembered "especially an old tin shed" in which they "taught Launceston girls how to 
spin and weave".64 In early 1924 P&B's management commented that the scheme to 
train local labour had "already worked well, and some of the apprentices or learners ... , 
are showing considerable aptitude, although naturally there is a proportion who are not 
making so much progress as the others".65 Despite the slow progr~ss of some, the 
Examiner believed, "Still there is reason to believe that the firm regards the experiment 
as satisfactory". 
Unlike P&B Launceston, there is no indication that training of local operatives 
began at K&K (Tas) before production commenced in February 1923. In early March, 
visiting English director J.H. Lord "expected .. . a great improvement when the boys 
now being trained on the spinning became skilled". 66 (This is the only reference at 
either mill to boys, rather than girls, being trained.) The required improvement appears 
to have been related to labour efficiency, rather than product quality. When some of 
60 P&B, To Town Clerk, 8/1111922: Launceston City Council, 19/6.1; McVann, To Town Clerk, 
10111/1922: P&B Mill History File. 
61 Hand-written extract' & Bill Grierson, To A.B. Stirling, P&B Personnel Manager: P&B Mill 
History File. 
62 Hand-written extract' & 'P&B Spinning Mill at Launceston', 13/5/1969: P&B Mill History. 
One of the above records claims the office belonged to Mc Vann, the other that it belonged to Peacock, 
but it is likely the shed was a shared facility. 
63 Bill Grierson, To A.B. Stirling, P&B Personnel Manager: P&B Mill History File. 
64Examiner, 14/6/1973. 
65 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.6. 
66 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 2/3/1923. 
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K&K (Tas)' s products were tabled for inspection only a few weeks after starting, Lord 
was "genuinely surprised at the quality of the flannel produced", considering the 
untrained labour.67 A shortage of skilled labour would, however, long prove 
problematic at K&K (Tas). With only 15 skilled operatives, training of unskilled 
labour took time and undoubtedly reduced efficiency at the mill. New looms were not 
able to start operating until each beginner was skilful enough to justify the looms being 
wor~ed.68 By May 1923, 28 looms were in operation,69 and by July there were over 30 
looms, others continuing to be added as labour was trained. With more than 50 
employees engaged by this time, K&K' s plant was expected to be fully operational by 
the year's end, employing upwards of 100.70 In mid-1924 K&K directors 
acknowledged that unskilled labour had initially been a problem, but claimed they now 
had "a fairly well trained number of employees".71 
One way of ensuring a guaranteed period of employment in exchange for 
training was through apprenticeship schemes. How extensively this was employed by 
either mill is uncertain, but a few facts are on record. As early as April 1923 K&K 
(Tas) accepted an application thr~ugh the Repatriation Department for an unindentured 
apprentice.72 In early 1924 P&B Launceston mentioned that the training of apprentices 
was progressing satisfactorily.73 With retention of labour a problem, the mills appeared 
keen to encourage schemes which promoted an extended commitment to their firm by 
young employees. In September 1925 P&B Launceston's general manager, Arthur 
Procter, informed P&B Alloa of a new .apprenticeship scheme likely to be implemented 
at the next Wages Board. With young wool sorters not currently apprenticed, Procter 
felt the idea a good one. 74 
Not all training of local labour was on the job. A small number of employees 
from both mills went to Britain to attend textile colleges or upgrade skills at the home 
firm. 75 This option was only offered to select individuals in senior positions or 
67 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fourth AGM, 25/5/1923. 
68 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1923-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
69 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings,,Fourth AGM, 25/5/1923. 
70 Eighth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1923-23, No. 24, p.7: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1923-24. 
71 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Fifth AGM, 30/511924. 
72 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 16/4/1923. 
73 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.6. 
74 ARP, To Stirling, 9/9/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
75 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
10/11129 
Deer Sir 
Mr Crow 
I have Dicided to Leve The 
Wavley Wooling mills Has it Tis 
Too Far away 
and I wont to now Could 
I Cum Back to my Job 
again I would Like to 
Start again at once if Possibal 
Pleas Let mee Now 
at once 
Yours 
Miss ... 
No 12 Howard Str 
24. Letter of application for a position at K&K (Tas) 
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intended for such roles. As most senior positions at both mills were held by migrant 
employees in the 1920s, this was all the less an issue in the period under review. 
Nevertheless, there was at least one case of a local receiving training in Britain during 
the 1920s. Educated at Launceston Grammar School, Percy Macdonald Hart, started 
work at K&K (Tas) in 1925, aged 15. Grandson of founding director, F.P. Hart, Mac 
worked at the mill for over two years to gain general experience. Before commencing 
employment, the family had arranged that when Mac turned 18 years he would attend a 
wool technical college at Galashiels, Scotland. Departing Tasmania in 1928, Mac 
spent three years at college, and then worked at K&K's home mills gaining practical 
experience before returning to K&K (Tas) in 1934.76 This case was unique not just for 
its singularity in that decade, but because the trip was privately, rather than company 
funded. No other such instance was located at either of the two mills in question, even 
in later periods. As few, if any, locals could afford or justify such expense, the financial 
position and company connections of the Hart family provided Mac with an 
opportunity for future advancement simply not available to most workers.77 
More common for the majority of employees would be to commence work at 
the mill at an early age. The legal minimum was 14 years. Education levels were 
therefore minimal, which could hamper the likelihood of future advancement. An 
example of literacy levels can be seen in a 1929 job application placed with K&K (Tas) 
by a former young female employee (see opposite page).78 Her skills were basic, but 
adequate to impart her message. While one letter cannot be seen as representative of 
textile operatives' educational standards generally, P.M. Hart recalled that education 
Of Launceston's other textile mills, the Hogarth family (proprietors of Waverley Woollen Mills) also 
sent certain male members to Galashiels for technical training. 
Bob Hogarth, Talk to Launceston Industrial Heritage Group, 11/6/1996. 
76 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
Describing this time as "a tremendous experience", Hart enjoyed his stay in Britain, meeting his future 
wife (an employee of K&K Rochdale) during his stay, the couple marrying in 1937. After 49 years 
service with the mill, Hart retired 9 months short of his 65th birthday in 1974. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 23/4/1974: RAK Minute Book, June 1965-June 1976. 
77 Australia had no textile training schools when the industry began to expand rapidly after World 
War I, but labour shortages soon led to discussion about the establishment of such. There was 
pressure within Victoria for a textile training school to be established in that State, the Victorian 
government appointing Professor A.F. Barker to advise upon the matter. In his report presented in 
1924, Barker concluded that a school should be erected in Melbourne and run in conjunction with the 
university. Geelong felt that it deserved the school, however, and a decision upon location was not 
reached. Additionally the Victorian government believed the federal government should contribute to 
the project. The federal government disagreed and the idea lapsed. 
Forster, Industrial Development, p.87. 
78 See Miscellaneous material in Box MS 5: QVM. 
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was not particularly important for most workers because the job involved nearly all 
hand work. He does remember one girl who had to be taught fractions because the 
company measured in eighths of a yard, "but in general they were literate enough for 
that". 79 
On the whole, minimal education had little impact upon career advancement for 
the majority of the textile industries' work force - women - as few such opportunities 
existed. 80 There were limited positions for experienced women to act as overseers of 
other women, but even wholly female departments appear to have been headed by men. 
A 1957 advertisement in the Examiner's 'Career Supplement' highlights the longevity 
of such gender labour divisions within Launceston's textile mills. Focussing upon P&B 
Launceston, the advertisement claimed that the textile industry offered "a wide variety 
of careers" for both men and women".81 The claim appeared biased. P&B Launceston 
offered "careers for young men, especially selected for permanent staff positions". On 
offer for girls, however, was merely "a wide variety of interesting jobs".82 
Nevertheless, for most women the lack of opportunity for career advancement 
within the textile industry was of little concern. Although married women worked at 
both textile mills during the 1920s, it was still common for a girl to leave work upon 
marriage. The automatic association between these two events can be seen in a 1926 
appraisal of office staff at P&B Launceston. Although clerk Miss E. Green was 
praised as "a capable girl", it was noted she will "be leaving us shortly as she is 
engaged to be married".83 Accordingly, the working life of many female employees 
might only span from school-leaving age until marriage. During these working years, 
however, a change was apparent in the way the girls' income would previously 
have been distributed. Those girls employed as operatives at the textile mills 
generally came from working class families, and unmarried children from lower socio-
economic backgr~mnds had traditionally contributed most of their wage to family 
income. Henry Reynolds' calculations of income necessary to attract girls to 
Launceston's textile mills in 1929 (as previously discussed), shows a move away from 
this trend. Of the 42s. figure cited, 17s. was suggested as for the girls' own personal 
79 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/11/1996. 
8° For example see Frances & Scates, Women at Work, pp.37-38. 
81 
'Article for Examiner Career Supplement, 10/9/1957: P&B Mill History. 
82 It seems the only career opportunity for women was in the Chemical Laboratory and Physical 
Testing Department. 
83 
'Report on Office Staff, ARP, To P&B Alloa, 21/5/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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use; clothing would talce most of this.84 Although female incomes offered little chance 
for independent living, such jobs were allowing young women greater financial 
freedom than previously possible. 
For married women working at the mills, income was seen as supplementary to 
a husband's wage.85 Even when the employment of married women gained greater 
social acceptance after World War II, traditional family patterns stayed strong. In 
1960 the Examiner credited Launceston as ''Tasmania's foremost living centre for 
women who want to work".86 By this time P&B Launceston was not only the largest 
mill of its type in the Southern Hemisphere, but "the biggest employer of women in 
Tasmania". The city's five textile mills employed a total of 2,700 people. Of these 
P&B Launceston had almost 2,000 employees, around 66% of whom were women. 
K&K (Tas) employed 330, "mostly women"; Waverley Woollen Mills around 130, 70 
of whom were women; Thyne Bros. 70 women out of a total work force of 100; James 
\ 
Nelson 117 (unspecified whether in total or women specifically). The Examiner 
claimed that "The mills must talce credit for Launceston's high living standard", adding 
that "About half of the female workers are married and they can supplement the pay 
packet of their husbands by weekly wages ranging up to £ 17". 87 
Difficulties Retaining Labour 
After obtaining and training labour, the next major problem confronting textile 
mills was the retention of labour. Both Launceston mills under consideration suffered 
from losing trained staff throughout the 1920s, as did many other mills around the 
country. Colin Forster points out that country mills, in which he categorises those in 
Launceston, had special labour problems arising from location. As soon as employees 
' 
were trained, they moved to larger centres and the training process had to 
recommence; Forster uses K&K (Tas) as an example of one such mill losing trained 
labour to the mainland. In addition to losing local workers, he adds that country mills 
84 A.E. Weymouth, Industrial Department, To Town Clerk, 1112/1929: Launceston City Council, 
21/1.8. 
85 While no statistical evidence was available, the general impression gained from records was that 
many of the married women working at K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston had husbands also working 
at the mill. This propensity might be partly explained by low wages for male textile employees 
necessitating their wives continuing work to supplement family incomes. 
86 Examiner Supplement, 2/8/1960, p.21. · 
87 The £ 17 wage mentioned was no doubt the exception rather than the norm. 
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could not hold their skilled operatives from England. 88 This was again a conspicuous 
trend at the main Launceston mills introducing migrant labour. There was no one 
simple explanation why skilled workers in regional areas choose to relocate to larger 
cities. The reasons for moving were varied. While some local labour may have been 
attracted to the bright lights once trained, or migrants attracted to larger cities, more 
like those whence they came, there is no indication that such impulses directly 
motivated any of Launceston' s locally trained textile labour or migrant labour to 
relocate. The greatest loss of general operatives from Launceston appears to have 
been caused by financial necessity. This problem was more significant at K&K than 
P&B. Thus, not only were there a number of different reasons for labour leaving the 
mills, but the reasons varied between the two mills. 
The answer in this instance lies in the financial state of the mills. As detailed in 
chapter 5, both mills spent periods throughout the 1920s working at less than full 
production. Although the nature of P&B Launceston's records does not allow the 
exact periods of short-time to be stated with any certainty, that company appears not 
to have reverted to short-time on the same frequency as K&K (Tas). On a number of 
occasions P&B Ltd mentions that most of its mills were on short-time, but does not 
specify whether their Launceston mill was included. ·The only definite period of short-
time worked at P&B Launceston during the 1920s was at the height of the textile 
industry's depression in mid-1925.89 Alternatively, since beginning production in early 
1923, K&K (Tas) spent part of every year during that decade, with the exception of 
1927, working short-time or full-time but with half labour. These stints sometimes 
lasted for many months, suggesting job insecurity impacted most greatly upon K&K 
(Tas)'s ability to retain operatives. 
K&K (Tas) recognised the dangers of constant reversion to short-time. At one 
stage during the 1924-25 slump, they chose to produce more stock than the company 
had in orders "rather than part with the labour we had trained". 90 On more than one 
occasion they also accepted orders at cut prices to continue in full time employment.91 
The direct link between short-time and loss of labour can be seen in K&K (Tas)'s 
difficulties reverting to full time after periods of short-time in 1925 and 1926. In both 
88 Forster, Industrial Development, pp.89-90. 
89 For example see ARP, To T. Stirling, 29/511925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
90 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Sixth AGM, 29/5/1925. 
91 For example see Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 29/8/1925. 
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years the process was slowed considerably because of difficulties procuring labour. 
Following a period of short-time in 1926, for example, shareholders were told that 
"many" of K&K (Tas)'s weavers had left Launceston, either to take up employment 
elsewhere, or, in other cases, to follow male relatives who had left the state seeking 
work - indicating that the recession spread well beyond the textile industry. Other 
weavers had taken up alternative employment within the city and K&K (Tas) was again 
left to begin training "much" unskilled labour.92 The loss of labour to other local 
industries demonstrates that desire to move afar was not a primary issue for all workers 
leaving the company. Constant reversion to short-time created a vicious cycle at K&K 
(Tas) for much of the 1920s. Upon commencing production K&K's competitiveness 
had been affected by untrained labour reducing efficiency. This would have influenced 
the need to revert to short-time. Just as labour gained experience, however, reversion 
to short-time saw trained labour leave. With the mill forced to recommence with new 
inefficient labour, the problem was perpetuated. 
This is not to imply that workers rushed off at the first sign of trouble. 
Relocation was often a last resort, as it meant uprooting family and leaving all that was 
familiar. Many textile employees actually demonstrated a great sense of company 
loyalty, even under the most adverse conditions. In 1925, for example, weavers at 
Hobart's James Aiken & Sons Ltd offered to work without pay for a month to help 
their financially troubled employer. The board expressed gratitude for their offer, but 
declined. 93 Such an offer would have been at great personal hardship to the weavers in 
an industry where general operatives' pay gave little more than subsistence. Despite 
this gesture, survival eventually had to take precedence over company loyalty. When 
the promised recommencement of operations at Aikens' took longer than expected to 
eventuate, employees began looking elsewhere. Even though a deal had been struck to 
allow the mill to reopen, delays in finalising arrangements saw many employees 
requesting references with a view to relocating to the mainland before their funds dried 
up.94 Such moves were motivated by practical financial considerations 
The textile industries financial difficulties during the 1920s also affected the 
mills' ability to retain its most skilled workers - the industrial migrants. Both logic and 
irony appeared in this process: some, probably most, migrants, left Britain because of 
92 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Seventh AGM, 26/5/1926. 
93 Notice posted at Mill, 15/5/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
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the industry's depressed condition there, and now a similar situation beset them in 
Australia. In June 1924, Minnie Rainsford, whose husband worked at K&K (Tas), 
nominated her brother, Charles Needham, and family.95 The family arrived in 
December that year.96 Charles, his wife and daughter were all textile workers, and on 
Charles' application form for assisted passage he cited his current English employment 
as being short-time. Although claiming employment was being arranged for them at 
the Launceston mill,97 K&K (Tas) was itself on short-time when the Needhams' 
nomination was lodged. 
There were further ways in which the textile industry's financial difficulties had 
particular impact upon migrant labour. Some migrants nominated by the mills had 
agreements ensuring full payment during short-time throughout their contractual 
period.98 By contrast, migrants without safeguards (such as those nominated by other 
migrants rather than the company, and therefore not under contract) could experience 
even greater hardship than local labour during periods of short-time. With only a 
handful of relatives and/or friends, they lacked the broader support networks available 
to locals during periods of unemployment. An example of such difficulties can be seen 
in the following case. In May 1924 Harvey Riggs, an employee at K&K (Tas), 
nominated his wife Eva to join him in Launceston. Eva had worked in the cotton 
rather than woollen industry in Rochdale, but was to take up employment at K&K 
(Tas) upon arrival.99 In April 1925 Harvey Rigg was reprimanded by authorities 
because his wife's loan repayments for her passage were overdue;100 she claimed to be 
waiting for notification to start repaying the money. 101 Although committing herself to 
pay the required £2 per month towards the debt, Eva was only able to pay £ 1 in her 
first payment - no explanation being offered. In June Eva was again able to pay only 
£1, due to short-time "etc" worked at the mill, the same occurring in September that 
year. 102 For unspecified reasons, in November 1925 Eva applied for a passport to 
94 McKay, To Lyons, 24/6/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
95 
'State of Tas, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 25/6/1924: SWD4, M 9/475. 
96 State Immigration Officer, To Mrs. M. Rainsford, 22/12/1924: SWD4, M 9/475. 
97 
'Government of Australia, Application of Australia', 12/5/1924: SWD4, M 9/475. 
98 For example see ARP, To W.T. Procter, Alloa, 9/6/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
99 
'State of Tasmania, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 23/5/1924: SDW4, M9/467. 
100 Director, Labour & State Immigration, To Harvey Rigg, 22/411925: SDW4, M9/467. 
101 Rigg, To Director oflmmigration, 27/4/1925: SDW4, M9/467. 
102 Rigg, To Immigration Office, 26/6/1925 & 25/911925: SDW4, M9/467. 
183 
return to England, wishing to leave on 16 December. 103 Due to her remaining £ 10 
debt, however, she was ineligible for a passport until the debt was liquidated. 104 A 
lump sum discharging her full obligation was paid within the next few days, her past 
financial difficulties suggesting the money could only have been raised through a gift or 
private loan. 105 
Other migrant workers had different reasons for leaving employment at the 
mills. The shortage of skilled textile labour meant that migrant workers were able to 
make a variety of demands upon employers that were simply not an option to less-
skilled local labour. If demands were not met, these skills allowed dissatisfied workers 
to transfer elsewhere. Demands were most often pay related, but there were also 
instances at P&B Launceston of migrant workers leaving because of dissatisfaction 
with employment conditions or because desired promotions were not forthcoming. 
Such was the case with English recruit John McArthur, who left P&B Launceston's 
employ in early 1926. McArthur arrived under the misapprehension that he was to be 
in charge of the carding and combing department, but the job belonged to another 
migrant, George Barker. Although he was subsequently placed in charge of the 
combing department's night shift, McArthur's wife remained unhappy with the 
arrangement. He therefore decided to accepted a position at Castlemaine Woollen 
Mills. Castlemaine mill had only a small worsted plant, but McArthur was to be in 
charge of carding, combing and drawing as desired. 106 In October 1929, another P&B 
employee, under-foreman Willie Robertson, asked management about his future 
position with the firm Informed that no promotion was proposed, Robertson gave a 
week's notice. Desiring promotion to a recently vacated position, Robertson was 
unhappy with the company's decision to bring out another migrant to fill the role. 107 
Nevertheless, being a demanding employee may not have been the best selling point to 
prospective employers even when one's services were in demand. Robertson therefore 
appears not to have related the real reason for his departure from P&B to his new 
employers at Waverley Woollen Mills. As Bob Hogarth of Waverley remembers the 
103 Officer-in-Charge, Immigration, Launceston, To Director, Labour & State Immigration, 
24/11/1925: SDW4, M9/467. 
104 Director, Labour & State Immigration, To Douglas, Launceston, 25/11/1925: SDW4, M9/467. 
105 Director, Labour & State Immigration, To Sub-collector of Customs, Launceston, 2/12/1925: 
SWD4, M9/467. 
106 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 19/1/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
107 ARP, To T. Stirling, 23/10/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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story, Willie crune out to work at P&B Launceston, but, upon arrival, was informed 
that worsening economic conditions meant his position was no longer available. 
Hogarth claimed Waverley mills had been "fortunate" to acquire Robertson.108 
The selection of skilled migrant staff was undoubtedly easier for firms with ties 
to a British textile manufacturer, because the workers most often came from the home 
firm and their skills were already proven. For companies without such ties, it could be 
safer - involving less cost, responsibility and risk - to acquire skilled staff from other 
firms. Accordingly, even when they had nominated the people involved, firms had 
difficulty retaining their migrant workers. This was certainly the case with migrants 
introduced by both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston. As previously noted, two-year 
contracts were insisted upon for nominees brought out by the two companies, but after 
this period they were free to leave. One result was that P&B Launceston was under 
constant pressure to raise migrants wages to retain their services. K&K (Tas) was less 
financially able to match outside offers and did lose at least one pivotal migrant 
employee soon after his contract expired, the fore-mentioned Jrunes Butterworth, who 
had been brought out from K&K's home firm in 1922, but transferred to Hobart 
Woollen Mills, James Aiken & Sons Ltd in October 1924. Butterworth was recruited 
as Aiken's mill manager to tum its fortunes around, part of the firm's problem being 
previous bad management. Aiken company director, C. McKay, acknowledged 
Butterworth as "by far the best manufacturer of goods the Company has yet had";109 
Sydney and Melbourne customers had nothing but praise toward the company's 
product since Butterworth's arrival, all agreeing "it was the best they had yet seen". 
Recognised as "a capable, energetic and sound mill manager", Butterworth's skill saw 
him personally credited with producing "several saleable lines in a small way without 
loss", despite inadequate machinery and serious financial difficulties. 110 No wonder 
competing firms sought such men as Butterworth! 
Not all head hunting crune from competitors. Throughout the 1920s, for 
exrunple, P&B Ltd showed increased interest in their Launceston mill's wool buyer, 
Watson Dawson. Dawson originally crune from the home firm, but had since been 
promoted. As part of his job, Dawson regularly travelled to New Zealand, purchasing 
108 Robertson stayed with that firm until his death, suffering a heart attack while at work and being 
found dead lying on a pile of wool in the wool store by his son, who also worked at Waverley. 
Bob Hogarth, Talk to Launceston Industrial Heritage Group, 11/6/1996. 
109 McKay, Director of James Aiken and Sons, Ltd, To Premier Lyons, 15/51925: PDl 179/8/25. 
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for both the Launceston and English mill. With "nothing but satisfaction to record" 
regarding Dawson's recent wool purchases, in April 1926 P&B Alloa took the unusual 
step of expressing this sentiment to him in a letter. 111 Later that year the parent 
company asked whether Dawson could be spared for a visit "home".112 P&B Ltd 
explained that the visit would be advantageous (to whom was unspecified), because the 
New Zealand wool market was increasingly important to the English firm and because 
Dawson had never met any of the English directors in charge of the wool Department. 
Their real intention was to sound Dawson out about accepting a new position within 
the firm. Arthur Procter was informed in July 1927, that Dawson had accepted an 
appointment to become the company's permanent wool buyer in New Zealand. 
Recognising that P&B Launceston would be disappointed at losing Dawson, the parent 
company believed Launceston would see that ''the interest of the firm as a whole must 
take precedence to branch preferences" .113 
Wages 
As previously seen, K&K (Tas)'s difficulties retaining locally trained labour 
stemmed largely from job insecurity during constant reversion to short-time and its 
associated financial hardship for workers. Although this affected some migrant 
workers as well, a national shortage of workers with the migrants' expertise meant this 
group was more often able to demand, and generally receive, higher wages. If 
management wished to retain its most skilled workers, it often had little choice but to 
approve their wage demands. The ability effectively to demand higher wages, 
however, applied only to a very small percentage of employees. 
In fact, Tasmania's wage structure undoubtedly influenced both British 
companies to establish in this state rather than on the mainland. During early 
negotiations, K&K (Tas) made repeated inquiries about wages and conditions in the 
Tasmania's textile industry. 114 Although Hobart Council initially claimed it was not in 
the position to provide pay rates, 115 Henry Reynolds eventually answered K&K's wage 
110 Wagga Wagga Express, 28/5/1925: PDl 179/8/25. 
111 T. Stirling, To ARP, 20/4/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
112 T. Stirling, to ARP, 1/12/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
113 P&B Ltd explained that it was unsatisfactory to double expenses by having two wool buyers 
engaged on the same ground, Launceston' s and their own. 
T. Stirling, To ARP, 2617/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
114 For example see Agent-General, To Premier, 5/7/1917: PDl 118/19/17. 
115 Acting Town Clerk, Hobart, To Secretary to Premier, 10/10/1917; PDl 118/19/17. 
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inquiries by simply sending a copy of the rates fixed by the Textile Workers' Wage 
Board. 116 (As remarked, prior to 1926, wages and conditions in Tasmania's textile 
industry were governed by this agency's determination.)117 What was common under 
both State and federal awards for the 1920s was that Tasmanian wages were based 
upon the average cost of living figures in five Tasmanian towns. 118 With minimum 
wage rates likewise fixed according to cost of living in other states, mainland big-city 
rates well-exceeded those paid in Launceston. The companies argued that this 
difference was necessary to counter freight costs in Tasmania, 119 but presumably it had 
a yet wider appeal for large labour employers. 
The textile industry also lowered labour costs by employing a predominantly 
female force. An analysis of labour costs at P&B Launceston offers an example of why 
textile mills preferred female labour. In September 1925 it came to P&B Alloa's 
attention that the Launceston mill's current night shift was very uneconomical. 
Admitting the shift was expensive, Arthur Procter provided costing details of the 
combing department. During the day the combing department ran six combs and nine 
cards, employing 23 girls and five men, gross wages on average totalling £58. 3s. per 
week or £9. 13s. lOd. per comb. The night shift worked on a reduced scale, running 
only two combs and the necessary cards. With women not legally allowed to work 
night shift, it took 12 men to run this shift and cost £59. 2s. 8d. per week or £29. 1 ls. 
4d. per comb, over three times the cost per comb of the day shift. 120 P&B Alloa 
described the cost of running the night shift' s two combs as "appalling". 121 P &B Alloa 
subsequently calculated that, on average, men's day wages at P&B Launceston were 
about £4 per week, night shift men receiving around £5 per week, while girls received 
approximately 35s. per week. 122 It therefore made good financial sense to employ 
women, rather than men, whenever possible. Nevertheless, K&K appear to have 
116 H. Reynolds, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, To Secretary to Premier, 23/10/1917: PDl 
118/19/17. 
117 See above, pp.165-166. 
118 Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech for FourteenthAGM, 25/8/1933. 
119 In the 1932-33 financial year, the Federal Arbitration Court ruled that a flat rate was to be paid 
throughout the Commonwealth (excluding Queensland) based on the average figure of the five 
Australian capital cities. Creating national wage parity throughout the industry, Tasmanian 
manufacturers lost what they saw as their main compensating advantage for freight charges (90% of 
K&K (Tas)'s product was sold on the mainland). 
Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech for Fourteenth & Fifteenth AGM, 25/8/1933 & 19/9/1934. 
120 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 19/111926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
121 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 23/2/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
122 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 23/2/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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started operations with a significant proportion of_ male employees, as seen in 
illustration No. 25. As mentioned earlier, K&K had discussed training boys, rather 
than girls, as machine operatives, 123 but why they initially chose this option is uncertain. 
The existence of companies employing large numbers of female workers at 
lower rates likely suited authorities as well. The federal government perhaps 
encouraged the establishment of the largely female employing textile industry after 
World War 1 as one solution to concerns about female labour. During the war women 
had filled vacancies in areas traditionally viewed as male domains. The fear was that 
women might remain in these vocations once the men returned from war. In 1917 W. 
Jethro Brown, president of the Industrial Court of South Australia, summed up the 
fears of many Australians in calling for state uniformity of action on the imminent 
threat posed, particularly, by female labour and repatriated soldiers. He believed their 
assertion could become very considerable. 124 The growth of Australia's textile industry, 
however, offered women the opportunity to work in jobs traditionally designated as 
women's work, rather than compete for jobs in the male domain. 
While data is sparse and confusing, it appears that the companies gave 
considerable play to piece-work rates. 125 However these were impractical ~hile girls 
were in training, and likely to make the mills unattractive employers. The problem was 
complex. When K&K (Tas) ruled that fixed rates should prevail in the mill's early 
stages, its handful of skilled operatives protested. In May 1923, the Lillie sisters, three 
of the company's best weavers recruited from Western Australia, were "becoming 
discouraged" at delays in implementing piecework rates, and had "hinted" they were 
considering returning home.126 In order to retain the girls, directors offered them a 5s. 
bonus per week while they continued helping learners and until piece work rates were 
implemented.127 The three girls were not satisfied with this offer, however, requesting 
the figure be raised to 10s. each per week. The request was granted until-piece work-
rates began, the bonus to be paid monthly. 128 The case of the Lillie sisters provides yet 
123 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meeting, 2/3/1923. 
124 W. Jethro Brown, President, Industrial Court Chambers, Adelaide, Minister of Industry, 23/1/917: 
PDI 84/12/17. 
125 Forster, Industrial Development, p.92. 
126 Minutes of K&K Dirq;tors' Meetings, 24/5/1923. 
127 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1923. 
128 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 9/6/1923. 
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another example of difficulties retaining experienced labour, and of the ability of skilled 
wor~ers to achieve better wage conditions when their skills were in demand. 
This appears to have been truer for skilled male migrant foremen than for 
skilled females machine operatives. The Lillie sisters' case was the only one recorded 
where machine operatives were able to negotiate better salaries, if only for a limited 
time. P&B, for example, even sought to renege upon wage guarantees made to its 
skilled female migrants in their two-year contracts. In March 1924, P&B Launceston 
sought clarification on the British girls' wage conditions. 129 Before a response was 
forthcoming, Arthur Procter discovered a telegram instructing Launceston to pay the 
girls full wages for six months. He immediately notified the migrant girls that 
deductions would henceforth be made for short-time. The following day "the girls 
protested en masse", claiming they had been promised a full wage for the full two 
years. 130 The parent company eventually agreed to uphold the girls' demands, but 
simultaneously refused to cover another promised benefit (as discussed later).131 
P&B were not alone in attempting to avoid its legal wage obligations. When 
K&K (Tas) directors felt ready to commence on piece-work rates in August 1923, they 
resolved to begin payment at a scale laid down by English director, J.H. Lord. 132 While 
information is inconclusive as to whether Lord's rates differed from that set by the 
Wages Board, K&K (Tas)'s earlier reluctance and/or refusal to pay award wages to 
labourers during the mill's construction phase suggest this was a possibility. Both 
companies made repeated references throughout the 1920s to high labour costs at their 
Launceston mills, so it is possible that K&K Ltd were attempting to implement lower 
rates. Further suggesting there was some variation between the company's intended 
wage rates and those set by the Wages Board, K&K (Tas)'s subsequently postponed 
implementation of piece rates until Carl Stackhouse had consulted with Reynolds on 
this matter. No further reference is made to this visit or its outcome, so the matter 
must have been amicably resolved. Legal arguments aside, it would have taken little 
effort to convince K&K that unions would not stand for such direct attacks on workers 
basic rights, if indeed, it was K&K (Tas)'s intention to undercut award wages. 
129 Telegram to P&B Alloa, 22/3/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
130 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 28/3/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
131 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 11411924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
132 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 3/8/1923 & 17/8/1923. 
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With the bulk of employees at both mills paid according to rates fixed by the 
outside authorities, there was no real possibility for these workers to negotiate for 
wage increases, other than to apply pressure through their union (about which so little 
information was located). Nevertheless, the companies repeatedly criticised workers 
for their role in increasing production costs and any requests for wage increases or 
improvements in working conditions being fought against. In 1927, for example, 
directors of K&K (Tas) expressed concern about impending legislation to decrease the 
length of the working week, currently 48 hours. With prospects looking up for the 
industry generally, company chairman, Carl Stackhouse felt, ''The only bugbears" 
facing the company was the "distinct possibility" of a 44 hour week being 
implemented. 133 In 1928, K&K (Tas)'s first dividend paying year, Percy Hart again 
attacked labour. He maintained that since the mill had commenced, the State, 
Launceston city, and the operatives particularly had benefited, while shareholders were 
the only parties not receiving adequate returns. Hart argued that to sustain Australia's 
high living standard Australians either had to work harder or accept a lower standard 
of living. He claimed that the present scale of wages could only be maintained if 
workers and management combined to maximise efficiency. Hart failed to mention the 
hardships imposed upon many workers through constant reversions to short-time. 
Predictably, the parent companies were also of the opinion that labour costs at 
the Launceston mills were high. Two separate cost analyses undertaken by P&B Alloa 
in 1926,.however, suggest that Launceston workers cost little more than those at P&B 
Alloa. In early 1926 P&B Alloa director, William Procter, admitted that the home firm 
had calculated the wages paid to men and women in Launceston and compared the 
result with putative home conditions, and were "pleased to say that it corresponds very 
nearly with your figures". 134 A comparison between P&B Launceston and Alloa mills 
made a few months later revealed that labour costs at P&B Launceston worked out at 
only 0.86d. per lb. of product more than at Alloa. Alloa director, Thomas Stirling, 
admitted that, in view of Launceston's high wages, this figure was "not 
disappointing". 135 
Despite claims by both local and British directors, textile operatives would not 
have accepted that they were highly paid. Little comment is made on this issue 
133 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eighth AGM, 17/8/1927. 
134 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 23/311926: Private Correspondence, Ex Alloa. 
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throughout the twenties, but during the 1932 strike action over wage reductions, 
Launceston's textile workers claimed "they were already paid starvation wages". 136 
Being asked to accept another 12.5% wage reduction on top of an 8.5% reduction in 
working hours was therefore seen an unbearable. Tasmanian textile workers held that 
"They could not live on wages they were receiving at present" and "would be better off 
on the dole". The unemployment sustenance that did exist at this time was widely 
recognised as insufficient to meet basic needs, which suggests that the textile workers 
were merely attempting to dramatise their position with this example.137 
In contrast, a small number of skilled employees on wages were able to demand 
and generally receive regular and often substantial wage increases throughout the 
1920s. This applied more so to P&B Launceston than K&K (Tas), probably because 
of the stronger financial position of the first mentioned mill. It also applied particularly 
to those holding positions at the level of foreman or above. Demand for their skills in 
an expanding industry often forced companies to pay experienced managerial staff 
handsome salaries to retain their services. With both companies introducing virtually 
all employees at this level from their home mills, and these positions filled entirely by 
men, those able to demand pay increases were almost exclusively male migrants. 138 
The consistency of the pay claims throughout the 1920s suggests that, if anyone was to 
blame for increased wage costs in the textile industry, it was management, broadly 
defined. 
The early quibbling over wages seen at P&B Launceston was partly motivated 
by Launceston's cost of living exceeding the migrants' expectations. Finding 
conditions "very different here from home", most of the migrant foremen were 
described as "feeling the pinch", and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, housing 
rentals were seen to be "appalling". 139 In April 1924 general manager, Arthur Procter, 
rightly predicted that the company would have its "hands full'' once current agreements 
expired. The first of many recorded increases at P&B Launceston came in March 
1924, when Procter recommended an increase from £450 to £600 p.a. for his 
135 T. Stirling, To ARP, 31/8/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
136 Examiner, 25/8/1932. 
137 See Lloyd Robson, A History of Tasmania, Colony and State from 1856 to the 1980s, vol. II 
(Melbourne, 1991), p.429. 
138 Apart from the previously mentioned demands made by the Lillie sisters of K&K (Tas), no other 
reference was found at either mill to female employees claiming, or receiving, wage increases. 
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successor as head of the wool department, Watson Dawson;140 the increase was 
approved the following month. 141 As previously mentioned, Dawson was highly 
regarded by the company and continued to impress. After his 1925 wool-buying trip to 
New Zealand, Procter recommended Dawson for another £ 150 per annum increase.142 
Although pleased to encourage Dawson, P&B Alloa only agreed to £100 increase, and 
wanted it made clear that this was not to be an annual event.143 Dawson's salary was 
therefore advanced to £750 per annum as of 1 November 1925.144 Dawson took his 
wife on the next wool-buying trip to New Zealand the following year and, as an 
expression of appreciation and recognition that he was doing "extraordinarily well" for 
the company, P&B Ltd contributed £100 Stg towards his wife's expenses.145 This ploy 
allowed the company to offer a bonus without setting any precedent of regular pay 
increases and was also adopted by K&K. 
Predictions of unrest when contracts expired proved correct. Migrants workers 
who arrived in 1923 were on two year contracts, so the first main round of 
negotiations began in 1925. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in April of that 
year, P&B Alloa authorised P&B Launceston to offer George Barker up to an 
additional £2 per week to remain with the firm. This would increase his salary to £ 10 
per week, considered to be "an extreme wage" (a common catch-cry for the parent 
company that decade). 146 Launceston was able to retain Barker with only a£ 1 raise. 147 
Before Andrew Maitland's two year contract expired in July 1925, Arthur 
Procter warned Alloa that Maitland would not be satisfied with his current £ 7 per 
week. Already authorised to offer Maitland an additional £ 1 per week, Procter felt 
that £2 would be necessary to retain him, having heard, "in a round about way", that 
139 ARP, To T. Stirling, 9/6/1924; & ARP, To W.T. Procter, 11/4/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence 
Ex. Alloa. 
140 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 19/3/1924 & 1114/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
Procter pointed out that he and Dawson got on very well together, consulting with him before 
anything which was not purely routine was done, and he personally hope~ Da~s~~~pa~}nc~~~e -~as_ 
granted. 
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145 T. Stirling, To ARP, 25/2/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
Dawson's job required spending months at a time away from home. In May 1926, for example, he 
spent at least 5 months overseas. 
T. Stirling, To ARP, 24/5/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
146 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 27/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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Maitland had received other offers. Procter recognised that men with Maitland's 
knowledge of wool were in much demand, and people were prepared to offer them 
"fairly good salaries" .148 He gave the example of Willie Robertson, who had been 
offered £9 per week by a Sydney firm as a wool classer. Both these instances 
demonstrate the company's understanding of the difficulties they faced retainmg their 
elite employees. Although authorising Maitland's £2 increase, P&B Ltd felt that a 
somewhat lesser arrangement could be reached, as this was an "outstanding wage" 
(later described as "excessive")149 for someone in his position.150 Skilled labour had the 
upper hand, however, and Maitland acquired the entire £2 increase in exchange for 
signing a four year contract. 151 In May 1929 Maitland applied for a further increase as 
the end of that contract approached. While not considering the job worth any more, 
Procter again advised that an increase might be necessary to retain Maitland' s services. 
Head-hunting by other firms remained a concern, as Procter suspected that Maitland 
had been offered a salary of £ 10 per week by a Melbourne company. 152 Believing 
Maitland was well paid at £9, P&B Alloa recognised that his departure would place 
Launceston in an awkward position and granted an increase to £ 10 in exchange for 
another four year contract. 153 
By late 1925, the majority of P&B's migrants had received pay increases. In 
December of that year, Arthur Procter recommended a £ 100 p.a. increase for William 
Ferguson, pointing out that Ferguson was now the only Alloa migrant not to have 
received an increase.154 No mention is made of the Halifax migrants, but one of the 
previous examples, George Barker, was from Halifax. Ferguson, however, had started 
on a salary of £800 p.a., the approved increase raising that amount to £900 taking 
effect from January 1926.155 Ferguson again requested a pay increase in October 1928. 
147 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 28/4/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
148 ARP, To T. Stirling, 29/5/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
149 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 31/5/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
150 T. Stirling, To ARP, 13/7/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
151 ARP, To T. Stirling, 9/9/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
152 ARP, To P&B, Alloa, 31/5/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
153 P&B Alloa did not want the question of a pay increase for Maitland raised again for "some 
considerable time", but need not have worried as Maitland died soon after. In September of that year, 
urgent arrangements were therefore being made to send John Dunley and family out from Alloa on 
assisted passages as Maitland's replacement. 
W.T. Procter, To ARP, 2517/1920; ARP, To T. Stirling, 23/10/1929; & T. Stirling, To ARP, 6/9/1929; 
& ARP, To T. Stirling, 23110/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
154 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 16/12/1925: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
155 ARP, To P&B Scotland, 26/10/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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Acknowledging that Ferguson could command a considerably higher wage on the 
mainland, 156 he was granted a further £ 100 p.a. increase. 157 
For some of the workers, wage increases were not only substantial, they were 
very regular. British migrant, S.B. Stewart, took control of P&B Launceston's order 
department in April 1926. Commencing at £5 per week, his salary was increased to £6 
on 1 October 1926 (the order department had been considerably enlarged that month); 
to £7 on 1 March 1927 (the department had continued to expand); and was 
recommended for an increase to £8 in May 1927.158 P&B Alloa felt that Stewart's 
salary was advancing ''by leaps and bounds" to which they were unaccustomed, and 
found it difficult to comprehend what additional duties could warrant such increases. 159 
Agreeing to be guided by Procter's opinion, however, the latest advance was approved 
as of 1 October 1927. This was on the understanding that such increases could not 
continue as Stewart's salary was as high as his position would carry. At the end of 
1929 S.B. Stewart again requested an increase from £8 per week to £500 per year. 
Stewart claimed to have been promised this salary by Alloa director John Forrester-
Paton, during his 1926 visit to Tasmania. Asked for confirmation, Forrester-Paton 
evidently did not support Stewart's version of events. Stewart did receive an increase 
from 1 October, but it was to only £450 rather than the £500 requested.160 
Not only those with years of experience were able to attract wage increases 
during this period. In July 1928 a salary increase from £6-10-0 per week to £8 was 
recommended for then 23 year old Elliott Rae. Rae had worked in P&B' s wool office 
since April 1924. Experienced in almost all aspects of the department, including 
buying, Rae shouldered much responsibility with Dawson frequently away in New 
Zealand. He was also receiving top marks in accountancy studies being undertaken in 
his spare time. While acknowledging the increase was substantial for one of Rae's age, 
Procter felt Rae could easily procure a mainland position at much more than he 
Demonstrating the differences in wages between management and the general worker, at the same 
time Ferguson was earning £900 p.a., or over £17 per week, one of the most junior employees, J. 
Pennyston, the office boy, was earning lSs. per week. 
'Report on Office Staff', ARP, To P&B Alloa, 21/5/1926: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
156 ARP, To P&B Scotland, 26/10/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
157 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 20/12/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
158 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 23/5/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
159 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 28/6/1927: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
160 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 18/12/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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currently made. 161 Alloa were "anxious to encourage our capable men all we can", but 
felt £8 to be at the top side for Rae, agreeing instead to a £ 1 increase from 1 August 
that year.162 Pr?cter respond~d that he realised the amount was high but had not 
wanted to risk losing Rae's services. Rae, nevertheless, seemed happy with the 
amount. 163 His £8 per week salary was subsequently approved as of 1 January 1930.164 
The first pay related claim at K&K (Tas) came as early as August 1923, when 
engineer Sam Tuting requested extra remuneration for working time above that 
prescribed in his contract. He had also acted as night watchman at the mill since the 
previous Easter165 (it was Tuting who was granted a company housing loan to enable 
him to be on call). While pay claims at both mills were often linked to increased 
responsibility as the mills expanded, K&K (Tas) generally showed themselves 
unwilling, and probably less financially able, than P&B Launceston to renumerate 
employees accordingly. Tuting's request was forwarded to K&K Rochdale who had 
made the contract,166 and three months later a £ 10 bonus was approved.167 As at 
P&B, one-off bonuses were both less expensive than wage increases in the long term 
and helped avoid triggering pay increases by other staff. 
Tuting was next awarded a 10s. per week pay increase in February 1926. This 
was again granted only to cover an increased workload resulting from a night shift 
161 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 3117/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
162 Stirling, To ARP, 15/9/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
163 ARP, To Stirling, 31/10/1928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
164 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 18112/1929: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
165 The company also had a member of the public doing a similar job for no pay. For the 18 months 
prior to April 1923, a Mr. Higgins had pastured his horse on the K&K owned Barnard estate, having 
not been told to remove the animal when the land was purchased. The company had since locked the 
gate into the paddock and, when Higgins requested the key to remove his horse, the company decided 
to charge an agistment fee of 2s. 6d. per week, backdated for twelve months. Higgins' response was 
not recorded, but a mutual agreement was eventually reached under which the bill was waved and 
Higgins' horse allowed to remain free of charge, in exchange for Higgins "keeping an eye on the Mills 
and guarding against trespassers during non-working hours". Higgins was also given the authority to 
question and act upon people entering the premises in non-working hours. P&B handled a similar 
situation at their property with greater tact. Upon transfer of Council land to P&B Launceston, a Mr. 
E.A. Fawkner was informed by the Council that his rights to graze on the Reserve had been 
terminated. Unlike K&K (Tas), P&B Launceston had no objections to Fawkner's sheep remaining 
"for the time being" and placed no conditions upon their offer - it might have been bad for public 
relations for a woollen mill to evict sheep off its property. 
Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 10/4/1923 & 16/4/1923. 
Acting Town Clerk, To Mr. E.A. Fawkner, 15/6/1923: Launceston City Council, Land & Properties 
General (1922-23), 2111.1. 
166 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 31/8/1923. 
167 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 23/11/1923. 
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being cornmenced. 168 Nevertheless, Tuting appears to have continued doing 
substantially more than for which he was paid. When re-negotiating his contract in 
1928, he agreed to renew for a further three years on the same terms as before, asking 
only for consideration regarding holidays. He customarily worked Christmas week, 
most mill holidays and many weekends. The only concession guaranteed Tuting, 
however, was an increase in annual holidays from two to three weeks. Even this came 
with a proviso: the three weeks were not be taken all at once, and timing was subject 
to the mill manager's discretion. The mill manager was also authorised to allow Tuting 
an occasional week day holiday in lieu of the considerable amount of weekend work he 
put in.169 There are examples of other K&K (Tas) foremen receiving pay increases, 
and these also appear to have been granted because of an increased workload. In 
February 1926 K&K (Tas)'s weaving manager,17° Fred Crow, was awarded a pay 
increase to £6. 1 Os. per week. Directors made it clear that "under normal 
circumstances" Crow was not to expect any further increase during the period of his 
present agreement. 171 
By contrast, pay increases for K&K (Tas)'s managing director were approved 
with little comment. Even financially strapped companies knew that good leadership 
was essential to their success and were willing to pay for it. In April 1925, at the 
height of the textile industry's depression, K&K (Tas)'s managing director was granted 
a £ 150 p.a. advance, backdated to 1 January. 172 When renegotiating the managing 
director's salary in August 1929, a somewhat lesser pay increase of £50 p.a. was 
approved, again back-dated to the start of the year and expected to last until the end of 
his present agreement. A £50 p.a. car allowance was also approved. K&K' s managing 
director and directors were additionally entitled to a percentage of company's profits. 
The managing director's 1929 salary increase was, for example, subject to a decrease 
in his present rate of commission from 3.33% to 2.5%. 173 Directors were entitled to 
2% of profits when sufficient profit was made to declare and pay more than a 10% 
168 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 2412/1926. 
169 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/5/1928. 
170 Interview with P.M. Hart, 2411111995. 
171 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/2/1926. 
172 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/4/1925. 
173 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 28/8/1929. 
Under current economic conditions the exchange was probably a better deal for Overstall than 
percentage of profits. 
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dividend. 174 Some company foremen had contracts which similarly entitled them to a 
percentage of company profits. In early 1926 Jim Holt negotiated a new four year 
contract at £500 p.a. plus 2% of company profits. There is no indication of 
comparable deals with foremen at P&B Launceston, which may partly account for less 
frequent demands for pay increases at K&K (Tas). Nevertheless, considering the 
company's financial position during the 1920s, profit-related deals would not have 
returned much. 
Labour Efficiency 
Difficulties in retaining skilled labour at Launceston's two British controlled 
woollen mills impacted. upon labour efficiency. Although Forster points out that no 
direct measure of efficiency can be made for the woollen industry during the 1920s, he 
determined that country mills generally appeared less efficient than city mills. 175 Claims 
of inefficiency during the twenties appeared truer for K&K (Tas) than P&B 
Launceston. Migrant managerial staff at, P&B tended to be replaced by other migrant 
workers, the greatest problem here being a delay between one migrant leaving and 
another arriving. Locally trained labour, however, was more likely to be replaced by 
unskilled locals who had to be trained from scratch. As K&K (Tas) appears to have 
lost more workers from this latter category, they suffered greater inefficiency. In 1928, 
K&K Ltd director, R.C. Roe, paid credit to how well the Launceston mill was doing in 
view of all the labour needing to be trained. Complimenting K&K (Tas)'s 
management, Roe singled out George Brooks' achievements, despite being "badly 
handicapped" by the lack of experienced labour. 176 K&K (Tas) did not emerge from 
these difficulties until around 1927, when Stackhouse was finally able to report an 
improvement in the company's ongoing labour troubles. Following an increase in the 
company's output which was partly attributable to improved labour efficiency, 
Stackhouse summarised past problems: 
174 In 1936 K&K (Tas) directors proposed changes to directors' remuneration regarding percentage of 
profits. Believing it was not the intention of their agreements that a percentage of profits only be paid 
to directors when profits were declared, directors proposed that the 2% payment be linked to profits 
being made, but not necessarily declared. 
Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech for SeventeenthAGM, 11/9/1936. 
175 Forster, Industrial Development, p.91. 
176 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/511928. 
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The Company has suffered severely in the past from want of efficiency, because just as 
labour was trained to some extent the trade depression that came along made it absolutely 
necessary to discharge some labour and go on half time. When trade conditions improved 
we could not get the labour together again and it took us some time to train fresh labour. 
That difficulty is very nearly over, however, and the people in the Mill are increasing in 
efficiency to a very marked degree. 177 . 
Adding weight to claims of improved labour efficiency, in August 1927 K&K (Tas) 
directors reported, "we are getting the utmost from our available plant at present". 178 
P&B Launceston appear to have suffered to a lesser extent from loss of labour 
and its associated effects upon efficiency, and from the outset sustained the attitude 
that their mill would be particularly efficient. Increasing reliance upon machines rather 
than people was the key. The Examiner first stressed this point during P&B 
Launceston's construction in 1922. Claiming that P&B had "availed themselves of 
every opportunity" to install "the latest machinery", the paper was enthusiastic about 
these innovations: 
It is really wonderful to what perfection modern wool spinning machinery had been 
brought in an effort to minimise labour costs. Labour is one of the big factors in industry, 
and manufacturers have been forced to seek and inventors to provide plant that will result 
in economics. The spinning industry is no exception, in fact the process is such a long one 
that it is essential in the modern mill to have the latest labour saving devices to get 
results. 179 
Soon after P&B Launceston began production, the Examiner reiterated that "efficiency 
is largely written over the works" .180 
The Alleged Superiority of the British Worker 
Despite optimism at the efficiency of modern machinery, not all within the firm 
were convinced that Tasmanian labour met the company's high efficiency standards. 
During a 1926 visit to Launceston, P&B Alloa director, John Forrester-Paton, 
remarked that it was not yet true that ''Tasmanian workers were equal in efficiency to 
those in Scotland, but he saw no reason why they should not reach the same 
standard".181 Within the same decade, however, P&B directors would admit to being 
177 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eighth AGM, 17/8/1927. 
178 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, Eighth AGM, 17/8/1927. 
179 Describing P&B's new premises as "the most up-to-date in the world'', the Examiner felt that, as 
the most recent mill brought into operation in Australia, it "may be regarded as the thing in spinning 
mills". 
Examiner, 21/4/1922: P&B Mill History File. 
180 Examiner, 26/1/1924. 
181 
'Manufacturer farewelled' (undated press cutting): Launceston City Council, Rapson Tyre Industry 
- Industries General (1926-27), 21/1.5. 
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"well satisfied" with local workers and "surprised at their aptitude to learn various 
operations they were required to perform". 182 
Upon K&K's decision to establish in Launceston, State parliament was told 
that the company intended to introduce a number of operatives with the "necessary 
technical knowledge" from England, but, as local employees became skilled, expert 
work would be given to them. 183 Nevertheless, both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston 
would long demonstrate a lack of confidence in the skill of local workers, and showed 
considerable hesitation in allowing locals to assume certain positions within the mill. 
While a shortage of locals with the requisite skills was the main reason for introducing 
British staff when the mills commenced, the persistence of this practice, particularly at 
top management level, suggests an underlying lack of confidence by British controlling 
interests in the ability of Australian workers. Even when all other management levels 
were gradually filled by locals over successive years, P&B Launceston did not appoint 
its first non-British general manager until August 1987.184 Ian Webster, the pioneering 
Australian, held that the company's "attitude was typical of the English companies 
attitude everywhere ... It was part of a feeling that we were colonials and needed to be 
taught properly" .185 
A perception that Australian workers were inferior to British workers was also 
apparent at K&K (Tas). Upon taking up the position of K&K's managing director in 
early 1926, Les Overstall was unhappy with the production output of the weaving 
department and by September decided the company would nominate the Howarth 
family, Tom, Annie and daughter Doris. While Tom was to work in the mill as a 
labourer (certainly a position a local could have assumed), Annie was selected for her 
skills as a weaver. 186 It was intended that Annie would set the standard for local girls, 
or highlight their shortcomings as the case may be. As it turned out, within a few 
weeks of Annie's arrival it became apparent she was no better than the best of the 
182 
'Assisted Migrants', by A.E. Weymouth, 1937: SWD 5/1. 
183 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department for 1919-20, No. 21, p.4: Tasmania, Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1920-21. 
184 This of course excludes William Stewart, the first general manager. Victorian based Stewart 
handed power over to Arthur Procter soon after production commenced and did not even reside 
permanently in Tasmania until late in the mill's construction phase. 
185 Examiner, 10/10/1987 
Webster believed that this attitude had disappeared over several years. 
186 
'State of Tas, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 11/9/1926: SWD4, M 9/673. 
199 
locally-trained girls. Overstall was reputedly "confounded". 187 K&K (Tas) were also 
hesitant in allowing a local to be appointed to their company's top position. The main 
argument for introducing British workers had always been that the necessary skills 
were not available locally. Nevertheless, when Les Overstall's British successor, Tom 
Dawson, was chosen, he was straight out of university and inexperienced. With over a 
decade remaining before Overstall retired, Dawson had many years in Tasmania to gain 
experience before assuming the top position. 188 A promising local could just as easily 
have been groomed for the role. 
Also influencing a belief in the superiority of British textile workers was a belief 
in "hereditary instinct". P&B's general manager from the end of the 1920s, J.B. White, 
elaborated upon this philosophy the following decade: 
certain firms in England have held for decades a pre-eminent position in the production of 
certain classes of yarns, and ... their employees are drawn from families who have been 
connected with the firms for generations. This is a case of hereditary instinct and 
ingrained, almost subconscious, knowledge.189 
According to such reasoning first generation Tasmanian woollen workers were innately 
inferior to their British counterparts with a long background in the industry. White 
then undermined the whole basis of this argument. He added that, after ten years in 
Launceston, P&B had "found it unnecessary, unless in exceptional circumstances to 
bring any people from the home mills, because Tasmanian employees had proved so 
very receptive that many have been promoted to positions of trust and responsibility in 
the working control of the Launceston mill". White's statement was no doubt 
influenced by public concerns about the continued importation of labour. The 
experience gained from overseas ventures, however, also proved that non-British 
workers soon became as skilled as their British counterparts, and helped debunk the 
idea of "hereditary instinct". 
The abandonment of this philosophy by P&B Ltd became apparent after World 
War II, when P&B constructed the world's largest knitting wool manufacturing plant, 
in Darlington, Country Durham, England. This was an area not traditionally associated 
187 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995 & 1/11/1996. 
Les Overstall told Hart this story, suggesting Overstall did see the irony in the situation. 
188 Les Overstall went to England after the war "to upgrade his skills", and seek a future replacement 
for his own position. Visiting the Textile Section of Leeds University to inquire about a suitable 
candidate, K&K Rochdale' s verdict on the chosen candidate was "If you don't take him, [we] will". 
Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/1111995. 
189 
'Pioneer Booklet', signed J.B. White, 1934: 'Some Old Records and Information of Interest from 
1923'. 
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with textile manufacture. In direct contrast to White's 1934 statement, P&B Ltd 
boasted that, by drawing the majority of labour from women and girls with no textile 
manufacturing experience, the company was able "to introduce scientific training 
methods and scotch the old tradition of 'inherited skills"'. 190 All these staff, it was 
claimed: 
lack the 'inherited skill' of which so much has been heard in the textile industries. Patons 
and Baldwins have always been a little sceptical of this alleged inheritance; having trained 
a heterogeneous collection of girls and women to a point where the best of them, after a 
maximum of three years' experience, can compete in output with any West Riding 
operative, they feel that they have finally scotched it. 191 
While the abandonment of this belief may or may not have influenced the company's 
faith in its non-British textile workers at mills such as Launceston, it did discredit a 
major bargaining tool of established workers. In the past, the experience inherent in 
hereditary skill provided the relevant textile workers with some negotiating power. 
The company also saw this connection. In establishing their Darlington factory, P&B 
Ltd admitted that the recruitment of a new work-force "completely untrammelled by 
the traditions and prejudices of the older staff in the textile industries" was something 
"many a harassed industrialist has ardently dreamed of'. 
Paternalism, Social Hierarchy, and Community 
Despite difficulties retaining labour, ongoing wage battles, and an apparent lack 
of confidence in the abilities of local workers, both K&K (Tas) and P&B Launceston 
claimed good work place relations. After 49 years with K&K, P.M. Hart held that 
relations between management and workers were "excellent". 192 During a 1926 
directorial visit to P&B Launceston, John Forrester-Paton, likewise commented that 
employer/employee relations, "were very pleasant".193 P&B Launceston went further, 
claiming that "A tradition of good relationship between Management and Workers 
[had] persisted throughout the history of the firm''. 194 This "happy feature" was seen 
to result from "the interest taken in the well being of the workers since the inception of 
190 Business, The Journal of Management in Industry, April 1951, p.46: Miscellaneous material held 
byCP. 
191 Business, The Journal of Management in Industry, April 1951, p.46: Miscellaneous material held 
byCP. 
192 Interview with P.M. Hart, 2411111995. 
193 
'Manufacturer farewelled' (undated press cutting): Launceston City Council, 2111.5. 
This statement ignored much of the unpleasantness discussed in the previous chapter. 
194 
'The Romance of Patons Yarn': 'Some Old Records oflnterest from P&B Launceston': 
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the business". Company interest in all aspects of employees' lives can certainly be 
traced back to the origins of both K&K and P&B during the Industrial Revolution. 
Mill owners' responsibility toward employees was traditionally seen to extend beyond 
the workplace, and they often led the way in establishing, and being actively involved 
in, community facilities such as schools and churches. 195 On the one hand, this 
behaviour could be seen as a way of further controlling the work-force by interference 
in religion and education, traditionally recognised as two of the most powerful means 
of social control. 196 From another perspective, however, the owners viewed 
themselves as the patriarchal head of their family (the employees) and the move from 
running a factory to participating in the social sphere was a natural progression. This 
relationship was also one acceptable from both sides. Reciprocal duties of workers and 
those in power were firmly established principles in Britain, as in most societies. 
When Launceston' s two British-controlled companies began operations in the 
1920s, this patern~listic attitude was still apparent to varying degrees at both mills, 
although was more strongly associated with P&B. E.Z. and Cadbury also "sought to 
integrate their employees through forms of paternalism'', Cadbury extending its 
concern for employees' welfare to issues of morality. 197 Soon after K&K's decision to 
establish in Launceston, Henry Reynolds had praised the mill's proposed inclusion of 
"the latest improvements, ventilation, lighting and other things affecting the welfare of 
employees". 198 Likewise, before P&B's deal was finalised, parliament was told that 
195 Focusing upon the contributions of the Paton company during the nineteenth century, various 
directors from that company served upon and headed their local Council and school board, as well as 
building and donating to their communities a Town Hall with a reading room, public baths and a 
gymnasium, a higher grade/secondary school, a model workshop for manual instruction, and a hall 
and suite of rooms for Sunday School work. 
The Romance of Patons Yams: 'Some Old Records of Interest from P&B Launceston'. 
196 The link between religion and work place politics was not just confined to the nineteenth century. 
When P&B Launceston and K&K (Tas) workers headed the 1932 strike action against wage 
reductions, the minister of Launceston's Congregational Church commented that "It is not for the 
church to say how much employers should pay their men", but that it was the Church's place "to say 
that the man who scamps his work, breaks an arbitration court contract, or adopts an irritation strike 
is an unchristian workman". The Church did claim to oppose oppression of workers. 
Examiner, 5/9/1932. 
197 Robson, A History of Tasmania, p.420; Also see Alison Alexander, A Heritage of Welfare and 
Caring: The EZ Community, 1918-1991 (Risdon, 1991) & Ruth Barton, 'Cooperation and Labour 
Management at Electrolytic Zinc and Cadbury-Fry-Pascall Between 1918 and 1939', M.A., Uni. of 
Tas., 1989. 
198 Fifth Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1919-20, No. 21, p.4: Tasmania. Journals and 
Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1920-21. 
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employees of this new mill would be working ''under the best conditions". 199 In early 
1924 the Examiner claimed that "Nothing could be better than the actual conditions" in 
this "ideal factory'', which showed "every consideration for those who have to work in 
it". 20° Concluding that P&B Launceston had "gone far beyond what might reasonably 
have been expected of them in providing for their employees," the paper then touched 
upon the company's motivation for offering such conditions. P&B believed that "if 
the best work is to be accomplished it is desirable that the conditions should be such as 
to enable that to be done". Among the facilities P&B provided for employees was a 
canteen in the northern end of the western wing. Described as a "striking example of 
the firm's consideration for their employees", the canteen's interior was "decidedly 
pleasing with its stained Tasmanian oak walls". Employees were then able to eat their 
meal in a large upstairs room called the social hall, also to be used for various 
gatherings, under conditions comparing ''very favourably with those of a city cafe". 
(See illustration Nos. 26 & 27.) When the mill was fully operational the company 
proposed offering a substantial mid-day meal at a minimal cost. In early 1924, 
however, only a cup of tea could by obtained at lunch time for ld. and employees acted 
as their own waiters as a matter of economy. These facilities were superior to those at 
K&K (Tas), where original plans allowed no provision for workers at meal times. In 
December 1920, local directors had supported E.G. Stone's suggestion that provision 
be made for employees to have their meals under cover, and space be provided for 
bicycles and luncheon baskets. They agreed to bring the matter to K&K Rochdale's 
attention.201 The result of these discussions is unclear, but K&K (Tas) did not begin 
operations with a canteen. Many of its workers, however, lived close enough to the 
mill to go home for lunch. During the war the company eventually purchased a house 
to act as a canteen at the end of Mayne Street, and thereafter provided subsidised 
lunches.202 
The first welfare scheme proposed for P&B Launceston was an attempt to 
appease worker dissatisfaction, and again related to the migrant workers' contracts. 
As mentioned earlier, P&B had agreed, after some debate, to honour its female 
199 Seventh Annual Report of the Industrial Department, 1921-22, No. 14, p.8: Tasmania. Journals 
and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1922-23. 
200 Examiner, 26/1/1924, p.6. 
201 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 20/12/1920. 
202 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
Mayne Street was the street in which the mill was located. 
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migrants' wage conditions during their two-year contracts. Simultaneously announced, 
however, was the parent company's refusal to pay the girls during sickness. The girls 
were "rather sore" because this benefit had also been promised for the duration of their 
contracts.203 P&B Launceston pleaded the girls' case. Procter suggested that if the 
company was not willing to pay the girls when sick, they might consider paying 
subsidies to a lodge (the prevailing form of private health insurance). Procter pointed 
out that medical fees were high and because Australia had no national health scheme, it 
was "a serious matter for a girl to pay a doctor's bill" even when on full wages. The 
parent company subsequently decided to honour its original verbal agreement until the 
contracts expired. 204 This only related to migrant employees, and therefore did not 
benefit most of the company's workers. 
Another proposal to establish P&B Launceston's first welfare scheme for 
workers was made in the latter half of 1924. P&B Alloa were interested in receiving 
particulars of this proposed Benevolent fund, as the only scheme similar at their mill 
was used for unemployment relief and other "hard luck" cases. 205 Run under the 
auspices of the Trade Union, P&B Alloa' s ~nd received voluntarily contributions from 
the workers, with weekly funds collected matched by the firm. Alloa described the 
scheme as "a great boon to our people". There is no indication as to whether the 
Launceston project advanced beyond discussion stage. While P&B Alloa showed 
some enthusiasm in this case, dependence on Britain could hamper such schemes. 
K&K (Tas)'s financial difficulties did not allow their company to implement employee 
welfare schemes in the 1920s but, even when conditions improved, progress was 
restricted by controlling British interests. In 1936, for example, K&K (Tas)'s local 
directors were keen to establish an employees' Mutual Benefit Society, but did not 
have the authority to make lump sum contributions to such a scheme.206 The response 
of Rochdale directors was evidently negative, as the matter was let drop for that year. 
Although alternative schemes were discussed, 207 none eventuated that decade. K&K 
(Tas) did eventually establish a sick benefit fund in May 1940, 208 seemingly the first 
such scheme at the mill. 
203 ARP, To P&B Alloa, 1/4/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
204 Telegram from P&B Alloa, 8/5/1924: P&B Correspondence, 1923-24. 
205 W.T. Procter, To ARP, 13/10/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
206 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 24/611936. 
207 Minutes of K&K Directors' Meetings, 2317/1936. 
208 Sick Benefit Fund: QVM, Box MSS, 1977179/22. 
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While K&K (Tas) may not have had money to contribute to expensive welfare 
schemes in the 1920s, the mill's employees demonstrated that a sense of community in 
the work place was not dependent upon financial input, or even support, from 
controlling interests. In late 1925, a well attended meeting of K&K (Tas) employees 
unanimously approved staging their first company picnic at Swan Point on 13 February 
the following year. Although trade was just beginning to pick up at this time, the 
"unfortunate position" of K&K (Tas) "was such that it could not guarantee any 
financial support".209 Directors were, nevertheless, supportive of the idea (in 
theory).210 The company's lack of support for this venture was apparent in its decision 
that time lost during the Saturday morning of the picnic had to be made up. Overtime 
schedules ran from 1-12 February.211 At a time when the mill was suffering badly from 
a loss of operatives, the company might have been well advised to show greater 
support for any event contributing to a sense of community within the mill. When 
arrangements were made to hold another picnic the following year, K&K claimed it 
was still not in a position to contribute. Directors did, on this occasion, show their 
support by each personally providing a £1 donation212 and agreeing to make the picnic 
day a half holiday.213 The same year as K&K's first picnic, P&B hired Launceston's 
Albert Hall to hold an employee social and dance. It was not until 1933, however, that 
the company's long-running tradition of an annual sports day at York Park, followed 
by a ball at the Albert Hall, came into being.214 
Both companies also operated a variety of sporting and social clubs throughout 
their time in Launceston. These appear to have largely commenced after the time 
period under consideration, but P&B Launceston did have a soccer team as early as 
1925. Choosing soccer as the first company team-sport demonstrated the British 
influence at the mill, and a team photo including the general manager and other senior 
foremen showed company support for the venture. (See illustration No. 28.) Michael 
209 K&K Employee Picnics, 16/12/1925 & 21/12/1925: QVM, Box MS5. 
210 2s. per head was charged to cover the cost of chartering the S.S. 'Rowitta' for transport to the 
location, hiring two tarpaulins, and providing ice-cream and a keg of ginger beer. The picnic 
committee also provided hot water and tea and arranged the sports, prizes and music, while 
participants - which extended to friends of mill employees - were to bring all their own edibles. 
K&K Employee Picnics, 16/1211925 & 21/12/1926: QVM, Box MS5. 
211 K&K Employee Picnics, 11/111926: QVM, Box MS5. 
212 K&K Employee Picnics, 16/12/1926: QVM, Box MS5. 
213 K&K Employee Picnics, 19/1/1927: QVM, Box MS5. 
K&K (Tas)'s company picnics did not continue on after their second year (perhaps a result of the 
company's lack of support for the event), although the union did run employee picnics in later years. 
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Roe points out that Tasmanian soccer has always depended upon imported interest, 
and describes Victor Tuting (one of K&K's original employees) as long "the organising 
genius of local soccer football".215 The first indication of team sport at K&K (Tas) 
came j'ust after the end of the time period under review', with a female hockey team.216 
Not confining itself to projects benefiting its own employees, P&B Launceston 
also became involved in the wider Launceston community during the period under 
review. As previously noted, unemployment had been a concern since the beginning of 
the 1920s. While male unemployment remained relatively stable throughout the 
1920s, 217 greater community awareness of the issue was apparent during the 
Depression years. In June 1930 a meeting was held of committee members appointed 
by Launceston citizens to consider means of relieving unemployment. A number of 
fund-raising schemes were devised, including requests from all business houses and 
their employees for contributions. The overall response was hailed as "highly 
satisfactory", and the committee commended "the generosity of several industries and 
government departments".218 There was, however, a marked difference in the response 
of the two British textile mills. P&B Launceston had two representatives on the 
unemployment committee, its general manager, J.B. White (representing the firm) and 
employee representative, J. Cannon.219 Employees of P&B Launceston were also the 
second largest industrial contributors to the unemployment fund, donating £ 191. ls. 
9d.220 Unrepresented on the committee, K&K (Tas) twice refused requests for 
assistance because of the current financial position of their own mill which was on 
214 See Albert Hall Booking Register: Launceston City Council 6, 42/1. 
215 Michael Roe, Australia, Britain and Migration 1915-1940: A Study of Desperate Hopes (Oakleigh, 
1995), p.243. 
216 See photographic collection, QVM 1988: P0322. 
217 In late 1925 local papers reported that between 250 and 300 men were out of work in the city; 
while 300 Launceston men were reported as unemployed in May 1930. 
21/9/1925: LCC Press Cuttings, 18/4/1923-19/111926; & 20/511930: LCC Press Cuttings, 1926-30. 
218 Chairman, To Members of Mayor's Unemployment Relief Committee, 30/10/1930: Launceston 
Council, Funds - Unemployment Relief, 20/3.7. 
219 Robert Hogarth, Director of Waverley Woollen Mills, was also a committee member, but as a 
representative of the Chamber of Manufacturers, not his mill. 
Minutes of meeting of committee appointed by citizens to consider ways and means of raising funds to 
relieve unemployment [in future referred to as Minutes of Unemployment Committee], 19/6/1930: 
Launceston Council, 20/3.7. 
22° Chairman, To Members of Mayor's Unemployment Relief Committee, 30/10/1930: Launceston 
Council, 20/3.7. 
The largest contributors were staff from the Railways' Department. In recognition of their efforts, the 
committee wrote P&B staff a letter of thanks "for their very generous donations to the fund", the letter 
posted on the mill notice board. 
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short-time.221 The differing responses not only reflected on the two mills' differing 
economic circumstances since beginning production, but P&B Launceston's larger size 
also created a greater sense of community ownership and community responsibility. 
While the textile companies may have fostered good work-place relations 
through the implementation of welfare schemes and involvement in employee and 
community activities, both reinforced a sense of class-consciousness at work. This 
reflected in the companies' hierarchical structures. The top managerial staff at P&B, 
for example, inspired a sense of awe, perhaps even fear, from those below them. They 
were easily identifiable by the white dust jackets they wore, a symbol of one's work-
place status.222 The practice of such jackets was also seen at K&K (Tas) and was 
adopted by consecutive general managers in the 1920s. 223 K&K additionally had one 
of the most recognisable icons of the class system at the top of their structure - an 
English Lord. London-based Lord Rochdale, later promoted to Viscount, reputedly 
did his bit for reinforcing stereotyped class perceptions. Stories about Lord Rochdale's 
occasional visits to the company's Rochdale mills filtered back to K&K (Tas). 
Conspicuously arriving in a Rolls Royce, he was said to be accompanied by a different 
young woman on every trip, whilst Lady Rochdale was never to be seen. 224 
Employees within both mills were very aware of how their particular jobs fitted 
into defined social strata, which reinforced assumptions concerning behaviour and 
status. When head of P&B Launceston's wool department, Watson Dawson, applied 
for a substantial pay increase in early 1924,225 Arthur Procter advised P&B Alloa that 
Dawson had been "having a pretty rough time of it"226 with Launceston' s high cost of 
living.227 Dawson was not, however, struggling to survive, but struggling to maintain 
his expected social status on current salary.228 The increase was granted. As 
reinforcement of the social gulf between factory hands and management, when P&B 
Launceston built their new cafeteria in 1935, the "white coats" ate behind a screened 
J.B. White, To Secretary, Unemployment Relief Fund Committee, 2/10/1930: Launceston Council, 
20/3.7. 
221 Minutes of Unemployment Committee, 1017/1930 & 2417/1930: Launceston Council, 20/3.7. 
222 General conversation with Deanna Edwards, secretary at Coats Patons. 
223 There was both tradition and utility behind this practice, which eventually went into disuse 
Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/11/1996. 
224 Source did not wish to be identified. 
225 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 19/3/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
226 ARP, To T. Stirling, 9/6/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
227 ARP, To W.T. Procter, 1114/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
228 ARP, To T. Stirling, 9/6/1924: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
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off area and were afforded such privileges as linen table-cloths. 229 Not all management 
was aloof, however; rumour has it that K&K (Tas)'s first general manager, Noel 
Walsh, made a point of walking around the mill every morning and smiling at all the 
girls.230 Likewise, one of K&K (Tas)'s migrant foremen, who arrived in Launceston 
ahead of his family, had no qualms about mixing with the workers. Revelling in his 
temporary bachelor status amidst a female dominated work force, this foreman was in 
no hurry to nominate his wife to join him. In the end she insisted, and soon put an end 
to his mingling with the mill's female operatives.231 
It was not just top management who saw themselves as socially superior to 
other workers. There were obvious distinctions between various management levels, 
foremen and operatives. Office staff, for example, were considered higher on the social 
ladder than machines operatives. Labourers were again lower down the scale. When 
Mrs. Dorothy Rae wrote to Arthur Procter complaining about the treatment of her son 
David in September 1928, she believed that David was not getting a "fair chance to 
learn the work". 232 Claiming that she had given her boys a good education and did not 
want David stranded as a labourer, Mrs. Rae suggested that if any other job was 
available in the mill where her son would be happier, he would gladly take it. Mrs. Rae 
was not, however, talking about another labouring position. She added that David was 
good at chemistry, and the Rector of the Alloa Academy had thought this would assist 
in his career advancement.233 As previously noted, another of Mrs. Rae's sons, Elliott, 
had made rapid advancement within the mill, and her son-in-law, Watson Dawson234 
had previously been a wool buyer and foreman at Launceston. It seems that Mrs. Rae 
did not view her family as labourer stock. 
Despite such social divides, there appears to have been a great sense of 
community amongst mill workers at both mills. P .M. Hart recalls that the sense of 
family at K&K (Tas) was "more or less continuous" throughout the life of the mill. 
This was partly geographic. Before almost universal car ownership, many mill 
employees lived near the mill, employees children went to school together, and 
229 General conversation with Deanna Edwards, secretary at Coats Patons. 
230 Interview with P.M. Hart, 111111996. 
231 Source did not wish to be identified. 
232 Dorothy Rae, To ARP, 111911928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
233 ARP, To Dorothy Rae, 19/911928: P&B, Private Correspondence Ex. Alloa. 
234 
'State ofTas, Assisted Immigration by Nomination', 19/1111923: SWD4, M9/412. 
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subsequently began their working lives together.235 The family atmosphere was also 
influenced by multiple generations of the same family working at the mill. Children 
would follow their parents and even grandparents into the trade. Hart feels that any 
break down of community that did occur "was very gradual, and not complete", the 
mill's sense of family and community still evident upon K&K's closure in 1977. 
This was also the case at P&B Launceston. In 1968 the Australian board of 
Coats Patons (as it had become) formulated a policy to present gold watches to 
employees with 40 years service. At a social function held to make the presentations, 
37 employees were presented with a watch. All had therefore begun work with P&B 
during the 1920s. Two locals, J.L. Waters and L. Bunton, were the only two current 
employees to have commenced with P&B Launceston in 1923, each serving 46 years. 
Of the retired personnel, one of the 1923 Scottish migrants, Maggie Boyd, held P&B's 
employment record, serving 59 years.236 Boyd had started work at P&B Alloa, aged 
14 years. During the next 16 years she had worked in all departments before 
emigrating to Launceston as senior forewoman. in the mill's warehouse department, 
where she remained for the next 43 years.237 With the proportion of employees serving 
40-plus years being higher in Launceston than in any of the firms other branches at the 
time of the presentation, current mill manager, L. Denham, claimed that "overseas 
Directors were amazed at the number of 'old servants' in the Tasmanian mill".238 This 
record gives, perhaps, the strongest indication of the sense of family, community and 
company attachment that began in the 1920s and surrounded P&B Launceston 
throughout most of the century.239 The sense of loyalty which both firms appear to 
have engendered from such a large proportion of their work force suggests that K&K 
235 Interview with P.M. Hart, 1/11/1996. 
236 The 30 men and 7 women receiving long-service awards in 1966 had a total of 1,554 years 
experience between them. 
P&B Mill History File. 
237 Retiring only a few months before the presentations, aged 73 years, Miss Boyd had "not been 
looking forward to [retirement]". r 
Examiner, 301611966, p.1 & 1/7/1966, p.7. 
Described as "a model servant of the company", Miss Boyd was presented with two cheques, an arm-
chair, and a coffee table at a function held in honour of her retirement. 
238 Managing Director of P&B Australia wide, C. W. Clift, himself with over 50 years service with the 
company, told the group "You people are the salt of the earth". 
Examiner, 3/12/1968. 
239 Long-service and company loyalty were already well established traits in Launceston's first woollen 
mill before either of the British mills under consideration arrived. In 1922 Waverley Woollen Mills 
claimed that a feature of its mill, currently employing between 80-100 people, was that "all foremen 
have been in the firm's employ for over thirty years". 
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and P&B successfully achieved the goals to which many of their labour policies were 
directed. One does not need to be a social revolutionary to believe that the.bosses had 
an easier run than overall they deserved. Workers may or may not have cared for 
empire, or nation, or locality, but certainly few among them pursued counter-loyalties 
of Marxist class-consciousness. 
Examiner, 4/11/1922. 
25. K&K (Tas)"s work-force assembled soon after production commenced 
26. Above - The canteen at P&B Launceston, 1924 
27. Below - P&B 's social hall, 1924 
(both are in wool store section of mill) 
28. P&B Soccer Club, Premier NTBF A 1925 
Back row - A.N. Johncock (trainer); R. Bremner; R. Foster; W. McCulloch; L Scott; 
H.N. Goldie, J. McArthur, A. Maitland (vice-chainnan) 
Second row - Wm. Comrie (chainnan)· C. McArthur; J. Gourlay (captain); J. 
Redman ; A.R. Procter (Hon. President & general manager of the mill) 
Front - J. Dixon; A. Stirling; L. Gral1am: W. Whitworth; W. Currie. 
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CHAPTERS 
FROM THE 19208: FULFILMENT, CHANGE, AND DECAY 
As noted in the final pages of chapter 5, both of our key companies had 
emerged from the hardships of the 1920s as integral to the Launceston community, and 
they assisted in changing the city's face. P&B Launceston was particularly significant 
to the region, employing around 1,200 by 1932. This made P&B the city's largest 
private employer. Although K&K (Tas) was not on the same scale, the city could 
boast few other industries its size. Employing around 300 people at the same time, this 
was more than Launceston's other three mills combined. 1 P&B Ltd's Australian 
operations underwent some structural changes in the early 1930s. The Melbourne 
based sales company, P&B (Australasia) Ltd, was liquidated and combined with P&B's 
Launceston branch to form a single Australian branch. 2 So the two firms established a 
perceptible place in the nation's social economy. For Australia at large, industrial 
progress of the 1920s continued and even intensified into the 'thirties. The 1929-30 
tariff increases further stimulated manufacturing development by attracting more 
British and American firms. In August 1937 Prime Minter J.A. Lyons claimed that 
"Advances made by Australian secondary industries during the past five years had been 
unparalleled in the industrial history of the Commonwealth". 3 
Although K&K and P&B both consolidated and expanded during this decade, 
Tasmania's industrial progress generally did not live up to national standards. The only 
significant new industry attracted during these years was a paper manufacturer 
established at Burnie on the north west coast, Associated Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd 
(APPM).4 For Launceston's other textile companies the 1930s were a period of mixed 
1 Examiner 22/8/1932. 
Employment numbers have been estimated from figures cited during a 1932 strike, at which time 
P&B, K&K and Waverley had a combined work force of 1,600. 
2 P&B Ltd, Report of Proceedings at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 18/7/1934. 
3 Lyons claimed that more than £14,000,000 in new capital had been invested in industry since 1932. 
'Inspiring Progress of Industries', Argus, 20/8/1937: Launceston City Council, Industries General 
(1936-37), 2211.1. 
4 APPM officially registered its factory on 2 September 1938. Employing 148 people at the start of 
operations, by the 1960s the mill would employ almost 2,000. 
Department of Public Health (Office ofChieflnspector of Factories), Report of the Chieflnspector for 
year ended 31/12/1938, No. 20, p.3: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1939. 
Lloyd Robson & Michael Roe, A Short History of Tasmania (Oxford, 1997), p.139. 
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fortune. After a financially unprofitable start in the 1920s, by 1937 Thyne Bros Pty Ltd 
had expanded operations to include its own spinning plant. 5 They had previously 
produced knitted goods from P&B's woollen yarn. On the other hand, Reliance 
Worsted Mills were forced into closure the same year.6 Reasons for their demise are 
not clear, but the financial restrictions of private ownership had limited the company's 
ability to expand and diversify to meet changing conditions from the start. The timing 
of closure was unfortunate for Reliance as, within two years, all local textile companies 
would be fully occupied by government contracts associated with the war effort. 
While World War I had seen Australia's few textile manufacturers profit 
greatly, stricter government controls on industry ensured the same did not occur during 
World War II. For efficient manufacturers, however, the period still had many 
advantages. Although textile producers nation-wide experienced difficulties acquiring 
sufficient staff during the war, their industry was deemed an essential service and 
subject to manpower regulations. 7 K&K ran some of its departments on 24 hour shifts 
to meet government demand,8 while P&B Launceston's employees numbered between 
1,000 to 2,000.9 Launceston's woollen mills not only gave locals the opportunity to 
contribute in some way to the war effort, but also brought the perceived threat of 
invasion closer to home. As the largest of the local mills, P&B was seen as a possible 
target in the event of an enemy attack. The mill was therefore manned on weekends in 
order to sound the alarm in case of an air strike. Trenches were also dug between the 
mill's back fence and nearby houses. During air raid drills, P&B's employees changed 
into hooded gear made out of sacks and proceeded to the trenches. One employee 
recalls that the mill's workers resembled members of the Klu Klux Klan during these 
5 Thyne Bros. Pty Ltd, To Director, Industrial Development Department, 13/3/1958: Thyne Bros. Pty 
Ltd Business Records, LMSS 136. 
6 At their 1937 AGM K&K directors regretfully noted the final closure of this mill, by then operating 
under the name Nettlefolds. 
Notes from K&K Chairman's Speech for Eighteenth AGM, 27 /8/1937. 
7 The industry would experience an exodus of workers once government restrictions were lifted. Some 
500 female employees had left P&B Launceston by late November 1945, for example, and numbers 
continued to decrease. 
'P&B, 22/11/1945', typed extract: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
8 Interview with P.M. Hart, 24/11/1995. 
9 Numbers employed are contradictory for this period. Morris-Nunn claims the figure was 2,000, 
while one extract from company files claims that, at its peak during the war, the factory employed 
1,200 females. Numbers of men employed were not included. The same extract also claims that pre-
war female employee numbers were at 600 plus, although other indicators suggest these figures are too 
low. 
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processions.10 The protection value of the outfits was questionable, and probably 
served only to make the hundreds of workers wearing them during any one shift all the 
more visible from above. Withal, such experience was yet another facet of the mills' 
integration with the Australian zeitgeist. 
While the war created opportunities for growth within the textile industry and 
most local mills worked at optimum production, one prominent Tasmanian had an even 
grander vision for the future of textile production in the region. In Australia's 
Tomorrow, published in late 1944, Sir Gerald Mussen offered his solution to the effects 
of Japanese textile competition. Mussen suggested that Japanese competition could be 
overwhelmed by a co-operative British/ Australian re-organisation of the textile 
industry. Already associated with the establishment of one of Tasmania's most 
significant industries, APPM, Mussen was a visionary whose achievements gave his 
views credence. 11 Nevertheless, his outline for creating a textile "wonder city"12 in 
northern Tasmania had a utopian element. Australia was chosen for locating his new 
city because of its proximity to raw materials. Northern Tasmania was specified as the 
ideal location because of unlimited hydro power and ample water, and presumably 
because it was closer to the mainland than southern Tasmania. Mussen's idea involved 
building the world's first planned city devoted primarily to manufacturing wool. It was 
to be an efficient, production-line place in which the wool arrived at one point, went 
through its various processes, and as finished product was ready for distribution at the 
other end of the city. The success of the idea hinged on scale. Mussen envisioned a 
city catering for 250,000 people, more than the size of Tasmania's entire population.13 
Britain's role in this scheme was to supply 50,000 woollen operatives, plus their 
families, an influx of workers equal to the population of Hobart. As the experience of 
Launceston's textile migrants in the 1920s had shown, the introduction of less than 200 
British textile workers caused some public discontent. A suggestion to introduce 
50,000 British workers would have been viewed as akin to a hostile invasion. Mussen 
Miranda Morris-Nunn & C.B. Tassell, Launceston's Industrial Heritage: A Survey (Launceston, 
1982), p.191; & 'P&B, 22/1111945', typed extract: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
10 Naomi King, 'Looking Back', 1978: National Trust Files, QVM. 
11 B.E. Kennedy, 'Mussen', Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 10, pp.653-4. 
12 Sir Gerald Mussen, 'Create a Wonder City', Australia's Tomorrow (Melbourne, November 1944), 
pp.84-87. 
13 There had been no census since 1933 but in 1945 the State's population was officially estimated at 
249,559. 
W.A. Townsley, Tasmania: From Colony to Statehood, 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991), p.456. 
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was not, however, the only one with grand plans for Australia's woollen industry. At 
the war's end the Australian Wool Development Company was planning to erect 
woollen mills in over 30 Australian centres, each mill valued at more than £500,000. 
Two of these were intended for Tasmania. 14 As ever, Launceston Council was 
enthusiastic about the venture, and informed the company of the city's textile tradition 
and predicted little difficulty in supplying the 1,500 operatives necessary. 15 Neither 
scheme eventuated for Launceston, but the proposals did demonstrate an ongoing 
confidence in the textile industry's potential. 
While the drawbacks of Launceston's focus upon textile manufacture had long 
been recognised, war-time reconstruction plans offered northern Tasmania its greatest 
opportunity for industrial diversification. When negotiations to establish an aluminium 
processing plant in Tasmania became public knowledge in July 1941, Launceston 
Council was quick to tell the principals concerned of their region's benefits. 
Dominated by largely female-employing textile mills, the Council pointed out that 
provision of male labour was no problem.16 From the Council's perspective the 
industry offered a solution to Launceston's industrial gender imbalance. Keen to 
encourage Tasmania's post-war development, Premier Cosgrove was instrumental in 
advancing Tasmania's claim for this industry.17 Plans progressed slowly, however, and 
after more than two years of inquiries and planning the Federal Cabinet decided that 
the Tasmanian proposal should be entirely Commonwealth owned. 18 Even then the 
plans met with some resistance. 
A public outcry erupted in February 1947 when the Examiner published a letter 
outlining serious side-effects linked with the industry. After receiving information 
about environmental and health problems associated with an aluminium refinery, 
Frederick Smithies (a noted Tasmanian bushwalker and man with a keen interest in the 
14 W.H. Mather, Consultant to the Directors, Australian Wool Development Company, To Mayor, 
18/3/1946: Launceston City Council, Industries General (1946-47), 23/1.11. 
15 Town Clerk, To W.H. Mather, 18/4/1946: Launceston City Council, 23/1.11. 
16 At this point the two likely contenders to run this operation were the Electrolytic Zinc Company of 
Australasia or White Metals Pty Ltd. 
Town Clerk, To F. Partridge, c/- General Motors-Holdens Ltd, Port Melbourne, 1617/1941: 
Launceston City Council, Industries General (Aluminium Industry) (1941-45), 23/1.10. 
Town Clerk, To Hugh Anderson, Melbourne, 17/7/1941: Launceston City Council, 23/1.10. 
17 W.A. Townsley, Tasmania: From Colony to Statehood, 1803-1945 (Hobart, 1991), p.451. 
18 The project was linked to war-time concerns that aluminium ingots necessary for defence purposes 
were currently being imported. 
'Aluminium Manufacture in Tasmania', 29/9/1943 (press cutting): Launceston City Council, 23/1.10. 
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State's natural beauty) concluded, "the project [had] nothing to commend it". 19 He 
also suggested that it was "possible to pay too high a price for any benefits which 
industrialisation may bring to the city". Public concern about Smithies' revelations was 
such that Premier Cosgrove personally affirmed that the refinery posed no danger to 
health or vegetation and that the people of Launceston "need have no apprehension". 20 
This was significant as one of the first occasions since the industrialisation push when 
environmental concerns were used to question the merit of manufacturing industry 
within northern Tasmania.21 The Tasmanian government continued slow to 
acknowledge that it was possible to pay too high a price to attract industry. The 
refinery eventually opened in 1955 at George Town, a small sea-side village 
approximately 30 miles from Launceston. Comalco purchased the Commonwealth's 
interest in this venture in 1960, and the industry went on to employ up to 2,000 
people.22 
As occurred after World War I, the aftermath of World War II saw a backlog in 
consumer demand which fared well for Launceston's woollen mills.23 Conditions 
similar to those encouraging the establishment of K&K and P&B almost three decades 
earlier also saw another British textile company considering establishment in 
Launceston. At various stages during the 1920s English cotton mogul, Amos Nelson, 
had been linked with the possible establishment of a Launceston based cotton mill. In 
1949 one of his companies, James Nelson, was again discussing plans to establish in 
Launceston, but the proposal was now to produce synthetic material. With 
Launceston's four existing mills devoted to the manufacture of wool, this was a 
diversification for the city's textile industry. Yet, in contrast to the widespread 
19 Examiner, 'Aluminium Project Questioned', 6/2/1947, p.2. 
See Ann G. Smith, 'Smithies', inADB, vol. 11, p.677. 
20 
'No Danger From Aluminium Plant', 1912/1947 (press cutting): Launceston City Council, 
Industries General (1946-47), 23/1.11. 
21 Pollution levels had been discussed in relation to the establishment of E.Z. in Hobart. 
Lloyd Robson, A History of Tasmania, Colony and State from 1856 to the 1980s, vol. II (Melbourne, 
1991), p.298. 
22 Robson & Roe, A Short History of Tasmania, p.139. 
23 The post-war backlog appears to have been met by the early 1950s, as indicated by declining 
employment numbers within the industry. For the year ended December 1951, for example, the 
State's largest decrease in employment numbers occurred in the woollen and spinning industry, which 
fell by 22% or 474 people. 
Department of Labour and Industry, Twelfth Annual Report for year ended 31/12/1951, No. 42, p.4: 
Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1952. 
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enthusiasm surrounding K&K and P&B's arrival, questions were raised as to whether 
Launceston really needed this latest venture. 
Upon learning that James Nelson proposed erecting a factory to produce rayon, 
one local resident warned Launceston' s mayor of the environmental dangers of 
synthetic manufacture. Reminiscent of concerns raised about the aluminium refinery, he 
acknowledged that all Launceston residents were anxious to see their city develop, but 
pointed out that "it is possible to pay too big a price for such an addition to our 
industrial progress".24 Insisting that a full inquiry was needed on "the obnoxious 
effluent" resulting from this industry, he added "that such manufacturers [had] found it 
difficult to arrange factory sites, owing to the almost poisonous nature of the effluent". 
The perception that synthetics directly competed with woollen goods may also have 
influenced local objections. One of the aims of Mussen's textile wonder~city had been 
to "provide an effective means of meeting the competition of synthetic fibres". 25 
Competition from synthetics was already a concern in the 1920s, but would 
increasingly impact upon natural fibre markets in the latter half of the century. 
Although all Launceston's textile mills repeatedly insisted that none were in direct 
competition with one another,26 James Nelson's arrival foreshadowed problems 
confronting woollen manufactures after World War II. 
Public concerns were ignored amidst local and State government enthusiasm to 
attract industry, particularly in light of employment needs of returned soldiers. While 
environmental issues were being raised (if not yet addressed) when weighing up the 
costs and benefits of new industry from the 1940s, in the 1920s the argument of cost 
versus benefit had centred around public money being used to support private ventures. 
These concerns remained valid after World War II as the State government's financial 
involvement in private industry appears to have increased. Along with the same type of 
concessions on water and hydro previously given to the other British textile companies, 
the State government went even further to attract industries such as James Nelson. In 
contrast to the post-World War I period, municipal government had a markedly lesser 
24 The resident pointed out that if the proposed mill planned only to manufacture goods from rayon 
yarn, few problems existed. If they manufactured their own yarn - which they did - the matter was 
altogether different. 
Private correspondence from 60 St. John Street, To Mayor Henty, 12/8/1949: Launceston City 
Council, Industries General (1948-49), 23/1.12. 
25 Mussen, Australia's Tomorrow, p.8. 
26 For example see Tasmanian Textile Society, Tasmania: The Textile State. 
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role in negotiations to attract industry after World War II. This reflected both an 
adjustment in the powers of the various government strata, and Launceston Council's 
loss of control over hydro sales (arguably the most significant factor in the attraction of 
industry immediately after World War I). In 1948 the Tasmanian government passed 
its Industries Establishment Act27 aimed at encouraging industry to settle within the 
State. 28 The most common incentive adopted saw the government pay for the erection 
of new factories. These were then leased to companies with an option to purchase 
after a specified period. By June 1954, 61 such buildings had been made available, and 
37 were still owned by the State.29 James Nelson (Australia) Pty Ltd's factory was 
constructed under this scheme. Located in Launceston's newest industrial suburb, 
Mowbray, the factory cost £53,183, was 35,000 sq. ft. in area, and was let at an annual 
rent of approximately £2,830.30 
James Nelson's establishment had many similarities with that of K&K and P&B. 
No locals were experienced in the manufacture of synthetics, so it was necessary for 
James Nelson to introduce migrant workers from England. The English parent 
company was based in Nelson, Lancashire, and most of the migrants hailed from that 
region. As in the aftermath of the World War I, Australia was increasingly concerned 
about its vulnerability. Nevertheless, at the height of campaigns promoting Australia's 
need to populate or perish, the experiences of James Nelson's textile migrants echoed 
many of the concerns and prejudices expressed towards Launceston' s industrial 
27 Industries Establishment Act, 1948, Advisory Coinmittee Report for the period ending 30/6/1949, 
No. 39, p.1: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1949. 
28 Forms of assistance included acquisition of land, erection of factories and leases with option to buy 
or renew, grants towards establishment expenses, subsidies, guarantees on overdrafts, and loans on 
security of real property. 
Industries Establishment Act, 1948, Advisory Committee. Report for the period ended 30/6/1950, No. 
36, p.l: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1950. 
29 Industrial Development, Report of Director for year ended 30/6/1954, No. 51, p.1: Tasmania, 
Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1954. 
The Advisory Committee was appointed under the Industries Establishment Act, 1948, the committee 
ceasing to exist on 31/3/1951 when the Industries Establishment Act expired. It was replaced by an 
Industrial Development Board. 
Industries Establishment Act 1948, Advisory Committee Report, for the period ended 30/611949 & 
30/6/1951, No. 39, p.1 & No. 50, p.1: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vols. 
1949 & 1951. 
30 Industries Establishment Act, 1948, Advisory Committee Report, for the period ended 30/3/1949, 
No. 39, p.14: Industrial Development Report of Director for year ended 30/611953, No. 43, p.3: 
Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vols. 1949 & 1953. 
By the early 1960s James Nelson had expanded to a floor space of 70,000 sq. ft. and would employ 
around 134 staff. 
'New Machinery', 23/8/63; & 'Factory Gets New Machinery", 1962: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z' 
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migrants three decades earlier. In many ways the ill-feeling toward JN's workers 
appears to-have been more intense than that experienced in the 1920s. Much of the 
trouble stemmed from local indignation that migrant workers could queue-jump the 
waiting list for housing. With Tasmania's housing shortfall estimated at approximately 
10,000 at the war's end, housing was given first priority from the start of 
reconstruction in Tasmania.31 As part of a deal to attract the company, JN's migrants 
had been given a special deal regarding housing and locals resented that the needs of 
newcomers were apparently given higher priority than their own. Feeling was such 
that, when one local builder learned that a house he was constructing was going to a 
JN migrant, he simply refused to finish the job. 32 (It seems the builder had ideas of 
moving into this particular residence himself.) In a battle of words through the 
Examiner, one of the industrial migrants responded to criticism by asking whether a 
major new industry should be expected to fold because its operatives could not find 
accommodation, or should the workers be expected to pitch tents in the paddock? 
They received little sympathy. A local respondent asked why the migrants thought it 
"degrading to live in tents".33 
Far for believing they had received preferential treatment, JN' s migrants felt 
misled and were shocked at the primitive conditions in which they were initially forced 
to reside. For the first few weeks after arrival accommodation for many of the 
migrants was, at best, crude. Some husbands and wives were placed into gender-
segregated bunk-houses, and bathroom facilities were little more than a hole in a shed 
in the back paddock. Accepting immigration propaganda about sunny Tasmania, the 
migrants had also arrived inadequately prepared for a Launceston winter. Most 
migrants went shopping for hot water bottles after experiencing their first (gender-
segregated) night in the city.34 
While the attraction of new industries received much public attention 
immediately after the war, government policy changes were occurring which had 
implications for the future development of both new and established industry. In 1947 
31 £1,010,000 had been approved for housing works at the time, £216,000 of this for Launceston. 
Ministerial Statement of The Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, 1944, Tabled in the House of 
Assembly on 21111/1944 by The Hon. Edward Brooker, No. 28, p.5: Tasmania, Journals and Printed 
Papers of Parliament, vol. 1944. , 
32 Jim Marwood, Ways of Working (Kenthurst, 1986), p.114. 
33 Marwood, Ways of Working, p.122. 
34 Marwood, Ways of Working, pp.109 & 119. 
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Tasmania's Director of Labour and Industry, E.J. Ogilvie, contended that we could no 
longer "live in isolation or ignore external controls of our trading and living 
standards".35 This was an obvious modification on the post-World War I push for 
national self-sufficiency. Despite the general sense of prosperity during the 1950s and 
1960s, inflation was also a concern in the early 1950s. In December 1953, Ogilvie's 
Department told of suggestions "that the most efficient but politically unpopular way to 
check inflation [was] to decrease certain tariffs and exchange rates drastically". 36 
Following World War I tariff protection was seen as serving the nation's greater good. 
After World War II attitudes were changing. In July 1958 director of the Australian 
Industries Development Commission concluded that ''Economic nationalism [had been] 
tried and failed". 37 He warned against "reverting to the practices of the inter-war 
period" in which countri~s sought "self-sufficiency within their own boundaries". With 
the textile industry particularly sensitive to outside competition, such attitudinal 
changes had an apocalyptic tone. 
Although both firms were consistently profitably during the 1950s and 1960s, 
negotiations over renewal of power and water contracts at P&B and K&K during this 
period demonstrate that these firms were not wholly contented with their lot. In the 
early 1950s both complained that vast increases in freight costs were reducing 
competitiveness with mainland manufacturers. P&B also bemoaned that the HBC 
would not grant them "anything approaching the liberal terms" previously given by the 
Council. 38 With more issues of significance to industry now in the hands of State 
authorities, the post-war Labor governments did not appear to cherish Launceston and 
its industrial development as highly as Launceston's own Council had when the scope 
of its powers were greater. With existing companies increasingly unable to extract the 
same concession levels from the State government, proposed increases in Council 
water charges therefore led to an outcry by both companies. P&B claimed the issue of 
35 Department of Labour and Industry, Seventh Annual Report for year ended 31/12/1946, No. 28, p.7: 
Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1947. 
36 Ogilvie pointed out that these measures needed to occur in conjunction with effectively controlling 
bank credit, capital issue, excess profits though banking, and taxation, in order to restrain spending to 
essential goods. 
Department of Labour and Industry, Fourteenth Annual Report for year ended 3111211953, No. 24, 
p.11: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1954. 
37 Australian Industries Development Association, Director's Report, No. 78, July 1957: 1974 
Newspaper Cuttings, CP. 
38 Gray, P&B Manager, To Town Clerk, 20/2/1950: Launceston City Council, Industries General 
(1950-51), 23/1.13. 
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competitiveness had "reached such serious proportions" that investigations had been 
made about relocating to the mainland. It was claimed the move had cost 
advantages.39 K&K suggested that increases in water costs might jeopardise future 
extensions at their Launceston mill.40 The Council stood firm. It claimed that 
concessions were never intended to be permanent and it was unreasonable to expect 
the Council to continue supplying water below cost.41 Neither company held good on 
their threats. P&B did not relocate and K&K did build further extensions. Power and 
water were, nevertheless, the two main incentives which had attracted the companies 
to Launceston in the first place. Removal of low cost charges in these areas meant that 
the city no longer had any great appeal besides the hold of capital investment in the 
mills themselves. As the future was to tell, when tariffs fell, existing capital investment 
would not be a strong enough incentive to remain. Although the industry's turning 
point did not occur until the 1970s, the level of government protection continued to be 
of concern to manufacturers throughout these years. The lifting of import restrictions 
in early 1960, for example, led to the textile industry's biggest slump in many years. In 
late 1961 emergency tariffs were required in an attempt to stop the decline. 42 
Government policy was changing during this period, and so too were many 
aspects of the mills themselves. Both companies saw a number of structural changes 
during these post-war years. In 1951 P&B's parent company decided to establish a 
separate Austra~an company. Control of all P&B's Australian operations were 
subsequently shifted to the newly formed P&B (Australia) Ltd, headquartered in 
Melbourne.43 The scope of P&B Launceston's operations also continued to expand 
throughout this period and, by 1966, the Launceston mill had over 2,100 employees44 
and reputedly was the largest manufacturing plant of its kind in the Southern 
hemisphere. From 1 January 1969 P&B's Australian company changed its name to 
39 P&B claimed that a site had already been purchased in NSW, admittedly intended foremost for a 
warehouse extension, but that investigations had shown that even with high building costs the 
company could still sell their goods cheaper than their mainland competitors if they made the move. 
4° K&K Director, L.D. Overstall, To Town Clerk, 20/2/1950: Launceston City Council, 23/1.13. 
41 Memorandum for Works Committee, 7/3/1950: Launceston City Council, 23/1.13. 
42 
'Textile Slump Feared from Import Increases', 20/3/1963: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
43 Minutes 4/6/1951, No. 51/2: L. Denham, Book 2. 
P&B (Australia) Ltd was registered as a public company in the State of Victoria on 27 April, 1951. 
As the company's sales distributor, the Melbourne branch had handled many of the administrative 
aspects of the Launceston mill since the early 1930s and was the logical base for the new company's 
main office. 
44 Examiner 5/11/1966, p.3. 
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Coats Patons (Australia) Ltd after an amalgamation with cotton giant J. & P. Coats.45 
The following year the Australian company merged with Bonds Industries Ltd, to form 
Bonds Coats Patons (Australia) Ltd, and was now the largest textile operation in the 
country.46 By the early 1960s K&K (Tas) was also a leader in its field. Described as 
"one of Australia's most successful mills",47 K&K (Tas)'s achievements convinced the 
parent company to purchase the whole of the Launceston mill's locally owned 
component. 48 With Australian shareholders offered a deal too good to refuse, 49 K&K 
(Tas) became a wholly owned subsidiary of K&K Ltd in 1963. Coats Patons' British 
parent company then gained controlling interest in K&K (Tas)'s parent company in 
1969.5° K&K (Tas) and Coats Patons Launceston were now ultimately controlled by 
the same board of directors. Launceston's other British owned textile company, James 
Nelson, likewise underwent structural changes during these years. Its parent company 
was taken over by giant synthetic firm, Courtaulds, in November 1963.51 
Changes were also notable in the composition of the mills' work force, 
/' 
particularly at P&B. While the introduction of British workers had caused some 
concern in the 1920s, by the 1950s and 1960s P&B became a more ethnically diverse 
work place. European migrants speaking little English found P&B to be one of the few 
places in Launceston where they could acquire work. By 1961 the mill had 171 new 
Australians from 17 different countries. Italians were predominant.52 This 
transformation appears to have occurred with little local comment, but perhaps reflects 
more upon a changing perception toward textile work than a revolution in attitudes 
towards migrants. As noted in chapter 6, migrants were most willingly accepted if they 
undertook the type of employment that few locals wanted. When much comment was 
45 The Australian company had continued to operate under its original name until this point. 
'Coats Patons (Australia) Limited', Typed Extract: CP Miscellaneous. 
'Company Structure Being Changed ... ', October 1968: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
46 
'What Bonds Stands to Gain From Coats Patons Merger', 19/611970: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'; 
Examiner 19/6/1970: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
47 
'Doctor's Real, Live Lord', May 1970: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z' 
48 The parent company gave assurances that K&K (Tas) would retain its locally resident board of 
directors and continue "as an autonomous company subject only to financial control and broad policy 
directives from the parent company". 
Kelsall and Kemp Limited, 1815-1965, p.27. 
49 In late November 1962 directors agreed to offer £8 Australian per £1 ordinary share and £1. Ss. per 
£ 1 cumulative share conditional upon acceptance by 20 December. 
K&K Minutes 27/11/1962: July 1961-May 1967. 
50 Minutes of Directors' Meetings, 21/10/1969: RAK Minute Book (June 1965-June 1976). 
51 
'L'ton Fibre Firm in U.K. Buy-Out Bid', 14/1111963; & 'Giant Bid of Nelson Accepted', 
14/11/1963; CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J' & 'K-Z'. 
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being made about migrants taking local jobs in the 1920s, unemployment was high and 
authorities were attempting to direct migrants into jobs which few Australians wanted, 
particularly as domestics and farm labourers. By the 1950s, almost full employment 
had been achieved, demand for domestic labour was less significant, and the need for 
farm labour was on the decline with the increasing application of technology to 
agriculture.53 As the economy evolved and technology advanced, new employment 
opportunities were also created. Unlike their mother's generation in the 1920s, girls of 
the post-World War II period could and did opt for white-blouse employment. Factory 
labour's main appeal continued to be ease of employment access to traditionally 
disadvantaged groups. 
There were further shifts among the communities that formed around both mills 
from the late 1920s. In the 1960s a breakdown of these communities began to occur. 
Rather than corresponding with the physical decline of the industries - which did not 
occur until the 1970s - this to.ok place when the textile industry was at its peak as far as 
employment levels were concerned. In the days of almost universal car ownership, the 
story for these suburbs was a common one. As distance from one's place of 
employment became less important when considering housing locations, people began 
moving out of these industrial suburbs into the more popular residential suburbs.54 
When survival of the industry was under attack the following decade, however, a 
strong sense of community was still evident. 
Tasmania's textile industry was at its peak in the 1960s, employing around 
4,000 people or 11.5% of the State's manufacturing work force. 55 The rate of 
expansion at P&B was such that the mill had almost reached its site's limits by the mid-
1960s. When the company decided to extend its oper.ations to include synthetic 
production, a decision was made to establish a small plant at neighbouring George 
Town. Employment at George Town centred around its single large industry, 
aluminium producer Comalco. With Comalco almost exclusively a male domain, 
52 A.B. Stirling, To A.P. Stirling, 4/5/1961 in 'Some Old Records oflnterest from 1923': Held by CP. 
s3 A third of the Tasmanian population had been categorised as primary producers in 1937, the figure 
had fallen to only 11% by 1961. 
Lloyd Robson, A Short History of Tasmania, (Melbourne, 1985), p.171. 
s4 Grade 60, Glen Dhu Primary School, A History of Glen Dhu School and Community (1986), p.18. 
The students based their conclusions about Glen Dhu' s population decline upon school enrolments, 
which peaked at over 1,000 in the 1950s and began to fall off in the 1960s. Many of their families 
would also have worked at the mill and therefore had first hand knowledge of the suburb's demise. 
ss Tasmanian Textile Society, Tasmania: The Textile State. 
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residents welcomed any new factory offering employment opportunities for its female 
population. Ironically, Comalco's establishment had been welcomed for going some 
way toward rectifying the female dominated labour imbalance in the Launceston 
region. The community which had built up around this male dominated industry, 
however, was now experiencing the same problems with its female residents as had 
Launceston with males three decades earlier. The new P&B plant was initially to 
employ 40 women and a few men, with numbers to increase later.56 The 200,000 sq. 
ft. building and machinery cost $750,00057 and production started in July 1967.58 The 
new factory supplemented production at the Launceston mill by spinning acrylic yarns 
for the machine knitting trade. 59 Although the terms of any deals are uncertain, it is 
likely the company was granted significant concessions or offered financial incentives 
by the State government for establishing in this out of the way location. A site closer 
to their existing mill would certainly have been more convenient. Further suggesting 
there were benefits on offer for establishing in George Town, a couple of clothing 
manufacturers moved to this town around the same time, and K&K were also planning 
to shift their mending and darning section into George Town the previous year. 
Initially to employ 12 women (later rising to 20), K&K's proposal was to handle cloth 
which was woven in Launceston, transferred to George Town, and then returned. 
Although temporary arrangements were made for K&K to use an established building60 
and the government pledged to assist the move,61 K&K's George Town expansion did 
not eventuate. 
Signs of impending difficulties for the textile industry were evident by the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The Department of Industrial Development and Trade noted in 
its 1970-71 Annual Report that the State's industrial growth had been ''unfavourably 
influenced by events and developments which originated outside Tasmania". 62 Marxist 
economist Karl Polanyi epitomised the helplessness many felt in the early 1970s in the 
face of an increasingly transnational world economy, claiming that "Nations and 
56 Examiner, 5/1111966, p.3. 
57 
'New Mill', undated paper cutting: CP Miscellaneous & Examiner, 5/1111966, p.3. 
58 George Town Committee, Works Study Dept., 29/6/1967: George Town Satellite Production, 1965-
67. 
59 
'New Mill', undated paper cutting: CP Miscellaneous & Examiner, 511111966, p.3. 
60 
'George Town Industry' & 'George Town may get New Industry', Examiner, 23/7/1965: CP Press 
Cuttings, 'K-Z'. 
61 Examiner, 24/7/65: CP Press Cuttings. 
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peoples were mere puppets in a show utterly beyond their controf'.63 Despite earlier 
acknowledging the impact of outside influences, in 1972-73 the Industrial Department 
commented that "Tasmania is noted for stability in industrial matters".64 Offered as 
proof was the steady expansion of Tasmania's textile industry during that financial 
year. 
Past industrial stability meant little as subsequent events unfolded. Eric 
Hobsbawm, defines 1973 as the end of what he terms "the Golden Age" (its start in 
1946).65 According to Hobsbawm the international oil crisis,66 triggering inflation and 
unemployment, marked a clear divide between the period of post-war p~osperity and 
the troubled times which followed. The beginning of the Australian textile industry's 
decline supports Hobsbawm's contention and can be more specifically pin-pointed as 
June 1973 when the new federal Labor government announced that tariffs on textile 
products would be slashed by 25%. For synthetic manufacturers readjustment had 
already begun, with, on average, a 10% reduction in tariff protection implemented by 
December 1971. 67 Tariff cuts were not the only factors influencing the textile 
industry's downturn. As part of attempts to "dampen down inflation", the government 
had also undertaken two unilateral revaluations of the Australian dollar (in December 
1972 and September 1973), and decided not to devalue in line with the USA dollar in 
February 1973. It further introduced preferential trading arrangements for developing 
countries in the Australian market in July 1973, implemented an agreement to accord 
minimum margins of preference to New Zealand in August 1973, and eased quotas on 
some garment imports. Occurring within a short space of time, these measures "dealt a 
severe blow to the Australian textile industry". 68 The introduction of equal wages for 
women was significant to an industry reliant upon a predominantly female work force. 
62 Industrial Development and Trade, Report of the Director for 1970-71, No. 54, p.5: Tasmania, 
Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1971. 
63 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, 
1971), p.217. 
64 Industrial Development and Trade, Report of the Director for 1972-73, No. 54, p.3: Tasmania, 
Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1973. 
65 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (London, 1994) pp.8 & 244. 
66 While the effect of the oil crisis would impact upon the world economy and therefore upon the 
industries in question the immediate impact of this event was beneficial to manufacturers of natural 
textile fibres. It increased the cost of synthetics which are produced from oil. Expanding in early 
1974, K&K noted that the oil crisis meant full orders for them. 
'Launceston Plant Expands', 16/1/1974: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z'. 
67 
'Falling Textile Tariffs', by Tony Maiden, 7/12/1971: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
68 
'Uncertain Future for Textile Industry' (undated paper cuttings): QVM, Box MS5, 1977:79:28. 
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The impact of the tariff cuts was not immediate. One 1974 Financial Review 
editorial noted: "The much heralded slump in the textile industry, forecast last year 
after the Federal Government cut tariffs all around, has yet to show up in major textile 
company profits".69 Nevertheless the slump was not far away. Between May and 
August 1974 there was a reduction of 770 textile workers in the Launceston district.70 
By 1975 the State government noted that the Tasmanian firms most adversely affected 
by Australia's deepening recession were Launceston's textile producers71 and, in the 
two and a half years ended November 1976, employment in the State's textile industry 
had halved.72 Nationally employment in the textile industry fell by 38,000 in the three 
years until March 1977.73 None of Launceston's textile manufacturers escaped 
substantial cuts. 
The Examiner raised the human element of government policy changes and was 
scathing as to how Labor had handled the tariff cuts. In the aftermath of E.G. 
Whitlam's late-1975 defeat, the paper insisted that while: 
sound academic arguments were found for its decisions, ... Labour made the politically 
indefensible mistake of not preparing for the results. Thousands of textile workers were 
thrown out of jobs and the rather startled amateurs posing as Ministers went around 
muttering 'What do we do now?".74 
Launceston resident and Tasmania's only Liberal Cabinet Minister, Kevin Newman, 
was reminded that "the Labor Government's mauling of the textile industry" was the 
main reason he had won a 1975 by-election in the Bass electorate. While the Examiner 
was optimistic that Newman would "work energetically within Federal Parliament" on 
the issue of job losses within the textile industry, Newman appeared to miss the point 
being made. The following day he commented that "labour intensive industries such as 
textile, were gradually pricing themselves out of the market". 75 The State Secretary of 
the Textile Workers' Union, Derek Holden, responded that: ''Employees in 
manufacturing and labour intensive industries [would take] little comfort from Mr. 
69 
'Bonds Coats Patons ... Where is the Tariff Reduced Recession?', Financial Review, CP Press 
Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
70 This included Launceston and George Town (George Town was the base for CP's satellite factory). 
'Mill on Holiday to Avoid Layoffs', 28/8/1974: CP Press Cuttings, 'K-Z'. 
71 Industrial Development and Trade, Report of the Director for 1974-75, No. 76, p.4: Tasmania, 
Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 1975. 
72 Mercury, 10 & 11/1111976. 
73 Examiner, 25/3/1977. 
74 Examiner, 10/9/1976. 
75 Examiner, 11/9/1976. 
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Newman's remarks''.76 Holden was incredulous that someone receiving well over 
$25,000 a year could make this claim to his workers. Some Coats Patons employees 
received as little as $123.30 a week. 
Coats Patons' George Town factory was the first casualty of the downturn, 
closing in 1976.77 More significant was the winding down of K&K (Tas) which also 
began that year. Here indeed, did the irony of history play. The arrival of K&K and 
P&B in Launceston had been the embryonic stage of expanding into the multinational 
giant their mutual parent company would become. In 1963, even before taking over 
K&K Ltd, J.P. Coats, Patons & Baldwins Ltd employed over 70,000 people in. 26 
countries.78 While little thought vi:as given to consequences of foreign ownership in the 
1920s, events in K&K (Tas)'s final years brought home the disadvantages for Tasmania 
of remote, profit driven multinationals. Since K&K Ltd gained full control of a 
profitable K&K (Tas) in 1960, locals maintained that inadequate money was reinvested 
in the firm to ensure its continuing viability. This trend reputedly continued after K&K 
was taken over by Coats Patons. When Australia's high cost structure and small 
domestic market were combined with changing world conditions, it made better 
financial sense for a multinational company to let such plants as K&K (Tas) run down 
and die a natural death, than to invest further money which could provide greater 
returns elsewhere. 
K&K (Tas) had been experiencing difficulties even before the 1973 tariff cuts 
were implemented and would not again pay a dividend after 1970.79 By November 
1974, their position was so acute that K&K was one of only six Australian textile 
companies offered interim government assistance (under strict conditions). 8° K&K's 
work force had dropped from 406 to 250 in the six months prior to that date.81 By 
early June 1976, a major restructuring of K&K (Tas) was announced which signalled 
the ~ginning of the end for the firm. All the company's assets and liabilities, excluding 
land and buildings, were to be sold to Coats Patons (Australia) Ltd, and K&K was to 
trade as a division of that company. K&K (Tas)'s name was also changed to Doctor 
76 Examiner, 13/9/1976. 
77 Sixteen staff were retrenched due to the closure, and the government was making efforts to find an 
alternative industry to fill Coats Patons' empty premises at George Town in September 1976. 
Mercury, 8/9/1976 & Examiner, 91911916. 
78 
'To Start Soon', 16/10/1963: CP Press Cuttings, 'A-J'. 
79 Examiner, 25/3/1977. 
80 
'Six Clothing Finns Will Get $1M Help', undated: CP Newspaper Cuttings, 1974/76. 
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Textile Mills Ltd as of 21 June 1976. "Doctor" was the company trademark. That 
company was then to be placed in liquidation, to be effected by 1 January 1977. 
Remaining assets were to be distributed amongst shareholders. Company secretary, 
John Watson (later Senator) was appointed liquidator.s2 
Events in the last six months of K&K (Tas)'s operations, did most to suggest 
that the parent company had no intention of saving this firm. After the impending 
closure was publicly announced, textile journal Rag trade questioned the company's 
explanation that imports and high cost were responsible for the closure. By the time 
the closure was announced, K&K was "firmly back in a healthy trading position after a 
hard struggle over the past few years". s3 Ragtrade therefore asked why "the parent 
organisation has closed the plant at this particular point". It was particularly interested 
in a deal between Bonds Coats Patons and South Australian textile manufacturer, 
Onkaparinga. The agreement gave Onkaparinga the option to purchase K&K (Tas)'s 
machinery on the basis that none of this machinery be used in competition with 
Onkaparinga in Tasmania. s4 Ragtrade also questioned why the financially troubled 
Onkaparinga was better able to produce the mill's products more profitably than 
K&K.ss Thyne Bros. and Waverley Woollen Mills had formed a local consortium in 
late March 1977 in an attempt to keep K&K operating, but their efforts failed because 
of Bonds Coats Patons' agreement with Onkaparinga. Coats Patons had also refused a 
"most generous offer" of government assistance to encourage them to reconsider their 
decision. s6 Any rescue bid soon became impractical, as K&K' s remaining staff took 
other jobs as they arose and left the mill with too few employees to operative 
effectively.s7 Ragtrade concluded that "All appeals to the company's responsibility to 
the people of Tasmania to keep the mill going [had] failed". Federal Minister, Kevin 
Newman promised to draw the attention of the Corporate Affairs Commission's to the 
deal between Bonds Coats Patons and Onkaparinga with a view to investigating 
possible breaches of the Trade Practices Act.ss Nevertheless, K&K (Tas) closed its 
81 Examiner, 
82 Minutes 2/6/1976: RAK Minute Book, June 1965 - June 1976. 
83 
'Good Bye K&K', Ragtrade, No. 112, April 15.30, 1977: QVM, Box MS5, 1977/79/28. 
84 Examiner, 2/411977. 
85 Onkaparinga had recently reported a substantial loss. 
86 
'Good Bye K&K', Ragtrade, No. 112, April 15.30, 1977: QVM, Box MS5, 1977179/28. 
87 Mercury, 29/3/1977, p.3. 
88 Newman was described as being at the forefront of the battle to stop K&K's closure. 
'Good Bye K&K', Ragtrade, No. 112, April 15.30, 1977: QVM, Box MS5, 1977/79/28. 
227 
doors on 30 June 1977. The closure saw 238 people lose their jobs (although many of 
these had left before the final date), and $2,000,000 in annual wages, plus another 
$1,000,000 in indirect wages and services, lost to northern Tasmania. Upon K&K' s 
closure the State government could only comment that the textile industry's future was 
uncertain and depended largely upon long-term policies on freight and tariffs. 89 Little 
certainty lay ahead. 
An event marking K&K's demise demonstrated Launceston's affiliation with 
the mill. When K&K (Tas )' s closure was first announced local headlines read 
"Millhands Weep" and told how a "feeling of utter despair" had gripped K&K staff.90 
Once the inevitability of the event was accepted, employees celebrated their connection 
with K&K (Tas). In May 1977 nearly 1,000 past and present employees and their 
partners jammed into the Albert Hall for a "whopping wake".91 Leaving little doubt 
who was culpable, the Examiner noted that, after 56 years in Launceston, K&K was 
being "closed by the multi-national parent company". 92 The mill subsequently provided 
premises for a number of small business ventures and also housed the Launceston 
chapter of "the Outlaws" motor bike club. Suffering from the effects of weathering 
and neglect, the mill was demolished in 1996 to make way for warehouse facilities.93 
P&B's George Town satellite factory and K&K (Tas) were the only textile 
manufacturers in the Launceston region to close in the 1970s. Tariff protection, vital 
to the survival of Australia's textile industry, no longer had the same sanctity as when 
the establishment of this industry was seen as a matter of national pride and self-
determination. The tariff, debate throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s would be 
dominated by federal government rhetoric about level playing fields, even though 
regions with low labour costs had significant advantages and very few countries 
adhered to Australia's self-imposed standards. Then came a backlash of sorts. With 
manufacturing industry nation-wide on the decline, rhetoric echoing that of the post 
World War I period re-emerged. In 1979, Bonds Coats Patons Ltd Chairman, W.R. 
Slade, discussed government consideration of further tariff reductions: 
89 The Tasmanian Economy, No. 42, p.17: Tasmania, Journals and Printed Papers of Parliament, vol. 
1977. 
90 Examiner, 25/3/1977. 
91 Examiner, 14/5/1977. 
92 Examiner, 14/5/1977. 
93 Examiner, 1117/1996. 
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The Government strongly promotes the need for maximum local processing of our raw 
materials. Australians quite rightly do not want their country to become just a quarry. But 
this principal holds good for more than minerals. Australian textile producers are major 
processors of the raw materials supplied by our great rural industries. 94 
While the general concept of industry's importance to nationhood remained, by the late 
1970s its seemed that woollen manufacturing had lost its place as the icon for 
industrialisation. Textile manufacturers now had to try and convince the government 
of their industry's national significance. 
The 1970s ended with Launceston's textile industry operating on a greatly 
reduced scale. The decline continued into the 1980s and 1990s. Tasmania's oldest 
privately owned woollen manufacturer, Waverley Woollen Mills, had operated 
continually since 1874 and been under the control of the Hogarth family since the 
1890s. The mill's long heritage offered no immunity from current hardships. 
However, the reasons for Waverley Woollen Mills' decline differ somewhat from those 
affecting Launceston's other textile mills. Bob Hogarth maintains that the tariff cuts 
"had little or no effect on the blanket industry . . . imported blankets were not the 
problem''.95 In his view declining demand for their product in the 1970s was the result 
of a long period of extremely mild winters, rapid acceptance of continental quilts, and 
more efficient home heating. By 1979-80 the company had made a number of small 
trading losses and its non-working shareholders "became restive". 96 A decision was 
therefore made to place the mill on the market. After negotiations with a potential 
Italian company fell through, staff were advised that the mill was winding down for 
closure.97 Waverley was, however, granted a reprieve. One of the deals under way 
during the mill's last days came to fruition and the mill was purchased by Melbourne 
famµy, the Temples. Again hitting difficulties in the early 1990s, Waverley was $2.6 
million in debt and forced to close when a buyer could not be found. 98 Waverley was 
once again rescued by a Melbourne buyer, John Fahey, who purchased the mill and 
reopened it soon after.99 
Survival within Australia's textile industry had long hinged upon ability to 
diversify and change direction as circumstances changed. This ability was just as 
94 Bonds Coats Patons Ltd Annual Report 1979, Chairman's Statement (by W. Russell Slade), p.3. 
95 Talk to Industrial Heritage Group by Bob Hogarth, 11/6/1996; Examiner, 3/811977. 
96 Talk to Industrial Heritage Group by Bob Hogarth, 1116/1996. 
97 Examiner, 5/5/1981. 
98 Examiner, 11611990. 
99 Examiner, 3/8/1991. 
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important, if not more so, in the post-tariff cut environment. Waverley epitomised this 
ability to change. Waverley Woollen Mills, for example, had been one of Australia's 
pioneers in electric blanket manufacture, commencing production in 1961. 100 In the 
1980s they attempted to link into an increasing Australian interest in its Scottish 
heritage by expanding into tartan production. The mill also took advantage of its own 
heritage to capture part of the tourist trade. Guided tours of the mill provided since 
the 1980s101 were complimented by a coffee shop and a store which sold the mill's 
merchandise on site. Waverley attracted further tourists to their out of the way 
location by housing an automobile museum. The only one of these side-lines 
continuing to operate today is the merchandise shop. The mill employed a total of 65 
workers in February 1998.~02 
Soon after Waverley's crisis in the early 1980s, closure . of synthetic 
manufacturer, James Nelson, also appeared inevitable. The mill was one day away 
from its determined closing date when a deal was struck between a number of its staff 
and Omnitex. The deal was contingent upon four of JN' s employees in key positions 
also investing in the venture. 103 This involved going into substantial personal debt to 
invest in a company whose future was uncertain. The decision of the employees 
involved to do just that not only ensured their services were retained and they were 
wholly committed to the venture's success, but their actions engendered loyalty from 
the wider work force. James Nelson again hit the headlines in the mid-1990s after 
developing a new material, demand for which outweighed their production capacity. 
By mid-1997, however, uncertainty over tariff policy again raised questions about their 
future survival. In February 1998 the company employed 78 workers.104 
The last of the privately owned mills to be established in the 1920s, Thyne 
Bros. Pty Ltd, also underwent a number of changes in the post 1970s period. A 
prosperous post-war period had seen Thyne Bros. became Australia's largest 
manufacturer of lambs' wool garments by the 1960s.105 Nevertheless, by August 1974 
100 Part of the need for constant innovation can be seen in this example. Within two years of the mill 
commencing production of this line there was said to be 20 other producers doing likewise, and after a 
further two years the product had become uneconomical. 
Talk to Industrial Heritage Group by Bob Hogarth, 111611996. 
101 Examiner, 3/1211981. 
102 Employment figures compliments of Waverley Woollen Mills, 3/2/1998. 
103 Jim Marwood, Ways of Working, p.131. 
104 Employment figures compliments of Waverley Woollen Mills, 3/2/1998. 
105 International imports would, however, soon bring an end to this claim to fame. 
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the mill's production had fallen to 10% of its capacity. 106 Between December 1973 
and March 1977 numbers employed at Thyne's fell from 101 to only 9.107 Due to this 
down-turn in business the company decided to sell the inner-city premises it had 
occupied since the 1920s and lease factory space. 108 Operations began from a vacant 
section at Waverley Woollen Mills in August 1977.109 The down-tum meant that 
Waverley likewise had space available. A subsequent change in ownership at Waverley 
saw Thyne Bros. move to their present site in South Launceston in 1981. 110 The 
following year the firm changed its name to Tamar Knitting Mills, m after the 
registered brand-name used since commencing operations, Tamar Knitwear. Like 
Waverley, it opened a shop near the mill to sell merchandise, and visitor sales provided 
about 40% of company revenue in May 1996. The founding family, the Thynes, sold 
their remaining interest in the frrm to interstate buyers in May 1996.112 In February 
1998 Tamar Knitting Mills employed 26 people.113 
As the largest textile employer in Launceston, and indeed the State, Coats 
Patons hardest felt the effects of the 1973 tariff cuts. Between 1972 and 1982 
employee numbers at Coats Patons' Launceston mill fell from 1520 to 585. 114 
Although operating on a greatly reduced scale by the end of the 1970s, Coats Patons 
weathered much of the 1980s. Late in that decade, however, conditions again took a 
down-turn. One of Coats Patons' main problems was an on-going decline in the 
popularity of hand-knitting. In addition, imported ready-made synthetic jumpers were 
now cheap and available. When Peter Dickson took over as general manager in the 
early 1990s, substantial staff reductions were necessary in an attempt to produce 
anywhere near the target figures set by the parent company. As managerial salaries 
constituted the greatest cost, this group was targeted. The retrenchment of many of 
the mill's most experienced workers brought its own problems and also increased 
employee dissatisfaction. Many of the workers involved felt a great sense of loyalty 
'A Darn Good Yarn', Examiner, 25/10/1982. 
106 Examiner, 29/811974: CP Newspaper Cuttings, 1974/76. 
107 Examiner, 15/4/1982. 
108 Examiner, 29/8/1974: CP Newspaper Cuttings, 1974176. 
109 Examiner, 16/8/1977. 
110 Examiner 12/2/1991, p.21. 
Another reference claims that the move was made in 1983 (see Examiner, 24/5/1996) 
111 Examiner, 1115/1992. 
112 Examiner, 25/1111996. 
113 Examiner, 24/5/1996, p.15. 
114 Examiner, 15/4/1982, p.7. 
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toward the mill, a loyalty which had little reciprocity. Such values no longer had any 
place in the world of big business. Short-term, Launceston benefited from this value-
set. In 1991 the parent company decided to close its Sydney and Melbourne plants and 
centralise in Launceston, consequently creating 110 new jobs. Decision makers 
pointed out that economics, not sentiment, were at work. The deciding factor had 
been that the Launceston mill was owned outright, whereas the Sydney and Melbourne 
operations were "leased properties on expensive capital land". 115 People and 
communities mattered little in such reasoning. 
Early 1996 saw the appointment of the mill's first general manager not 
permanently based in Launceston since William Stewart briefly held the position during 
the mill's construction in 1922-23. This decision signed the parent company's lack of 
commitment to the long-term viability of the Launceston mill. Although the possibility 
of closure was not unexpected, the May 1997 announcement offering three months 
notice still shocked its 175 employees.116 The parent company had decided to move its 
Launceston operations to New Zealand after amalgamating with the New Zealand 
· company, Alliance Textile Ltd. New Zealand had been an important part of the parent 
company's business since the 1920s but, more significantly, had a cheaper labour cost 
structure than Australia. Strike action followed the announcement of the redundancy 
package. Its terms seemed to prove the company's lack of interest in its employees' 
welfare. Soon after P&B first opened, the Examiner commented that, "It was difficult 
to see how it could possibly fail". 117 After 74 years of operation Coats Patons' 
Launceston mill closed its doors on 31 July 1997. In late December the factory was 
acquired by Southern Wool Tasmania, a consortium of 15 Tasmanian woolgrowers and 
Victorian investors who planned to produce wool tops for the export market. In 
February 1998 the multinational Anglo-American Standard Wool Corporation became 
an equity partner in this $8,000,000 venture, which is expected to begin operations 
around May 1998 and employ 34 people.118 
While a sense of vulnerability encouraged industrialisation after the World War 
I, the decline of tariff protected industries since the 1970s brought that theme again to 
the fore. A 1989 employment summit pointed out that such vulnerability was a 
115 Examiner, 21/10/1991, p.8. 
116 See Examiner, Mercury, & Advocate, 6/5/1997. 
117 Examiner, 26/111924, p.5. 
118 Mercury, 31/12/1997, p.11 & Sunday Tasmanian, 22/2/1998. 
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consistent theme in Tasmania. 119 Tasmania, and Australia generally, had long been 
keen to attract any investment capital, but the summit recognised that Tasmania had 
suffered further because ownership and/or control of so many of the State's industries 
lay outside Tasmania. 120 The experience of K&K and P&B reinforces this point, yet all 
the while Tasmania appears unable to alter its reliance upon capital from outside the 
State. Focus and blame for the State's woes have therefore been directed toward other 
aspects of Tasmania's economy. In the early 1980s economic analysts concluded that 
Tasmania's long adherence to hydro-industrialisation - significant in attracting the two 
companies under consideration - was now a discredited strategy and that a major 
restructuring of the economy was inescapable. 121 Economic rationalism added its 
accent to criticism of erstw~e policy. John Madden, from the University of 
Tasmania's Centre of Regional Economic Analysis, maintained Tasmania's interests 
had been best served by the tariff cuts to clothing, footwear, textiles and motor 
vehicles. 122 Madden added that "clothing, textiles and footwear, although important to 
a degree in Launceston and along the coast are not so important as those industries 
that would gain". Such reasoning seemed to allot the north more than its fair share of 
sacrifice for the supposed greater good. (Although Madden claimed that even northern 
Tasmania benefited from the tariff cuts). 
One benefit Launceston did gain from industry decline was development of 
educational facilities. The fall-out from the tariff cuts saw some political incumbents in 
industrially dominated electorates ousted and governments going into damage control. 
This was certainly the case in Launceston, core of the Bass electorate, which in mid-
1975 foreshadowed the nation's repudiation of Whitlam's Labor. When discussing the 
problems of industry in September 1976, federal member for Bass, Kevin Newman, 
claimed there was "an urgent need to change the base of employment" in 
119 Employment Summit, lnfonnation Paper No. 3, Key Features of the Tasmanian Economy, 
Tasmanian Employment Summit, 28-29 Nov. 1989, Parliament House, Hobart. 
Economic vulnerability was also seen to be increased by the extent of linkages between agricultural 
and manufacturing industries. 
Tasmania's Economic Challenge (State of Tasmania), July 1988. 
120 In 1989 the 10 largest private sector employers in Tasmania were all either mainland or overseas 
owned or controlled companies. Until the 1970s P&B would have ranked in this list, but by the 1980s 
was no longer large enough to be included. 
121 R. Taplin & P. Tighe, The Implications of Uneven Australian Resource Development for 
Tasmania, University of Tasmania, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper, 14, 1989. 
122 Tasmania: Economic Status, Proceedings of a Forum Conducted by the Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, University of Tasmania, 19/2/1982. 
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Launceston. 123 He pointed out that the establishment of the Maritime College and 
proposed Tasmanian Institute of Advance Education would assist in this change. Blue-
collar employment had dominated the region since the 1920s, but was now on the 
decline. A change of public attitudes to education was therefore necessary in a State 
where higher school retention rates were traditionally poor. All major developments 
occurred post-1973. These included the restructuring of the Hobart-based Tasmanian 
College of Advanced Education, its core moving to Launceston in 1979 to join the 
existing teacher's college. Expanded, it was renamed the Tasmanian State Institute of 
Technology in 1985, and amalgamated with the University in 1991.124 Perhaps the 
most blatant government attempt to appease Launceston voters through improved 
educational facilities was the establishment of the Commonwealth funded Australian 
Maritime College. The selection of Launceston as the site for this new institution was 
announced on 10 June 1975 in the middle of the campaign for a particularly important 
by-election in the Bass electorate, and followed close on the heels of major job losses 
in the textile industry. As Launceston's own maritime facilities offered little 
competition with other centres, the decision appeared to be based wholly on political 
rather than rational grounds.125 
Launceston's transition to a city which now places greater emphasis upon its 
educational facilities than was the case during its industrial zenith has arguably been a 
successful one. Students in that city and its region might now stay at school longer and 
move on to tertiary work. Yet the decline of the State's largest industries and 
subsequent failure to replace them with alternate job opportunities means that 
employment prospects are dim even, indeed especially, for these people. One of the 
reasons Tasmania sought industries such as K&K and P&B after World War I was to 
stop its youth leaving the State. A constant lament about Tasmania's brain drain 
suggests that, in this regard, industrial alternatives have proven unsuccessful. 
123 Examiner, 11/9/1976. 
124 Robson and Roe, A Short History of Tasmania, p.178. 
125 See Alison Alexander (assisted by a committee of Barrie Lewarn et al), The History of the 
Australian Maritime College (Newnham, 1994), p.10. 
2 9. The vibrancy of P&B can be seen at the end of a shift in the 1940s. 
30. Above - K&K (Tas) in the early 1930s. (Note the increase in 
size compared with illustration No. 9.) 
31. Below - Further growth at K&K by the late 1940s included a 
new office block and filtration plant. 
32. Above - Aerial view of K&K (Tas) in the ntid- l 960s. 
33 . Below - The mill during demolition in 1996. 
34. Above - P&B Launceston from Glen Dhu Street, circa 1930. Note the 
extra two stories on the warehouse block. 
35 . Below - Aerial view of P&B in 1947. Includes canteen building and bike 
sheds. 
36. Above - Circa 1956 . As well as the first southern extension to the mill . 
development of the surrounding district is also apparent. 
37. Below - Aerial view of P&B in 1960, includes second southern extension. 
new carding and combing section and mechanics ' workshop. 
38. Above - P&B Launceston, circa 1963. Continuing expansion includes third 
southern ex1ension and new filtration plant 
39. Below - Circa 1966. New additions to the mill include a car park, wool 
store extension boiler house and carpenters ' shop. 
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CONCLUSION 
Concentrating upon two significant players in Launceston's industrial 
development - textile producers Kelsall & Kemp (Tas) Ltd and Patons & Baldwins Ltd, 
Launceston - offers an insight into the processes involved with Australia's first 
government sanctioned efforts to industrialise. Although focussing primarily upon the 
establishment period between World War I and the Depression, a brief examination of 
the subsequent period until the present day highlights Australia's changing self-
perception and values as a nation. In a world with increasingly blurred economic 
borders, rejection of national self-sufficiency was (very obviously, but not only, in the 
framework of this study) brought home by the mid-1997 closure of Coats Patons. 
Despite operating on a greatly reduced scale in recent years, Coats Patons had long 
been a trophy to Launceston's industrial successes. Its closure marked the end to 
whatever link the city still held with its past as the self-proclaimed ''Bradford of the 
South". Even though Waverley Woollen Mills, Tamar Knitting Mills, and James 
Nelson Pty Ltd are still operational, Launceston can no longer justifiably claim to be a 
textile city. It is significant that, apart from the loss of the small privately owned 
Reliance Worsted Mills in 1937, the only mills in Launceston altogether to disappear 
were the two under consideration. The implementation of tariff protection was largely 
responsible for attracting these two British companies after the war. Although both 
K&K and P&B were larger and had greater financial backing than most of 
Launceston's other mills, their controlling interests were, in the end, not willing to 
maintain these operations once tariff protection was significantly reduced. So the 
imperial connection which in its day served Australian national interests, now faded: 
Robert Dixon's Course of Empire ran dry. From this perspective today's situation 
would seem to accord with efforts to crystallise Australian nationhood in Republican 
terms. Might this not be an appropriate further stage in the contribution to the 
nationalist debate from Launceston, erstwhile site of enthusiastic action against convict 
transportation and for Federation? 
One would like to end on such a note, but many facts scarcely permit. They are 
symbolised by the draining of intelligence noted in the final words of chapter 8. This 
phenomenon too indicates a syndrome especially palpable in Tasmania, but of 
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Australia-wide relevance. The island State still relies heavily upon mining, forestry 
products, agriculture and a handful of hydro-power intensive industries; most of these 
major industries have substantially down-sized their work forces in recent years. The 
nation follows! As the reduction in tariffs continues, many Australian manufacturing 
industries subsequently decline. While much is heard about the future hopes for sunrise 
industries, Australia's economic base remains grounded in primary industries, often 
non-renewable and commonly value added outside the country. Despite the efforts of 
political leaders and a variety of nationalistic sources to encourage industrial 
diversification after World War I, 1990s Australia (although, in many ways, a very 
different place) is perhaps just as enclosed within the metaphoric "sheep-run" now, as 
when the period under review commenced. Those who in earlier years equated 
nationhood with industrial sophistication have yet to be proved wrong. 
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APPENDIXB 
LIST OF SHAREHOLDERS OF KELSALL & KEMP (TAS) LTD AS AT 7 JUNE 1922 
NAME ADDRESS OCCUPATION NUMBER OF 
SHARES 
HELD: 
Pref. Ord. 
Shares issued fulll'. J!aid UJ! otherwise than in cash: 
Kelsall & Kemp, Ltd Rochdale, Lancashire Flannel 5,000 
manufacturers 
Shares issued subject to J!al'.ment wholll'. in cash: 
Rochdale, Lord Rochdale, Lancashire Flannel 4,000 
manufacturers 
Lord, Jesse Howarth Lancashire Flannel 4,000 
manufacturers 
Roe, Reginald Claude Lancashire Flannel 4,000 
manufacturers 
Lord, Edmund Lancashire Flannel 3,000 
manufacturers 
Kelsall & Kemp, Ltd Lancashire Flannel 46,000 
manufacturers 
Hart, Frank Percy Launceston Investor 1,500 1,001 
Danvers Walker, C.W. Launceston Chartered Secretary 800 801 
Danvers Walker, L. Launceston 400 
Guy, G.A. Launceston Accountant 1 
Shields, H.J. Launceston Law Clerk 1 
Martin, William. Launceston Solicitor 1 
Martin, Charles W.B. Launceston Solicitor 1 
Stackhouse, C.K. Launceston Solicitor 1 
Savigny, John H. Launceston Civil Servant 75 50 
Ritchie, John Sydney East Tamar, Tas. Orchardist 150 100 
McKinlay, G.T. &/or Launceston Draper 300 200 
Mckinlay, G.C. 
Davenport, John Launceston Draper 300 200 
(the late) 
Gillet, Harry Ross, Tas. Pastoralist 150 100 
Gillet, Mrs. F.M. Ross, Tas. Domestic Duties 150 100 
Booth, Mrs. M.F. Wahroomga, NSW. Woolbuyer 600 400 
Grubb, C.B. Strathroy, Tas. Farmer & Grazier 300 200 
Muirhead, Thomas Epping, Tas. Pastoralist 150 100 
McKenzie, H. Launceston Engineer 300 190 
Grubb, Reginald C. Lemana Junction, Tas. Pastoralist 60 40 
Grubb, Mrs. E.B. Lemana Junction, Tas. Wife 240 160 
Beanland, Joseph Sydney, NSW. Woolbuyer 300 200 
Clough, John W. Sydney, NSW. Woolbroker 1,200 800 
Perrin, Cyrul A. Launceston Merchant 600 400 
Perrin, Miss Kate Launceston 90 60 
Hutchinson, John H. Launceston Butcher 90 60 
Hutchinson, Hy. R.P. Launceston Butcher 60 40 
Gray, Betty &/or 
Bruce, Miss Irene Launceston Domestic duties 120 80 
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Bruce, Miss Irene &/or 
Gray, Betty Launceston Domestic duties 330 220 
Parkinson, Chas E. Brisbane, Qld. Civil Engineer 600 400 
Dudfield, Ambrose R. Melbourne, Vic. Agent 2,000 2,000 
Dudfield, William G. Melbourne, Vic. Agent 6,000 4,000 
Dowling, C.I. Evandale, Tas. Domestic Duties 50 
Fysh, P.O. & Co. Ltd. Launceston Warehousemen 300 200 
Cragg, George Launceston Managing Director 550 700 
Cragg, Miss Nina F. Launceston 90 160 
Genders, A. Gilbert Launceston Merchant 300 200 
Twelvetrees, Mrs. A.S. Launceston Widow 600 400 
Russell, Joseph H. Launceston Investor 120 80 
Williams, W.M. Hobart, Tas. Gentleman 300 200 
Hogarth, Robert Waverley Mills, L' ton Woollen 180 120 
Manufacturer 
Down, Mrs. Ethel Ruth Melbourne, Vic. Gentlewoman 500 500 
Foster, Henry John D. Epping, Tas. Pastoralist 150 100 
Jones, Sir Henry Hobart, Tas. Managing Director 500 
Jones, Henry & Co Ltd Hobart, Tas. Jam Manufacturers 500 
Lord, Arthur Sydney, NSW. Woolbuyer 750 500 
Lord, Mrs. May Sydney, NSW. Married Woman 750 500 
Inglis, Cruikshank & 
Creasey Launceston Public Accountants 200 100 
Evershed, H.R. Launceston Engineer 150 100 
Gleadow, Geo D. Launceston Bank Manager 90 60 
Baird, W.G. Launceston Bank Manager 200 
Ritchie, Miss E.A. Launceston 100 50 
Ritchie, Miss Mar~a T. Launceston 150 100 
Rolph, William Robert Launceston Newspaper Proprietor 120 80 
Rolph, Mrs. Emily Launceston ~nvestor 120 80 
Rolph, Gordon Burns Launceston Newspaper Proprietor 60 40 
Rolph, Robert Stewart Launceston Investor 60 40 
Rolph, Miss Dorice A. Launceston Investor 60 40 
Rolph, Mavis Emily Launceston Investor 60 40 
Smith, R. Norman Launceston Merchant 60 40 
Lee, Herbert William Launceston Manager 60 40 
Green, Joseph Launceston Ironmonger 150 200 
Ferrall, Alfred Charles Launceston Merchant 200 100 
Hordern, Mrs. Frances Chatswood, NSW. Married Woman 150 100 
Hordern, Miss Edith L. Chatswood, NSW. 150 100 
Cranswick, Mrs. Olive Chatswood, NSW. 150 100 
Jordon, J. Sydney, NSW. Woolbrooker 1,200 800 
Ball & Welsh Pty Ltd Melbourne, Vic. Drapers & 300 200 
Manufacturers 
Swinbourne Sydney, NSW. Woolscourers & 600 400 
& Stephens Ltd Fellmongers 
Scott, Alfred Geo Launceston Insurance Manager 100 100 
Hooper, Geoffrey H. Sydney, NSW. Woollen Merchant 900 600 
Cox, Trevor Capertee, NSW. Grazier 1,000 
Ludbrooks (Tas) 
PtyLtd Launceston Draper 300 200 
Bourke, Thomas Launceston Clothier 300 200 
Ritchie, David R. Launceston Mill owner 120 80 
Baragwanath, Mrs. P. Melbourne, Vic. Married Woman 300 
Eardley Wilmot, S. Launceston Merchant 250 
Armstrong, Robert W. Launceston Clerk 30 20 
Armstrong, Alfred J. Launceston Clerk 60 40 
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Armstrong, William J. Launceston Clerk 30 20 
Cox & Webb Ltd Launceston Tailors & Merchants 150 100 
Stephens, P.H. Launceston Shipping & Insurance 60 40 
Agent 
Perrin, R.A. Launceston Draper 200 
Beck, James Launceston Grocer 60 40 
Birchall, Mrs. L. Launceston Married Woman 120 80 
Payne, Hy. R.I. Launceston Draper 120 80 
Smith, Percy C. Launceston Merchant 250 
Cook, Joseph (the late) Launceston Merchant 600 400 
Archer, Basil Cressy, Tas. Grazier 60 40 
Cheek, John William Evandale, Tas. Farmer 200 
Scott, Robert Steele Launceston Investor 120 80 
Martin, William &/or 
Stackhouse, C.K. &/or 
Martin, C.W.B .. Launceston Solicitors 500 
Field, R.C. & Son Cressy, Tas. Pastoralist 300 200 
Gatenby, Keith Longford, Tas. Pastoralist 250 
Fitze, Norman Howard Launceston Tailor 100 
Smith, Hy. Radcliffe Launceston Accountant 60 40 
Cleaver, Geo Hy. &/or 
Cleaver, Frederick H. Launceston Ironmongers 60 40 
Glasgow Engineering 
Co Ltd Launceston Engineers 60 40 
Scott, James Launceston Engineers 60 40 
Gatenby, Mrs. Maude Cressy, Tas. Domestic Duties 60 40 
Lade, Herbert Bradley Scottsdale, Tas. Land Owner 12 8 
Hagerty, James D. Launceston Draper 50 
Mackay, Mrs. E.A. Melbourne, Vic. 60 40 
Broomby, John J. Launceston Merchant 120 80 
O'Corror, Arthur Avoca, Tas. Pastoralist 600 400 
Archer, Daniel (the Llewellyn, Tas. Farmer & Grazier 200 
late) 
Snow, John & Co 
Pty Ltd Glenferrie, Vic. Draper 150 100 
Snow, Syndey Ltd Syndey Draper 300 200 
Baragwanath, William Melbourne, Vic. Merchant 300 200 
Darkin, Miss Rita Melbourne, Vic. Draper 180 120 
Duff, Robert Ross Melbourne, Vic. Commercial Traveller 60 40 
Allen, Miss Elsie Launceston Clerk 30 20 
Fletcher, Jacob Melbourne, Vic. Civil Servant 50 100 
Goode, Durrant 
&CoLtd Adelaide, SA. Drapers 500 
Shaw, Henry Launceston Draper 180 120 
Burdekin, Beaufort Sydney, NSW. Barrister 400 266 
Laidlaw, Edwin Launceston Retired 200 
Ellis, Mrs. Alice Launceston Married Woman 30 20 
Crowther, Miss Alice Melbourne, Vic. 300 
&/or Crowther, W. 
Crowther, William Melbourne, Vic. Woolbuyer 200 
Russell, Frederick Launceston Timber Merchant 100 
O'Connor, Roderic G. Cressy, Vic. Farmer 600 400 
Broadribb, Keith Alfred Hobart, Tas. 1,200 800 
Findlay, P.A. Launceston Music 60 40 
Warehouseman 
Stewart, Allan James Launceston Auctioneer 60 40 
Dowling, Mrs. Jessie R. Campbell Town, Tas. Married Woman 500 
Robinson, Alfred Geo Launceston Accountant 100 
Stewart, Jas. & Co Ltd 
Peterson, Boesen 
&CoLtd 
Hodgson, Miss Lydia 
Boyle, Mrs. Lydia 
Skipworth, John 
(the late) 
Craw, Percy Ambrose 
Allen, William Claude 
Sheehan, William J. 
Sinclair, Leslie D. 
Metcalf, J. Savile 
Rockhampton, Qld 
Sydney, NSW. 
Melbourne, Vic. 
Sydney, NSW. 
Ulverstone, Tas. 
Burnie, Tas. 
Launceston 
Launceston 
Brisbane, Qld. 
London 
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Shares Issued Subject to Payment Wholly in Cash 
Shares Issued Fully Paid up Otherwise than in Cash 
Total Number of Shares Issued @ 7 June, 1922 
Drapers 
Warehousemen 
Draper 
Draper 
Ironmonger 
Warehouseman 
Master Mariner 
(NB. The Preference share list adds up to 1,000 less than the total given. 
This was probably just a the result of a secretarial mistake at the time the 
list was compiled) 
*** 
600 
300 
100 
100 
60 
30 
30 
150 
30 
400 
200 
40 
20 
20 
10 
100 
20 
£40,367 £87,951 
£5,000 
£40,367 £92,951 
SUMMARY OF SHARE CAPITAL AND SHARES OF K&K (TAS) LTD made up to the 
seventh day of June 1922 (being the fourteenth day after the date of the First Ordinary General 
Meeting in 1922) • 
Nominal Share Capital 
1. £200,000 divided into: 
100,000 Cumulative Preference Shares of £1 each 
100,000 Ordinary Shares of £1 each 
2. Total number of Shares taken up to the seventh day of June 1922: 
40,367 Cumulative Preference Shares 
92,951 Ordinary Shares 
133,318 
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3. Number of Shares issued subject to payment wholly in cash: 
40,367 Cumulative Preference Shares 
87,951 Ordinary Shares 
128,318 
4. Number of Shares issued as fully paid up otherwise than in cash: 
.5,000 Ordinary Shares 
5. Number of Shares issued as partly paid up to the extent of per share, otherwise than in cash 
Nil 
6. There has been called up on each of the 40,367 Cumulative Preference Shares: 
2/- on application 
18/- in calls 
20/-
7. There has been called up on each of 87,951 Ordinary Shares: 
11- on application 
9/- in calls 
10/-
8. Total amount of calls received, including payments on application and allotments: 
£84,007 
9. Total amount agreed to be considered as paid on 5,000 Ordinary Shares which have been issued 
as fully paid up otherwise than in cash: 
£5,000 
10. Total amount (if any) agreed to be considered as paid on Shares which have been issued as partly 
paid up to the extent of __ per share: 
Nil. 
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11. Total amount of calls unpaid: 
£254 Cumulative Preference Shares 
78 Ordinary Shares 
£332 
12. Total amount (if any) of sums paid by way of commission in respect of Shares or debentures or 
allowed by way of discount since date of last summary: 
Nil. 
13. Total amount (if any) paid on __ Shares forfeited: 
Nil. 
14. Total amount of Shares & stock for which share warrants are outstanding: 
Nil. 
15. Total amount of Share warrants issued and surrendered respectively since date of last summary: 
130 Ordinary share warrants issued, of which 2 Cumulative have been surrendered 
129 Cumulative Preference warrants issued, of which 1 has been surrendered. 
16. Number of Shares or amount of stock comprised in each share warrant: 
40,367 Cumulative Preference Shares 
92,951 Ordinary Shares 
17. Total amount of debts due from the Company in respect of all mortgages and charges which are 
required to be registered with the Registrar: 
Nil. 
18. Names and addresses of the persons who are Directors of the Company, Kelsall & Kemp (Tasmania) 
Limited on the seventh day of June 1922: 
Names 
Rochdale, Rt. Hon. Lord 
Lord, Jesse Howarth 
Roe, Reginald Claude 
Cragg, George 
Jones, Sir Henxy 
Hart, Hon. Frank Percy 
Addresses 
Beechwood, Rochdale, Lancashire, England 
Braeside, Oakenrod Hill, Rochdale, Lancashire, England 
Meadow House, Rochdale, Lancashire, England 
Adelaide Street, Launceston, Tasmania 
Hobart, Tasmania 
6 Stewart Street, Launceston, Tasmania 
Registered Office: 170 Cimitiere Street, Launceston, Tasmania. 
(Source - K&K (Tas) Ltd, Minute Book, Annual List of Members & Summary: QVM, 1977/79/25, MS 5) 
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APPENDIXC 
Industrial Migrants Introduced by Launceston' s Textile Mills 
(inclusive of chain migrants employed at the mills)* 
* This list is drawn from many sources, including records from the Department of Social Welfare, 
company records, and newspaper extracts. It is not necessarily complete, however, as employee 
records for the 1920s were not available for either mill and it is was not possible to compile a 
comprehensive list from immigration records alone. Not all employees nominated by the company 
received assisted passages and therefore do not appear in government records. Likewise, not all 
migrants truthfully listed their intended employment, and the detection of chain migrants is sometimes 
difficult. Not least, the volume of immigration records makes some oversights on the author's part 
likely! Compili~g information on P&B Launceston was aided by the company's own compilation of 
migrants nominated in the 1920s. Included under the heading 'Miscellaneous' are a few migrants 
who (a) appear to have arrived in Tasmania with no direct connection to the mills but were known to 
have gained employment there & (b) who could not be linked to a specific mill but had the necessary 
skills and/or connections to gain employment at Launceston's textile mills. 
Kelsall & Kemp (Tasmania) Ltd 
Danvers Walker, C.W. - company secretary, arrived to assist with negotiations 
in 1920. 
Tuting, Samuel - mechanical engineer/ foreman mechanic, Rochdale, arrived 
March 1921 
Butterworth, James - mill manager, Rochdale, arrived by Dec. 1921 
Brooks, George - ex-serviceman, English, arrived 1921 
Tuting, Mrs. Lillian - domestic duties, 42 yrs. (at 417/1921), Rochdale, arrived 1922 
- Sydney - 21 yrs., b.7/5/1900, telephone instrument faultsman 
- Victor - 15 yrs. 
- Ronald - 10 yrs. 
- Marion - 7 yrs. 
- Harry Crowther - 4 yrs. 
(Nominated by husband and father, paid by K&K Ltd) 
Holt, James (Jim) - foreman carder, 40 yrs. (at Dec. 1921), arrived Jan. 1922 
-Mrs. Holt 
(First nominated by Mrs. Tuting & family in July 1921 
Subsequently nominated by K&K) 
Morris, Mrs. Elizabeth - came out in April 1922. 
(Nominated husband Walter to work at K&K in Dec. 1922) 
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Chadwick, William mill) - woollen worker 
Westwood, Dave - a British employee known to be working for K&K in early 1923, 
but little other information is available. 
Whitfeld, M. - a British employee known to be working for K&K in early 1923, but 
little other information is available. 
Morris, Walter - cotton worker, ex-servicemen, Rochdale, to undertake general 
mill work 
(First nominated by wife, Elizabeth; 
Subsequently nominated by William Chadwick, woollen worker, 
Assisted passage rejected on medical grounds, but departed England in 
April 1923) 
Chadwick, James Alfred - woollen operative, mule room, ex-serviceman, 
b.18/6/1898, Rochdale, arrived Aug. 1923 
(Nominated by brother, William Chadwick) 
Chadwick, Bertha 
(Nominated by husband, James Chadwick on 24/3/1923) 
Rothwell, Thomas - wool spinner, ex-serviceman, Rochdale, arrived Sept. 1923 
-Mrs. Lily 
-Rita 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Brooks, Mrs. Annie - weaver, b. 31112/1892, Lancashire, departed Britain 18/10/1923 
- Ernest, b. 1918 
(Nominated by K&K (wife of George Brooks)) 
Rigg, Harvey - woollen worker, arrived 21/1/1924 on assisted passage 
Rigg, Eva - Cotton reeler, 24 yrs. (at May 1924), Rochdale, to be employed as mill 
worker, arrived Feb. 1924, returned to England in Dec. 1925. 
(Nominated by Harvey Rigg) 
Needham, Charles - miller, b. 13/12/1871, work being arranged, arrived 
Feb. 1924. 
- Mrs. Alice - miller, b. 18112/1876 
- Nora- Winder, b. 17/12/1903 
(Nominated by sister, sister-in-law, and aunt, Minnie Rainsford). 
Crow, Fred - loom jobber, b. 6/6/1887, Rochdale, arrived February 1925. 
- Mrs. Martha- b. 25/5/1888 
- Marjorie - b. 24/3/1922 
(Nominated by K&K) 
245 
Fletcher, James - under carder (cotton mill), 30 yrs. (at May 1925), Rochdale, 
intended employment in woollen trade, arrived Oct. 1925. 
- Mrs. Hannah - home duties, 50 yrs. 
-Albert Edward - piercer, cotton worker, 15 yrs. 
(Nominated by son-in-law & brother-in-law, Tom Rothwell) 
Stott, John - loomjobber, b. 17/8/1881, Rochdale, departed Britain Sept. 1926. 
- Mrs. Clara - b. 22/12/1883. 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Howarth, Thomas - labourer, b. 5/6/1897, Rochdale, departed Britain 14110/1926 
- Mrs. Annie - weaver, 24/11/1900 
- Doris - b.26/10/1922. 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Bagot, Robert - woollen spinner, b. 25/5/1906 
- Mrs. Hilda May - winder or ring spinner, b. 1917/1906 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Howarth, Miss Annie - woollen weaver, b. 30/10/1909, Rochdale, arrived 
May 1928. 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Howarth, Mrs. Elizabeth- housewife, widow, b. 14/211868, Rochdale, to be 
housekeeper for son, arrived May 1928. 
(Nominated by son, Tom Howarth) 
Tynann, Thomas - woollen spinner, b. 7/2/1901, Rochdale, arrived July 1928. 
-Mrs. Florence - mending women, b. 14/9/1899 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Sykes, Percy - finisher, 32 yrs. (at July 1923), arrived Dec. 1928 
-Mrs. Ada- weaver, 36 yrs. 
- 3 daughters - aged 9, 6 & 5 yrs. 
(Nominated by K&K) 
Shatwell, Gilbert- Finisher, 28 yrs. (at Aug. 1929), Rochdale, arrived Jan. 1930 
- Mrs. Lily - weaver, 29 yrs. 
- Annie - 6 yrs. 
- Doris - 2 yrs. 
(Nominated by K&K. Gilbert was T. Howarth's brother-in-law) 
Patons & Baldwins, Limited, Launceston 
Mc Vann, John - mill manager, U.K., arrived 1922 
Stewart, William Mason (Jnr) - general manager, Melbourne, arrived 1922 
Smith, Allan - Chief engineer, from Foy & Gibsons, Melbourne, arrived 1922 
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Grierson, William - assistant engineer, Scotland, arrived Jan. 1923 
. Ferguson, William- chemist and manager of dyehouse, Alloa, arrived March 1923 
Adamson, Miss Ann (Annie) Young - worsted spinner, b. 1904, Alloa, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Anderson, Alexander - yarn dyeing, b. 1897, ex-serviceman, Alloa, arrived 6/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Barker, George - carding and combing, Bradford, arrived 16/6/1923 
-wife 
- children 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Boyd, Miss Margaret (Maggie) - warehouse worker, b. 1893, Alloa, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Bremmer, Robert - yarn dyeing, b. 1904, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Brotherton, Miss Margaret (Peggie) Ann - worsted twisting/reeling, b. 1893, Alloa, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Chalmers, Miss Esther Gordon - worsted twister, b. 1896, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Comrie, William - warehouse foreman, b.3/6/1889, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
- Mrs. Agnes - b. 11/6/1889 
- Alex - b. 1912 
- Edward Christie - b. 1916 
- Agnes (jnr) - b. 1920. 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Cowling, Miss Doris - mill operative/twister, Wakefield, arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Dawson, Watson - wool buyer, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
-wife 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Dickenson, Mrs Clara - worsted drawing, b. 9/11/1891, widow, Wakefield, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
- Norman - drawing, b. 9/3/1908 (son) 
(Nominated by P&B) 
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Gleeson, Miss Isabella (Bella) - worsted drawer, b. 19/9/1901, Wakefield, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Irene, John Mitchell - twisting and reeling overlooker, b. 5/10/1899, 
arrived 16/6/1923. 
- Rose - worsted spinner, b.3/6/1902. 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Izatt, Tom - spinning foreman/worsted spinner overlooker, b. 27/2/1891, Alloa, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
- Mrs. Annie Hunter - worsted spinner, 31 yrs. (at Jan. 1923) 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Maitland, Andrew - foreman wool sorting, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
-wife 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McFarlane, Miss Helen (Nell) Allan - worsted reeler/cone winding, b. 1893, Alloa, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McLaren, Miss Marg~et (Peggie) - worsted twister, b. 1890, Alloa, 
arrived 16/611923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Mitchell, John - universal twisting, Wakefield, arrived 16/6/1923 
-wife 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Shields, George - drawing foreman/overlooker, b. 11/2/1891, Halifax, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
- Mrs. Minnie - b. 6/8/1885 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Snadden, Miss Janet (Nettie) - worsted spinner, b.1904, Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Snadden, Robert - cap twisting foreman/worsted spinner overlooker, b. 9/8/1888, 
Alloa, arrived 16/6/1923 
- Mrs. Mary McEwan Snaddon - b. 13/1/1990 
- Robert (jnr)- b. 22/9/1916 
- Thomas McEwan - b. 25/6/1918 
- Eric - b. 9/4/1921 
(Nominated by P&B) 
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Walker, Miss Florence Elizabeth - drawing, b. Feb. 1888, Wakefield, 
arrived 16/6/1923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
White, Miss Jean Walls -yarn reeler/spinning & cone winding, b. 1901, Alloa, 
arrived 16/611923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Cochrane, Robert - pin setter/foreman heckler, b. 311911881, Alloa, departed 
Britain 24/511923 
- Mrs. Maggie - b. 20/1/1882 
- Robert Gnr) - b. 13/4/1910 
- James - b. 171711912 
- Janet - b. 2/2/1915 
- William - b. 211911920 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McArthur, John - combing overlooker, b. 6/3/1897, Alloa, departed 
Britain 24/5/1923 
-Margaret - b. 26/2/1901 
- John Gnr) - b. 17/5/1922 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Robertson, William- woolsorter, b.1899, departed Britain 24/511923 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McArthur, William Drysdale - combing overlooker, 26 yrs. (at April 1925), Alloa 
(Nominated by John McArthur: brother) 
Kerruish, Frank -Arrived from England in 1924, started work at P&B that same year 
in carding and combing and wool mixing. 
(Nominator unknown) 
Procter, Arthur Robert - wool buyer and in charge of wool department, Alloa, 
arrived late 1923 
Rae, John Elliot- woolsorter, 18 yrs. (at Nov. 1923), arrived April 1924 
(Nominated by brother-in-law, Watson Dawson; 
Request for assisted passage rejected on medical grounds.) 
Gourlay, John - wool sorting, Alloa, arrived 1911111924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McCulloch, William - wool sorting, Alloa, arrived 19/11/1924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Currie, William - wool sorting, Alloa, arrived 19/11/1924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
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Stirling, Sandy - wool sorting, Alloa, arrived 19111/1924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Anderson, Alexander - dyehouse, arrived 19/11/1924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Bremmer, Bob - dyehouse, arrived 19/1111924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Feather, Miss Susie - forewoman mender, 39 yrs. (at Sept. 1925), Yorkshire, arrived 
Feb. 1926 
(Nominated by sister, Sarah Smith) 
Cairns, Alexander- drawing and spinning/ worsted spinner overlooker, b.1/2/1902, 
Alloa, arrived 1926 
- Mrs. Jeanie - worsted spinner, b. 14/8/1901. 
- children 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Scott, Arthur Wright - engineer, 21 yrs. (at April 1926), family arrived Oct. 1926. 
- Jessie Cairns - office worker, 20 yrs. 
- Miss Agnes Drummond - home, 18 yrs. 
- Mr. & Mrs Scott (parents) too old for assisted passage and coming at own 
expense 
(nominated by brother and son, George Rennie Scott, fitter at P&B) 
Brooks, James - b. 181711880, Bradford, to work in one of the mills, departed 
Britain 2/9/1926. 
- Mrs. Mary - b. 10/5/1880 
- John - textile worker, b. 16/1011906 (there is a later ref. to John working 
with his uncle at P&B) 
(Nominated by brother-in-law, brother, and uncle, George Barker) 
Ramsay, Duncan - drawing and spinning/textile overlooker, b. 12/11/1895, Alloa, 
arrived 1926 
- Mrs. Isabella - b. 20/5/1895 
- William - b. 24/411923 
- Alexander Fraser- b. 2411/1926 
(nominated by P&B) 
Woodend, Sam - drawing and spinning/worsted spinner overlooker, b. 5/2/1894, 
Alloa, arrived 1926 
- Mrs. Clarissa Ada - b. 1/9/1892 
- children 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Boyd, Tom - Alloa, arrived 1926 
-wife 
(Nominated by P&B) 
McDonald, Tom-Alloa, arrived 1926 
-wife 
(Nominated by P&B) 
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Chalmers, Miss Robina Neil - Scotland, arrived late 1926 or 1927 
(Nominated by sister, Esther Gordon Chalmers, forewoman at spinning mill) 
Gibb, Mrs. Flora - mill worker, 34 yrs. (at April 1926), Paisley, Scotland, arrived 
Nov. 1926 
- Margaret - 10 yrs. 
- Jane - 6 yrs. 
- Agnes - 3 yrs. 
(nominated by husband and father, James Lawson Gibb) 
Sinclair, John - b. 28/8/1903, state that they will find work 
- Mrs. Margaret - home duties, b. 28/9/1903 
(Nominated by sister-in-law and sister, Jean White, mill worker:) 
Batty, William - spinner overlooker, b. 11/12/1900, departed Britain 717/1929 
- Mrs. Hilda - household duties, b. 25/4/1903 
- Jean - b. 7/9/1924 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Robertson, George - mill worker, b. 26/10/1884, to work in mill, departed 
Britain 19/11/1927 
- Mrs. Catherine - housewife, b. 16111/1892. 
- Maggie - b. 1/8/1918 
- Cathie - b. 3/211920 
- Mary - b. 21/9/1926 
(Nominated by brother, brother-in-law and uncle, William Robertson, 
foreman woolsorter) 
Gibb, John - iron turner, engineer, b. 23/1/1896, Paisley, Scotland, departed 
Britain 22/12/1927 
(Nominated by brother, James Lawson Gibb, woolhand) 
Cook, Miss Laura - shop assistant, 21 yrs. (at Oct. 1927), will be employed at mill 
(Nominated by uncle, Lawson Graham, mill employee) 
Hood, Miss Flora- Parlour maid, 28 yrs. (at Sept. 1928), intended employment in 
domestic service, but later transferred to P&B 
(Nominated by cousin, James Lawson Gibb) 
Chalmers, Miss Aileen - shop assistant, 18 yrs. (at Dec. 1928), Scotland, 
employment whatever offers, arrived Jan. 1929, later applies for passport to 
return to Scotland, granted 21/3/1935. 
(Previously nominated by sister, Robina Neil Chalmers in Nov. 1926, 
subsequently nominated by sister, Esther Gordon Chalmers, mill forewoman) 
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McDonald, Thomas - mill worker, 26 yrs. (at Jan. 1929), Alloa, arrived 
May 1929. 
- Mrs. Elsie - housewife, 25 yrs., previously employed at P&B Alloa 
- Daniel - 2 yrs. · 
(Nominated by friend, George Percy Robertson) 
Snadden, Miss Janet - mill worker, b. 18/1111882, Alloa, arrived May 1929. 
(Nominated by George Percy Robertson (no relation)) 
Donaldson, Alexander - textile worker, 39 yrs. (at March 1929), Alloa, employment 
to be secured at P&B, arrived August 1929. 
(Nominated by brother, Archibald Donaldson) 
Dunley, John - wool sorting foreman, Alloa, arrived Nov. 1929. 
-wife 
- child 
(Nominated by P&B) 
Donaldson, Catherine Wright - housewife/mill worker, 38 yrs. (at March 1930), 
arrived 3/12/1930 
- Janet Cochrane - 10 yrs. 
(Previously nominated for assisted passage on 1417 /1929. 
Nominated by Alexander Donaldson, mill worker) 
Reliance Worsted Mills Pty Ltd. 
Townsend, Joseph Crowther - mill manager 
(Nominated by Reliance) 
Townsend, Miss Nimmy - power loom weaver, 34 yrs. (at Jan. 1926), Yorkshire, to 
instruct other machinists, arrived 29/3/1926. 
(Nominated by brother, J.C. Townsend) 
Wordsworth, Norman - cloth finisher, 25 yrs. (at June 1927), Huddersfield, arrived 
Nov. 1927. 
- Mrs. Alice - home duties (but also a cloth finisher by trade) 
(Nominated by Reliance) 
Hoyle, Stanley - loom tuner, b. 6/1/1897, departed Britain 14/111928. 
- Mrs. Adeline - b. 13/4/1901 
- Clifford - b. 2311/1919 
(Nominated by Reliance, half to be paid by nominator, half by nominee) 
Crowther, Miss Sarah Jane - weaver, 47 yrs. (at April 1928), Yorkshire, to be 
employed as weaver at Reliance, arrived August 1928 
(Nominated by niece, Nimmy Townsend) 
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Heywood, Mrs. Carrie Emma Sheldon-weaver, 26 yrs. (at April 1932) 
- James - 4 yrs. 
(Nominated by husband and father, Robert Heyward, mill operative) 
Thyne Bros. Pty. Ltd. 
Curtis - mechanic, England 
(Nominated by Thyne Bros; Co. requested refund for assisted passage but 
· rejected) · 
Curtis, Miss Lillian Maud - Clerk, b. 10/1/1896, departed Britain 1/11/1927 
- Mrs. Curtis (mother of above) 
(Lillian nominated by Thyne Bros.) 
Miscenaneous 
Barnes, Martha - silk weaver, 47 yrs. (at Nov. 1921), England, employed at K&K 
by May 1925. 
- Edgar, 13 yrs. 
- George, 7 yrs. 
-James 
(Nominated by husband and father, J.W. Barnes. 
In Tas. for 5 yrs when family nominated in February 1920) 
Haslam, Percy - textile mechanic, Lancashire, intending to become orchardist. 
(Nominated Oct. 1922) 
Burden, Earnest Harry - woollen mill operative, b. 26/9/1896, ex-serviceman, 
Oxfordshire, to work in unspecified mill, departed Britain 13/10/1923. 
(Nominated by brother-in-law) 
Hallas, George - engineer, 21 yrs. (at April 1925), lists intended employment as 
motor engineer and garage work, 
(nominated by John McArthur, combing overlooker at P&B: no relation) 
Betteridge, Eva - mill worker/weaver, 33 yrs. (in July 1925), widow, Rochdale, 
intended employment, dairy work and domestic duties on brother-in-law's 
farm 
- Leonard Lee 
(Nominated by sister and aunt, Millicent Alice Lee of Forth) 
Woods, Greaves - spinning mule, arrived Oct. 1925. 
- Hilda - roving frame 
(Nominated by William Douglas Scott, farmer at Tea Tree) 
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BIBLIOGRAPIDCAL NOTE 
Most references within the text are self-explanatory, but certain issues do 
warrant further elaboration. The first relates to the use of newspaper extracts. The 
author was fortunate that a number of organisations and institutions gathered press 
cuttings of relevance to this work. However, not all were referenced and the accuracy 
of the references given cannot be guaranteed. In the majority of cases the location of 
the reference is therefore provided along with the reference's details. The second issue 
is the mid-1997 closure of Coats Patons at Launceston. Prior to the company's closure 
records were made available for the purpose of this study, and this material is listed 
both within the footnotes and the bibliography as being held by P&B/Coats Patons. 
After the company's closure, most of the records were donated to Launceston's Queen 
Victoria Museum and Art Gallery and are currently in the process of being arranged 
and described. The finding aids prepared by the museum will facilitate access to these 
records. An explanation about two sections within the bibliography is also necessary. 
Section A2, entitled 'Coats Patons', has a sub-section for material on K&K (Tas). 
This is because K&K and P&B/Coats Patons were controlled by the same parent 
company since the late 1960s, and many of K&K (Tas)'s records were transferred to 
Coats Patons' Launceston mill upon the former company's closure. The second point 
relates to section A3, headed 'Coats Patons, Mulgrave'. The records obtained from 
the Victorian branch of the company were temporarily transferred to the Launceston 
mill for the purposes of this study. 
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